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Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on partnership learning in the context of economic 
development policy implementation. In the field of business support services, local 
partnerships' ability to engage in inter-organisational learning can shape the 
effectiveness of their services, their impact on regional development and governance 
systems. Where partners are able to change their partnership'S tacit norms and values, 
strong synergies could be achieved, sustainable double-loop learning may occur. But 
when a partnership is unable to transcend each collaborating partner's agenda, 
organisational rivalry, conflict of interest and power struggles can inhibit collaborative 
learning. We need to understand the processes that underpin partnership learning and 
unveil how partnerships can overcome the crises and conflicts bound to occur during 
their existence. 
The empirical investigation of the issues outlined above is conducted in the context of 
the French government's Reseau de Diffusion Technologique initiative. The study is 
conducted using a case study format, following interpretive traditions in social sciences. 
Presence Rhone-Alpes (PRA) and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie (NPC) were 
selected as polar cases. 
The findings indicate that the broad notion of partnership learning can be analysed in 
terms of social learning and process learning. Specifically, process learning (linked 
with the implementation of operational goals) is strongly dependent on pre-requisite 
tacit knowledge developed through social learning. Indeed the comparative analysis 
demonstrated that although both partnerships had similar problems, only PRA was able 
to resolve the deep-rooted causes of crises it experienced through the progressive 
creation of a governing elite in the region. The presence of such an elite, with clear -
albeit tacit- rules for decision making, facilitated partnership "process learning', which 
meant that negotiations over operational objectives, partnership strategy and even 
regional policy became opportunities to exert influence and collective power as opposed 
to instances where collaborating organisations fought to protect their individual turf. 
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1. 1 Introduction 
This dissertation investigates how partnering organisations can learn to overcome 
hurdles associated with joint working. The context of the study is the Reseau de 
Diffusion Technologique (RDT), a governmental initiative designed to promote 
technology transfer to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) within French 
regIOns. The RDT initiative relies on partnering between regional econom ic 
development actors. 
This introductory chapter provides an account of French institutional reforms that led to 
increased use of partnerships for the delivery of public sector policies. The following 
section focuses on the challenge ofpartnering through the formulation of two research 
questions about partnership learning capability. The research questions are I) Are value 
and operational crises components of partnership learning? 2) What are the 
relationships between partnership learning and the negotiation and implementation of 
partnership objectives? In the same section, the research methods used in this study are 
outlined. The choice of a case study approach and an overall interpretive 
epistemological rationale are outlined. The final section provides a short introduction to 
each of the chapters of this dissertation. 
1. 2 French Institutional Reform and Partnership 
Growth in the number of partnerships and collaborative strategies is a European 
phenomenon. They have meant that economic development responsibilities are shared 
amongst a broad range of actors (Geddes & Martin, 1996; Le Gales & Lequesne, 1997). 
In France, such an evolution has been possible because of broader changes to the 
political and institutional contexts enabled by the decentralisation laws and the 
subsequent trcnd towards state deconccntration (Cole & Loughlin, 2003). 
15 
During the 1970s, local authorities gained increased control over the building and 
management of public utilities. Following the 1977 economic crisis, local involvement 
in economic development increased further. Indeed "cities suffering from the 
consequences of restructuring in industry, and the associated loss of employment. 
tended to increase their prerogatives" (Biarez, 1993 pp. 192). Central government was 
instrumental in this process, given that larger proportions of its budget were channelled 
directly to local authorities, departements and Conseils Regionaux (Biarez, 1993). This 
de facto built the foundations for a redistribution of responsibilities between different 
tiers of government. The decentralisation laws, the so-called 'Loi Deferre' of March the 
2nd 1982, provided the legal and administrative framework, within which responsibility 
transfer could occur throughout the French territory. 
Decentralisation in France meant that different tiers of government, particularly regional 
and local authorities, could widen the scope of their activities very dramatically within a 
clearly defined framework of'competences'\ (Ricordel, 1997; Cole & Loughlin, 2003; 
Le Gales, 1995; Corolleur & Pecqueur, 1994). In addition to this extension of 
responsibilities, the departement-Ievel Conseils Generaux were turned into politician-
led executives, whilst elected regional assemblies were introduced (Smith, 1999), 
turning departements and regions into administrative and political entities fully involved 
in policy making and local governance. Therefore, regions, 'departments' and 
'communes' (i.e. local authorities) grew in political and economic significance and 
started to be active in the policy areas where they gained responsibility. At the same 
time the role of the prefect, representing the state in regions, and departements evolved. 
Instead of being endowed with rigid financial, technical and administrative control 
I rbe tenn " competen ces, is used in France to describe the activity fields / remits of different tiers of 
government, the state. the "region', the 'departement' (akin to a British county) and the 'oommunc' (the 
town), 16 
duties over local administrations, the prefect now verifies the legality of policies 
designed by local executive bodies (Wollmann, 1999) (See appendix I for a simplified 
representation of the French administrative infrastructure). In this conte~ collaborative 
relationships substituted themselves to the traditional top-down decision-making lines 
(Ricordel, 1997; Wollmann, 1999). This was the progressive outcome of two distinct 
trends. The flTst occurred at local level amongst local players. Faced with narrowly 
defined competencies (and a tightly monitored funding regime associated with these 
competencies), local players sought to work with partners whose competencies were 
complementary and enabled them to be active in fields they would otherwise need to 
forego. 
The second trend was initiated by central government, which adopted a negotiated 
approach to regional policy making through the reliance on contracts. This was 
facilitated by a progressively 'deconcentrating' state. 
First, the level of collaboration between local actors increased as a result of changes in 
the funding regime and the ways in which local players interpreted their policy remit 
(their so-called competencies). Indeed, public sector economic intervention has 
traditionally been enabled by two categories of funds. 'Direct sUpport,2 refers to 
subsidy or 'loan type' of business support provided directly to a particular business. 
Direct support funds are mostly under regional government control. 'Indirect sUpport,3 
funds include, for example, management advice, the provision of business premises in 
Sciences Parks, but also the support of an enterprise agency. The distinguishing feature 
of these two types of support is the existence, or non-existence, ofa direct flow of cash 
into the business helped. After 1982. indirect support funds increased to the detriment 
of direct support funds. This boosted collaborative efforts among local players \\ho 
2 The French temlinology used for 'direct support' is 'aides directes'. 
1 The French for 'indirect support' is 'aides indirectes'. 17 
were seeking to enhance the level of flexibility and the range of their intervention 
methods by, for example, teaming up with partners whose intervention areas were 
complementary to theirs (Corolleur & Pecqueur, 1994; RicordeL 1997). Most 
significantly, local authorities and Conseils Generaux created 'screen structures'" to 
operate in and beyond their legally defined competencies or remits (Corolleur & 
Pecqueur, 1994). The expression 'screen structure' is a literal translation for "structure 
ecran'. It describes various types of organisations (mainly established as not for profit, 
i.e. 'association loi de 1901 ') specialised in a specific economic development field. for 
example, business counselling, training or technological advice. The tacit purpose 
behind the establishment of a screen structure is to enable one or more of its main parent 
organisations, or funding providers, to be active in an area beyond their defined rem it. 
The result of these changes has been an overall increase in economic development 
activities, which in tum called for higher levels of local co-ordination (Corolleur & 
Pecqueur, 1994). 
Local co-ordination was partially achieved through local partnering, but was also 
supported by a 'deconcentrating' state. Deconcentration as a phenomenon has attracted 
much attention in French public policy analysis. It refers to the French government's 
partial disbanding of its centrally located ministerial administrations and their 
establishment as regional offices across the country. The underpinning rationale of 
deconcentration was to ensure that policy implementation and administrative decision-
making were as close to service users as possible. It was, therefore, also a means of 
incorporating the subsidiarity principle of the Maastricht Treaty within the French 
administrative structure. 
4 Screen structures are generaJly set up as not for profit organisations (NPO) and involve locaJ partners. 
If set up as an NPO. they will be su~ect to the 190 I law on societies. Alternatively, th~ may be set up 
as a "societe d'ecooomie mixte' (SEM), public-private corporations (a new and rather unique legal status, 
found in France). SE ~ 1 are subject to specific legislation. 18 
Although deconcentration became a policy objective only recently, it has roots in post-
war France. At a time of rapid urban and economic growth. government 'field services' 
forged close links at local levels in the context of large infrastructure projects. for 
example (Guyomarch, 1999). The more recent steps towards contemporary 
deconcentration took place in 1989 with national Decrees giving the opportunity for 
prefects (at regional and departement level) to bid and become what was then called 
responsibility centres5, taking on duties previously carried out centrally (Guyomarch. 
1999). This, to some extent, compensated for the loss of power associated with earlier 
decentralisation measures. In 1990, these responsibility centres were given a legal 
status by decree. By 1991 services from the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure 
were deconcentrated into 25 regional responsibility centres, 6 entirely new DRIRE 
(Direction Regionale de L'Industrie, de la Recherche et de l'Environnement) were set 
up and 20 'field offices' deconcentrated from the Ministry of Sports and Youth were 
also launched (Cluzel, 2001). The implementation of these measures was characterised 
by a strong emphasis on contracts with central government, the inclusion of service 
related performance targets and the adoption of a comprehensive 'modernisation' 
agenda with, for example, clearly defined personnel training and development 
programmes in a range of sectors (Guyomarch, 1999). The above themes, and in 
particular the monitoring of performance and quality, have progressed quite 
substantially and can now be found in a wide range of fields. including medical 
research, health care provision and education (Hirtzlin, 1999; Cole, 2001). The more 
recent developments in this progressive modernisation agenda lean towards a 
consumerist perspective, pursuing the idea that citizens are in fact consumers in all 
policy domains. including education (Dudezert, 2001). 
S Centres de Responsabilites in French. 19 
Smith (1999) shows that some French policy analysts have highlighted that increased 
deconcentration was unwelcome locally, because it led to increased state control of 
local economic development activities. This is consistent with the analysis presented by 
John and Cole (2000 pp. 256) who argue that 'the fragmentation of institutions and the 
multiplication of individual decision makers in tum promoted state actors who tried to 
assert control in sectors such as urban policy'. In other words, the process of 
deconcentration could be seen as a means of recapturing power and control the state 
relinquished through the process of decentralisation. Others argue that the ability to 
negotiate with local ministerial and administrative outposts has dramatically sped up 
bidding (particularly in the case of European Structural fund bidding), encouraged 
collaboration on local issues, and altogether enabled the government to be more 
responsive to local/regional needs. Overall, one of the key outcomes of this process has 
been further emphasis on collaboration; this time supported by a comprehensive 
framework based on contracts and performance targets. 
In summary, partnering (whether contractual or informal) progressively became a key 
component of policy design and delivery in France. The increased reliance on 
collaboration among local players largely resulted from the 1982 decentralisation laws. 
but was further enhanced by the deconcentration measures in the 1990s. European 
policy and in particular the modalities that accompanied the allocation of structural 
funds, reinforced collaborative strategies given that they too often required partnership 
delivery (Nay, 2001; Jones, 1999; Janus, 1996). The growth in the use of partnerships 
for policy delivery is striking and hints towards an outstanding level of convergence 
among policy makers at local, national and European level. However. this form of 
policy delivery presents significant challenges for regional and local economIc 
development actors who sometimes struggle with this form of working. 
20 
1. 3 The Research Problem and its Investigation 
The contextual evolution outlined in the previous sections generates unique challenges 
for economic development actors. This section explores, in the first instance, the nature 
of these challenges and derives from them the research problem and research questions 
that will guide this study. It then presents data collection and analysis methods, whilst 
highlighting the interpretive epistemology underpinning the study. 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
Researchers increasingly argue that public policy analysis needs to focus on 
'governance' as much as it might on 'government' (Basset, 1996; Le Gales, 1995: 
Cochrane, 1994; Lowndes, Nanton, McCabe, & Skelcher. 1997). 'Governance' 
conveys the idea that sovereignty is redistributed to networked actors active in the 
implementation of public policies at regional and local levels (Ricordel, 1997). 
According to Le Gales (1995) public decision-making processes have. therefore. 
become transversal and embedded within policy networks. The emergence of such 
policy networks is not problem-free. Indeed, they have the potential to completely 
reconfigure existing institutional systems at local level, and may even call into question 
the existence of some of the traditional players (Geddes & Martin, 1996). 
How can collaboration be fostered when emerging governance systems could become a 
threat to the institutional sovereignty of existing economic development actors? This is 
particularly acute in the field of technology transfer, where there is a multitude of 
agencies involved (Clergeau et aI, 2000). The requirement for them to collaborate 
within an ROT is ultimately equivalent to fostering the creation of a policy network. 
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The issue is whether the collaborative rhetoric and the desire for synergy can overcome 
the tensions likely to arise from institutional loss of power and authority. 
Given the above developments and the difficulties they create for econom IC 
development organisations, there is growing research focus on the managerial 
challenges associated with collaborative policy formulation and implementation in 
France. Issues that are progressively being documented include power struggles, control 
of information and turf wars. They tend to be related to the hierarchical management 
culture that dominates French public administration, and to the overall legalistic culture 
that dictates roles and responsibilities, activity areas and organisational legal structures. 
In his study of partnering, Nay (2001) highlights that despite apparently shared goals 
designed to foster synergies among collaborators, there appears to be widespread 
reluctance to share strategic information. According to Nay, this is symptomatic of turf 
wars that persist despite the 'official' acceptance of partnering as a mode of policy 
delivery (Nay, 2001 pp. 478). In the field of technology transfer and innovation 
policies, one of the most significant resources that needs to be shared among partners is 
information, including data on customer needs, yet Clergeau et al (2000 pp. 33) found 
that despite a strong collaborative discourse, information sharing remained a thorny 
Issue. Janus (1996) unearthed similar problems. He argues that tension over 
information sharing resulted from the fact that different partners were jockeying for 
leadership and overall partnership control (Janus, 1996), perhaps illustrating the 
profoundly hierarchical management culture that tends to permeate French public 
adm inistration (Cluzel, 200 I pp. I). 
In addition to this type of entrenched culture, the changes that affected formal remits 
and resources - and were then embedded within the legal framework within which all 
public sector organisations were to operate - were so profound that organisations 
affected found it difficult to adapt and attempted to hold onto sources of power they 
needed to relinquish (Nay, 2001). Therefore, for Nay (2001) effective partnership can 
only occur when resources and skills are shared, and when partners pre-empt future 
conflicts by early agreement on the basic rules of collaboration. They need to negotiate. 
in particular, their respective and collaborative activity areas, even though such talks are 
likely to create tensions, generate opposition and probably foster competition. rather 
than collaboration in the short term. 
In British literature, such an approach is widely recommended. Indeed. Eden et a/ 
(1996) demonstrates that "much, ifnot most, ofthe literature on collaboration prescribes 
a clear statement of aims for the collaboration as essential for progress but [ ... ] in 
practice, this is often difficult to create". Huxham (1993) also emphasises the 
limitations of this approach and offers an alternative perspective. which is rooted in the 
empirical work that she and her team have conducted over time. She questions whether 
the development of a 'meta-strategy' (i.e. a shared partnership strategy) is at all 
desirable given the high risks of conflict that it generates (Huxham, 1993). The 
alternative to opt for a minimalist, broad. inclusive, and overall unthreatening statement. 
may be a less contentious way of priming collaboration among a range of actors 
unaccustomed to this way of working. She recommends that partners deliberately take 
advantage of opportunities that arise locally - for example, changes in policy or local 
circumstances - and use these as catalysts to further collaboration (Huxham. 1996). 
The above is partly in line with Clergeau et a/ (2000)'s analysis of technology transfer 
policies. They agree that the need to collaborate in areas. where key players tended to 
compete. generates serious difficulties in terms of turf and rem it in French technolog) 
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transfer partnerships, and can therefore ultimately affect stakeholder power and control. 
Yet their recommendation is not an early resolution of potential conflicts, but a call for 
partnership learning, which, according to them, involves the development over time of 
trust relationships, fostered by social and cultural interactions at individual as well as 
organisational levels. 
To summarise, a discussion of governance and of managerial challenges faced by 
economic development partnerships suggests that joint working is fraught with 
difficulty, often related to power sharing challenges. These difficulties crystallise when 
partnerships attempt to formulate joint strategies, goals and objectives. Whilst the 
rhetoric of partnership is associated with synergy types of ideals, there is ample 
evidence that their institutional/organisational interests in fact drive partners' 
motivations. This can, in turn, fuel conflicts of interest and power struggles in the 
earliest stages of a partnership's development. Likewise the crises that partnerships 
experience can question their viability and sustainability. 
This dissertation, therefore, focuses on partnerships' ability to learn from their crises 
and their experience of negotiating and implementing shared goals. Relying on the 
organisational learning literature, and in particular Argyris and Schon's seminal work 
on concepts such as single and double loop learning, and organisational theories of 
action (Argyris & Schon, 1978), this dissertation aims to investigate the following 
research questions: 
1. Are value and operational crises components of partnership learning? 
") What are the relationships between partnership learning and the negotiation and 
implementation of partnership objectives? 
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1.3.2 Research methodology 
This research is conducted following a case study format. The empirical investigation 
and its analysis are informed by the interpretive tradition in social science. This section 
outlines the rationale underpinning the choice of research methods and presents the 
theoretical implications of relying on interpretive research traditions for analysis. 
The use of case studies in public policy analysis is a common strategy. This research 
method is suited to the investigation of situated activity, particularly when it involves 
complex social phenomena. For Yin (2003a pp. 2) case studies enable researchers to 
'retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events'. This is an 
essential requirement given that the topic being researched requires an understanding of 
the way people involved in RDTs perceive and experience their partnering activities. It 
is through the development of such an understanding that one can assess learning 
patterns and practices in the French ROT context. 
Individuals' personal and subjective judgements guide their actions and shape the 
development of their beliefs and values on collaboration. They are therefore key 
components of partnership learning. To gain an understanding of these judgements, a 
semi-structured interview schedule was drawn up and used to gather data. The intention 
is to focus on individuals' lived experience and draw the shared meanings and values 
that arise through that experience. This is at the heart of the interpretive research 
methodology. Whilst some schools of thought within the interpretive trad ition see 
research as a means of doing politics (as in the case of critical perspectives, including 
Marxist. feminist and post-modem approaches to ethnography and discourse analysis). 
others (including grounded theory, dramaturgical analysis, ethnomethodological 
ethnography and conversation/text analysis) aim to address meaning (Travers. 2001). 
This desire to address meaning at the level of situated activity diverges from positivist 
research designs most frequently focused on macro-levels of analysis. Some critics 
(Adams, 1992; Brewer, Douglas, Facer, & O'Toole, 1999) view the qualitative nature of 
this type of inquiry as 'unscientific' and unable to generate generalisable 'truths' about 
the nature of the social world. Qualitative researchers' response to this varies. Indeed 
while some, including Lincoln and Guba state that 'the only generalisation is: there is 
no generalisation' when presenting their naturalistic inquiry methodology (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Others highlight that the nature of generalisation 
that can be obtained through qualitative research is substantively different from that of 
statistical generalisations derived from positivist studies. With the development of the 
Grounded Theory school of thought, Glaser and Strauss (1999) emphasised how 
unveiling recurring patterns in social interactions can radically enhance our 
understanding of the social world. Yin (1994; 2003b~ 2003a), who has significantly 
contributed to debates on the case study research method, argues that conceptual 
generalisation is a key source of contribution of studies based on the analysis of a 
limited number of cases. 
This study aims to unveil partnerships' organisational learning patterns through the 
analysis of the way individuals within these partnerships act and develop their beliefs. 
These patterns are specific to the cases studied. However, the broader concepts and 
ideas derived from such analysis can contribute to an enhanced understanding of 
partnering. Therefore. the research method adopted allows for more than a description 
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of social interactions within the partnerships studied; it aims to contribute to conceptual 
and theoretical development of partnership learning. 
Two polar cases were picked; these were Presence Rhone-Alpes (PRA) and Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie (NPC). Purposive sampling techniques enhance a 
researcher's ability to establish recurring patterns within cases that are otherwise judged 
as dramatically different. As summarised by Barbour (2001) purposive sampling allows 
for 'deviant cases to illuminate, by juxtaposition, those processes and relations that 
routinely come into play, thereby enabling "the exception to prove the rule'''. 
In the case of PRA and NPC, the differentiating criteria were derived from pilot 
interviews and formal evaluation and monitoring studies conducted at ministerial and 
RIDT6 levels. Access to both partnerships was secured by attending the initiative's 
1999 national conference hosted in Toulouse, where the recommended partnership 
managers were approached. 
Data analysis is based on the full transcripts of the semi-structured interviews. These 
were conducted in French with all senior institutional representatives within each of the 
partnerships. Overall this represented 374 pages of text (that is 145,534 words), which 
were transcribed, coded and analysed. The analysis of the qualitative material relied on 
the use of N'Vivo, a software package enabling computer assisted qualitative data 
analysis -CAQDAS- (Richards, 1999). 
(l The RIDT is the Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique. It is the national monitoring 
organisation for the RDT initiative. It ~roduces yearl~ evaluation ~d ~itoring data on all RDTs ~d 
conducts or assists in the conduct of specific (often regional) evaluatIOn studies. - 7 
Coding is an important part of the analytical process when using CAQDAS. Its initial 
purpose was to build a triangulated account of each partnership's history and operations. 
This process was supported primarily by thematic coding. The themes coded for were 
derived from the literature, but were also informed by the specific nature of the 
initiative and cases studied. In a subsequent stage, however, the purpose \\ as to move 
beyond the narrative to a conceptual and theoretical analysis of learning processes by 
interpreting data, for example, to determine whether a particular event led to the 
emergence of shared partnership norms and values and/or theories of action. To achieve 
this, coding techniques moved away from their original thematic focus towards theory 
building. The development of theories through coding requires the extensive use of 
memos (Glaser & Strauss, 1999). Memo writing centres on the identification of links 
and connections between segments of data or themes. The researcher can therefore 
capture her / his continuously evolving interpretation of data and develop theories in a 
very transparent manner. 
In conclusion, this is an interpretive study of partnership learning. It relies on two case 
studies of French technology transfer partnership, which were selected using purposive 
sampling techniques. The partnerships selected, Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, were identified as polar cases. 
The nature of the research topic, organisational learning, called for a qualitative research 
methodology, where participants' recollection of specific partnership events, the norms 
and values that they have developed about collaboration, are gathered through semi-
structured interviews. The interview material was transcribed and analysed in a 
systematic fashion using a qualitative data analysis software package, N'Vivo 1.3. 
Although data analysis methods (with for example the use ofmemoing techniques and 
• in 'vivo' codes) was largely influenced by data analysis techniques developed for 
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grounded theory, this study is partly driven by a theory testing rationale, given its 
reliance on previously developed concepts and theories, particularly Argyris and 
Schon's work on organisational learning. 
1. 4 Purpose of Dissertation Chapters 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introductory chapter aims to put this research project into context. It therefore 
gives an account of French institutional and administrative changes that have brought 
about a greater reliance on partnering in order to deliver government policies. The 
introductory chapter outlines the research problem and research questions that guide this 
inquiry. It presents the interpretive research methodology that has been selected. 
Chapter 2: Can Economic Development Partnerships Learn? 
This chapter reviews the literature on economic development partnerships in France and 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. It focuses on two bodies of literature. It considers the 
challenges that are associated with collaborative policy delivery and highlights the 
concepts and theories that have emerged from the economic development and public 
policy fields. It then considers partnership learning, mainly relying on the 
organisational learning literature. In its fmal section, this chapter proposes a framework 
for investigating partnership learning and formulates two research questions. 
Chapter 3: Investigating Collaborative Activity 
This chapter presents the interpretive research methodology that has been adopted f<.u 
the research project. It outlines the rationale and the epistemological assumptions of 
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that methodology and presents the qualitative data gathering and data analysis 
strategies. The rationale for purposive sampling and the selection of two case studies 
are also outlined. 
Chapter 4: The National Reseau de Diffusion Technologique (RDT) Initiative 
This chapter provides a detailed account of the RDT initiative, to which the two cases 
studied belong. Issues such as the history of the initiative, its objectives and its overall 
performance are considered. 
Chapters 5/6: Presence Rhone-Alpes Reseau & Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie 
These two chapters cover each of the case studies. They follow the same format, 
whereby their regional context and past partnering experience are outlined. Then 
focusing on the formation and implementation of each partnerships goals and 
objectives. Each case study in concluded by the analysis of the case material against the 
research questions. In the last section, partnership learning sequences are heavily 
focused upon. 
Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions: 
This chapter presents a cross-case analysis. It first identifies some of the common 
issues to both cases and evaluates how the cross case analysis helps in answering the 
research questions. The implications of the cross case analysis are considered and the 
limitations of the study outlined. 
2 Can Economic Development Partnerships Learn? 
2. 1 Introduction: 
There is a growing body of literature focused on partnering and collaborative policy 
delivery in the field of econom ic development. However, research has, by and large. 
focused on Anglo-Saxon contexts, where this fonn of intervention grew in significance 
well before it did so in France. This study is set within the French context and aims to 
enhance our current level of understanding of partnering issues within this specific 
setting. Therefore, this chapter provides a review of French and Anglo-Saxon 
literatures in order to identify some of the challenges associated with public policy 
delivery through partnerships. 
The problem that will initially guide the review is focused on the need to detennine 
whether partnering organisations can learn to overcome hurdles associated with joint 
working. Therefore, the first section of the chapter will highlight some of the political 
issues associated with partnerships, particularly in relation to accountability and 
governance. The managerial hurdles and the issue of partnership performance will also 
be explored. The second section of this chapter will focus on the conceptualisation of 
partnership, drawing primarily on economic development literature. By contrast, the 
third section will explore the potential for partnership learning from the perspective of 
the organisational learning literature. The chapter is concluded with the fonnulation of 
the research questions, which direct this study. 
2. 2 Issues with Partnership as a Means of Delivering 
Policy 
2.2.1 The Meaning of Partnership in a French Context 
Partnerships, defined as agreements, usually fonnal. sometimes informal. to \\ ork 
together towards specified economic development objectives (Bennett & Krebs, 
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1991) have been promoted as the most appropriate means of developing local 
economies. In the US, public-private partnerships were prominent policy 
implementation tools as early as the 1970s. Very rapidly, the notion of public-private 
partnership became synonymous with the 'conditioning of government assistance to 
significant private participation in government approved projects' (Bingham & Mier, 
1993 pp. viii). The United Kingdom followed in the US footsteps and over the last 20 
years, despite changes in administrations, the notion of partnership and that of 
collaboration amongst key stakeholders, became deeply embedded in policy making and 
funding allocation strategies (Parkinson, 1996; Haughton, Peck, & Strange, 1997; 
Clarence & Painter, 1998). The French government and territorial administrations have 
been slower to follow suit. However, partnership is now part of their rhetoric and 
policy implementation strategies, as outlined in the previous chapter. 
This does not necessarily suggest that all three national approaches are identical. 
Indeed, critics were quick to highlight the limitations of a wholesale transposition of 
concepts and practices developed and implemented in the US to the British context 
(Hambleton, 1991; Wood, 1996). Likewise the unique characteristics of the French 
policy making context have been examined (Cole, 2001; Cole & Drake, 2000; John & 
Cole, 2000). The meaning of partnership needs, therefore, to be teased out in the 
specific field of economic development policies in France. 
A review of recently published French papers on public policy suggests that four broad 
themes are associated with the partnering discourse. The first is related to the 
negotiation of policy contracts between different tiers of territorial authority. The 
second pools the literature that refers to local collaborative policy formulation and 
implementation. The third draws directly on policy implementation through public-
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private partnerships. The fourth refers to situations in which private sector enterprises 
are called upon to deliver subcontracted public services. 
This introduction explores the different forms of partnership that arise from the diversity 
of perspectives and contexts that are encapsulated by these clusters characterising the 
French literature. 
The requirement for collaborative contract negotiations, which define econom IC 
development initiatives, resource these initiatives and set the scene for their evaluation, 
is directly related to French decentralisation and deconcentration. Negotiation between 
tiers of government, particularly the state (represented by its deconcentrated field 
offices) and the region substituted itself to traditional top down policy making. Indeed, 
the 'contrats de plan Etat-Region' set the objectives of cooperation and layout the 
respective commitments of partners. These 'contrats de plan' were initially negotiated 
for a four-year period (1984-1988), but this progressively lengthened, so that the latest 
round of negotiation gave rise to seven year plans (2000-2006). A characteristic of 
these 'contrats de plans' in some French regions is their fairly tight monitoring and 
evaluation, a trend that only emerged in the 1990s in France, and tends to be regionally 
driven (Fontaine & Warin, 2001). The academic study of this recent 'collaborative' 
relationship between different tiers of territorial authorities is yielding a range of 
analyses and conclusions in relation to the meaning of collaboration. Cornu and Gilbert 
(2001) analyse the process whereby authority is transferred from one territorial 
authority to the other, and where one partner can make decisions, which commit all 
parties. This could theoretically be consistent with the European principle of 
subsidiarity. However. the authors find that in the case of relationships betwecn the 
state and the region. thcre are instances where the smaller territorial authority (i.e. the 
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region) relinquishes authority to the state for the implementation, and management of 
regional projects (Cornu & Gilbert, 200 I pp. 39): 
"... authority delegation is not consistent with the implementation of 
subsidiarity. In the case of the relationship between the state and the region. the 
smaller territorial authority (the region) gives the state control over some of its 
finances as it receives matched funding complementing its budget" 
The meaning of partnership in these instances is reduced to joint funding, and in some 
cases, can be equivalent to centrally controlled regional policy implementation. It 
assumes clear leadership from one territorial authority and excludes any form of 
consensual decision-making or collaborative project management. 
Nay's (200 I) analysis is different, in that collaborative and consensual policy making 
do appear to be the starting principles of the partnerships he explores. These are all 
European funded regional projects, which all call for state/ region interaction. The 
terminology he uses refers to shared rather than delegated responsibility, interdependent 
stakeholders, and shared goals. Investigating the 'operational' (i.e. mainly funding) 
implications of the above, he highlights the presence of matched or multi-organisational 
funding which commits all organisations involved (Nay, 200 I pp.462): 
"The partnership concept assumes that public intervention is founded on the 
shared responsibility of several authorities whose status and remit are 
interdependent, and which pursue shared goals within the same policy field. 
Partnership has an operational dimension because it impacts on procedures and 
rules associated with the implementation of European regional policy. The 
European policy infrastructure must not only open up to a range of stakeholders 
for policy formulation, implementation and evaluation, but it also calls for joint 
funding, and therefore joint responsibility of the statt: and its territorial 
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authorities. " 
From the above we can infer that partnership according to Nay (2001) supersedes joint 
funding. It is meant to involve all institutional stakeholders more heavily, and draw on 
their resources in multiple ways. His empirical evidence, however, suggests that 
practitioners' collaborative efforts are in fact far from the ideals of shared goals that he 
advocates. Indeed, many hurdles - associated partly with the French adm inistrative 
structures, issues of authority and power - still need to be overcome at implementation 
stages. These will be investigated further in the next sections of this chapter. But it is 
clear that despite these findings, the meaning of partnership presented by Nay (2001) is 
broader than that used by Cornu and Gilbert (2001). Furthermore, it gets closer to the 
type of collaboration principles taken for grated in the technology transfer field. 
The notion of partnership is also being used in the French context to describe evolving 
relationships between public service providers (territorial authority and/or dedicated 
agency) and service users (citizens) (Brachet, 1995). Brachet (1995), like Nay (2001), 
identifies conflict as an issue affecting partnership between service providers and users; 
but he sees what he calls "a conflict dynamic' as a positive partnering process (Brachet, 
1995 pp. 96): 
"The cases analysed confirmed the central hypothesis of this study relating to the 
strategic role of the voluntary sector in 'public service' partnerships, assuming 
that partnership is not synonymous with harmony and that the presence of 
conflict is not a sign offailure or inadequacy, sometimes quite the opposite." 
Importantly, Brachet also suggests that partnership with user groups can be positively 
correlated with superior public service performance. He sees partnership at the end of a 
continuum, which starts with information dissem ination, moves on to consultation 
(albeit limited in the sense that public sector organisations do not necessarily commit 
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to taking into account opinions expressed during consultations that they manage). Then 
shifts to involvement (which suggests a participative approach to decision making) and 
finally leads to partnership. Partnership, in this contex~ assumes that participative 
decision-making becomes institutionalised and accompanied by some fonn of formal 
acknowledgement and acceptance of stakeholder involvement. Refining this definition 
of partnership, Brachet (1995) suggests that there are three broad types of partnerships. 
The frrst refers to collaboration between different public services and administration. 
His argument is that in some instances, a particular government department or field 
office may find itself using services provided by another public sector service provider. 
A second form of partnership emerges when public sector organisations interact with 
individual service users. For instance, they seek information from them. The third form 
of partnership that this author identifies is that which exists between a public sector 
organisation and organised service user groups. Brachet (1995) recognises that there 
are variants of the above and that representativeness of organised service users is 
limited. Nonetheless, he maintains that the primary goal of such partnerships is to 
optimise the relationship between public sector organisations and service users and that 
this relationship is itself a public service. 
Lorrain (1988) introduces another level of analysis. He focuses on relationships 
between local authorities and the service providers they use in the delivery of their 
public services. He uses a legal perspective to unveil the nature of emerging public-
private partnerships in the process. His argument is tha~ in urban developmen~ the type 
of interaction that may exist between the public and private sector is still 'codified' by 
rhetoric inherited from the late XIX th century that opposes free enterprise and capitalism 
to collectivism. bureaucracy and socialism. According to him. this is a simplification 
that is not suitable for policy analysis in contemporary France where the boundaries 
between the public and private sectors are far from clear. Where infrastructure 
ownership does not necessarily mean power. and where collaboration across sectors 
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is rapidly developing. He illustrates the above by showing that in the late XIX th 
century, the legal frameworks available for service delivery were simple. and 
characterised by diametrically opposed ownership regimes. The legal structure of a 
'regie' meant public ownership and public sector service provision. The legal structure 
of the 'consession' on the other hand meant private ownership and private sector service 
provision. These have evolved over time, and other types of contracts were introduced: 
which enabled ownership transfers across sectors (these included the 'affermage' the 
'regie interesee, and the 'gerance'). In the 1960s, the range oflegal structures for public 
service delivery became even more complex with the introduction of the 'Societe 
d'Economie mixte' (as in 'mixed sector organisations'), which enabled public sector 
organisations to become majority shareholders of organisations operated under 
commercial law. At the level of the local authority, these trends have dramatically 
widened the range and types of partnerships that could be used to manage the local 
economy (Ricordel, 1997). 
Overall, these changes mean that the legal boundaries between the private and the 
public sectors today are very vague. The range of legal frameworks, which underpin 
partnerships used by local authorities to deliver public services, is illustrated by Douat 
(1995). He shows how widely they are used and highlights that they affect most policy 
fields. Lorrain's analysis is consistent with Douat's work. But it also suggests that 
these new legal structures have provided an incentive for local authorities to extend 
their level of involvement in areas where they were formerly less active. He suggests 
that the opportunity to get involved more heavily in a range of sectors, by investing and 
obtaining infrastructure ownership, has lured some authorities into thinking that they 
would, through ownership, gain a greater level of leverage in strategic decision-making 
that may, in tum, affect their economic development plans. 
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The study, however, demonstrates a clear dissociation between ownership and strategic 
decision-making, largely due to the strength and economic power of private sector 
partners involved in these ventures, for example in the area of public transport (Lorrain, 
1988 pp. 61): 
"For many councillors, obtaining ownership meant gammg power. They 
renegotiated public transport contracts, and accepted to be involved to a greater 
extent in mixed sector companies, with this in mind. Yet what does a decade of 
practice demonstrate? Local authorities are far more involved in these fields than 
they were in the past. However, their role is not much more significant in 
strategic decision-making. The example of local public transport services is 
revealing in this respect. Ownership, which may be a necessary condition, is 
certainly not sufficient." 
The conclusions Lorrain draws mirror, to some extent, Brachet's own findings on the 
need to enhance relationships between service providers and service users. Indeed, 
Lorrain suggests that focusing on sources of divergence between the public sector and 
its service providers, is far less helpful than appreciating and enhancing collaboration 
amongst them (Lorrain, 1988 pp. 61): 
"To re-Iaunch the public policy debate we need to recognise that we no longer 
work with separate categories; they are interdependent. The searching question 
therefore is not about establishing who possesses, but to appreciate what is 
produced. How? For whom? Therefore policy is no longer about boundaries. it 
is about optimising relationships". 
Nonetheless, he notes that this requires addressing imbalances in power and decision 
making. which he notes. have highlighted how weakened French local government has 
become when negotiating contracts with powerfu I service providers. 
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To summarise, approaches to the analysis of partnerships vary significantly among 
French scholars. Some focus on funding regimes and arrangements (Lorrain. 1988). 
while others are mainly interested in the legal arrangements underpinning partnering 
(Brachet, 1995), while yet others investigate joint policy formulation mechanisms and 
hurdles (Nay, 2001). Likewise, the range of partnerships covers those that involve 
several tiers of territorial authority in the negotiation of regional development contracts 
(Cornu & Gilbert, 2001). Those that rely on the private sector for joint service delivery. 
and finally those relying on the private sector for the full delivery of sub-contracted 
services (Douat, 1995; Ricordel, 1997). Despite differences in partnership types and 
variations in analytical perspectives, the following research issues apply across the 
board: 
Is partnership merely a 'front' for a process where lead / powerful partners 
appropriate control and decision-making to the detriment of collaborative policy 
formulation and implementation? 
What are the implications of partnering for local governance systems? 
Does partnership mean enhanced public service performance? 
Can partners learn to overcome hurdles associated with joint working? 
In the next sections of this chapter some the above questions will be addressed, as the 
issues associated with partnerships as means of delivering policy will be explored. 
Therefore, the implication of partnering on local governance systems and, in particular, 
the risks associated with loss of democratic accountability and the dangers inherent to 
the strengthening of local elites will be explored. 
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2.2.2 Partnership Governance and Accountability: The Political 
Analysis 
In France, the boundaries between the 'public sector' and the 'private sector' are blurred 
and tend to overlap. Such a state of affairs is wide-spread and affects a range of 
countries, including other European countries, and the US (Hawranek. 2000; Wettenhall 
& Thynne, 2000). Policy-making is decreasingly the prerogative of elected bodies 
acting alone. Economic development responsibilities in many parts of Europe are 
shared amongst a broad range of actors (Geddes & Martin, 1996~ John & Cole, 2000~ Le 
Gales & Lequesne, 1997) where partnership arrangements are increasingly common. 
These developments have led to "an inclusive approach to the question ofresponsibility 
for policy problems, in which actors from all three spheres of the state, the market and 
civil society collaborate in designing and implementing programmes" (Geddes & 
Newman, 1999 pp.17). 
As a result, 'government' gives way to the notion of 'governance', now an unavoidable 
concept in the analysis of public policy (Basset, 1996; Le Gales, 1995; Cochrane, 1994; 
Lowndes et aI., 1997). 'Governance' is mainly used in contrast with the notion of 
'government' to convey the idea that sovereignty is redistributed to interconnected or 
networked actors, instead of being concentrated in the hands of one of them - generally 
an elected organisation (Ricordel, 1997). The involvement of a multiplicity of actors in 
economic development policymaking, and implementation, leads to the formation of 
complex, if not confusing systems. Such complexities arise, according to Le Gales 
(1995), from the fact that public decision-making processes are no longer vertical (as in 
hierarchical structures), neither are they horizontal (as in competitive systems), but thc~ 
become transversal and embedded within policy networks~ with a variety of 
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organisations, from different hierarchical or authority levels, collaborating to achieve a 
common goal (Le Gales, 1995; Le Gales & Thatcher, 1995 pp. 14): 
"In a complex environment, networks are the outcome of non-hierarchical 
cooperation (which may not be stable) between organisations which know each 
other and acknowledge one another, negotiate, share resources and may share 
norms and interests. These networks, then, playa fundamental role in pushing 
particular issues on the agenda, in decision-making and in the implementation 
of public sector action." 
The above is highly consistent with the analysis of John and Cole who state that 
'relationships between key actors or organisations in a policy sector shape the policy-
making process through habits of association and shared norms and understanding about 
public affairs' (John & Cole, 2000 pp. 252). Indeed emerging governance systems have 
the potential to completely reconfigure exiting institutional systems at local level, and 
may even call into question the existence of some of the traditional players (Geddes & 
Martin, 1996). They bring to the fore issues of responsibility (Cluzel, 2001) and 
accountability (Papadopoulos, 200 I; Davis & Geddes, 2000). Indeed, critics argue that 
policy effectiveness may not necessarily be synonymous with legitimacy, as the 
representativeness of those involved in governance systems and policy networks can 
often be questioned (Le Gales P., 2001; Papadopoulos, 2001). 
For example, Papadopoulos (2001) argues that much of the debate over governance 
focuses on negotiation and decision-making efficiency, overlooking to some extent, the 
deeper issue of legitimacy. According to him, policy networks and partnerships cannot 
be substitutes for democracy. They lack 'democratic accountability' because 
democratically elected representation is replaced with stakeholder group or lobby 
representation (Papadopoulos, 200 I pp. t 69): 
" ... the reduction of governmental control and the inclusion of a range of 
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private interests, represented by individuals now contributing to policy making 
and implementation, can by no means be assimilated to democratisation 
process. This mode of operation tends to replace representation acquired 
through the ballot box by a mixture of groups and influence representation 
enabled by sectoral or local knowledge." 
Brachet (1995) goes further by suggesting that such partnerships may be helpful in 
incorporating concerns over economic efficiency, however, they are insufficient to 
implement the values underpinning public services and associated with the French 
public sector ethos (Brachet, 1995 pp. 94): 
"To sum up, in this partnership everything operates 'as if these professionals 
represented their clients, whose interests are not the same. This is why, while 
this partnership is necessary, it is not sufficient to fulfil public sector principles. 
It is useful in terms of efficiency, but clearly deficient in terms of democracy". 
Similar issues have, and are still widely debated in British policy analysis. For instance, 
in their study of local government modernisation in the United Kingdom, Davis and 
Geddes vividly illustrate the potential lack of democratic accountability of some of the 
local government partners (Davis & Geddes, 2000 pp. 17 -IS): 
"Whatever the weakness of current local government electoral turnouts, 
councillors (executive or otherwise) are at least subject to electoral 
accountability [ ... ]. As one councillor commented 'my right to be at the table 
is a cross against my name in the ballot box'. It is not always apparent how 
some other partners earn their place at the table or to whom they are 
accountable. " 
Similar lines of inquiry can be found in earlier work by Boyle (19S9~ 1993) who 
emphasised the political and ideological implications of the rise of public-private 
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partnerships, and highlighted how significant US examples have been in promoting this 
format for British urban policy. Cochrane (1994) went further as he analysed the 
implication of pUblic-private partnerships on our contemporary understanding of the 
Welfare state. Basset (1996) suggested that, overall. the growing involvement of the 
private sector in policy making has been accompanied (particularly under conservative 
governments of the 1980s and early 1990s) by a shift in policy agendas. Urban 
development was to be achieved through property led developments, place marketing, 
an overall focus on competitiveness and the widespread adoption of consumerist 
perspective on public sector service delivery. In this context, distributional goals 
remained rhetorical and relied on 'trickledown effects', which assumed that higher 
levels of competitiveness in local areas would attract a growing number of jobs, hence 
contribute to the well being of local populations. It seems that partnership is currently 
so deeply entrenched in policy implementation that the concern is not to move away 
from this form of policy delivery, but to alter it in such a way that from it emerges "a 
more progressive form of public-private partnership which includes the restructuring 
and redistribution of work to deal with poverty and exclusion; and the evaluation of 
principles of social justice over those of competitiveness, implying a principle of global 
solidarity rather than local chauvinism in local development" (Geddes & Newman, 1999 
pp. 23). Unfortunately perhaps, some of the empirical evidence emerging from local 
government practice seems to suggest that progress is being made in the opposite 
direction. Indeed, Foley (2002) argues that local government, as an employer. is 
progressively losing its ability to promote good employment practices within local 
economies. The increased reliance on the outsourcing of services, and the transfer of 
employment to the private sector highlights that "even with the protection of TUPE 
[Transfer of undertaking; protection of employment regulations] there is a pattern 
emerging of reducing terms and conditions for new staff and the erosion of benefits for 
existing statT" (Foley. 2002 pp. 6). Likewise, the more recent labour government's 
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attempts to promote a form of partnership that leads to a 'citizen centred democracy' 
within the Best Value framework may end-up being closer to the consumerist 
approaches than desired by those in power. Indeed, Martin and Boaz (2000) show that 
whilst the ideal of 'community partnership' may involve communication. consultation 
and co-production leading to shared policy formulation; the latter remains largely an 
unattained goal. Further, the fundamental idea that 'community partnership' should 
involve interaction with customers, but also citizens and communities, that is interaction 
with service users as well as non-users, is one that proves very difficult for most local 
governments to put into operation. Yet, the involvement of non-users, i.e. citizens and 
communities defined in their broadest sense, may well be one of the most fundamental 
distinctions between the operationalisation of partnership from a left wing point of 
view, (e.g. the 'progressive partnership'), and a right wing perspective (i.e. consumerist 
approaches). The Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) initiative launched in 2001 by the 
British Labour government suggests a commitment to address the above issues, by 
addressing at neighbourhood level education, employment, crime, health and housing 
issues (DETR, 200 I). Indeed the Government's guidance notes state that LSPs aim to 
'bring together at a local level the different parts of the public sector, as well as the 
private, business community and voluntary sectors so that different initiatives and 
services support each other and work together. [ ... ] [They operate] at a level which 
enables strategic decisions to be taken and [are] close enough to individual 
neighbourhoods to allow actions to be determined at community level.' Nonetheless, 
early evaluation demonstrates the magnitude of the challenge such a remit represents. 
Indeed the Local Neighbourhood Unit's review in 2002 concluded that 'there was 
limited evidence of progress in addressing diversity issues. [ ... ] more than half of the 
LSPs have a collective commitment to engaging hard to reach groups. However, there 
was no evidence of widespread engagement of Black and Ethnic Minority communities. 
[ ... ]. Many LSPs consider the private sector difficult to engage and the level of 
representation varies across LSPs. '(Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 2002). 
These concerns are mirrored in some of the US literature. For instance, Peters and 
Savoie (1996) revisit the issue of democracy as they stress the fundamental differences 
that distinguish citizens from clients (Peters & Savoie, 1996 pp. 285): 
"Public administration has a number of core values; one value high on many 
lists is fair treatment for all. It is one of several values that distinguish 
government operations from private firms. There is a world of difference 
between citizens (read 'government') and clients (read 'business'). Clients are 
sovereign: they can hold private ftrms accountable through their behavior in a 
competitive market. Clients can tum to the market to defend their interests, or 
they can walk away from an unsatisfactory ftrm and tum to a competitor. 
Citizens, on the other hand, have common purposes. They can hold politicians 
accountable at election time, through political institutions and the media. 
Politicians, in tum, can hold public servants accountable by imposing rules and 
regulations. Clients are treated differently by private ftrms- the bigger the 
client, the better, often, the service - and non clients are obviously less, if at all 
important. Citizens, however demand equal and fair treatment for all from 
their governments." 
The issue of fairness and equal treatment is also at the centre of Himmelman's (1996) 
work. He argues that, in some cases, elite gatekeepers in society use collaborative 
rhetoric to protect their interests (and those of their 'class') at the expense of 
weaker/poorer communities. Ideals of equal treatment and fairness are lost as dominant 
groups use collaborative strategies to sustain their power. and demand of communities 
that they should 'do more with less' and that they should adjust to 'the pain associated 
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with decreasing benefits and resources for human and infrastructure needs, particularl~ 
where there are high concentrations of lower-income people' (Himmelman, 1996 pp. 
24). In the United Kingdom contex~ Basset (1996) provided empirical evidence of this 
phenomenon, illustrating how the call of partnership in the 1980s has meant the entry of 
local business elites in urban politics giving them progressive control over the urban 
development agenda. In the same contex~ further empirical evidence was provided by 
Peck and Tickell (1994) in their analysis of the North West Business Leadership Team 
(NWBL T), which was chaired by the Duke of Westminster, and had 30 business leader 
members selected "on account of the business they represent and the corporate strength 
which they bring to the region". As the authors pointed out, the NWBLT "was 
unselfconsciously elitist", quoting one of the members describing the representativeness 
of their organisation (Peck & Tickell, 1994 pp. 257): 
"We are speaking for the region, because if we are speaking for ourselves, i.e. 
for business, we are speaking for jobs and so that must be the right way to do 
it ... If it does benefit big business I think it is a good thing because this tends 
to benefit the region" 
Empirical evidence of the emergence of elites is also available in the US context, for 
example, Weber's findings on collaborative environmental policy formulation. He 
shows how carefully managed collaboration may simply be another way of asserting 
influence by powerful, and well established stakeholders (Weber & Khademian, 1997 
pp.407): 
'"[ ... ] the use of collaboration, which includes environmental med iation and 
dispute resolution techniques, can be a subtle but powerful form of political 
control by established economic interests, which co-opt public interest 'voices' 
in the name of consensus outcomes." 
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Indeed, in the specific case studied by Weber, one of the most significant user groups 
(drivers) affected by the legislation felt that the stakeholders involved in its formulation 
were unrepresentative of their interests. 
The potential lack of democratic accountability of partnerships, their potential control 
by elites who use them to further their group intereS4 are serious and omnipresent 
Issues. Partnerships de facto bring together organisations legitimised by, and 
accountable to, different stakeholder groups (for example citizens and business 
members). Partners have different types of mandates (for example democratic mandate 
and membership mandates). Therefore, concerns over accountability and 
representativeness become particularly sensitive when partnerships are partly or fully 
resourced through public funds and operate in public policy fields. Yet, there is ample 
evidence that the range of policy fields, where partnering has become the dominant 
form of intervention has increased dramatically in the United Kingdom (Foley, 2002~ 
Geddes & Newman, 1999; Nicol, 1998; Martin & Boaz, 2000) and is on the increase in 
France (Lorrain, 1988; Hirtzlin, 1999; Janus, 1996; Cornu & Gilbert, 2001). Despite 
commentaries from French scholars, (1995; 2001; 2001; 1995), it can be argued that the 
literature debating the political impact ofpartnering in France remains embryonic. This 
type of consideration became topical in the mid 1990s with the publication of research 
bringing French and British scholars together, as in the case of the book edited by Le 
Gales and Thatcher (1995), which focuses on the study of policy networks. Overall, the 
investigation of partnering from a managerial perspective remains more developed. It is 
concerned with operational efficiency, and largely focuses on the unveiling (and 
sometimes resolving) some of the hurdles that need to be overcome for effective 
partnering to take place (See for example Janus, 1996; Clergeau et aI., 2000; Nay, 
2001). 
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In conclusion, the above suggests that the sociological and political science perspectives 
are pivotal to our appreciation of the broad implications of partnership delivery of 
public policy on our society and political system, particularly in terms of representation 
and democratic accountability. Likewise the study of partnerships as organisational 
forms (therefore from a managerial perspective) is worthy of attention for they are 
notably challenging to manage, and generate (sometimes exacerbates) issues that are 
novel. The next section explores some of the managerial issues that have been 
associated with partnership management and partnering in the French literature. 
2.2.3 Collaboration and its Hurdles: An Emerging Managerial 
Analysis 
Although the idea that partnerships enhance public sector efficiency is widely accepted, 
much of the empirical investigation of partnerships, in a French context, re lates mainly 
to the implementation hurdles they encounter. Such hurdles are well illustrated in the 
work of Nay (200 I). He clearly differentiates between the, sometimes, idealistic picture 
that policy-makers paint of their partnership, and partnerships' often challenging and 
difficult reality. Nay's main argument is that the proliferation of partnerships was 
largely fuelled by European policies and principles, including those of additionality and 
subsidiarity. The broad definition of partnership he proposes (see section 2.3.1), which 
emphasises shared goals, joint responsibility, collaborative decision making and inter-
dependency of actors, sets a tall order on partners. The partnerships that he investigates 
illustrate how difficult it is for collaborators to develop processes that enable them to 
meet these requirements. The widespread reluctance to share information that may be 
perceived as strategic by some partners is symptomatic of turf wars that persist despite 
the 'officiar acceptance of partnering as a mode of policy delivery (Nay, 200 I pp. 478): 
"Whilst partnering requires increasingly to share market intelligence related to 
employment, training and economic development, the tendency to manage in 
isolation information systems is a sharp reminder of the competitive knowledge 
management practices, which are among the last forms of hidden, often denied. 
opposition that characterise the relationships between public sector actors." 
These types of power and turf struggles are documented in several policy fields 
involving partnerships, including those designed to promote technology transfer and 
small firm innovation (as documented by Clergeau et al (2000)) or those set up to 
manage European development funds in French overseas territories (as illustrated by 
Janus (1996)). In the case of innovation policies, one of the most significant resource 
that needs to be shared among partners is precisely information, including data on 
customer needs, yet Clergeau et al (2000 pp. 33) found that despite collaborative 
rhetoric, information sharing remained a thorny issue: 
"[ ... ] the free movement of information among partners is sometimes source of 
problems. They indeed can be reluctant to share their knowledge of business 
needs. To summarise, [ ... ] matching objectives and resources sometimes is a 
delicate matter and conflicts of interests can affect the good functioning of the 
agency" 
In some instances, such tension about information sharing resulted from the fact that 
different partners were jockeying for leadership and overall partnership control (Janus, 
1996). perhaps illustrating the profoundly hierarchical and legalistic management 
culture that tends to permeate French public administration (Cluzel, 2001 pp. 1): 
"Yet, the process has a number of shortfalls resu Iting from the legal framework 
within which it operates. Principles of autonomy and participation conflict 
with the sustained emphasis on hierarchical relations: evaluations have gaps 
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and incentives are too rare" 
Furthermore, the changes that affected formal remits and resources, as a result of 
consecutive public sector reforms, were so profound that organisations affected found it 
difficult to adapt and attempted to hold onto sources of power they needed to relinquish 
(Nay, 2001). Nay argues that such a reluctance to relinquish power is compounded by 
early experiences of partnership, particularly informal arrangements, where partners 
built a rigid view of their role and responsibilities. In such cases, further partnership 
progress may be hindered as partnership requirements evolve. 
Given the difficulties outlined above, it should come as no surprise that partnerships 
take time to set up and even longer to operate along the lines they set out to follow 
originally. The case study of MISSILE7 provided by Janus (1996) and that of the 
ARDr in the Loire Region (Clergeau et aI., 2000) are perfect illustrations of that. 
However, the implications French scholars draw vary. For Nay (2001) effective 
partnership can only occur when resources and skills are shared; and when partners pre-
empt future conflicts by agreeing the basic rules of collaboration at an early stage in the 
partnership. They need to negotiate, in particular, their respective and collaborative 
activity areas, even though such talks are likely to create tensions, generate opposition 
and probably foster competition rather than collaboration in the short term. 
By contrast Clergeau et al (2000) do not recommend an early resolution of potential 
areas of conflict. They call for partnership learning, which according to them involves 
7 MISSII.E stands for MISsion pour Ie Sui\i et I'impultion des Initiatives Locaks et Europecnncs. It is a 
JXU1nership initiative that brought together three key playas in the Martinique one of the French ovt..Tscas 
departcmcnt. Ry working together the ~Cgion (~t..-gionaJ co~ncil) ~he DCpart~~cnt (~uivalent to ~ County 
Council) and the PrNccturc (The J·rench (J(WLTTlment s regIOnal admlnlstratlvc l"l-'Tltrc) alml.'\! to 
maximise their ability to support local economic development and bidding procedures lOr European 
Funding. . . 
8 The ARDT is thc Loire Region's technology transfer partnership. Like Presence Rhone-Alpes it is put 
" 1 of thc national RD r initiativc. -
the development over time of trust relationships, fostered by social and cultural 
interactions, at individual as well as organisational levels. 
Whether partnerships can indeed learn, is the central question of this study. As 
highlighted above, the French literature on partnership dynamics seems to focus on 
power sharing and conflict, but falls short of exploring how partnerships' learning 
capabilities develop and help them overcome the crises they experience. Despite the 
widespread recognition that partnering is challenging, the evaluation literature rarely 
weighs the benefits associated with this form of policy delivery against its costs. 
Therefore, some researchers argue that partnership evaluations are used as legitim ising 
devices rather than opportunities to learn and enhance partnering capabilities. These 
questions are explored further in the next section. 
2.2.4 Assumption of Performance: Evaluation or Legitimisation? 
Emphasis on public policy performance is mostly characteristic of American and British 
contexts, even though such concerns are now clearly present in France (Fontaine & 
Warin, 200 I). The much quoted work of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), also associated 
with the rise of 'new public management', is seen as pivotal in expressing the 
underpinning entrepreneurial rationale of this 'new' public management philosophy. 
The latter incorporates a can for constant policy evaluation and control based on output 
measures as opposed to inputs. To illustrate the difference this can make to funding 
effectiveness, the authors use the example of the Illinois Department of Public Aid's 
review of its nursing home funding system for Medicaid patients (Osborne & Gaebler. 
1992 pp. 138): 
"It [the department] paid according to the level of care provided: for severely 
ill patients residents who needed more care. the state paid more~ for those \\ ho 
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needed less care they paid less. This seemed entirely logical and fair. but when 
state analysts fmalty looked at the results, they were horrified. The overriding 
goal of the state po1icy was to keep the elderly as independent as possible. so as 
to minimize costs. Yet the percentage of nursing home patients who were bed 
ridden was rising steadily. Apparently, by paying more for bedridden patients. 
the state had given nursing homes a financial incentive to keep them bed-
ridden [ ... ]." 
The argument is that output-driven policies generate higher levels of performance. This 
approach is growing in France, with the use of target related contracts (CluzeI. 200 I). 
and the commissioning of one-off evaluation studies, generally conducted by outside 
consultants or independent scholars (Fontaine & Warin, 2001). Increasing reliance on 
partnerships has provided additional incentives to set up evaluation. auditing and 
monitoring systems aiming to quantify outputs, and even qualify broader intervention 
impacts. As a result, authors like Papadopoulos (2001) coined the term 'output 
democracy', suggesting that democratic accountability could be achieved by output 
driven policies as long as the electorate mandates its representatives to pursue their 
partnering strategies for policy delivery, and deem that these are delivering the 
outcomes they expect as tax payers. 
This argument, and the assumption of superior partnership performance associated with 
it. has been used to legitimise the growing reliance on partnerships for policy delivery. 
Strengthened with the growing use of evaluation by policy makers, the link between 
performance and partnering seems to be widely accepted. This section explores the 
debate on the foundations and rationale of evaluations commissioned by policy makers 
to investigate the nature of this performance equation. 
The assumption of performance enhancement through partnership IS criticised by 
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Ricordel, who shows that very little empirical research has been conducted to validate 
what he labels a postulate (Ricordel, 1997 pp. 434): 
"This idea connects public service performance to the extent to which it relies 
on partnering. It is based on the assumption that successful local public service 
management depends on a counciHor's ability to establish links with the 
private sector. It suggests that there is tight link between governance and 
performance. Yet, this idea has no empirical foundation at all and is rooted in 
another type of assumption, which, this time, links subsidiarity and 
performance and is presented within the literature as a postulate". 
Indeed, even in more recent publications, partnership performance tends to be analysed 
in theoretical and conceptual terms, rather than from an empirical perspective. This 
may we11 be related to the difficulties associated with defining and measuring 
performance. Hirtzlin (1999), for example, reviews developments in the health sector, 
where co11aborative strategies have widely been promoted on the basis that they would 
enhance the overall performance of the sector. She identifies different types of 
performance (including internal performance, system performance, spin-off effect type 
of performance, technical performance and output performance), and discusses their 
theoretical foundation. However, empirical evidence is lacking in what remains 
essentia11y a theoretical exploration of the links between partnership and performance. 
The notion of partnering performance used by Ricordel is a compound measure of a 
range of economic indicators designed to capture the extent to which local authorities 
manage their services in partnership or themselves. Performance measures devised by 
the authors include indicators such as the size of the local authority in employee terms. 
budget, the proportion of that budget dedicated to non-profit organisations etc ... In his 
study of 20 French local authorities, he finds that partnering can indeed relate to 
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superior economic performance, provided local authorities carefully manage their scope 
and number. Indeed, local authorities that engaged in the smallest or the highest number 
of partnering arrangements were under-performing against other authorities. which 
seemed to balance control through direct service provision and delegation through 
partnership delivery. He highlights that without such a carefully balanced mix in 
service provision, the impact of a local authority's economic policies will be sub 
optimal, whether it relies on partnerships or not (Ricordel, 1997 pp. 444): 
"[ ... ] Management and operational performance depend on a balanced mix of 
participants from the public and private sectors. Too high levels of delegation 
and partnering lead to fragmentation and loss of control. which, in tum. have 
negative effects on local authorities' capacity to regulate, and therefore their 
capacity to exploit or enhance local economic vitality. Likewise, service 
delivery reliant solely on the public sector leads to the poorest results in terms 
of a local authorities' ability to regulate". 
Such empirical investigations are limited in numbers and, as highlighted in the work of 
Ricordel (1997), the relationship between partnership and performance is not as 
straightforward as may be suggested in policy documents. The lack of empirical 
performance evaluation in France can be attributed to two elements. Firstly, evaluation 
as a discipline remains very new. Secondly. evaluations lack the level of academic 
independence that is required for entirely impartial studies to be conducted. These two 
points are well illustrated by Fontaine and Warin (2001) who argue that one of the 
primary goals of evaluations is not to assess the efficiency or effectiveness of a policy, 
but it is to legitimise it to the public (Fontaine & Warin, 2001 pp. 372): 
.. The most important function of evaluation does not consist in finding out if 
the public action has been successful or not but rather in creating a cloud of 
certainty around the action: talking about the action on the basis of tangible 
elements we then pretend to measure makes it exist." 
They further suggest that in addition to this legitimisation goal, political promotion and 
the enhancement of the profile of actors involved can be prom inent outcomes of 
evaluation. This may lead to situations were local and national players give themselves 
more credit than they deserve, by overlooking or underplaying contributions from the 
European Union for example (Fontaine & Warin, 2001 pp.372): 
"Indeed, on the basis of single evaluations we can get a distorted view of 
public action. In matters of structural funds, the contribution of the European 
Union, as essential financing institution, can actually escape the notice of the 
persons to whom policies are intended." 
In the British literature, where debates on the usefulness and relevance of evaluations 
studies are more advanced, the extent to which partnering does make a measurable 
difference to actual levels of local competitiveness remains debatable (Bovaird, 1994; 
Foley, 1992). Indeed, critics have argued that such activity can be seen as a public 
relations exercise enabling public sector organisations to portray themselves as "doing 
something' (Bovaird, 1994; Hutchinson, Foley, & Oztel, 1997). Evaluation studies in 
economic development have traditionally been carried out as one-off exercises at the 
completion of a particular project, or programme. Very rarely is the set of variables 
broad enough to be meaningful to all stakeholder groups (Bovaird, 1994; Sanderson, 
1996). The use of longitudinal analysis, that would allow for checks on displacement 
effects (Boyle, 1993) and would enable an appreciation of long term cultural changes, 
which cannot be captured by short term performance reviews (Hartley, Butler. & 
Benington, 2002; Martin & Sanderson, 1999), are also too infrequent. As a result, 
commentators highlight how this restricts opportunities for policy learning (Hartley et 
aI., 2002; Rashman & Hartley, 2002; Sanderson, 1996: Martin & Sanderson, 1999). 
Nonetheless. there are signs that evaluation as a discipline is evolving in two distinct 
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directions in British policymaking. These include, first of all, a change in the role of 
evaluators, who are increasingly becoming involved in pilot policy initiatives and are 
therefore taking on facilitation and developmental roles (enhancing to some extent the 
scope for longitudinal follow-up) (Martin & Sanderson, 1999). Another development in 
the field is the increased use of collaborative evaluation, also referred to. in some 
instances, as 'democratic' evaluation (Pollitt, 1999; Townley & Wilks-Heeg, 1999). 
Economic development partnerships have become prominent in public policy, perhaps 
less for their outcomes or economic impact, than their perceived cost effectiveness in 
policy delivery. They seem to be embraced in contexts where resource constraints are 
emphasised (Weber & Khademian, 1997; Hawranek, 2000; Himmelman, 1996). 
Currently, in the French literature, the factors pushing towards the growth of 
partnerships in economic development relate mainly to the nature of the French political 
and administrative systems with their associated funding regimes and the overlapping 
remits of different tiers of government (Cornu & Gilbert, 2001). The issue of resource 
constraints is only emerging as a rationale driving partnering (Cluzel, 200 I ). This may 
suggest that policy makers are still more concerned with inputs than they are with 
outputs and outcomes, perhaps explaining why evaluation outcomes do not always lead 
to policy review or adjustment (Cluzel, 2001 pp. 19): 
"In general, this means that the policy itself could be adjusted given evaluation 
outcomes. Unfortunately, most of the time, findings rarely translate into 
action." 
Despite the above uncertainties and concerns over the evaluation of partnering 
initiatives, and the lack of empirical evidence testifying of their superior performance. 
they are part of the range of tools available to politicians whose visibility and credibility 
they enhance. 
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In conclusion, the number of independent empirical investigations looking at the policy 
delivery efficiency of partnerships is still limited, leaving the relationship between 
partnership and efficiency an untested assumption. Although ·evaluation' is 
establishing itself as a scholarly discipline in France, developments are still embryonic 
in comparison to the British literature for example. By and large, French scholars view 
evaluation studies commissioned by practitioners as legitimisation devices rather than 
means of fostering policy learning. 
2. 3 Conceptualising Partnering 
Much of the rationale for the promotion of partnership, as a means of delivering policy, 
assumes that it brings about clear benefits. These include, for example, assumptions of 
synergy, shared goals, resources and expertise, better understanding of each sector, and 
sensitivity to customer needs. Underpinning these assumptions, there is the idea that 
partners can learn from each other and work together. They should therefore be able to 
provide services of a higher standard than those partnership members could provide 
ind iv id ua lIy. 
In order to explore such assumptions, the conceptual and theoretical developments 
associated with our understanding of partnership in a pUblic-private context are 
explored. The development of shared goals is explored first. Then the benefits that 
may be derived by a partnership structure are investigated. Finally, the impact of shared 
histories and experience may have on partnership learning is explored. 
2.3.1 Partnering Drivers: Towards Shared Goals? 
Much research has been dedicated to partnership goals. particularly to the rationale 
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underpinning an organisation's involvement and commitment to a partnership 
arrangement. In the United Kingdom, this type of research grew in volume throughout 
the 1990s, in an attempt to keep pace with increased governmental reliance on 
partnering for policy delivery. 
In an early piece Mackintosh (1992) identified three basic 'models' of partnership. 
including, synergy, transformation, and budget enlargement. Through the empirical 
investigations of similar ideas, many authors have enhanced our understanding of the 
synergy and transformation concepts. This literature is reviewed here. Budget 
enlargement as a driver for partnering has been recognised in a range of cases; however, 
the review suggests that it may not fully encapsulate some of the unique characteristics 
of the French context. Therefore this section pools a range of analyses on the 
significance of policy territory/ remit, to suggest that budget enlargement may need to 
be incorporated in its broader rationale, which will be called 'maintaining policy remit'. 
2.3.1.1 Partnering to Generate Synergy 
Mackintoshes' early work encapsulates three types of rationales driving partnerships. 
She refers to them as models of partnerships. The 'synergy' model refers to '''cross-
boundary partnerships of two distinct economic sectors, each with identifiable pools of 
assets and capabilities, and with clear and distinct (but not wholly mutually exclusive) 
objectives" (Mackintosh, 1992 pp. 213). The assumption behind this approach is that 
synergy is produced as a result of partners' complementary assets, skills and powers. 
The definition Mackintosh proposes for synergy remains very broad, and relies on the 
widely accepted assumption that synergy exists when 1 and 1 add up to 3. The key 
characteristic of her definition is its emphasis on the idea that partners are from different 
sectors (therefore have complementary assets, skills and powers) and that they achieve 
the "additional benefits of companies acting together rather than separately" 
(Mackintosh, 1992 pp. 212). Huxham sharpens the concept and adds a novel dimension 
to its conceptualisation by emphasising partner interest within a collaborative setting 
(Huxham, 1993 pp22): 
"It [synergy] will be achieved when something unusually creative is produced 
-perhaps an objective is met - that no organisation could have produced on its 
own and when each organisation, through the collaboration is able to achieve 
its own objectives better than it could alone." 
In later work, Eden et al (1996) reiterate the significance of partners' ab ility to satisfy 
their organisational goals within the realm of the collaboration. They argue that 
partnership members, "will, through their representatives try to incorporate their goals 
in the collaborative's agenda so that their participation in the collaborative contributes 
to the achievement of their goals. [ ... ] it is the organisational goals that provide the 
organization with the incentive to participate in the collaboration" (Eden et a I., 1996 pp. 
8). 
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Huxham draws on strategic management perspectives when she suggests that 
synergistic outcomes signal the existence of collaborative advantage, which. according 
to her is precisely what partnerships should seek to achieve (Huxham, 1993). Her work 
is deeply embedded within a managerial perspective. Indeed, she acknowledges that her 
research on community collaborations, for instance, focuses on the "'practical leverage 
(that is the instrumental value)" to be gained from community involvement (Huxham, 
1996 pp. 9). This business perspective is also present in a more recent publication by 
the French author, Hirtzlin (1999) whose analogies draw on econom ics. In her study of 
partnerships in the healthcare sector, Hirtzlin found evidence of what she labelled 
'relationship rents' which according to her could speed up innovation processes 
(Hirtz lin, 1999 p .. 116): 
" In research and innovation terms, this quasi 'relationship rent' is comparable 
to what Jaquemin (1987) called 'dynamic economies'; collaboration fosters 
shared learning and could accelerate the innovation process". 
Such focus on operational and business aspects of the notion of synergy does, to some 
extent, contrast with Hastings' (1996) exploration of the same concept. Indeed in a 
review of the partnership rationales proposed by Mackintosh (in particular the 'synergy' 
and 'transformation' models she put forward), Hastings strives to outline the political 
implications of partnerships dominated by one rationale or another. This leads her to 
distinguish between partnerships driven by resource synergy and those driven by policy 
synergy (Hastings, 1996 pp.259): 
"Resource synergy can be conceptualised as 'added value from the co-
ordination of resources and from joint efforts of agencies. [ ... ] Policy synergy 
[ ... ] describes a process by which new insights or solutions are produced out of 
the differences between partners." 
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Like Huxham, Hastings seems to associate synergy with creativity, and the emergence 
of creative solutions. This in tum is consistent with Hirtzlin's view that collaboration 
can speed up innovation. 
A common characteristic of all the authors discussed above is that they see synergy as 
the outcome of a process. Wettenhall and Thynne's more recent work (2000), by 
contrast, associates synergy with structure. They synthesise, and draw. on Peter Evans 
1997 book State-Society Synergy that suggests that synergy can be seen as 
'complementarity' or 'embeddedness'. The form of synergy that is referred to as 
'complementarity' "comprises the harmonisations of various contributions in ways that 
result in co-operative action, but without the contributors or their tools of the trade 
having to be moulded into a new set of arrangements"; however synergy as 
'embeddedness' "goes beyond complementarity by forging a new system that 
consciously provides for a more fundamental integration of relevant contributors and 
their respective knowledge, skills and modes of operation" (Wettenhall & Thynne, 2000 
p .. 5). This seems to suggest that synergies can be generated through straightforward 
co-operations as well as integrated multi-organisational structures. 
In summary, synergy can be seen as a process that yields innovative or creative 
outcomes as a result of the interplay between complementary resources, skills and 
assets. Such outcomes contribute to the existence of collaborative advantage. They can 
take the shape of value added derived from resource synergies or can lead to shared 
policy formulations. The search for synergies is driven by partnership member interests 
and therefore should contribute to the achievement of member objectives as well as 
partnership objectives. Finally, synergies can be derived in a variety of 
interorganisational structures. ranging from loose co-operations. to integrated multi-
organisational settings. 
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2.3.1.2 Partnering to 'Transform' Partners 
The second model that Mackintosh proposed was that of transformation, where '''the 
private sector is seeking to bring private sector objectives into the public sector. to 
shake it up, get it to seek more market oriented aims, to work more efficiently in its 
terms. [ ... ] The public sector, conversely, is trying to push the private sector towards 
more 'social' and longer term aims" (Mackintosh, 1992 pp. 216). 
Drawing on this model and evaluating her empirical findings, Hastings (1996) 
highlights the significant differences she found in collaborations, where partners sought 
to achieve 'mutual transformation' (based on a shared desire to learn from, and teach to, 
one another) and those where some pushed for 'unidirectional transformation' 
(Hastings, 1996 pp.262): 
"In this model of partnersh ip processes [unid irectiona I transformation] a battle 
for change is joined, which involves an unequal power relation, in which 
crucially, one or all parties are unwilling to change". 
Specific policy contexts seem to have an important bearing on the kind of 
transformation that may take place at local levels. Indeed, much of the literature that 
analysed the rationale for private sector involvement from the early 1980s until the mid 
1990s suggests that transformation was a fundamental item on the British central 
government's agenda to 'shake up' the public sector, and in particular, local 
government. Associated with consumerist aims and the so-called 'New Public 
Management' (and beyond the underpinning political aims), one finds instrumental 
managerial objectives. Cope and Goodship suggest that NPM is "about taking 'macho-
managers' into government to take on professionals, and shake up bureaucrats so as to 
get things done (that is things that government wants doing) and keep within budgets 
(that is budget that government wants kept)" (Cope & Goodship. 1999 pp. 6)). 
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In his earlier analysis, Basset (1996) suggests that private sector involvement in policy 
making was not entirely the result of state sponsorship. He shows that business 
membership organisations, such as the CBI were in the 1980s actively promoting 
businesses' 'enlightened self-interest\ and calling members to become involved in 
shaping policies to counter the effects of local economic decline. He further states that 
in some instances, such organisations argued that only "local businessmen could 
provide the kind of long term vision that local political leaderships were said to be 
incapable of providing" (Basset, 1996 pp. 540). 
Some authors argue that the public sector too has the opportunity to transform private 
sector practices while partnering. For example, Ghere (2001) suggests that public 
sector managers have the opportunity to impress on their private partners principles, 
such as due process, ethical conduct and disclosure. However, the overwhelming 
picture that emerges is that of unidirectional transformation taking precedence over 
mutual transformation. And indeed, the empirical evidence reported in the literature 
focuses on some of the profound changes taking place in the public sector as opposed to 
the private sector. In their analysis of the reliance on subcontracting partnerships in 
local government, Bovaird and Davis illustrate some the deep changes in organisational 
culture that took place to cope with declining budgets (1999 pp 298): 
"The London Borough of Wandsworth, for example, experienced both a major 
cultural change and a re-orientation from service delivery to contract 
management. Brent LB completely restructured its services, incorporating a 
major decentralisation in management. These changes [ ... ] appear to have led 
to permanent changes in attitudes, policies and practices within authorities". 
In summary, transformation could be seen as a two-way process in thc context of a 
partnership. However, research seems to focus mainly on changes occurring within the 
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public sector; and presents a backdrop of declining financial resources and the adoption 
of managerial ideals at central government level as drivers of this process. 
2.3.1.3 Partnering to protect turf 
The model of 'Budget Enlargement' is based on the assumption that "many joint 
ventures are held together very strongly by a common external objective. of which the 
most frequent is the extraction of a financial contribution from a th ird party" 
(Mackintosh, 1992 pp. 217). In particular, the decline in local government resources 
has been clearly documented, and commented upon in the United Kingdom. According 
to Bovaird and Davis "[it] is estimated that revenue support grant (the principal tool for 
central-local government transfers in the United Kingdom) had been reduced, after 
discounting for inflation, from £14.6 billion in 1980-81 to £9.5 billion by 1989-90 - a 
reduction of around 35 per cent in real terms" (Bovaird & Davis, 1999 pp. 294). In this 
context, local authorities increased their level of involvement in partnerships to deliver 
econom ic development objectives (Basset, 1996 pp. 540): 
"Following the defeat of the New Left challenge by the late 1980s. more and 
more councils across the political spectrum became reconciled to, and even 
enthusiastic about the idea of partnership with local business. As local 
government funding was squeezed, such partnerships were increasingly seen 
by hard-pressed councils as a source of expertise, funds and possible channels 
of influence to central government" 
In the United Kingdom, this trend is now reversing, following the implementation of the 
Labour government's local government modernisation agenda. Local authorities 
budgets are now increasing in real terms year on year. By contrast, evidence IS 
emerging that budgetary controls and constraints are more stringent elsewhere. 
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In France, for example, bUdgetary control and resource management are indeed growing 
in importance in the rhetoric, and practice, of central government since 1989 (CluzeL 
2001 pp.3): 
"Since the 1989 Rocard proposals, increased emphasis on civil servants' 
responsibilities was a central theme of public sector refonn. It was a means to 
enhance administrative efficiency. However, it became an end in itself during 
the refonn, and was refocused on budgetary control: today fmancial resource 
management is a priority in public policy". 
Central government control over legislation, which dictates the policy areas where 
different tiers of government may be active in the context of decentralisation, has had a 
greater level of impact and has been an issue at regional level. Organisations, whose 
remits were being redefmed, have had to adjust or find ingenious ways of remaining 
active in policy fields, which were no longer under their responsibility. To account for 
this French idiosyncrasy, the issue of budget enlargement needs to be incorporated in a 
broader category encapsulating the need to maintain and/ or enlarge an organisation's 
activity areas, whether this requires partnering to access financial resources or to 
maintain activity in cherished policy fields. Therefore, protecting turf may be a 
broader, yet more applicable concept than that of budget enlargement in the French 
context. It aims to encapsulate both 'budget enlargement' and 'remit protection' aims. 
as both ultimately feed into an organisation's ability to offer services in particular 
economic development areas. 
2.3.2 Strategy Through Structure 
2.3.2. t Levels of Engagement 
There is a search in the partnership literature for ideal-type alternatives to the better-
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known markets or hierarchies. A common desire is to understand how alternatives. 
such as partnership and network-based structures function. While significant 
differences exist in the approaches used to make sense of such alternative forms of 
organising, there seems to be a well-accepted principle that members have several levels 
of engagement in partnerships. The differing levels and types of engagement are 
therefore mirrored by conceptual and empirical investigations that propose multi-level 
analyses. 
Coe (1988), for instance, clearly establishes her level of analysis at the inter-
organisational level, considering the whole as a structure; an entity suitable for analysis 
and also requiring a specific set of managerial approaches. This whole is what she calls 
a multi-organisational network, or a 'meta-organisation'. She advocates 'open focus' as 
a conceptual model designed to support goal implementation in the partnership arena. 
Her framework operates on the basis of three attributes, namely, "linking 
communication', 'evocative leadership' and 'collaborative vision'. Stakeholder equality 
and open communication are strongly advocated in this approach, which focuses on the 
partnership entity more than it does on partners. 
Acknowledging the difficulties associated with the idea that a 'meta-strategy' should be 
developed in the early stages of partnership development, Huxham et al (Huxham, 
1993) (Eden et aI., 1996) recommend an opportun istic approach to partnering. Indeed 
they point our that whilst shared objectives at multi-organisational level may be 
desirable, a pragmatic stance, that takes into account members' organisational interests. 
may be more effective in building collaborative capability. The existence of potential 
areas of conflict between partnership members highlights one of partnerships unique 
features and requirement. that is the need to take into account the inter-organisational 
level as well as the organisational level given that each organisation is a partner but 
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also a stakeholder within the partnership (Diamond, 2001; Huxham & Vangen, 2000a). 
Likewise the significance of individuals representing their organisation and negotiating 
on behalf of their parent organisation has been identified as yet another level of analysis 
that may require attention in the analysis of partnerships (Bache, 2001). Individuals' 
personalities, methods of work and level of commitment may, or may not, reflect those 
of their organisation and may in some instances be significant barriers to partnering 
(Eden et aI., 1996). 
In summary, engagement in partnerships can occur at meta-organisational level (the 
partnership considered as an organisational entity), as well as the organisational level 
(partners act as independent stakeholder with specific agendas brought to the 
partnership) and at the individual level. All three levels of engagement are significant~ 
therefore their separate categorisation helps in making sense of some of the 
complexities associated with partnerships. 
2.3.2.2 Social Network or Strategic Apex? 
The tight integration that exists between ind ividuals and strategic decision-making 
structures is particularly evident in the way key representatives operate a social 
network, which effectively substitutes itself to the formal strategic apex of a partnership. 
This integration is supported by the emerging literature on partnership leadership. which 
distances itself from traditional command and control perspectives, and introduces 
concepts such as lateral influence and boundary spanning, for instance. 
According to Coe partnership leaders must have a clear sense of direction. however 
"'they do not closely control. but allow others the latitude to create solutions and make 
decisions" (1988 pp 520). This stems from the fact that" the system is composed of 
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many groups and individuals, no organization or individual generally has overall 
hierarchical authority. Authority is often unclear or overlapping, and power is shared. 
As such lateral influence is more relevant than is hierarchical authority:" (Coe, 1988 pp. 
518). A similar point is made by Huxham and Vangen (2000b) who point to the 
limitations of the leader-follower prem ise that is widely accepted within the leadership 
literature, and connect leadership influence with transformation (meaning, here. a 
change in partner behaviour as a result of leadership influence) (Huxham & Vangen. 
2000b pp. 1160): 
""[ ... ) there is a problem with the leader-follower presumption. The implication 
that there is a formally acknowledged leader with managerial responsibility and 
a hierarchical relationship with followers does not apply in collaborations 
because the individuals involved come from different organizations or groups. 
The leadership challenge [ ... ] is concerned with influencing or transform ing 
individuals only (or at least largely) to the extent that such transformation may, 
in tum, affect the behavior of organizations" 
Therefore, some of the key tasks that Huxham and Vangen (2000b) associate with 
partnership leadership are about inspiring, nurturing, supporting and communicating. 
This is to a large extent very close to the characteristics that Coe (1988) attached to 
what she called "evocative leadership' and "linking communication'. It is also 
extremely close to the contemporary perspectives on leadership that have been 
developed in the strategic management literature (in particular in the learning 
organisation field). For example, Peter Senge (1990b) describes leaders as stewards and 
as teachers. As stewards, leaders' attitude towards others is based on strong 
commitment and desire to serve them. It is this desire to serve that generates and 
sustains their aspirations to lead. As teachers, leaders focus their efforts on helping 
everyone in the organization to gain a deep appreciation of current reality. The latter is 
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fundamental~ in tha4 it enables leaders to make explicit some of the assumptions held in 
organisations. It also enables them to shape these assumptions and build a shared 
understanding of their organisations~ position, and purpose for instance. In a 
collaborative contex4 the need to explicit tacit beliefs can be instrumental in creating a 
shared view of the partnership's purpose and operation. 
The strong focus on the role of the leaders as enablers and as political actors mirrors, to 
a large extent, part of the literature on partnerships, which is primarily concerned with 
the formation of social networks, and with their analysis as alternative forms of 
organisational governance. Williams' work (2002) on boundary spanning is typical of 
this approach. He is concerned with the "factors that influence the effective 
collaborative behaviour and competence of key agents managing within inter-
organizational theatres" (Williams, 2002 pp. 103). The labelling of these key agents as 
boundary spanners adds to an analytical framework based on the leadership literature 
primarily derived from the study of private sector organisations. Indeed the unique 
characteristics of the public sector in France as in the United Kingdom call for concepts 
capable of capturing their complexities and encapsulating issues such as governance, 
networking, mandated collaboration, competition amongst partners. Williams argues 
that "partnerships are characterised by networked forms of governance", and that 
"networking is the predominant modus operandi of choice of the boundary spanner'~. 
He further shows that within the particular partnership he analysed key decision makers 
operate in a social network, which effectively acts as the strategic apex of the 
partnership (Williams. 2002 pp. 117): 
"Within the particular interorganisational domain studied, there is a well-
developed network of key' movers and shakers' - primary nodes in the network 
_ which make the partnerships work. It consists of a reservoir of people active 
at a strategic level, representing different agencies, and organizations \\'ho 
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are referred to as 'the usual suspects' because of their appearance in man~ 
different partnerships" 
The above is consistent with Downe, Hartley et al (2002) argument that networks can 
not only be means of enhancing organisational effectiveness, but they are also important 
means of exerting influence and enabling policy learning. The notion that few clearly 
identifiable individuals determine the strategic orientation of a partnership is close to the 
concept of centrality, that emerged from the study of business networks (Gnyawali & 
Madhavan, 2001). These authors defme centrality as the "position of an individual 
actor in the network", it denotes "the extent to which a focal actor occupies a strategic 
position in the network by virtue of being involved in many significant ties" (Gnyawali 
& Madhavan, 2001 pp. 434-435). Williams' findings seem to suggest that in an LED 
partnership context, however, centrality may apply to several key actors as opposed to a 
single actor. 
Williams also shows that key strategic decisions are in fact made outside formal 
structures, and within social networks. Indeed strategies are decided in the context of 
personal informal exchanges, to such an extent that sometimes formal meetings may 
only tum into rituals, where partners validate decisions well rehearsed before hand 
(Williams, 2002 pp. 118): 
"There is a general view that the 'real' business of partnership work is effected 
within the framework of these personal exchanges. It is where difficulties are 
shared, aims agreed, problems sorted out, deals struck and prom ises made - all 
out of the public gaze. Crucially, this is where interorganisational imperatives 
are translated into the organization realities of individual participants, and 
where the progress of formal events are mapped out in advance and 
choreographed. " 
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These findings are in line with the analysis of some French researchers, who 
investigated the relationship between informal networking and formal partnering in 
order to enhance our understanding of the reasons why formal partnering seems to be 
resisted in some instances. Brachet (1995) argues that the problems organisations (and 
their representatives) experience, when working in partnership, do not result from a lack 
of skills but from the rigidity that fonnalisation imposes upon them. This opens up an 
entirely different set of issues, and leads to the work of authors who focus on 
collaborative capability building for example. According to Brachet, civil servants, 
agency managers, have always relied on networking and partnering when confronted 
with issues that can not be tackled through traditional hierarchical means (Brachet, 1995 
pp. 102): 
"As soon as hierarchical decision-making fails; civil servants at all levels 
engage in lateral networking with politicians or professionals. Therefore 
partnership is by no means a new phenomenon. When relied upon as a 
dominant mode of operation within the public sector, partnership is equivalent 
to surfacing and legitim ising existing governance systems that already 
underpin power in local political and administrative systems. This is one of 
very reasons why there is much concern and resistance towards this form of 
working" 
The difference between infonnal reliance on networking and the establishment of a 
formal partnership is that the latter requires an open and shared recognition of lateral 
sources of power. Such formalisation can, in tum, become a source of contention, and 
can generate competitions. In the context of infonnal networking, these sources of 
tension would be regulated by the flexible adjustment of alliances between individuals 
and by the fluid social, cultural and institutional learning that occurs as networks evolve 
as shown by (Clergeau et a\., 2000). Clergeau et aI's work to a large extent mirrors 
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ideas that have been developed in the field of sociology, with Bandura's (1977) work on 
social learning. Such adjustment and flexibility, as well as the fluidity of network 
membership, disappear or are diminished, as a result of partnership formalisation. This 
may be one of the paradoxical situations that arise when formalisation occurs for policy 
delivery purposes: the type of benefits sought through partnering may be less likely to 
be achieved. 
2.3.2.3 Service delivery through operational networks 
The notion of network and networking in a public policy context is a well researched 
one. However there tends to be a focus on policy making with for instance the analysis 
of policy networks ( as in the work of Lowndes & Sketcher, 1998). Alternatively,(Le 
Gales, 1995; Le Gales P., 2001) small firm networks may be analysed in relation to 
innovative milieus or regional learning ( as in the work of Keeble & Wilkinson, 1999; 
Sternberg, 1999; Hendry, Brown, & Defillippi, 2000; Rabellotti & Schmitz, 1999). 
Some recent publications, though, present networks as value added service systems 
(Ferlie & Pettigrew, 1996; Bate, 2000). One of the key reasons for partnering is 
resource dependency. Sharing resources, relying on partner resources require the 
establishment of systems that enable effective flows of assets, information, and status 
whether such collaboration takes place in the private or the public sector (Gnyawali & 
Madhavan, 2001). Yet, given differences in types of resources (which may take the 
form of finance, equipment, information, or managerial/technical expertise) strategies 
invariably need to adapt. Perhaps the most significant challenge is the pool human 
expertise when individuals operate under the same umbrella but are located in different 
places and specialise in different fields. Pooling diverse professional resources. and 
maximising their contribution to the delivery of a meta-organisation's agenda is indeed 
a complex task. 
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The work of Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996) and that of Bate (2000) focus on the analysis of 
networks in the British National Health Service, and aim to unravel the nature of such a 
challenge. Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996) present the structural and cultural changes that 
took place within the NHS, as a result of centrally driven policies and reform that 
transformed the NHS from being a vertically integrated organisation to becom ing a 
system regulated by internal markets in the early 1990s. They then point to the 
progressive growth of relational contracting. Relational contracting extends the notion 
of contracting beyond product! service exchange, and incorporates processes of social 
exchange that reduce uncertainty and build trust and therefore leads to the formation of 
strong networks. Such networks underpin, for instance, joint service systems, which 
they call 'Value Added Partnerships' (or VAPs). V APs exist when "a set of 
independent companies work closely together to manage a flow of goods and services 
along an entire value-added chain." (Ferlie & Pettigrew, 1996 pp. 83). According to 
these authors, "within public sector care [ ... ] there is an increasing number of 'joint 
production' processes, where the NHS joins with social services, the voluntary and 
informal sectors in producing joint goods" (Ferlie & Pettigrew, 1996 pp. 83). They 
argue that in addition to facilitating the management of joint production: networks also 
enable organisations to enhance flexibility and learning (fundamental when there is an 
emphasis on greater service variety, service innovation and greater user choice). 
Further, they ease the management of culturally diverse, and physically dispersed 
organisations. 
Bate's analysis also draws on evidence gathered in an NHS context, through a two year 
ethnographic investigation of one trust, where levels of friction, conflict and 
disharmony were so high. morale so low that ''the hospital had virtually ceased to 
operate as an organisation" (Bate. 2000 pp. 489). However. his analysis ditTers 
significantly from that of Ferlie and Pettigrew. Bate focuses on culture. while Ferlie 
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and Pettigrew focused on structures and systems. He finds that three types of cultures 
prevail in the trust studied. These include the 'culture of tribalism', where different 
professional factions "dedicate themselves to winning gains for their 'patch' regardless 
of the harm this inflicts on other parts of the organization" (2000 pp. 490). The 'culture 
of individualism' emerges as the culture of tribalism is played out. The consequence is 
that people are left out to their own devices, and are rarely called to account for their 
actions, leading to problems of accountability. Finally the presence of a strong 'culture 
of conservatism' impedes innovation and change. 
The research methods used are unusual in that they are described as 'applied 
ethnography' and follow some of the principle of action research, which involves not 
only giving feedback to participants, but also, calls for the active facilitation of change. 
This is relevant because the research philosophy, and the methods used were 
instrumental in deriving a network solution to alleviate the problems that arose from the 
interplay of the three dominant cultures. In this case, there was a widespread 
recognition that the issues had a cultural origin, and that therefore the solutions should 
be cultural themselves. Therefore much of the author's facilitation centred on 
determining the kind of culture that hospital staff wanted for their organisation. Very 
rapidly the idea that a single culture could bridge the interests of different 'tribes' was 
rejected (Bate, 2000 pp. 503 ): 
"Allegiances to one's profession were far too strong to ever conceive of a 
single dominant hospital culture; it was not therefore a question of doing away 
with the different tribes but of fmding sensible and realistic ways of linking 
them together and improving communication and knowledge exchange" 
The vision that emerged was one of "'a multi-cultural, pluralistic society of inter-locking 
sub-communities, each fairly autonomous (the intellectual knowledge 'capitals' of the 
75 
hospital) but bound together by a sense of common purpose, and shared responsibility. 
According to Bate, "what had emerged from all the talking was an essentially home 
grown concept of the future that happened to bear a close resemblance to the idea of 
network organising [ ... r' (Bate, 2000 pp. 503). In this context, participants did not 
approach the network concept as a structural issue; instead they saw networking as the 
dominant culture, and process that should regulate their work within the hospital. This 
culture of networking had significant advantages in that it was able to resolve some of 
the apparently irreconcilable tensions that existed in the organisation. Indeed, it 
"offered the prospect of more responsibility and more freedom, more diversity and 
convergence, individuality and collectivity." (Bate, 2000 pp. 504 ). 
In summary, network forms of organisations and networking cultures are, in some 
professional contexts like that of the NHS, growing in significance. They enable the 
pooling of many of the advantages that are associated with partnerships (including the 
creation of value added services), and seem to still allow for the freedom, diversity, and 
individuality that are fundamental in such contexts. They provide innovative 
operational solutions to organisations or groups of professionals seeking to work 
collaboratively without compromising their unique identities. 
2.3.3 History, Experience and Learning 
The earlier section showed that informal networks underpin strategic decision-making 
within partnerships, and may even shape operational service delivery. It is evident from 
the work of a number of researchers that networking is one of the earliest, and most 
important forms of interactions. It often enables key stakeholders to 'experiment' 
working with one another, mostly on the basis of very loose, informal agreements. 
before they commit to formal partnering. This was illustrated in the work of Martin and 
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Oztel (1996) who showed how successive informal and local partnering initiatives 
enabled key decision makers to pool efforts, and successfully set up Business Link 
Birm ingham, in the UK. 
Such experimentation is analysed by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) as the formation of 
an informal network of key decision-makers. Indeed according to these authors. "the 
period of pre-partnership collaborative activity is one in which ideal type network 
relationships tend to predominate" (2002 p.124). 
In these early stages, a number of processes are at play and provide the necessary 
goodwill, which in tum underpins some of the critical success factors associated with 
partnering. Factors such as the development of trust and shared understanding, the need 
to develop some kind of collaborative competency, the usefulness of basic rules that 
regulate exchanges within the partnership, the necessity for comm itment, good faith 
collaboration and partner equality, as well as the importance of collaborative leadership 
have all been emphasised by a wide range of authors considering just as wide a 
spectrum of collaborative set-ups in the United Kingdom, France or the US ( see for 
example Janus, 1996; Spiering, 2000; Wettenhall & Thynne, 2000; Nay, 200 I; Clergeau 
et aI., 2000; Lorrain, 1988; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). 
In their analysis of collaborative capability building, Sullivan and Ske1cher (2002) pool 
to a large extent most of the above 'critical success factors' by proposing a simple 
structuring framework. It emphasises individual and organisational collaborative 
capability building, and determines some of the variables associated with each. 
According to these authors. collaborative capability is largely dependent on the presence 
of boundary spanners and reticulists (i.e. people who are skilled communicators and 
have excellent networking and negotiating skills enabling them to bring partners 
together by identifying areas of common ground). Such individuals can fulfil the 
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need for leadership in a range of situations, including circumstances where it is not 
possible to discern a formal leader. In such cases, "leadership needs to be exercised 
through the employment of personal skills such as persuasion, through the application 
of processes and activities that nurture and facilitate co-operation between individuals 
and organisations and through the use of personal authority to access necessary 
resources to contribute to the collaborative effort" (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002 pp. 104). 
In the case of mandated partnerships, where leaders are appointed because of their 
position, or the role of their organisation within the partnership (positional leadership), 
there can be a significant learning challenge. Indeed, individuals "find themselves 
applying their leadership capacity in a new environment, one where hierarchies have 
been replaced by networks and inter-organisational reliance and it is not possible to lead 
simply by virtue of one's formal authority in unitary bureaucracy" (Sullivan & 
Skelcher, 2002 pp. 104). Trust is the other collaborative capacity building element that 
is significant at the individual level. The authors highlight that trust is one of the key 
outcomes of the social networks that develop in partnerships. According to them, it 
provides a "way of coping with risk and uncertainty in relationships with others" 
(Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002 pp. 102). In addition to the above, Sullivan and Skelcher 
point to the fact that individual concerns, such as the possibility to advance one's career 
within the context of the partnerships, can be important elements shaping collaborative 
engagement. 
Overall. individual collaborative capability is a function of effective communication 
(reticulists) and socialisation. Capability building should therefore mirror learning in 
these areas. This is highly consistent with the work of some French policy analysts. 
who associate learning with social network formation, and analyse such learning as an 
ongoing process that is intertwined with building and maintaining trust (Clergeau et at.. 
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2000). If one extends this rationale, learning can be seen as a process underpinning 
socialisation; one that is inherently dynamic and experiential. 
At organisational level, collaborative capability is dependent on the presence or absence 
of a collaborative culture, which tends to be 'strategically adaptive and responsive" 
according to the same authors. Organisations with such a culture tend to be "confident 
in devolving decision-making down to the front line and have a strong external 
orientation" (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002 pp. 105). There is the assumption that such 
organisations will attempt to capture learning and build on partnering experience as it 
unfolds. The authors show that such 'learning efforts' need to be dissociated from 
government driven initiatives (particularly since 1997 in the United Kingdom) that tend 
to focus on policy learning at governmental level, and may be a little value to local 
players. Local partner learning tends to be the outcome of ad-hoc local internal 
evaluations they suggest. In this context, organisational learning is clearly seen as the 
outcome of ex-post evaluation studies. Therefore, the implication is that partners can 
learn from their past. A long history of partnership is likely to create learning 
experiences that cumulate over time and form progressively enhanced collaborative 
capability, particularly when evaluations and reflection are built into the partnering 
process. However, Sanderson (2001) shows that much work remains to be done in 
order to link evaluation and learning. In their review of the Beacon Council Scheme. 
Rashman and Hartley (2002), show that evaluation and audit still focus on control, as 
opposed to learning, and change management. Sanderson, Percy-Smith and Dowson 
(2001) concur in their analysis of the local government modernisation and in particular 
the Best Value agenda. These authors emphasise local authorities need to build a 
capacity for learning and improvement that relies on research. 
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In a paper examining learning reported within a network of local authorities 
implementing changes to address central governmenfs 'Best Value' agenda in the 
United Kingdom, Hartley and Allison (2002) tested the applicability ofNonoka's model 
of knowledge creation (Nonoka, 1994). Their fmdings emphasised the very strong 
significance of social aspects underpinning knowledge creation; the need to incorporate 
tacit knowledge transfer when evaluating organisational and inter~rganisational 
performance and the need to more extensively rely on policy implementation methods, 
such as networking, in order to engineer modes of knowledge transfer that foster 
socialisation and tacit knowledge development. 
In conclusion, both individual and organisational learning can be seen as significant 
components in collaborative capability building. The literature suggests that experience 
and time are likely to facilitate effective collaboration at both levels. This review of 
partnering concepts, and in particular of notions such as social networking, and 
collaborative capability building suggest that history, experience and learning may 
indeed be intertwined. The following section aims to review conceptual developments 
in organisational learning, so that the latter can be combined with conceptual 
developments in partnership analysis and generate the research framework for this 
study. 
2. 4 Organisational Learning 
Numerous reviews of the organisational learning literature, includ ing those provided by 
Argyris and Schon (Argyris & Schon, 1996; Argyris, 2001~ Fiol & Lyles. 1985~ 
Shrivastava, 1983), indicate that early developments in the field occurred in the late 
1960s and involved a range of authors interested in organisational change, leadership 
and learning. However, the work of Argyris and Schon is probably one of the 
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greatest sources of unifying influence, providing not only synthesis but also a 
comprehensive theory of organisational learning, as early as 1978. Continuously high 
citation levels and widespread adoption amongst scholars, illustrate the sustained 
influence of their ideas since the early 1970s. This review of the literature focuses on 
identifying concepts that may be particularly useful to investigating learning processes 
in an economic development partnership context. It will heavily rely on concepts 
introduced by Argyris and Schon and will complement these, particularly when tailoring 
the ideas to the field of economic development and partnering. This section will 
therefore initially discuss key developments in the organisational literature, triggers to 
learning, single and double loop learning, organisational theories of action and the 
transfer from ind ivid ual to partnership learning. 
2.4.1 Key Developments in the Organisational Learning Literature 
In the 1999 edition of On Organizational Learning reprinted in 2001, Argyris provides 
a detailed review of the organisational learning literature. He makes a bold distinction 
between what he calls the 'learning organization' literature, which takes the desirability 
of organisational learning to be 'axiomatic'; and what he labels the 'scholarly literature 
of organizational learning', led by 'sceptical researchers into organizational learning 
[who] present, from a variety of perspectives, important reasons to doubt' (Argyris, 
2001 pp. 13). Both strands of the literature are rooted in theoretical and conceptual 
developments that can be traced to the late 1960s and early 1970s, although the 1990s 
witnessed a clear and strong revival of interest in organisational learning processes 
(Argyris & Schon, 1996 pp. xvii): 
"Now in the mid-I 990s, it is conventional wisdom that business firms, 
governments, nongovernmental organizations. schools, health care systems. 
regions. even whole nations and supranational institutions need to adapt to 
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changing environments, draw lessons from the past successes and failures. 
detect and correct the errors of the past, anticipate and respond to impending 
threats, conduct experiments, engage in continuing innovation, build and 
realize desirable images of the future. There is virtual consensus that we are all 
subject to a 'learning imperative', and in the academ ic world as we 11 as the 
practical world, organizational learning has become an idea of good currency. ,. 
Argyris suggests that both strands of the literature are important, despite the fact that 
one tends to ignore what the other considers to be central to the theory of organisational 
learning. He proposes to bridge some of the gaps that exist between the two strands by 
reiterating the importance of an 'action perspective' which he and his co-author Donald 
Schon introduced in 1978 with the publication of their seminal book Organizational 
Learning: a Theory of Action Perspective. 
The 'Learning organization Literature', flourished in a range of disciplinary areas, 
including sociotechnical systems, organisational strategy, production, human resources, 
organisational culture as well as economic development. They all promote the 
development of an organisational state where wide ranging capabilities are underpinned 
by learning (Argyris, 2001 pp. 1): 
"This ideal includes notions of organizational adaptability, flexibility, 
avoidance of stability traps, propensity to experiment, readiness to rethink 
means and ends, inquiry orientation, realization of human potential for learning 
in the service of organizational settings as contexts for human development." 
In strategic management, the idea of organisational learning has contributed to a shift 
from traditional planning approaches (with their strong emphasis on strategy 
formulation) to a focus on change management and implementation. Systems 
perspective and system ic representations of organisational action shed new light on 
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the management of organisational core competencies. In human resources management 
clear distinctions are being drawn between the benefits of formal training and the 
personal development strategies that centre on self-improvement and change. 
Organisational culture is presented as a collection of a set of values and norms, basic 
assumptions that permeate the organisation (shared mental models). Organisational 
leaders' responsibility is now seen as involving the 'surfacing' and management of 
these organisational mental models. 
Overall, this branch of the literature emphasises the deliberate management of 
organisational learning processes. By contrast, the assumption that organisational 
learning can be controlled and managed is considered problematic in the so-called 
'scholarly' literature of organisational learning, explored next. 
Indeed, this second branch raises questions on the very meaning of organisational 
learning. As early as 1978, Argyris and Schon asked: what is an organisation that it 
may learn (Argyris & Schon, 1978 pp. 8)? More recent contributors such as Kim 
(1993) highlighted the risks inherent to anthropomorphising organisations by extending 
to organisations, the use of concepts traditionally used to characterise human activity 
and learning. 
Furthermore. contributors to this branch of the literature question the validity and utility 
of organisational learning. In some cases learning can be considered as detrimental or 
as a negative process, rather than one that always leads to beneficial improvements 
(Cohen. 1991). Indeed. learning can be harnessed to preserve a status quo. Therefore. 
learning does not always equate to organisational change as would suggest the first 
branch of the literature. Contributors to this school also raise doubts about the 
productive nature of learning in an organisational context. Argyris and Schon (1978) 
have researched the nature of the processes that lead to individual and organisational 
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defensive routines. When these come into play, resistance to change can indeed become 
detrimental to the business. 
2.4.2 Triggering Learning 
In an early piece, Cangnelosi and Dill (1965) analysed some of the processes that 
underpinned participant learning in a controlled business game. Individuals acting as 
the senior management of a company were asked to manage that business, while 
fictitious changes were made to the external and internal environments by a computer 
programme. Teams were set up so that incumbents within the industry were competing 
with one another. The authors analysed the processes that underpinned decision-
making. They were particularly interested in finding out whether participants as 
individuals, and as a cohesive group forming the organisation, were able to learn from 
expenence. Their findings were encouraging but incomplete (Cangelosi & Dill, 1965 
pp. 190): 
"Many of the changes that we observed in behavior 'happened' without the 
kinds of explicit analysis and discussion that might signal that changes were 
impending. The observations were successful in demonstrating that the 
organisation did learn, but were much less successfu I in showing how it 
learned." 
Despite the researchers' inability to fully unravel the learning process, they documented 
extensively a critical element: the trigger of a learning sequence. According to them, 
tensions and contlicts are primary initiators of learning. Indeed they argued. "inter-
organisational contlict and tensions have constructive functions in stimulating 
adjustment and learning" (Cangelosi & Dill, t 965 pp. 198). 
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Such conflict and tension created three forms of stress, discomfort stress, performance 
stress and disjunctive stress. 
The authors suggest that discomfort stress results from "the complexity of the 
environment relative to the time, energy, and ability that groups can expend 
understanding it, and the uncertainty in the environment relative to a group's ability to 
forecast the future" (Cangelosi & Dill, 1965 pp. 200). 
Performance stress highlights organisations' high degree of sensitivity to success or 
failure. It is "affected by the outcomes of previous decisions, by the changes in 
preferences or aspiration levels, by incentives existing within the organization and 
manipulated by its leaders, and by the degree to which management is challenged with 
the newness of its task" (Cangelosi & Dill, 1965 pp. 200). Cangelosi and Dill (1965) 
argue that because discomfort and performance stress manifest themselves mainly at the 
individual level, they tend mostly to lead to sub-system, rather than total system 
learning. Therefore discomfort and performance stress may be of less significance for 
this study than the third form of stress they identity, called disjunctive stress. 
Disjunctive stress results from '"increasing degrees of divergence and conflict in the 
ways in which individuals and subgroups behave" (Cangelosi & Dill, 1965 pp. 201). 
They propose that disjunctive stress is the prime source of organisational learning 
(Cangelosi & Dill, 1965 pp. 201-202): 
"Organizations have expectations or norms about the extent to which various 
activities should be co-ordinated and about the amount of contlict and disorder 
that can be tolerated. [ ... ] When individual and sub-group adaptation produce 
divergence and conflict beyond what the organization can tolerate. total system 
learning is likely to take place." 
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The idea that tensions leading to stress or conflict tend to generate learning sequences. 
is in line with Argyris's early work (1976; 1978), which incorporated the notions of 
problem solving~ crisis and error generation and resolution as triggers and outcomes of 
learning (Argyris, 1976 pp. 365): 
"Learning is here defined as the detection and correction of errors. and error as 
any feature of knowledge or of knowing that makes action ineffective. [ ... ] The 
detection and correction of error produces learning and the lack of either or 
both inhibits learning." 
The precept that one would need to detect and correct errors (therefore engage in 
organisational learning) is very close to the idea that perfonnance stress is source of 
organisational learning. These ideas have been the subject of significant development 
in the contemporary crisis management literature, where crises are characterised by their 
high magnitude, their element of surprise, a requirement for immediate action: and the 
idea that they are outside the organisation's complete control (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). Scholars in the field share the view that crises have the potential to dramatically 
endanger organisations' reputation and viability (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 200 I; Ferlie 
& Pettigrew, 1996; Bate, 2000; Argyris, 1976). Despite these areas of convergence. 
scholars in the field do propose different ways of defining crises. In particular, their 
emphasis on sociological and political factors as sources of crises varies significantly. 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) use two dimensions to distinguish between incidents. 
accidents, crises and conflicts; all of which are disruptions of different magnitude and 
significance according to them. These dimensions are respectively the locus of 
disruptions (which can be a sub-system. or the whole system) and the system level that 
is affected by disruptions (these being the physical and symbolic levels). According to 
these authors, incidents are of a physical nature and occur within subsystems. The 
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operation of the system as a whole is not threatened and defective parts can be repaired. 
Accidents are also of a physical nature but do require shutting down of the system. 
They further propose the term conflict "to describe those times when the symbolic 
structure of a system is disturbed, but not to the point of challenging its basic set of 
assumptions" and defme crisis "as a disruption that physically affects a system as a 
whole and threatens its basic assumptions, its subjective sense of the self, its existential 
core." (1992 pp. 12). 
The distinction that Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) make between crises and contlicts9 is 
not present in the work of political scientist Sagan (1994) who highlighted that 
conflicting interests and norms amongst organisational sub-units can be the source of 
major disasters in high risk industries. 
Therefore, Cangelosi and Dill's concept of 'disjunctive stress' can itself be separated 
into two categories. These would incorporate stress or crises of a physical nature and 
crises that are affecting an organisation'S norms, values and belief systems. In the 
context of this study and for simplification purposes the main types of crises will be 
called respectively operational crises and value crises. 
2.4.3 Types of Learning: Single and Double Loop Learning 
Although empirical evidence was merely emerging, notions of single and double loop 
learning were debated in a paper published by Argyris in 1976 in Administrative 
Science Quarterly. Therein, Argyris provided a critique of the 1974 book Leadership 
and Ambiguity by Cohen and March. His main concern is about the assumption Cohen 
and March make about leaders' ability of to enhance decision-making (Argyris. 1976 
pp.364): 
Q Crises arc according to Pauchant and Mitrofl of a physical nature: while conflicts arc oJnsidcred more 
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"Cohen and March (1974) view inter-group coalition rivalries, avoidance of 
uncertainty, interpersonal threat and mistrust as factors inhibiting decision-
making effectiveness, but they were viewed as factors to be understood not 
altered." 
Argyris suggests that the idea that change is possible, even if the underlying causes of 
the problems an organisation experiences are not addressed, is paradoxical. He agrees 
that Cohen and March's approach to learning is the dominant form of organisational 
learning and labels it 'single loop learning'. He calls for double loop learning which 
according to him is more likely to generate sustainable change (Argyris, 1976 pp. 367): 
"One might say that participants in organizations are encouraged to learn to 
perform as long as the learning does not question the fundamental design. 
goals, and activities of their organizations. This learning may be called single 
loop learning. In double loop learning, a participant would be able to ask 
questions about changing fundamental aspects of the organization." 
Therefore, Argyris contests the idea that scholars should promote a form of 
organisational action that relies on limited learning structures. Instead he suggests that 
double loop learning should be sought and a model promoting this form of learning 
should be established so that decision-making effectiveness can be sustained using an 
explanatory approach to effective decision-making (Argyris, 1976 pp. 367): 
"To intervene in these circular processes, one needs a model that helps to 
explain what aspects of current behavior of decision makers and policy makers 
inhibit double loop learning, a model that would increase the effectiveness of 
decision-making and of policy making, and finally one that would make it 
possible to use the explanatory model to achieve effectiveness." 
A key area of contention between Argyris and Cohen in 1976 was therefore about 
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leaders' ability to alter embedded elements of organisational culture and practices. 
Whilst Cohen proposed to work with inter-group rivalries, Argyris recommended that 
such issues needed to be addressed to enable a deep level ofleaming, which he labelled 
double loop learning. 
In a short, yet emphatic rejoinder published in the same issue of Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Michael Cohen's position is clear. He would rather work with organisational 
realities as they are experienced; and optimise decision-making within them rather than 
try to impose idealistic approaches unlikely to be in sink with the way human beings 
operate (Cohen, 1976 pp. 376-377): 
"His [Argyris] objection is to what he views as our' support' of the world as it 
is when we recommend to leaders how best to cope with what they face. He 
would not have us offer advice premised upon the continued existence of 
organizational realities that he and I agree are unhappy. We differ as to 
whether those realities can be readily altered. In particular, he believes that the 
extent to which behavior in organizations is driven (he might say distorted) by 
the pursuit of individual interests can be substantially reduced by 
recommending a different theory of leadership. I confess I rather doubt it. My 
doubt rests in the one hand on the pervasiveness of conflict in human affairs 
and, on the other, on the perennial scarcity of that most precious resource. 
attention. These have been two central elements of political scientists' 
perspectives on human affairs since the discipline's emergence with 
Machiavelli. [ ... J. If conflict and attention scarcity are substantially 
irreducible features of social life. there will be present in most social situations 
powerful incentives not to convey full and accurate information. not to protect 
others' interests or to trust others, to protect one's own. not, in short to behave 
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according to an ideal standard that all might espouse and, indeed, genuinely 
prefer." 
In a subsequent publication, Argyris and Schon (1978) provide a more refined definition 
of single and double loop learning. According to them "organizational learning 
involves the detection and correction of error. When the error detected and corrected 
permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its present objectives, 
then that error-detection -and-correction process is single loop learning. [ ... J Double 
loop learning occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that involve the 
modification of an organization's underlying norms, policies and objectives." (Argyris 
& Schon, 1978 pp. 2-3) 
The above showed that the validity and relevance of 'double loop learning' as a 
concept, was brought into question almost at the point of inception. However, it has 
evolved and been widely adopted, renamed, to the extent that it is considered to be one 
of the building blocks of organisational learning theory. Argyris and Schon (1996) state 
that the distinction they make between single loop and double loop learning stems from 
Ross Ashby's Design for a Brain published in 1960. Since the distinction between 
single and double loop learning was made, variants of the same concepts have been 
offered, including lower and higher level learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985), adaptive and 
generative learning (Senge, 1990a), paradigm constrained and paradigm breaking 
learning (See Argyris, 2001 for a review). 
Overall, the precept that there are different kinds and depths of learning has widely been 
adopted within the literature. The representation of these different types of learning 
vary somewhat, even though, there is a clear influence from systemic perspectives of 
organisational learning (Stacey, 2000). 
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Throughout his research programme on organisational learning, Argyris has focused on 
presenting an organisation's entire learning system. This has meant that the feature that 
is most emphasised in his work is the identification and correction of error in the 
context of an organisation's entire learning system, as illustrated in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2-1 Argyris's representation of single and double loop leaming 
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Such an approach has enabled Argyris and Schon to investigate organisational learning 
systems as a whole (1978). They proposed that organisations fell into categories 
depending on the depth and effectiveness of their learning systems. 01 Model 
organisations are best described as places where single loop learning prevails. By 
contrast 011 Model organisations are characterised by the presence of double loop 
learning. When businesses are able to focus on the development of their learning 
systems they can achieve deutero-Iearning. When this occurs, the organisation is able to 
move beyond specific learning experiences and centres its efforts on sustaining and 
enhancing organisational learning systems. 
Peter Senge's work centres on the nature of organisational action and in particular, the 
identification of archetypical patterns that may characterise such action. He (1990a) 
emphasises symptomatic solutions (associated with 'adaptive learning') and 
fundamental solutions that he associates with 'generative learning'. As a result Scnge's 
representational approach departs from that proposed by Argyris and Schem (1978) 
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because of its focus on specific actions. This is particularly evident in the archetype 
labelled 'shifting the burden' that Senge reveals in his popular text, The Fifth Discipline 
(1990). The archetype 'shifting the burden' aims to differentiate between symptomatic 
solutions (which can only lead to limited learning, adaptive learning in his terms) and 
fundamental solutions (which represent the means of achieving sustainable change and 
deep level learning - labelled generative learning) - see figure 2.2. 
Figure 2-2 Senge's representation 0/ the archetype 'shifting the burden' 
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Like Senge, Stacey's representational approach focuses on a specific action as opposed 
to entire organisational learning systems. However Stacey's work remains extremely 
close to Argyris's philosophy because of the emphasis it places on the potential for 
double loop learning to alter existing organisational mental models. This is evident 
when Stacey's representations of single loop learning (figure 2.3) and double loop 
learning (figure 2.4) are compared. Unlike Argyris and Schon (1978), Stacey's purpose 
is not to disentangle complete and complex organisational learning systems, but it is to 
identify how a problem and its resolution affect the evolution of that organisation's 
norms and values, and therefore that organisation's mental models. This is highly 
consistent with the objectives of this study, which intends to investigate ho\\ 
partnerships learn from key events throughout their history. 
Figure 2-3 Stacey's representation of single loop learning 
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Figure 2-4 Stacey's representation of double loop learning 
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At a representational level, it will therefore be important to focus on key partnership 
events or decisions. and the impact these may have on partnership value systems. So far 
notions such as partnership nonns and values, mental models. worldviews or value 
systems have been used interchangeably. The next section aims to define these 
concepts and adapt their use specifically to this study. 
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2.4.4 Organisations' theories of action I mental models 
The definitions of single and double loop leamin~ strongly build on the idea that 
organisations possess 'frameworks' that incorporate their norms, values, goals and 
strategies. Such frameworks have been analysed by Argyris and Schon (1978) as 
organisational images, maps and as organisational theories of action. 
Images and maps are key components of organisational life. They are constructed at 
individual level, can be shared. As such they capture the collective understanding of 
organisational values, including, for example, norms that determine what is acceptable 
or unacceptable behaviour. They were described as 'the shared descriptions of 
organization which individuals jointly construct and use to guide their own inquiry' 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978 pp. 17). Such shared understanding and descriptions tend to be 
tacit and acquired through socialisation processes extensively analysed in the 
knowledge management literature (Nonoka, 1994; Lam. 1997). 
These images and maps have been labelled in more recent publications 'organisational 
mental models' (Kim, 1993; Senge, 1990a). Both Kim and Senge emphasise the 
importance of mental models. Kim (1993) in particular analyses in detail the building 
blocks of mental models distinguishing between norms, values10 and routine behaviour 
that has become deeply embedded within organisational practice. 
Accord ing to Argyris and Schon such norms, values, images and maps shape 
organizations' instrumental theory of action (Argyris & Schon, 1978 pp. 15): 
"The company's instrumental theory of action is a complex system of norms. 
strategies, and assumptions. It includes in its scope the organization's patterns 
10 Kim groups nonns and v.dues and labels them using the (fl.-rrn.aJ1 term Wcltanshaung. to suggest that 
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of communication and control~ its ways of allocating resources to goals, and its 
provisions for self-maintenance- that is for rewarding and punishing individual 
perfonnance~ for constructing career ladders and regulating the rate at which 
individuals climb them, and for recruiting new members and instructing them 
in the ways of the organization." 
Further~ organisations' theories of actions are of two kinds. They include espoused 
theories and theories in use. These concepts were introduced in the early work of 
Argyris and Schon (1978), however defmitions have been simplified and shortened in 
subsequent work (Argyris & Schon, 1996 pp. 13): 
"By 'espoused theory' we mean the theory of action which is advanced to 
explain or justify a given pattern of activity. By 'theories in use' we mean the 
theory of action which is implicit in the performance of that pattern of 
activity. " 
Much of Argyris and Schon's work since the 1970s has focused on showing how and 
why there tends to be clear discrepancies between how individuals and organisations 
tend to rationalise and explain their actions (espoused theories) and the actual rationales 
that led to these actions (theories in use). 
Our review of the role and significance of partnership objectives has highlighted how 
difficult the negotiation and implementation of shared objectives can be. This simply 
highlights how tall an order it is to assume that partnerships can develop, over relatively 
short periods of time, shared theories of action. The commonly imposed requirement on 
partnerships to state shared objectives may merely push them to formulate espoused 
theories that then become part and parcel of their public relations strategies. The 
question is whether they can ever implement these espoused theories and therefore 
transform them into theories in use. If they can. what would be the nature of the 
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learning process? The significance of single and double loop learning, discussed earlier. 
and their relationship with organisational theories in use and espoused theories, suggest 
that one can focus on specific organisational actions. The figures below aim to capture 
this idea. They draw on representations of organisational learning previously presented 
in this section (figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). They also tailor these to the analysis of a 
partnership's learning process and its constituting elements including partnership 
theories of action and the potential for single or double loop learning. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates how a particular partnership action may be framed within existing 
partnership value systems. 
Figure 2-5 Partnership learning when espoused theories and theories in use conflict 
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The right hand side of the figure shows how a partnership's existing theories in use 
frame partnership action. The positive signs illustrate how each of these elements has a 
reinforcing effect on one another. As discussed earlier, the nature of learning when 
actions are framed within established theories in use tends to be single loop. The limits 
of single loop learning is highlighted in the figure by illustrating the potential conflict 
there can be between a partnership's espoused (therefore public) theories of action and 
its actual behaviour when the latter is framed by tacit theories in use. 
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Figure 2.6 illustrates how a partnership's action can directly be linked with double loop 
learning that leads to the emergence of new norms or values or enables a partnership to 
transfer espoused theories into theories in use. 
Figure 2-6 Partnership learning when theories in use and espoused theories converge 
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In the kind of situations illustrated above, partnership action can not only lead to a 
readjustment and strengthening of existing norms and values but it can also generate 
new norms as espoused theories are reinterpreted through organisational action driving 
change. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 will be used in order to explore the relationship between 
partnership objective formulation and implementation and partnership learning. 
2.4.5 The Cyclical Nature of Individual Learning 
Since Kolb (1976) the cyclical nature of individual learning processes has been widely 
accepted and the principle extended to a range of management disciplines where the 
need for organisational learning was called for, including the total quality movement 
(Imai, 1986) and organisational culture and leadership (Schein, 1992). 
A key aspect of Kolb's early contribution is the distinction he makes between cognitive 
and behavioural aspects of the learning process. More recently, Kim (1993) used the 
same distinction in his analysis of the transfer between individual and organisational 
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learning, altering however slightly the terminology to reflect an applied business 
perspectives. He labels cognitive learning 'conceptual learning' and behavioural 
learning 'operational learning' as illustrated in the figure 2.7. 
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For Kim knowledge retention and memory are as important as the dynamic knowledge 
acquisition process. He therefore incorporates in his model the role of active memory. 
Active memory refers to 'the active structures that affect our thinking process and the 
actions we take' (Kim, 1993). They comprise individual mental models and routines. 
Kim's perspective enhances our representation of individual learning, but this depth of 
analysis may still be insufficient, because a number of scholars, includ ing Kim (1993) 
call for a more detailed investigation of the stages involved in organisational learning. 
The next section aims to unravel the learning process in more detail, first by exploring 
the nature of individual learning then exploring the implications for partnership 
learning. 
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2.4.6 From Individual to Partnership Learning 
How does the transfer between individual learning and organisational learning take 
place then? Both Senge (1990) and Kim (1993) suggest that the process is essentially 
incremental. Individual learning experiences and individual mental models 
progressively become explicit and lead to the formation of 'shared mental models'. 
Similarly, individual routines are progressively adopted and become organisational 
routines as they enable the improvement of existing practices. Therefore, from the 
perspective of these two authors, organisational learning is incremental; the process can 
be managed if sufficient emphasis is placed upon making explicit individual mental 
models, seen as the building blocks of shared mental models. 
For Argyris (2001) a detailed analysis of how such a transfer takes place is still 
required. According to him, the idea that organisational learning mirrors individual 
learning processes is too often taken for granted. Furthermore, key issues that will 
prevent organisational learning, including organisational defensive reasoning are also 
overlooked. Argyris points to the potential for conflict and resistance to change as 
organisations strive to learn. A similar argument is made within the economic 
development partnership literature. It is accepted amongst scholars in the field 
(particularly those who have analysed the process by which shared objectives are 
developed) that making explicit each partnering organisation's mental models is highly 
likely to enhance chances of conflict. It was shown in earlier sections of this literature 
review that some partners' agenda is to transform their counterparts, even though 
publicly they may well profess to be equals. Even in cases where partners are brought 
together because of a common objective, their long-term organisational interests 
frequently diverge. This may well explain why researchers in the field recommend 
pragmatic and opportunistic approaches centred on modest shared goal development 
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objectives. Therefore Senge and Kim's recommendation that existing mental models 
should be 'surfaced' in order to enable the development of shared mental models, and in 
the process facilitate organisational learning, may have limited scope for application to 
economic development partnership contexts where such an approach may increase the 
likelihood of conflict. The limited scope for the application of Kim and Senge's 
recommendation to manage mental models may stem from the fact that their research 
focuses on organisational learning in corporate settings. The range of variables that 
have a bearing on public-private partnerships are not only different, they are unique. 
For example, although notions such as corporate social responsibility have growing 
currency within the private sector's discourse, the extent to which they lead to changes 
to corporate behaviour remains limited. By contrast public sector organisations are 
constantly scrutinised by a range of stakeholders to whom they are formally 
accountable. 
Since making explicit the mental models of collaborating parties is likely to exacerbate 
conflicts of interest, the issue for partnerships could be to tap directly into the creativity 
of collaborating individuals to enable them to develop new, shared mental models. This 
would, for example, require them to draw the principles for collaborative actions from 
their practice of collaboration (instead of imposing principles on collaboration derived 
from their organisational mental models and prior to its practice). 
An earlier research project by the author (Oztel, I 998b; Oztel, 1997) supports this view. 
It showed that in collaborative contexts, the formation of shared mental models and 
theories of action is less dependent on surfacing members' mental models than it is on 
the partnership developing its own unique mental models as it accumulates experience 
over time. By drawing on Nonoka's spiral representation of the knowledge creation 
process (Nonoka, 1994) and building on the theory that partnership learning requires 
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the emergence from practice of shared mental models, one can represent partnership 
learning as an iteration between conceptual and operational learning that spirals into an 
ever growing body of shared mental models and partnership theories of action. Figure 
2.8, labelled 'the partnership learning spiral', illustrates such a partnership learning 
process. It illustrates how, in the course of collaborative activity, where employees or 
members) of different organisations are involved, new and creative ideas (conceptual 
learning) may be put in practice (operational learning) and inform the formation of 
collaborative routines. 
Figure 2-8 The partnership learning spiral 
From Oztel (1997) 
Shared mental models 
I theories of action 
conceptual 
learning 
Operational 
learning 
The figure also shows how an imaginative and practical solution devised in the course 
of daily partnership operations (operational learning) can trigger the development of 
new values or understanding (conceptual learning) which in tum may affect partner hip 
mental models and theories of action. 
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The interaction between conceptual learning and operational learning does not always 
follow an upward spiral. Significant regressions are likely to occur in the course of 
partnership activity. Given the conclusions drawn from the review of the literature 
relating to triggers of organisational learning, it is clear that operational and value crises 
need to be incorporated into the partnership's learning spiral. Whilst interaction 
between conceptual and operational learning are likely to enable the development of 
partnership theories of action, the likelihood of value and operational crises disrupting 
and endangering such a process is equaIJy significant. 
The impact of such crises and learning sequence that may occur depending 0 the nature 
of partnership crises are illustrated in figures 2.9 and 2.10. 
Figure 2-9: Learning through value crises 
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Figure 2.9 illustrates how the 'partnership learning spiral' can be used to explain how a 
partnership's sustainability may be weakened via value crises. Value crises are 
generated by pressures to adopt operational solutions, which are not acceptable to one or 
more collaborating parties. 
The 1997 study (Oztel, 1998b; Oztel, 1997) illustrated how this occurred in the context 
of a pUblic-private partnership. A private sector representative lobbied in order to give 
managers within the partnership a greater degree of financial discretion so that decisions 
could be made faster than previously (making the process more efficient from their 
perspective). However, from the perspective of a public sector partner, this limited 
public scrutiny and contradicted its accountability duty. As a consequence, the 
operational solution of greater managerial discretion in decision-making was rejected. 
The debate that followed could have questioned the very existence of the partnership, 
because several partnering organisations' core values were portrayed as inadequate or 
hindering partnership effectiveness. In this instance, however, members' awareness of 
one another's values was enhanced and, despite their conflicting perspectives, partners 
acquired useful new knowledge (conceptual learning). This in turn enabled them to 
agree a more acceptable (though not necessarily optimal) decision-making process, 
which allowed for financial discretion but also tied it with specific budget limits 
(operational learning as a result of the crisis). Figure 2.9 illustrates how the partnership 
value crisis occurred and was overcome with operational learning. 
The 'partnership learning spiral' can also be disrupted by implementation or operational 
crises. In a partnership contex~ operational crises arise when a common project is 
agreed but fails to be put in practice. The 1997 study (Oztel, 1998b; Oztel, 1997) found 
an instance of such a situation when members of the partnership agreed to share 
information held on their organisational client databases and to develop an 
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integrated infonnation system, which was to be accessed by aU partners. This made 
sense, because all partners were serving the same target market located within largely 
overlapping geographical boundaries. 
The project failed to be implemented within the time frames agreed because of 
resistance from middle managers (who felt their jobs were at threat) and because of 
concerns about the developmental costs of the intended system. This meant that some 
partners were slower to commit resources than others. The implementation crisis that 
followed generated debate among partners. They acquired a better understand ing of 
one another's problems, further the scope and purpose of the project was clarified and 
communicated more extensively. In parallel agreements were drawn about infonnation 
ownersrup and management. The conceptual learning that took place as a result of the 
implementation crisis secured greater commitment and facilitated the subsequent 
implementation of the project (see figure 2.10). 
Figure 2-10: Learning through implementation crises 
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In this example too learning enabled the partnership to overcome the crisis. In this 
instance though, the implementation crisis was followed by the development of new 
partnership norms and values (conceptual learning), in tum contributing to the growth 
of shared mental models. 
In conclusion, the presence of value and operational cnses demonstrates that 
partnerships' dynamics cannot simply be defined as positive learning experiences or 
continuous improvement. In fact a partnership's life can be paved with regressions as 
well as progress. A partnership's existence may be questioned after each crisis. 
Partners may fall out and decide that contlict or competition is better alternatives than 
collaboration, particularly when collaboration is not a statutory requirement. However, 
the partnership learning spiral suggests that such crises, when overcome through 
learning, can enhance the quality of relationships within the partnership and underpin 
their long-term sustainability, through the development of unique partnership mental 
models and theories of action. The partnership learning spiral will be used along with 
figures 2.5 and 2.6, which focus on distinctions between single and double loop learning 
as well as espoused theories of action and theories in use, in order to explore the nature 
of partnership learning in this study. 
2. 5 Conclusion 
Economic development partnerships in France operate within quite rigidly defined 
adm inistrative, legal and commercial frameworks. Therefore, partner roles and 
responsibilities tend to be clearly defined at the outset of partnering experiences. 
Nonetheless, the review of French scholars' approaches to defining partnership clearly 
revealed that behind such an apparent clarity lies a diverse range of partnerships. Some 
of these are riddled by power struggles between different tiers of government. 
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Others are primarily set up to access funding, whilst others have as true focal concern 
the formulation and implementation of collaborative policy. While some partnerships 
bring together powerful regional actors attempting to work together, others are 
determined by contractual agreements and focus on sub-contracted public service 
delivery. 
Despite the variety of partnering arrangements that have emerged in practice, policy 
implementation increasingly depends on such arrangements, indicating a drive within 
French public services to foster collaboration between the public and private sector, and 
amongst local economic development institutions, including local and regional 
governments. 
Such a drive isn't without problems. The boundaries between the public and private 
sectors have become increasingly blurred. Policymaking has become the remit of 
groups of organisations, some of which lack the democratic accountability that is 
normally expected of institutions empowered to formulate public policy. Power and 
decisional capacity are distributed across governance systems that have been emerging 
locally and are growingly influential in a wide range of policy fields. 
In addition to issues of democratic accountability and governance which have been 
documented in the United Kingdom and France alike; partnership as form of policy 
delivery is extremely challenging to implement. The potential impact on regional 
governance systems and the need for power sharing have a strong and practical bearing 
on a partnership's ability to formulate shared objectives. Turf wars and struggles for 
control can seriously slow if not endanger the progress of a partnership. Despite the 
widely accepted nature of the challenges associated with partnership working, policy 
makers persist in promoting this form of policy delivery. This has led some 
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commentators to analyse evaluation studies commissioned by practitioners as 
legitimisation devices rather than policy learning tools. However, others centre their 
work on determining whether partnerships can progressively learn from experience and 
develop a partnering capability that could enhance policy delivery locally. 
The key line of inquiry of this study is derived from this concern. In broad terms the 
study aims to determine whether partnering organisations can learn to overcome hurdles 
associated with joint working. 
This requires investigating the development of shared partnership objectives. Although 
synergistic rhetoric may be widely used, the drive to 'transform' partners, or defensive 
actions to protect turf indicate that the negotiation and implementation of shared 
objectives is one of the most significant stumbling blocks to effective partnering. 
Therefore, the originally established line of inquiry may be refined by exploring in 
detail the relationship between the negotiation and implementation of shared objectives 
and partnership learning. 
Such a research objective will require a strong focus on collaborative experience and the 
detailed analysis of specific events perceived by partnering organisations as turning 
points in their collaborative history. The literature indicates that social and operational 
networking, and engagement at the individual and organisational levels are likely to 
play a part in partnership goal negotiation and learning. However, the detailed 
dynamics of such learning processes remain under-researched in the field of economic 
development. 
Although the organisational learning literature is rooted in work published in the 1960s 
and the I 970s. it witnessed a revival of interest from a range of management 
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disciplines, but also in fields such as public policy and economic development. Man) 
of the concepts developed early in the literature have been 'rediscovered' and at times 
re-named, but the issues have by and large remained the same. 
Some of these concepts are highly relevant to this study. This is the case of the notion 
of single and double loop learning, the first indicating surface learning that takes place 
within existing organisational norms, values and mental models; the second indicating. 
by contrast, deep level learning that can not only alter existing norms and values and 
mental models but also enable the emergence of new ones. Likewise, organisational 
theories of action, with, in particular, espoused theories (which refer to the rationales 
organisations claim drive their actions) and theories in use (which are the tacit but real 
driving forces behind organisational action) are concepts extremely relevant to the 
analysis of partnership objective formulation and learning. They shall therefore be 
incorporated in the investigation of relationships between partnership learning and the 
formulation and implementation of partnership objectives. 
However, in order to enable that level of analysis of partnership learning, specific 
aspects of that learning process need to be addressed. Organisational learning processes 
appear to be triggered by crises or tensions, which lead to levels of stress that can only 
be overcome with learning and change. A review of the more recent crisis management 
literature suggests that such crises can be operational in nature or can be value crises. In 
both cases, the sustainability of the partnership can be at risk should organisational 
learning fail. The partnership learning spiral draws on the above ideas and builds on the 
accepted cyclical nature of learning in order to represent partnership learning. This 
inductive tool suggests that the interaction of conceptual and operational learning could 
lead to the emergence of partnership mental models and theories of action. It also 
suggests that operational and conceptual learning could be triggered by value and 
operational crises. 
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Because the development of the partnership learning spiral was inductive and 
considering the limited empirical testing it has been subjected to so far, the partnership 
learning spiral will need to be tested along with its constituting elements, in the course 
of this study. In particular the significance of value and operational crises as triggers of 
learning will need to be established and the robustness of the partnership learning spiral 
as a means of representing partnership learning will need to be evaluated. 
In addition, given the line of inquiry that emerged from the review the literature and the 
questions associated with the applicability of the partnership learning spiral, the 
research questions that will drive this study are: 
Rl: Are value and operational crises components of partnership learning? 
R2: What are the relationships between partnership learning and the negotiation and 
implementation of partnership objectives? 
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3 Investigating Collaborative Activity 
3. 1 Introduction 
This research is conducted usmg a case study fonnat following the interpretive 
traditions of social sciences. This chapter outlines the epistemological foundations that 
underpin such methodological choices and details how the research was conducted in 
practice, discussing the benefits and possible limitations of these choices. 
3. 2 Epistemological Foundations of this Study 
3.2.1 A Focus on Situated Activity 
Argyris and Schon describe their approach to the analysis of organisational learning as 
Deweyan inquiry (1996; 1978). Inspired by the early 20th century philosopher's work, 
they state that inquiry must combine reasoning and action. Therefore, ''the Deweyan 
inquirer is not a spectator but an actor who stands within a situation of action, seeking 
actively to change it" (Argyris & Schon, 1996 pp. 31). They further highlight that the 
interactions that exist between researchers and the situations they investigate are 
dynamic and inherently open-ended. Indeed, "as inquirers seek to resolve what is 
problematic about a situation of action, they bring new problematic features into being" 
(Argyris & Schon, 1996 pp. 31). These views have come to be closely associated with 
action research. Today action research is seen as a "strategy for addressing research 
issues with local people" (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Futing Liao, 2004 pp. 4). Therefore. 
action research involves collaboration, mutual education, and action for change. 
Argyris and Schon's preference for action research is closely linked to their focus on 
organisational learning, but also to their desire to produce knowledge that is of use to 
practitioners. They recognize that practitioners are themselves inquirers. As 
researche~ they are committed to collaborate with them thereby providing 
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alternative perspectives, which may enhance the scope for effective organisational 
learning (Argyris & Sch<5n, 1996). 
Although for access reasons that are detailed later in this chapter, an action research 
perspective was not possible in this study, the principles that underpin Argyris and 
Sch<5n's desire to unravel explicit as well as tacit aspects of organisational learning are 
fundamental to this particular research project. Indeed Argyris and Schon highlight 
how important it is to determine the rationales that shape organisational action. 
whatever their nature: 
"The researchers should try to discover what practitioners already know how 
to do and to learn to appreciate the inquiry in which practitioners are already 
engaged, including the questions they know how to ask and the knowing-in-
action they may take for granted and be unable to describe. These researchers 
should join with practitioners to help discover the hidden rationalities that are 
often build into everyday organisational practice, the productive forms of 
pattern causality of which practitioners themselves are often unaware" (Argyris 
& Sch<5n, 1996 pp. 43). 
The above has two significant implications for this study. First it becomes apparent that 
the identification of causal relationships is a condition for appreciating the elements that 
underpin organisational learning. Second it is necessary to focus analysis on 
organisational action as the unit of analysis. 
Argyris and Schon's perspective on causality diverges strongly from the meaning the 
concept has come to assume in a statistical sense. They highlight that in normal science 
the notion of causality centres on the idea of variable. "a named attribute extracted from 
the complexity of observed phenomena which is treated as essentially the same in 
whatever local context it occurs" (Argyris & Schon, 1996 pp. 38). The researcher's aim 
112 
is to formulate causal propositions or 'general laws' that govern the interaction between 
variables investigated. Mitchell (2000) follows a similar rationale and refers to 
'statistical inference'. He links statistical inference to the generalisation of 'laws' from 
samples to the wider population from which these samples are drawn. He suggests 
"statistical inference is the process by which the analyst draws conclusions about the 
existence of two or more characteristics in some wider population from some sample of 
that population to which the observer has access" (Mitchell, 2000 pp. 176). 
The above authors agree that causality in their work assumes a different meaning, one 
which has fundamentally distinct epistemological roots and which calls for qualitative 
rather than quantitative or purely positivist inquiry. Mitchell (2000) refers to causal or 
logical inference, whereas Argyris and Schon introduce the notion of 'design causality', 
all of which can be linked to Hammersley et ai's (2000) view of causality in case 
studies, Yin's (2003b; 1994) views on 'analytic generalisation' and Stake's (1995) view 
that qualitative research centres on cases or phenomena whilst seeking to identify 
anticipated as well as unexpected relationships. 
Mitchell argues that analysis and inference in qualitative case studies can only be causal 
and logical, not statistical. He suggests, "extrapolability from anyone case study to like 
situations in general is based only on logical inference" (Mitchell, 2000 pp. 177). 
Argyris and Schon's view 'design causality' as .. the causal relation that connects an 
actor's intention to the action he or she designs in order to realise that intention" 
(Argyris & Schon, 1996 pp. 39). Hence, their perspective complements that of Mitchell 
(2000). However. they emphasise two elements that further justify the search for design 
causality. As suggested earlier. they remind us that focussing on unravelling 
organisational actors' intent can indeed enable the researcher to unveil the tacit and 
explicit aspects of organisational learning. But they also strongly argue that 
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practitioners, themselves, rely on design causality when reflecting and drawing lessons 
from their experience. Therefore, they suggest that research that investigates design 
causality is more likely to echo practitioners' own sense-making processes and is 
therefore more likely to have a positive impact when attempting to foster change in 
organisational learning systems. 
One can infer from the above that statistical and positivist forms of inquiry would not be 
suitable for this research. All these could achieve is to establish relationships between 
sets of variables. This in itself can prove a significant contribution to the literature as 
numerous studies have demonstrated (Simonin, 1997; Kraatz, 1998; Jassawalla & 
Sashittal, 1999). However, such an approach is unlikely to unravel the tacit drivers that 
underpin organisational action. In particular, organisational theories in use, that are so 
significant in organisational learning, would fail to show up in studies designed 
following a positivist epistemology. This may be why equally (if not more) significant 
and influential studies have opted for qualitative research methodologies, and have 
deliberately sought to stay close the organisational actors. This is relevant for many of 
the pioneering studies in organisational learning, including Cangelosi and Dill (1965), 
Argyris (1976), Argyris and Schon (1978), Miles and Snow et al (1978). More recently, 
researchers have opted for qualitative forms of inquiry when investigating 
organisational learning, included Senge (1990a), Pardo et al (2001), Miner et al (2001). 
The logical implication of the above is that studies seeking to establish design causality 
need to be conducted at the level of situated activity. This is because when 
investigating organisational learning, the unit of analysis is organisational action. For 
Layder, analysis at the level of situated activity centres on "emergent meanings, 
understanding and definitions of the situation as these affect and are affected by 
contexts and settings [ ... ] and subjective dispositions of individuals" (Laydcr, 1993 pp. 
72). By contrast to micro-level analyses, which centre on the self (self-identity and 
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individuals' social experience), or macro-level analyses that tend to focus on the 
collective and institutional aspects of society (and are therefore quantitative). Research 
at the level of situated activity moves towards an exploration of the dynamics of the 
interaction. 
These authors' arguments make a case for the use of qualitative research conducted at 
the level of situated activity when investigating partnering dynamics and partnership 
learning. Partnering is about interaction, coordination; it is a dynamic phenomenon, so 
it calls for qualitative inquiry following Stake's rationale. According to Layder's 
perspective, the unit of analysis is clearly situated activity, where the issue researched is 
the dynamics of the interaction itself. Layder characterises further the type of research 
questions that are likely to be associated with such investigation: 
"Who is doing what, to whom, in this episode or strip of interaction? How are 
these things being achieved? Answers to these questions entail concentrating 
on the collective intentions and objectives of the participants (that is, as an 
interacting group rather than separately motivated individuals) and the forms of 
manipulation, persuasion and control that are being used" (Layder, 1993 pp. 
88). 
The above is highly applicable to this study given that one of the research questions 
precisely aims to determine the relationships that exist between partnership learning and 
the negotiation and implementation of partnership objectives. But in order to fu lIy 
address this question, it is important to take into account two aspects of situated activity 
that may call for specific investigation methods. Firstly, Layder points out .. the 
contribution of individuals concerned is such that each instance of similar activity will 
bear the unique imprint of the particular configuration of people involved" (Layder. 
1993 pp. 84). Secondly, Layder argues that the nature of the setting will also 
I 15 
dramatically shape the dynamic interaction that takes place amongst actors. 
The implication of these two characteristics of situated activity is that each partnership 
setting, each set of interactions and instances of learning need to be treated as unique. 
And indeed the literature review presented in earlier chapters has shown tha~ in France. 
there can be wide discrepancies between partnerships operating in the context of the 
same national enterprise development initiative. Therefore, one needs to consider each 
partnership as a unique entity. This in tum calls for a case study design. Hammersley 
et aI's (2000) analysis supports this view in that they clearly establish linkages between 
the case study method and the search for causal relationships of the kind outlined by 
Argyris and Schon (1996). They suggest that the theoretical value of case studies is 
derived precisely from case studies' suitability to uncover causal processes linking 
inputs and outputs within a system (Hammersley et ai., 2000). This perspective is also 
consistent with Yin's view of case study, which he defines as "an inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2003b 
pp. 13). 
To conclude, the investigation of organisational learning processes, whether tacit or 
explicit, requires this study to unravel relationships between practitioners' intent, 
organisational action and its outcomes. Such relationships can be analysed in terms of 
design causality (as opposed to statistical causality). This in tum requires the researcher 
to remain close to the situations being investigated and calls for the analysis of rich 
qualitative data. 
Therefore, the unit of analysis must be organisational action and the level of analysis 
has to be situated activity. Given the unique characteristics the each partnering situation 
brings to the study, it is proposed that partnership learning is investigated within 
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each partnership considered as a case study. Analysis at the level of situated activit~ 
has been shown to be particularly suitable when attempting to address research 
questions that centre on organisational actors collective intentions and objectives set in 
the context of dynamic interactions. This further strengthens the case for analysis at this 
level given that one the research questions of this study aims to unravel the relationships 
that exist between partnership learning and the negotiation and implementation of 
partnership objectives. 
To summarise, a case study approach, which focuses on the identification of causal 
relationships and relies on the analysis of primarily qualitative data appears to be a 
logical way to proceed given the focus of this research project. 
3.2.2 An Interpretive Research Approach 
Despite the sometimes entrenched positions that can be found in the research 
methodology literature, it is widely accepted that deduction and induction, as analytic 
rationales associated with quantitative and qualitative research methods, are two ends of 
the same continuum (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stake, 1995; Layder, 1993). For example, 
Stake (1995) agues that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches 
is a matter of emphasis, as they are mixtures. According to him ""in each ethnographic 
or naturalistic or phenomenological or hermeneutic or holistic study (i.e. in each 
qualitative study), enumeration and recognition of differences in amount have 
prominent places. And in each statistical survey and controlled experiment (i.e. in each 
quantitative study), natural language description and researcher interpretation are 
important" (Stake, 1995pp. 36). 
Such 'difference in emphasis' is generally related with researchers' varying degrees of 
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concern with theory generation as opposed to theory testing. and their reliance on 
inductive as opposed to deductive analytic strategies (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Layder. 
1993). Theory testing is sometimes referred to as 'verificatory inquiry'. For Lincoln 
and Guba, "verificatory inquiry attempts to verify or falsify propositions or hypotheses 
that have been arrived at elsewhere, while generative inquiry attempts to discover 
constructs using the data themselves as the point of departure" (Lincoln & Gub~ 1985 
pp. 334). Overall, interpretive research tends to focus on theory generation and relies 
on inductive forms of inquiry more than it would on deductive approaches. This is 
because interpretive approaches involve an "emphatic understanding of, or access to 
common sense knowledge of the investigated form of social life" (Seidel & Kelle, 1995 
pp. 55). Its point of departure and anchor are, therefore, empirical data rather than pre-
estab lished theories. 
Epistemological choices in research are as much guided by a researcher's own values 
about knowledge creation as they are connected with/to the nature of the topic under 
investigation, and the type of questions that drive the inquiry (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; 
Shipman, 1988; Travers, 200 I). This study belongs to interpretive research trad itions 
and, therefore, is close to the generative/inductive end of the research spectrum. But as 
indicated in previous chapters, the researcher also incorporates in the study significant 
conceptual developments that have characterised the organisational learning literature in 
order to determine the extent to which they apply to the particular partnerships being 
analysed. Because of this, this study incorporates positivist elements of theory testing, 
illustrating clearly that boundaries between analytic rationales overlap within 
interpretive traditions (Travers, 200 I; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
The rationale for a generative element in this study stems from its focus on situated 
activity, discussed earlier. It is also driven by the researcher's personal commitment 
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to detailed, and in depth analysis when investigating a problem. This is close to Seidel 
and Kelle's (1995) desire to develop an 'emphatic' understanding' when conducting 
empirical research. Stake (1995) builds on this perspective. He posits. in particular. 
that qualitative research is about developing understanding of a phenomenon. Attention 
must be given to the context in which the phenomenon took place. The feelings. 
arguments, ideas (etc.) of those involved are also taken into account. Therefore, the 
qualitative researcher should pay attention to emic issues)); show empathy; focus on 
respondent intentionality. In other words, he or she should appreciate all forms of 
interactions. For him the inclusion of emic concerns leads qualitative/ interpretive 
researchers to incorporate within their studies "the concerns and values recognized in 
the behaviour and language of the people being studied" (Stake, 1995 pp. 42). This in 
tum can lead to the emergence of rich narratives, characterised by 'thick description' , 
which according to him "is not complexities objectively described" but "is the particular 
perceptions of the actors" (Stake, 1995 pp. 42). The above are consistent with 
Shipman's view of interpretive inquiry as he suggests that it focuses 'on social 
processes and the meanings given to them by participants" (Shipman, 1988 pp. 38). 
This is also consistent with Argyris and Schon's (1996) call for unravelling 
practitioners' own understanding of their own learning process. 
By and large these views apply to this study and are common within the different 
schools of thought belonging to the interpretive tradition. Their shared central concern 
is to address meaning (Travers. 2001). This is the case for grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1999); phenomenology (Schutz, 1967); naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). ethnography (Spradley, 1979). It must be recognised at this point that although 
there are strong similarities within the interpretive traditions, they ditTer on significant 
dimensions too. Furthermore. the schools of thought mentioned above cover by no 
11 Fmic iSSUl'S arc "issu~ of the 3l.1ors. the Pl'Opie who belong to the case" (Stake. 1995 pp.20) I 19 
means the large variety of approaches that falls under the interpretive umbrella. In fact 
attempts to map the interpretive/qualitative research landscape have yielded different 
results. 
For example, Wolcott (1992) used the drawing of a tree and its branches to 
metaphorically illustrate 25 strands in qualitative methods stemming from five broad 
strategies: archival strategies, non-participant strategies, participant observation, field 
studies and interview strategies. Tesch (1990), on the other hand, focuses his taxonomy 
on research purpose. His computer-generated tree presents three substantive questions 
driving inquiry. These are respectively focused on the characteristics of language: the 
discovery ofregularities in human experience; and the comprehension of the meaning of 
text and action. He identifies in total some 27 types of qualitative research. It is already 
apparent that these two authors use similar as well as different labels for what could be 
called mini-paradigms in qualitative research. Other taxonomies exist; among them is 
that of Jacob (1987) who identifies five major qualitative research traditions (ecological 
psychology, holistic ethnography; ethnography of communication; and symbolic 
interactionism) while Orosz (1992) focuses on three main approaches in qualitative 
inquiry (positivistic, interpretivist and post-modem / critical theory led qualitative 
research, each of which can be subdivided into mini-paradigms). But as Miles and 
Hubermann suggest, "as comprehensive and clarifying as these catalogs and taxonom ies 
may be, they tum out to be basically incommensurate, both in the way the different 
qualitative strands are defined and in the criteria used to distinguish them. The mind 
boggles in trying to get from one to the other." (Miles & Huberman, 1994 pp. 5) 
For the remainder of this argument, therefore, the focus will be on identifying the 
features that apply to this study and trace when. or which schools of thought - within the 
interpretive tradition - have emphasised these features. 
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As indicated earlier, the desire to unravel social processes and the commitment to 
provide their description whilst incorporating in these accounts participants' 
perspectives, are connected to the researcher's own epistemological beliefs. However. 
the topic under investigation itself can call for generative research and inductive 
analytic rationales as argued by Coffey and Atkinson (1996), Shipman (1988) or 
Travers (2001) for instance. 
This study'S primary focus is partnership learning. The literature review has shown that 
partnering and organisational learning are rich and dynamic social processes. Learning, 
in particular, is closely related to lived experience. It relies largely on individuals' 
subjective assessment of an experience, which can lead to behavioural adjustments 
(Kolb, 1976; Kim, 1993), or error correction as suggested by Argyris and Schon (1978). 
The investigation of partnership learning hence requires a focus on the ways in which 
actors perceive their experience and act upon it. This, in turn, pushes the case for an 
interpretive inductive approach. 
The positivist tendencies of this inherently interpretive piece of work are explained by 
the nature of the subject too. Organisational learning as a topic has become a fairly 
prominent research topic in organisational studies since the mid 1960s; therefore, 
conceptual and theoretical developments are numerous. Contributions by scholars like 
Argyris and Schon (1978) are considered to be embedded within the literature. In 
particular, distinctions between single and double loop learning, and organisational 
theories in use and espoused are not only accepted; they have been fairly extensively 
researched in corporate contexts (Shrivastava. 1983; March. Sproul. & Tamuz. 1991; 
Senge. I 990a; Argyris, 2001) or in the context of education (Simonin, 1997: Arg)Tis & 
Schon. 1978) and non-governmental organisations (Argyris & Schon. 1978). By 
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contrast they have very rarely shaped research in the public sector field, and even less in 
the specific context of public-private partnerships. Instances where organisational 
learning is explored within a public sector context would include the work of British 
Scholars Rashman and Hartley (2002) and Sanderson et al (2001), and American 
researchers Pardo et al (2001). This suggests that there is a gap in the literature and 
there is scope to test some of the concepts and theories in the public sector and 
specifically in public private partnerships settings. Therefore, a verificatory angle to 
this research project is also needed. The research question that aims to determine 
whether value and operational crises are components of partnership learning mirrors a 
deductive analytical approach, which intends to determine how existing concepts and 
theories apply to the partnership settings being investigated. 
Furthermore, the ideas behind organisational theories of action (in use or espoused), 
themselves suggest that participants' perceptions of their learning experiences as well as 
their rationalisation of these events tend to be incomplete. Argyris and Schon (1978) 
indicate that whilst participants may use a particular rationale to explain their actions or 
motivations (espoused theories), the actual drivers that guide their behaviour and 
decisions may be very different and may remain tacit (theories in use). This in tum 
suggests that researchers investigating organisational learning need to progressively 
distance themselves from participants' narratives, and therefore move from the 
inductive/subjective towards the more deductive/objective dimensions of interpretive 
research. 
Such a process is seen as a cornerstone of the phenomenological school of thought 
within the interpretive research tradition. The 1967 translation of the 1932 seminal 
piece by Alfred Schutz set the foundations of the phenomenological school of thought 
in sociology. Like other interpretive schools of though~ the primary aim of the 
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phenomenological researcher is to unravel the process of meaning establishment. 
Whilst reviewing Weber's wor~ Schutz argues that interpretive research must be 
rigorous and scientific. He further postulates that the researchers' ultimate aim must be 
to present in an objective manner what is inherently subjective. Indeed, he suggests. 
"all social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning contexts" 
(Schutz, 1967 pp. 241). Interpretation is the process that underpins the shift from the 
subjective to the objective, and according to Schutz this process relies on the 
researcher's progressive construction of objective ideal types of participants' subjective 
experiences. He details the steps involved as follows: 
"In the process of ideal-typical construction, subjective meaning contexts that 
can be directly experienced are successively replaced by a series of objective 
meaning contexts. These are constructed gradually, each one upon its 
predecessor, and they interpenetrate one another in Chinese-box fashion, so 
that it is difficult to say where one leaves off and the other begins. However it 
is precisely this process of construction which makes it possible for the social 
scientist, or indeed for any observer, to understand what the actor means; for it 
is this process alone which gives a dimension of objectivity to his meaning. Of 
course, this process of constitution can only be disclosed to the interpreter by 
means of his own typifYing method. What he will thus come to know is only a 
conceptual model, not a real person" (Schutz, 1967 pp. 241-242). 
The need to draw out of participants' behaviour objective and conceptual understanding 
is of foremost importance given this study's aim to explore the extent to which elements 
of organisational learning theory apply to economic development partnerships. For 
some interpretive researchers this indicates a positivist bias. The positivist bias of this 
study is acknowledged and deemed necessary as argued above. It is however not 
unusual or groundbreaking within the interpretive research tradition. 
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Positivism and interpretivism tend generally to be contrasted at the epistemological 
level with distinctions drawn between positivism, interpretivism, realism and post 
structuralism (Travers, 2001; Layder, 1993). However, as shown by Travers (2001). 
Layder (1993) and Lincoln and Guba (1985), positivist inclinations are clearly present 
within interpretive schools of thOUght. Lincoln and Guba (1985) illustrate this by 
contrasting their naturalistic paradigm with grounded theory, which for them involves a 
strong positivist bias because of its emphasis on establishing causal linkages and its aim 
to derive grounded but also generalisable theories. 
To summanse, this study follows the basic principles of the interpretive research 
tradition. Because of its focus on partnership learning, which requires that attention be 
paid to participants' perception of their own lived experience, it uses an inductive 
approach and aims to provide rich narratives of that experience. However, the need to 
establish the relevance of well developed concepts in the field of organisational learning 
to the specific context of economic development partnerships also calls for a deductive 
analytic approach. The second research question, which aims to determine whether 
value and operational crises are components of partnership learning, follows such a 
deductive analytic rationale. 
3. 3 A Case Study Research Method 
3.3.1 Choice of Initiative and Access 
In the early stages of this study, the researcher's knowledge of specific economIc 
development initiatives in France was limited. Past research on partnering dynamics 
and partnership learning had been conducted in the United Kingdom and focused on 
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economic development policies, including the Business Link initiative (Martin & Oztel, 
1996; Hutchinson, Foley, & Oztel, 1996; Onel, 1997; Oztel, 1998b; Oztel & Martin. 
1998). 
The decision to analyse a French initiative was originally driven by a desire to generate 
data that could be compared to findings obtained in the British contex~ and was 
facilitated by the researcher being bilingual. Therefore, in July 1997 and with 
assistance from the supervisors of this study, an initial set of contacts were established 
in the United Kingdom with scholars who had been involved in previous comparative 
studies. This led to a first set of visits and interviews in August 1997 followed by 
another in January 1998. They involved meetings with civil servants at ministerial 
level, academics involved in economic development research and non-governmental 
organisations managers involved in supporting the SME sector (See appendix 2 for 
details). These interviews were conducted in order to explore the range of 
governmental initiatives in enterprise development that specifically relied on partnering 
arrangements. Work was primarily exploratory, the focus was on gathering as much 
secondary data as possible. and establishing links with French practitioners, whose 
knowledge was essential in providing the information required for selecting a national 
initiative suitable for this study. 
The selection criteria for determining which initiative ought to be investigated was that 
it should: 
I. Be national 
2. Rely on partnering 
3. Be in the field of economic development 
4. Focus on business support 
5. Preferably otTer a generic set of business services. 
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6. Be well established 
The outcome of the ten interviews and visits that took place in August 1997 and January 
1998 was the identification of two different initiatives that could be suitable for this 
research project from an initial pool of four policies. These initiatives were the 
RDE/RDI (Reseau de Developpement Economique or Reseau de Oeveloppement 
Industriel) which has come to be known as the 'Reseaux Developpeurs" and the ROT 
(Reseau de Diffusion Technologique) initiatives. 
Neither of these initiatives, however, met all six criteria outlined above, although they 
both met five of them. For instance, the Reseau de Developpeurs initiative was indeed 
national, did require partnering at local levels, was a government sponsored initiative 
that was designed to support SMEs by giving them access to a range of generalist 
business support services. However, it was fairly recent and most importantly 
undergoing significant changes that were driven nationally. In particular, it was felt by 
interviewees that the political manoeuvring and power struggles that were rife at that 
point in time might overshadow other partnering issues of interest to this study. In the 
case of the RDT initiative, again all the criteria were met, but one. This initiative did 
not provide a generalist set of services for SMEs; instead, it focused on technology 
transfer assistance. By contrast the 'Reseaux Developpeurs' however, the RDT 
initiative was well established nationwide and had a long history. This was felt to be 
more significant than the type of assistance provided given the study's focus on 
partnership learning, and therefore the need for local partnership to have signiticant 
experience they could draw and reflect upon. Furthennore, it was evident from the 
interviews conducted with senior civil servants involved in the design and 
implementation of both initiatives, that a focus on the ROT would be welcomed and 
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supported. The decision was made therefore to focus the inquiry on the French ROT 
initiative. 
The contact in January with the national manager of the RDT initiative enabled four 
significant developments. First the study was endorsed. Second, a comprehensive list 
of all regional ROT partnerships was obtained, with contact details for the managers of 
these partnerships. Third the researcher was invited to attend the forthcoming National 
Conference of ROT partnerships due to take place on the 23 rd of October 1998. Finally, 
the researcher was able to discuss the varying characteristics of local partnerships and 
identify a first case study, which was agreed to be the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie. Whilst in attendance of the 1998 National Conference, the researcher 
engaged further with partnership managers, established contacts, selected the second 
case study and secured access. 
The process described above has sim ilarities with that which was adopted by Burgess as 
outlined in Shipman (1988). Although one speaks of sampling when discussing the 
selection of the specific cases that will be studied, the purposive nature of the process 
used to identify a suitable initiative from which cases could be drawn bears resemblance 
with the steps followed by Burgess: 
"In purposive sampling the researcher does the picking. A typical but very 
well documented case is in the study of Bishop McGregor School by Burgess 
(1984). In 1984, Burgess found no ethnographic studies of comprehensive 
schools, the government had just announced that the leaving age was to be 
raised, and he was looking for a PhO topic. Burgess gets down to read ing. 
meeting education officials and attends available meetings of teachers. At one 
meeting he is approached by a man who asks • Who are you and where do you 
come from?' Not put off by the reply that he is speaking to a researcher at 
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the University of Warwick, the stranger introduces himself as running Bishop 
McGregor Comprehensive School, gives Burgess his telephone number and 
asks him to visit if he would like to look round" (Shipman, 1988 pp. 56). 
The partnership case selection criteria are further detailed in the next section. 
3.3.2 Case Selection: Purposive Sampling 
Purposive sampling in qualitative inquiry is defined as "the deliberate seeking out of 
participants with particular characteristics" (Morse, 2004). Patton (2002) identifies nine 
different forms of purposive sampling, including extreme or deviant case, intensity 
sampling, maximum variation sampling, homogeneous sampling, typical case sampling, 
critical case sampling, snowball sampling, criterion sampling and theoretical sampling. 
Given the need for in-depth analysis, to satisfactorily explore partnership learning 
processes, it was felt that only two case studies could be included in this study which 
has to comply with the usual length restrictions imposed upon PhD dissertations. 
Therefore, to maximise the relevance of the findings from these two case studies, it was 
important to look to patterns and consistencies in partnership learning across these two 
cases in circumstances that were significantly different. This justified the choice of 
maximum variation or polar sampling. 'Maximum variation sampling' intends to 
'document unique or diverse variations that have emerged in adapting to different 
conditions' and aims to 'identify important common patterns that cut across variations 
(cut through the noise of variation)' according to Patton (2002 pp. 243). 
The choice of this approach was guided by the finding in the literature that the 
"geometry' of economic development partnerships varies very significantly even when 
they fonn part of the same national initiative and have to comply with a set of 
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guidelines for their operation. This certainly appeared to be the case for the French 
ROT initiative at the centre of this particular research project (RIOT Senior Manager, 
1998; ANVA~ Secretariat d'Etat a l'Industrie, & Ministere de L 'Education Nationale 
de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 1999; Ministere de l'Education nationale de la 
Recherche et de la Technologie, 1989). The hope was that the findings derived could 
lead to conceptual developments that might be relevant to other partnerships, and enable 
sense-making for partnering organisations even though they may belong to entirely 
different initiatives. The dimensions used to maximise variation between Presence 
Rhone-Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie included the following: 
Operations: partnership members' ability to prescribe customers their own services 
(auto-prescription). This was possible in the case of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie, which of all ROTs has the second highest level of auto-prescription at 
91%. By contrast it is strictly forbidden in Presence Rhone-Alpes where that same 
rate stands at 00/0 (see appendix 8). 
Control: sources of authority for the partnership manager (entirely non-hierarchical 
or contractually imposed with service level agreements). Of all the 22 ROT 
partnerships only two used service levels agreements (at the time partnerships were 
selected). One of these was Presence Rhone-Alpes. All the other partnerships 
relied on the voluntary engagement of partnership members. Partnership managers 
had no hierarchical, or other forms of control over activity levels of individual 
business counsellors. 
Performance: national policy makers' views of the success of the partnership 
(unsuccessful and struggling. or exemplar and influencing national policy making). 
During the exploratory interviews conducted in the summer of 1997 and winter of 
1998, it was clear that Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologic was considered to be 
a partnership. which was struggling. and where partner contlicts were rife. It was 
recognised. however. that its structure and operations were largely consistent 
12<} 
with the majority of RDT partnerships, and in line with national guidelines. By 
contrast, Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie was portrayed as extremely 
innovative, and unique in the way it managed its operations. The choices that this 
partnership had made appeared to be at odds with the great majority of ROTs.. yet 
its overall operations were considered by governmental policy makers to be very 
successful. 
3.3.3 Data Collection Strategies 
Data collection strategies were determined by three elements affecting this study. These 
were the suitability of the strategies chosen for interpretive case study research; the data 
requirement in the light of the research questions formulated, and the level of access 
secured within each of the case partnerships. 
Marshall and Rossman (1995) distinguish between primary and supplemental data 
collection techniques in interpretive research. Primary methods include participation, 
observation, in depth interviewing and the review of documents. Supplemental methods 
incorporate, for example, narratives, life histories, films, videos and photographs, 
kinesics 12, etc ... According to Yin (2003b; 1994) case studies may combine a range of 
data collection methods, although each will tend to have specific strengths and 
weaknesses. Yin breaks down Marshall and Rossman's primary data collection 
methods into six categories and outlines their benefits and limitations. These are 
outlined in table 3.1. 
I~ Kinesics is the stud~ of hody movements l.xmtributing to communication (Ehrlich. Bcrg-FIc:\ncr. 
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Table 3-1 Six SOllrces of evidellce: strellgthS alld weaklleSJes mil, 2fJf(3) 
Source of evidence 
Documentation 
Archival reoords 
Interviews 
Direct Observations 
Participant 
Observations 
Physical Artefacts 
Strength. 
Stable: can be retrieved 
repeatedly 
Unobtrusive: not created as a 
result of the case study 
Exact- contains exact names, 
refermces, and details of an 
event 
Broad coverage: long span of 
time, many events and ~y 
settings 
Same as above for documentation 
Precise and quantitative 
Targeted: focused directly on 
case study topics 
Insightful: provides perceived 
causal inferences 
Reality: covers events in real 
time 
Contextual: covers context of 
event 
Same ~ above for direct 
observation 
Insightful into interpersonal 
behavior and motives 
Insightful into cultural features 
Insightful into technical 
operations 
Weaknesses 
Retrievability: can be low 
Biased selectivity if collection 
is inoomplete 
Reporting bias: reflect 
(unknown) bi~ of the autlKX' 
Aa:ess: may be deliberately 
blocked 
Same as the abo\'e for 
documentation 
Aa:essibility due to piwcy 
Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
Response bias 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
Ret1exivity: interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to hear 
TIme consuming 
Selectivity, unless broad 
coverage 
Reflexivity: event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
Cost: hours needed by human 
observer 
Same ~ above for direct 
observation 
Bias due to investigator's 
manipulation of events 
Selectivity 
Availability 
The need to investigate particular events and appreciate actors' personal perspectives on 
their experience indicates that interviews and participant observations would be the 
most suitable means of investigating partnership learning. The use of documentary and 
archival sources would give access to factual data and provide a degree of precision that 
may not be as strong were the researcher to rely entirely on interviewee recollections. 
The level of access secured in both partnerships, however, only provided limited scope 
for participant observation. Overall, at the time the inquiry was being conducted, both 
partnerships were involved or had just been involved with consultancy projects that had 
brought into the partnerships external agents already interacting, and collaborating 
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with key partnership players. The researcher did have endorsement at national level but 
had not had sufficient time to socialise and secure a degree of trust from partnership 
managers that would enable them to allow her access to key meetings, such as 
partnership board meetings. She therefore decided not to pursue this option and instead 
focus on a level of collaboration that would be acceptable to partnership managers. It 
was clear that they felt comfortable supporting an interview based approach and were 
happy to provide access to documentary sources, including evaluation studies. 
partnership business plans, counsellor training materials, policy guidelines etc ... In the 
case of Presence Rhone-Alpes the researcher was also invited to attend and contribute to 
a two-day training event designed for business counsellors. 
The implication of the above is that documentary sources and interviews became core 
sources of data for the case studies, as is often the case, as indicated by Yin (2003b). 
Although it was clear that this approach was largely a function of practical access 
reasons, it was felt that the methods chosen were highly suitable to the investigation of 
the research questions outlined in the literature review. Indeed the focused nature of 
interviews and the researcher's ability to explore, through this method, perceived causal 
inferences, meant that some of the key methodological concerns about causality in the 
investigation of partnership learning could be addressed. Further details on the 
implementation of this data collection strategy are outlined in the next sections. 
3.3.3.1 Documentary and Archival Data 
The researcher started to collect documentary sources in the early stages of the study in 
order to build a complete picture of the ROT initiative. Key documents shaping the 
policy were obtained from national coordinators of the initiative. These complemented 
the historical data that was obtained through open-ended semi-structured interviews at 
1''') 
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the exploratory stage of the research. These documents included original discussion 
papers on technology transfer policies, policy launch documents outlining the basic 
principles of the initiative, yearly national reports of ROTs activities and ministerial 
review documents. Specific, and significant documents such as counsellors' ethical 
codes of conduct, counsellor-training materials were also obtained. 
Other documentary sources were obtained that were more specifically relevant to each 
of the partnerships investigated. For example, partnership statutes, evaluation studies 
conducted by external consultants, partnership business plans were all made available to 
the researcher. 
Overall documentary and archival data were extremely significant because of the 
general lack of published research papers on the ROT initiative. The researcher was 
able to retain copies of these documents for review and analysis. They were the primary 
sources used in order to give an account of the ROT policy presented in chapter 4. 
3.3.3.2 Interviews 
Interviews were semi-structured and open ended. A mind-map was used as the 
interview protocol (See Appendix 4). It included a set of key themes that were seen as 
significant in the review of the partnership literature and were focused on respondents' 
view of their partnering experience. The issue of partnership learning or concepts, such 
as single or double loop learning and organisational theories of action were deliberately 
avoided, to minimise the issue of reflexivity outlined in table 3.1. Indeed. quality 
analysis of partnership learning processes was highly dependent on capturing rich 
accounts of participants views on their experience, their description of decision making 
processes or other operational issues. Therefore, the focus was on participants' 
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activities, their views, and their reflections, expressed using their own term inologies. 
The research outline provided to participants prior to their interview did give a good 
indication of the topics that were going to be covered, while at the same time remaining 
broad enough to enable participants to emphasise what they thought were the most 
significant partnership experiences. 
The interviewing strategy deliberately relied on a simple mind-map as a skeleton to 
support the exchange. In the mind-map themes are represented by single words. 
allowing maximum flexibility in the way questions were asked. Indeed, term inology 
used by the informant would be re-used in the questioning; clarifications about the 
meanings informants associated with particular words could be sought. The mind-map 
structure (as opposed to a numbered list of themes or questions to be covered) also had 
the benefit of allowing informants and interviewer alike to jump from one topic to the 
other, without necessarily reflecting or following the rationale initially used in build ing 
the sequence of discussion topics, but most importantly allowing respondents to follow 
freely their trail of thought. Such an approach opens up opportunities for the emergence 
of associations and causal connections that might not have been surfaced had an 
informant or the interviewer followed a pre-established rationale of inquiry and an 
explanation building strategy. 
However the risk of deviation and collection of data that are barely comparable is 
significant with this type of approach. This was overcome largely thanks to the m ind-
map structure of the interview schedule. Mind-maps allow the interviewer to minimize 
this risk because of the inherent benefits of mind-mapping. The one-page. visual 
representation of interview topics enables the interviewer to spot very easily. and in the 
course of the interview, points that need discussing that may have been overlooked 
consciously, or unconsciously during the exchange. Whilst interviews were being 
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tape recorded, the interviewer was also taking notes in a mind-map formal further 
enhancing the ability to identify gaps in responses, or topics that may have been easil~ 
missed had a linear note taking strategy been adopted. 
As indicated above, the interviews have all been tape recorded with the interviewees 
consent. It was agreed with them that the data this way recorded would be kept 
confidential and the nature of that confidentiality was agreed with them prior to the 
interviews taking place. Before their meeting, all interviewees were given the following 
indication regarding confidentiality: 
"Interview transcripts are solely designed to safeguard the accuracy of data. 
They will be used to conduct the analysis and outside the researcher, they can 
be seen in their entirety by the interviewees alone. Quotes from transcribed 
interview data can be included in the [mal PhD document and associated 
academic publications. They will not be attributed to a named individual. In 
sensitive cases, partnership identity may also be disguised" (Oztel, I 998a pp. 
2). 
A full list of interviews carried out for both case studies is provided in appendix 3. 
Excluding the first 10 visits and interviews that were conducted to determine which 
national initiative would be analysed, the researcher conducted an additional 25 
interviews in Lille and Lyon. These generally lasted between sixty and ninety minutes. 
In the case of Lyon. that is the Presence Rhone-Alpes partnership, this represented a 
total of 14 interviews. Fully transcribed, these interviews added up to 214 pages of data 
(that is 87,534 words). In the case of Lille. that IS Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie, there were II interviews. of which 9 were fully transcribed and 
represented a total of 160 pages of transcribed materials (that is just under 58,000 
words). 
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3.3.4 Data Analysis: The Role of CAQDAS 
This section focuses on the use of CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software) because this was the data analysis strategy used in this study. While 
there is a broad consensus on the type of research tasks that can be supported b) 
CAQDAS, writers tend to disagree on significant methodological issues. These include 
questions on the impact of CAQDAS on epistemological assumptions underpinning 
research. The origins of CAQDAS are discussed first, then categorisation strategies are 
outlined and the process by which theoretical development can be supported by 
CAQDAS is outlined. 
The use of computers in social sciences is by no means new. Textual data handling 
software, such as The Inquirer, designed for quantitative content analysis, were released 
in the late 1960s (Keile, 1995b). However debates on CAQDAS emerged in the 1980s 
and proliferated in the 1990s as qualitative researchers became increasingly attracted to 
the possibilities offered by increasing numbers of software packages capable of 
accommodating varied research traditions (Buston, 1997; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; 
Kelle, 1995a). There is significant convergence in the way CAQDAS is characterised. 
Researchers tend to primarily focus on the functions it fulfils, which revolve around 
different data coding and retrieval techniques used for content analysis. Hypertext is the 
technical platform most software packages rely upon. It has made possible the 
automation of these tasks, seen as the most tedious in qualitative analysis (Araujo, 1995: 
Dey, 1995; Prein, Kelle, Richards, & Richards, 1995; Richards & Richards, 1995). They 
have traditionally been conducted manually, relying on the use of cards. colour. scissors 
and glue i.e. any device imaginable that facilitated the coverage of large amounts of 
unstructured or semi-structured qualitative material (Prein et al.. 1995). However the 
amount oftloor space available to any researcher. and the timcframe within which given 
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research projects need to be completed soon become significant limiting factors 
affecting not only the project size, but also depth and reliability of the analysis (Kelle & 
Laurie, 1995). CAQDAS offers speed of data retrieval, enables researchers to conduct 
varied types of searches, it allows them to identify in the data generic themes. as well as 
connections between these themes (Richards, 1999). Through ongoing monitoring and 
recording of the research process, CAQDAS enhances transparency in qualitative 
research (Kelle & Laurie, 1995). As software packages become more versatile. so does 
researchers' enthusiasm for, and actual use ofCAQDAS (Buston, 1997; Cannon. 1998). 
Data coding and retrieval support three methodological processes: indexing, thematic 
coding and theorising (Cannon, 1998; Prein et aI., 1995~ Richards & Richards. 1995; 
Seidel & Kelle, 1995). A seemingly simple process, coding attracts diverging and 
sometimes conflicting views. 
Richards (1995 :85) identifies two categories for organising qualitative data. These are 
factual and referential: 
'Referential category structures are those whose categories are intended to hold 
textual data references to the topic of the category. This contrasts with factual 
category structures, whose categories refer not to the content of the text, but to 
attributes of the text: who said it, when, facts about the speaker, etc.' 
Seidel and Kelle (1995) use the distinctions made by Richards and Richards (1995) 
when they extrapolate to types of codes. For them 'a code can denote a text passage 
containing specific information in order to allow its retrieval' (Seidel and Kelle. 1995 
5") in which case they refer to the process of cod ing as . indexing'. It 'can also pp. -
serve to denote a fact' (Seidel and Kelle, 1995 pp. 52) in which case they propose to 
refer to it as 'coding as summarising'. Following this rationale. the researcher may 
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associate with an interview transcript a set of codes that include details about the 
interviewee, their organisation and their level of responsibility. Such infonnation is not 
directly reflecting the informant's recorded words. It mirrors what we know about 
them. Having 'indexed' all documents in this way, the researcher can, for instance, then 
retrieve data on the views ofall chamber of commerce chief executives on a given issue. 
The process described above reflects 'coding as indexing' and its key benefit. 
'Coding as summarising' entirely focuses on what infonnants say. If a statement is 
made on the origins of the partnership at stake, then this statement may be coded as 
'partnership history'. Likewise, if a statement sheds light on the speaker's position on 
trust in partnership, this can be coded 'trust'. 
While Seidel and Kelle's basic distinction between the two types of coding is straight 
forward, confusion may arise because some qualitative researchers tend to refer to the 
building of referential categories for their data (in Seidel and KeIle's tenns, 'coding as 
summarising') as 'indexing the data' (Cannon, 1998; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). For 
the purpose of this research, it is proposed that we use indexing to build factual 
categories containing general information about the interview (e.g. respondents name, 
role and organisation). 
Indexing is a short process quite distinct from coding designed to enable the analysis of 
interview content. The creation of referential categories (Richards & Richards, 1995) is 
sim ilar to thematic cod ing as proposed by Buston (1997), and mirrors Kelle' s ( 1997) 
'coding as summarising'. In this research project, and for simplification purposes, this 
process will be called thematic coding. Approaches to thematic coding vary amongst 
authors, depending primarily on the epistemological assumptions they hold. For 
example, Coffey and Atkinson (1996) suggest that researchers should start coding 
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by staying close to respondents own taxonom ies. By contrast Dey argues, "Categories 
must be 'grounded' conceptually and empirically. That means they must relate to an 
appropriate analytic contex4 and be rooted in relevant empirical material" (1995 pp. 
96). These two authors clearly champion different analytic strategies. Whilst Coffey 
and Atkinson's approach would be highly consistent with inductive analysis, Dey places 
significant emphasis on verificatory inquiry designed to detennine the relevance of 
extant theories and conceptual developments. 
The discussion, so far, highlighted the different ways in which scholars approach 
thematic coding, whether they use manual techniques or CAQDAS. This clearly 
indicates that technology itself does not shape the analytical process; instead, the 
researcher's epistemological assumptions infonn how that technology is used. This 
point is supported by a range of scholar reflecting and publishing on the epistemological 
implications of using CAQDAS (1995; 1995; Seidel & Kelle, 1995; Prein et aI., 1995). 
Differences between scholars are particularly strong when they debate the prospect of 
deriving theories from qualitative data analysis that relies on the coding strategies 
outlined above. For example, Buston (1997) remains sceptical of the claims made by 
some software developers that these packages can support theorising. By contrast, 
Cannon (1998) is comfortable with the idea that software packages can effectively 
support the interpretive process and enable theory development. Prein Kelle et al. 
(1995) provide a useful synopsis of the ways in which computer software can be used in 
such a way. 
According to them, qualitative theorising results from three basic processes: 
1. Establishing linkages between memos and text. and memos and codes 
2. Establishing linkages between codes 
3. Establishing linkages between different text segments 
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) first emphasised the importance of writing memos in 
qualitative research. When researchers are confronted with a very large amount of data 
they may fall into the 'coding trap', that is they lock themselves in coding the data at the 
expense of recording their ideas and their interpretation (Glaser & Strauss, 1999). 
Memos may directly relate to a particular section in a transcript. For instance, having 
read a statement on tense relationships between two partners, the researcher may write a 
memo highlighting that congruent statements were made in another transcript, and were 
further related to personality clashes between two individuals. From an analytical point 
of view this memo will not only support triangulation, it may also lead to the emergence 
of 'socialisation and personal relationships' as a theme in the research project. Memos 
may also be written on a code that was used to retrieve data about a theme underpinning 
the study. For example, having developed an overview of data coded for 'partnership 
management', the researcher could start to reflect on potential patterns emerging and 
flag them up for further reflection and analysis (e.g. irrespective of the partnership 
considered, there seems to be a high level of turnover of partnership managers, why?). 
In a software package like N'Vivo 1.3, memos are easily created, they can be coded 
themselves and analysed much in the same way as transcripts. As a result the synthesis 
of ideas is facilitated, and overall the interpretation of data is made easier and very 
transparent. 
The above illustrated what was meant by the 'establishment of links between memos 
and text, as well as links between memos and codes'. Identitying linkages between 
codes is the other technique that supports theorising according to Prein Kelle c:I al. 
(1995). Linkage here, could take two forms. On the one hand, the researcher could 
group together a set of codes and create an overarching category. The suhsumption of a 
range of codes into one more general code supports theoretical generalisation. akin to 
what Yin (2003b; 1994) labelled analytic generalisation. Prein Kclle eI al argue that 
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'" generalisation represents a bottom up strategy: descriptive codes are combined and 
integrated to construct analytic categories" (1995 pp. 64) 
From the above, one can infer that thematic coding can either focus on description 
(descriptive code), in which case it will enable the construction of rich and triangulated 
accounts of particular events within the cases studied. Thematic coding can also 
support conceptualisation and theory building as it increasingly moves towards 
summarising interview data by subsuming groups of codes into overarching categories 
that aid interpretation. 
According to Prein Kelle et af (1995), the researcher could subdivide one code into 
more refmed subcategories, in which case theoretical dimensionalisalion is facilitated. 
Indeed, "dimensionalisation is a top down strategy of theory building in which 
properties or dimensions of categories are specified" (Prein et af.. 1995 pp. 64). 
The option to move towards dimetionalisation or subsumption suggested by Prein Kelle 
et af (1995) is consistent with Dey's (1995) recommendation to code data by using 
'm iddle order categories'. He suggests that "the most flexible approach [to cod ing 
qualitative data] is to develop 'middle order categories' which draw some broad 
prelim inary distinctions within the data [ ... ] Once the data has been organised into 
broad categories, the analysis can move in either direction, towards more refined 
distinctions through sub-categorisation or towards a more integrated approach by 
linking and integrating the 'middle order' categories" (Dey, 1995 pp. 104) 
Whatever the theoretical outcome desired. the re-organisation of codes in a coding 
frame is made simpler and only takes seconds when using N'Vivo 1.3. Vel") 
importantly. changes made to the coding frame automatically update the way all 
transcripts have been coded. saving significant amounts of time when compared to 
manual techniques. 
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The establishment of connections between different text segments is a different and 
sometimes necessary process, which can also be mechanised. Linking text segments 
with each other may be necessary when respondents tend to diverge from the subject. 
For instance, if asked a question on the origins of a partnership. the informant may give 
a lot of very valuable historical information, while deviating significantly at times. In 
this case the researcher may 'jump' from one relevant text segment to the other and 
code them all 'partnership origin'. By retrieving all the segments that have been coded 
in that way, the researcher effectively cuts out all unnecessary information. 
Chronological sequence of events can be reconstructed. 
In summary, the above focused on what computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
offers. The main argument is that CAQDAS merely automates methodological 
processes (including data coding and retrieval) that would otherwise be carried out 
manually. Of these methodological processes, data coding is the one that attracts most 
debate and controversy. On the basis of the review conducted above, it is proposed that 
the practical tasks of data coding and retrieval are associated to three interconnected 
and, sometimes, overlapping methodological processes: indexing, thematic cod ing and 
theorising. In the next section, the epistemological issues that are associated with 
CAQDAS will be addressed. 
3. 4 Implications and Limitations of Methodological 
Choices 
The reliance on qualitative and interpretive research in public administration research 
has been a constant source of debate, particularly in the US where positivist and 
interpretivist camps appear to be strongly entrenched and critical of one another 
(Adams. 1992; Brewer et al.. 1999: Timney Bailey, 1992: White. 1986h~ White. 
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1986a; Cleary, 1992). But Orosz (1992) like Timney Bailey (1992) emphasise that 
these sometimes partisan debates obscure the most significant issues. They argue that in 
the case of interpretive research, rigour should really be central to these discussions. 
Scholars who discussed the contribution of interpretive research more generally than in 
the specific field of public administration, tend to express similar views. For example, 
Stake (1995) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) also emphasise the need to develop and 
implement clear procedures that ensure that qualitative inquiry is robust. Such 
robustness is derived from the reliability and validity of inquiry, its replicability and 
trustworthiness and its scope for generalisation. Each of these issues is discussed in the 
sections that follow. 
3.4.1 Validity and Reliability 
Construct validity is an important element of case study research. It is about 
"establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied" according to 
Yin (1994 pp. 34). Concepts from the organisational learning literature are well 
established and have been extensively researched; therefore the operationalisation of 
their investigation in this study largely replicates approaches adopted in past research. 
For instance, it is well accepted that organisational learning can be evidenced by shared 
mental models and organisational routines (Kim. 1993). These in tum will be sought in 
the analysis of transcribed interviews as the researcher aims to identifY respondents 
assumptions, the causal relationships they make between events and decisions, the 
routines that progressively have become embedded in the partnership as a result of past 
experience. 
However, construct validity is in itself not sufficient. The researcher needs to be able to 
demonstrate that the interpretation she or he makes of data is reliable in itself. For Yin. 
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reliability is about "demonstrating that the operations of a study - such as data 
collection procedures - can be repeated, with the same result" (1994 pp. 34). This in 
tum requires triangulation. As Shipman (1988) indicates in his review of the different 
forms of triangulation originally discussed by Denzin, the over-arching aim is to use 
different strategies, so that data can be crosschecked and interpretation deemed reliable. 
Whilst triangulation can take different forms, including theory triangulation, data source 
triangulation, investigator triangulation and methodological triangulation, data source 
triangulation appeared to be the most suitable approach in this study. 
Theory triangulation alms to find out whether researchers from different 
epistemological backgrounds come to the same conclusions whilst investigator 
triangulation intends to determine whether two or more observers make the same 
interpretation of the same occurrence. Both theoretical and investigator triangulation 
assume team based research, which is not consistent with the needs of a PhD 
dissertation. Methodological triangulation aims to determine whether different data 
collection methods lead to the same concepts. As discussed in previous sections, data 
collection methods were determined by the research questions and the level of access 
that cou Id be obtained in both case study partnerships. Interviewing and documentary 
sources were therefore heavily relied upon. However these two fonns of data collection 
methods did not cover the same issues and did not have the same focus. therefore 
restricting the possibility for methodological triangulation. 
Therefore, the only remaining option for ensuring reliable interpretation in this study is 
data source triangulation. Data source triangulation is about checking that an 
interpretation can be drawn from different sources of data. and is therefore worthy of 
inclusion in the analysis. Stake (1995) argues that the meaning we attribute to 
observations may need to be refined as add itional observations encourage us to revise 
our original interpretations. Implicit in this suggestion is the need for data source 
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triangulation. This can take two fonns. Firstly, one can seek to mUltiply the number of 
sources referring to the same event, in order to detennine whether the researcher" s 
interpretation of that event mirrors closely that of several practitioners who have 
experienced it. Secondly, one can aim to check if an observation repeats itself in 
different circumstances. Given that this study's focus was on partnership learning -
which required a strong focus on past events, and decisions- the approach adopted was 
to detennine whether multiple practitioners' descriptions of factual elements associated 
with an event converged sufficiently that a fair account of that event could be provided 
by the researcher. To iJlustrate this process, an extract from the memo Presence 
Rhone-Alpes goals" is included in the figure 3.1. 
Figure 3-1 Illustration of data source triangulation during memo writing 
1 - Focus on dement Separatioo between service prescription and service provision: 
Although partnership members clearty identified the co-existence of the service prescription and service provision 
activities in the partnership as a source of conftict of interested for member organisation, they were able to resave 
this tension only recently, with the formal change of membership and activity areas. This occurred with the 
signature of amended partnership status, in the summer of 1998. For the gang of four, whose strategic role in the 
region stretches beyond the ROT, other tasks emerged foIlcwving this decision. They ncwv need to focus efforts on 
the creation of a partnership of the supply side, whose role will centre on the need to facilitate and enhance the 
transfer of public sector research. 
JI (811FR080499) Donc on est partit de ce ROT qui etait a I'image de ce que nationalement on avalt pense 
pour progresslVement Ie specialiser, ma/s c 'est 8 /'epreuve du temps aussi, que ~a s 'est faIt , Ie speclallser sur la 
prospection et pUIS sur les petites entreprlses. Et puis /'aboutissement je dlfais forme lie de ceffe ret lex Ion et de ce 
long chemmement a eM donc /'annee demlere, en 1998. ou en fait on a decIde tous de changer les statuts de 
Presence RMne-Alpes qUI est i'association support du ROT (de memoire juin ou juillet 1998) 
II (83FR310399) L'autre changement , {autre modification essenflelle par rapport a la creatIon Imtlale, C est 
qu 'au depart Ie reseau comportait 8 la fOls des prestata/res et des prescnpteurs dans I'eltte Ma/s nous nous 
sommes rendus compte au ftl des annees qu'on ne pouva/t pas satlsfalfe et les uns et les autres Donc no us 
avons /'annee dem/ere, fSlt operer /'avancee slgn/ficatlve en dlsant Ie reseau Presence RhOne Alpes c st Ie 
resesu des prescripteurs 
(810FR080499) L'mteret qu'on s c 'est de falre en sorte que {association de Pre nee RhOn AI 
un support pour les pr SCflpt urs Le eentrage sur les prescnpteurs c 'est un peu l onentst/on sur I qu on 
comp/iHem nt en phas 81' e les collegu s de Is region, du DRRT, de f Anvsr. c ntr sur I s pre Crlpt urs t I 
pro~ SSJOnnsllsstlOfl de s p scnpt urs 
In the discussion of CAQDAS, the importance of memoing was emphasised. It is a 
powerful means capturing analysis and interpretation and is facilitated by the use of 
computer software. Figure 3.1 illustrates how, during memo writing, extracts from 
different respondents' interviews are brought together and used to interpret events and 
changes that have affected the partnership's focus. In this instance, the different 
transcript reference numbers (B 11 FR080499 for example) ind icate that com ments from 
three different respondents were relied upon. N'Vivo's capabilities are such that these 
extracts not only enable data source triangulation, but they also ensure that they are 
never read out of context. Indeed the'" symbol that appears in the memo is a hyperlink 
that allows the reader to revert back to each full transcript and read the quotation in the 
context of the entire interview should this be necessary. 
Therefore, even when synthesising ideas or presenting summaries the researcher is 
always very close to primary data ensuring that the interpretive process is as close to 
respondents intended meanings as possible. 
3.4.2 Replicability and Trustworthiness 
Biased interpretation has always been a significant risk associated with interpretive 
research and has also been one of the most common criticism of this approach by 
positivist scholars (Adams, 1992; Brewer et aI., 1999). However with a reliance on 
increasingly detailed procedures designed to safeguard the quality of interpretive 
research, the potential for bias can be dramatically reduced (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A 
key method designed to enhance the replicability of a study and its trustworthiness is the 
development of an audit trail. Indeed Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue. "the audit is a 
major trustworthiness technique, but auditability depends on the keeping of records in 
such a way [ ... ] that an auditor can later connect assertions in the report with the raw 
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data on which they are presumably based." Documenting the interpretive process with 
memo writing, contributes significantly to rendering it transparent as argued by Glaser 
and Strauss (1999). Figure 3.1 illustrated how this was implemented in this study. 
Replicability and trustworthiness are however further enhanced because data coding and 
interpretation are digitally captured and available for supervisors and examiners when 
using CAQDAS. In such cases, they can explore coded documents, follow the 
researcher's analytical process, and determine how this influenced ongoing coding and 
how new ideas; concepts, and theories emerged over time. 
To summarise, data collection methods used in this study are not unusual: documentary 
sources and interviews as part of a set of case studies. However the work differs from 
traditional approaches to public sector research because of its data analysis strategy. 
Indeed the latter aims to extensively document the interpretive process through 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS). CAQDAS is by no means a 
miraculous recipe, but it does offer the opportunity to make the interpretive process 
more transparent and enhances the scope for replicability. Because it relies on the 
interpretation of all data gathered, it restricts the scope for biased interpretation, and 
increases the potential for trustworthy and reliable conclusions. 
3.4.3 Generalisability 
In interpretive research the Issue of generalisability divides scholars (Gomm. 
Hammersley, & Foster, 2000). Whilst some well established researchers will argue that 
when conducting case studies 'the only generalization is: there is no generalization" 
(Lincoln & Guba. 2000). others will call for generalisation and even argue that case 
studies' contribution to the literature is a function of their potential for generalisation 
(Yin. 2003a~ Yin. 2003b; Ward Schofield. 2000). Proponents of generalisation through 
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case study, however, clearly indicate that commonly accepted statistical generalisation 
methods are not suitable in the context of case study research: 
"'A fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalisation as 
the method of generalizing the results of the case. This is because cases are not 
'sampling units' and should not be chosen for this reason. Rather, individual 
case studies are to be selected as a laboratory investigator selects the topic of a 
new experiment. [ ... ]. Under these circumstances, the method of generalization 
is 'analytic generalization', in which a previously developed theory is used as a 
template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study:' (Yin. 
1994 pp. 31) 
Timney Bailey's (1992) call for generalisation is consistent with the above. This author 
emphasises that case study findings can lead to generalisability because of the 
contribution they make in terms of conceptual development or thanks to the practical 
sense making that they enable (allowing what the author labels 'transferability'). Both 
of these objectives aim to be achieved in this study. Specifically it aims to rely on 
analytic generalisation by establishing, through empirical investigations, the extent to 
which organisational learning theories apply to economic development partnerships. 
3. 5 Conclusion 
The research questions that were formulated in the previous chapter and the overall 
focus of this study on partnership learning require the study to be conducted at the level 
of situated activity. As a result an interpretive research strategy based on the analysis of 
two case studies has been adopted. Qualitative data collections strategies, includ ing 
interviewing and the gathering of documentary sources were selected. 
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Whilst the underpinning principles behind this study are consistent with established 
methods developed for interpretive research strategies, data analysis, with its reliance on 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS), can be considered as one of 
the unusual aspects of this study. This choice was underpinned by the desire to make 
the analytical process transparent, and therefore enhance the scope for replicability. 
Consistent and comprehensive coding as well as the extensive use of memos are 
designed to ensure that the study's findings are reliable and trustworthy. Overall there 
is a desire to achieve analytical generalisation and contribute to the debates that centre 
on partnerships' learning capabilities. 
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4 The National Reseau de Diffusion Technologique 
(ROT) Initiative 
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4. 1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide readers with an overview of the French Reseau de 
Diffusion Technologique (ROT) Initiative. Two case studies of regional partnerships 
within the initiative will be explored in more detail in the next two chapters, but to make 
sense of some of these partnerships' strategic decisions, they need to be analysed 
against the background of national policy. 
The flTst section of this chapter analyses the historical development of the initiative. In 
the following section the rationale and objectives of the initiative and the way they have 
evolved over time are discussed. A section that focuses specifically on operational 
dynamics then follows. The last section of the chapter is an evaluation ofthe initiative's 
outcomes at the national level. 
4. 2 Historical Development of the RDT National Initiative 
The Reseau de Diffusion Technologique (ROT) initiative was launched in 1989 at the 
initiative of Hubert Curien, minister for Research and Technology. A key priority of the 
government at the time was to boost levels of industrial research and innovation, seen 
fundamental for local economic development: 
·,It is imperative for the government to address the current deficit in industrial 
research. [ ... J 
A range of initiatives has flourished throughout this decade at local and 
national levels, sometimes led by single institutions or managed in partnership. 
They are designed to promote the adoption of pro-active technological 
strategies by small and medium sized enterprises (SME). They also aim to 
maximise the benefit managers can get from the existing array of external 
technological resource and expertise prov iders. 
Following the speech on technology policy by Mr Curien during the Cabinet 
meeting on the 14lh of December 1988. the government decided to 
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reinforce its efforts towards the promotion of technology transfer to SMEs. 
[ ... ] 
The purpose is to establish a technology transfer network 13 [ROT] that builds 
upon existing initiatives and launches new projects targeted to SMEs. The 
venture will consist of regional ROTs interconnected through an interregional 
RDT14 [RIOT]." (Ministere de I'Education nationale de la Recherche et de la 
Technologie, 1989) 
Since the 1980s support for innovation had become a corner stone of French economic 
development policies. Numerous initiatives, including local and national projects, had 
flourished in regions, in particular in the context of the 8th and 9th series of negotiations 
for government-region planning contracts15. Chiefamong these new initiatives were the 
creation of the 'Centres Regional d'Innovation et de Transfer de Technologie' 
(CRITIs) and the deployment of Techno logical Counsellors by the Delegues Regionaux 
it la Recherche et it la Technologie (DRRT). There was therefore a need to coordinate 
all activities that were available. ROTs were seen as means of achieving that. 
In 1990 RDTs were piloted in four regions: Lorraine, Bretagne, Rhone Alpes and 
Limousin. Their main purpose was to facilitate technology transfer to SMEs by 
enhancing these companies' access to exiting services and by delivering new tailored 
services focused on their needs. RDTs had to pool (at the regional level) all existing 
technology and innovations initiatives. Local players had explicit mandates to get 
involved in the project. Nonetheless, the government stated that it remained flexible 
and open to operational solutions and agreements resulting from local consensus. Pilot 
13 For the remainder of the text these technology transfer networks will be referred to by their French 
label: Reseau de Diffusion Technologique (RDT). 
14 The interregional RDT will be referred to by its French label: Reseau Interregional de Diffusion 
Technologique (RIDT). 
15 These 'government-region' planning contracts (in French, 'Contrats de Plan Etat-Region) arc a set of 
measures periodically agreed between each French region and the government. They establish the 
economic and social policy priorities for the region and set out associated budgets (Lescot & Sinou. 
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regions were selected according to the presence (or not) of early partnership experiences 
and accord ing to their size: 
"In order to test the validity of this approach, four pilots were selected. The 
ministries were very rational in this selection process. So, they selected two 
large regions and two small ones. In each of these groups, one region would 
have a partnering history, while the other would not". (RIOT Senior Manager. 
1998) 
The overall outcomes ofRDTs were judged positive in pilot regions. As a consequence, 
it was decided that the initiative should be extended to remaining regions: 
"In 1991, there was an evaluation study. It showed that. well, results varied 
depending on regions. In some instances, the ROT was set up more rapidly 
than in others, but overall the initiative wasjudged worthwhile. The study also 
identified three critical success factors for future partnerships. It was shown 
that the partnership manager needed to have the profile ofa facilitator, the need 
for an explicit agreement and involvement from the regional council was also 
emphasised -to ensure the Region has the same public commitment to 
partnering, and to make sure that it would not be tempted to create its own 
parallel partnership. The third point was about the selection of the partnership 
chair. It was recommended that the chair should be a high profile individual in 
the region and preferably with an industry background ... " (RIOT Senior 
Manager, 1998) 
By 1994 twelve ROTs were established (Reseau Interregional de Oiffusion 
Technologique, 1998). All ROTs created since 1991 had the explicit support from their 
Region but their financial commitment came later when in 1994 regions were formally 
invited to contribute to ROTs funding. Overall funding levels were agreed in the round 
of negotiations for government - region planning contracts for 1994-1998. This led to 
local changes in the statutes of ROTs, indeed in some cases, entirely new non-profit 
organisations had to be created to fonn the support structure for the local ROT. 
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Further the mission ofRDTs was redefmed reflecting regions' involvement. This led to 
the dissemination of a new prospectus outlining the role ofRDTs. 
By 1996, the overall number of RDTs reached 18 (as indicated in figure 4.1). With the 
creation of RDTs in Alsace, Auvergne, and Bourgogne in 1997 and 1998, and in 1999 
in lie de France twenty-two French regions were covered, representing France's entire 
continental territory, as illustrated in figure 4.1. (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion 
Technologique, 1999). Preparations were well under way for the four remaining 
overseas regions. 
The establishment of the RDT network was therefore a slow process, which spanned 
over 10 years. The overall rationale for the initiative during this period remained the 
same but experimentation across regions and regular central government reviews led to 
significant changes in goals and objectives. 
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Figure 4-1 Geographical and historical RDT development 
1990 • 1994-95 
1991-92 1996-2000 
1993 
4. 3 Rationale and Objectives 
RDTs focus on the transfer of medium and low technologies. The rationale for the 
activities i threefold: firstly technological know-how is a key foundation of product 
and process improvement Therefore it contributes busine competitiven 
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Secondly, SMEs suffer from barriers to the development of their technological 
competence. Thirdly, prior to the creation of ROTs, most public support was based on 
the provision of 'off-the-shelf products that did not necessarily correspond to SME 
needs or were offered in uncoordinated ways (Minisrere de l'Education nationale de la 
Recherche et de la Technologie, 1989). 
Specific goals evolved as the initiative progressed from the piloting stage to becom ing a 
full-blown government policy. For pilots, goals remained very broad. They outlined 
the overall mission of ROT pilots, set out the scene, identified actors and broadly 
defined their roles leaving nonetheless much space for local improvisation: 
"The fonnation of a RDT network is primarily designed to fonnalise and 
enhance SMEs' technological demand, then to better satisfy this demand. 
To achieve this, the network will rely on existing national and regional 
institutions in the fields of research and development and technology transfer. 
It will interconnect these organisations in a more effective manner. In places 
where such organisations do not exist, the network will foster their creation. 
Through this initiative, the Public Service will promote public and private 
sector research laboratories and guide their offer so it meets current of 
industrial needs. 
Pilots have for goal to generate policy templates for the RTO initiative, to 
define intervention means necessary for its implementation, to set the 
foundations for its progressive extension to the rest of the French territory." 
(Ministere de l'Education nationale de la Recherche et de la Techno logie, 1989) 
The pilots and subsequent 6 ROTs, set up between 1989 and 1994, followed these broad 
guidelines and not surprisingly contributed to the emergence of a range of contrasting 
local practices and arrangements, in particular in terms of organisational status (eM 
International, 1994). 
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In 1994 a national review of the initiative was conducted (CM International. 1994) and 
a new set of government guidelines were issued in 1995 (Ministere de l'Education 
nationale de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 1995). The national review outlined 
two fundamentally different kinds of goals that since became part of ROTs remit: 
"Help SMEs to specify their technological needs, and where appropriate. 
signpost them on an ad-hoc basis to the most appropriate service provider. The 
ultimate goal here is to organise a systematic canvassing ofSMEs generally not 
aware of, or rarely using, external technology competences centres. 
Enhance overall supply side efficiency, by encouraging collaboration and 
exchange between various institutions engaged in technology transfer." (CM 
International, 1994) 
These two overarching goals were broken down into more specific guidelines in the 
prospectus that the government issued for established and future ROTs: 
"By gathering public sector organisations and regional public-private 
organisations, the ROT network's mission is to offer enterprises an 
homogeneous group of interfaces designed to identify and satisfy technological 
needs of the greatest number of enterprises, chief of which SMEs, in order to 
ease access to the most relevant competencies, to satisfy these firms needs and 
enable them to incorporate a technological dimension in their strategies. 
To fulfil this mission, ROTs' objectives primarily relate to din~~t business 
support - the support, in particular. of enterprises little accustomed to 
technological partnership - These include the following. 
Formalise and enhance technological demand and associated needs. 
through canvassing and awareness raising 
Help companies find the most appropriate competency centres. whether 
public or private. and the most suitable services to satisfy their needs 
Coach companies that so desire in the development of their technologies 
Ease access to public services 
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Support more generic awareness raising initiatives to sensitise SMEs to 
technological challenges and opportunities. 
As a corollary, RDTs will provide support to existing technology transfer 
support providers in order to: 
Favour and stimulate collaborative exchanges between public and mixed 
sector regional actors, through networking 
Extend their scientific and technological support to the national level, 
even European level, through active involvement in the inter-regional 
network ofRDTs [RIDT] 
Co-ordinate canvassing of industrial and (SMEs, 'artisanales' 
enterprises 16) 
Enhance the overall professionalism of counsellors 
RDTs will also provide support In the implementation of economic 
development policies in order to: 
Become a federating relay for the implementation of regional technology 
d issem ination po lic ies 
Enhance the coherence of the national technology transfer systems 
through inter-regional co-ordination 
Manage the allocation of technology transfer grants [Prestation 
Technologie Reseau -PTR]. This form offinancial support to businesses 
is made available by Anvar to the ROT, which then manages the 
application process." (Ministere de l'Education nationale de la Recherche 
et de la Technologie, 1995 Emphasis as in original). 
This detailed set of objectives was defmed centrally following the national review. and 
currently form the foundation of the RDT initiative. In the 1999 Activity Report of 
16 'Enterprises artisanales' is a label covering enterprises with a specific legal status in France. 
ArtisanaJes enterprises are generally very small businesses covering aJl sorts of trade, however they may 
have more than one employee. This is the main difference with the British 'self employed' status. 158 
RDTs, a joint declaration from the ministries involved (Education and Industry). and 
Anvar re-affrrmed the main axes of this intervention (ANVAR et al.. 1999). 
In conclusion, the need to address SMEs' technological needs in order to enhance 
overall competitiveness of the sector has remained the driving rationale of the RDT 
initiative. Over time, however, goals and objectives have become more specific. and 
have been redefmed centrally, suggesting increased levels of governmental control. 
Paradoxically, the need to remain flexible and foster locally sensitive solutions has also 
remained emphasised since the inception of the initiative. 
So what kind of local partnerships emerged? What type of activities do they conduct? 
How are they financed? The next section focuses on ROTs operational dynamics and 
addresses these questions. 
4. 4 The Operation of RDTs 
4.4.1 Activities 
ROT activities consist of three types of actions designed to increase market penetration 
levels; homogenise and increase service quality; and manage the process of allocating 
technology transfer funds (PTR). in line with service delivery objectives, a key 
function of ROTs is to increase SMEs' awareness and use of technology transfer 
services through various targeting, and canvassing strategies all aimed at increasing 
market penetration levels. Company visits are a fundamental aspect of this activity. 
Their evolution between 1996 and 2000 is illustrated in table 4.1. 
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Table 4-1: Number of RDT visits per region (1996-2000): 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 0 46 127 291 377 
Aquitaine 414 588 567 950 823 
Auvergne 653 1819 1090 1506 1990 
Bourgogne 75 367 377 420 415 
Bretagne 1087 1162 1076 1218 121 I 
Centre 1054 1200 1100 0 0 
Champagne-Ardenne 395 400 308 131 235 
Corse 25 100 80 140 0 
Franche-Comte 210 304 530 598 736 
IIe-de-France 0 0 0 0 0 
Languedoc-Roussillon 816 1469 1858 2378 2724 
Limousin 597 252 267 306 340 
Lorraine 491 643 556 591 554 
Midi-Pyrenees 191 215 140 133 1277 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 928 1200 1114 1284 799 
Basse-Normandie 854 822 759 816 968 
Haute-Normandie 283 509 448 347 179 
Pays-de-Loire 1262 1021 1068 1378 1437 
Picardie 296 486 559 392 185 
Poitou-Charentes 900 1100 1294 1138 1348 
PACA 869 999 1788 451 265 
Rhone-Alpes 1931 2070 1938 1747 2152 
TOTAL 13331 16772 17044 16215 18015 
ROT outlets 20 21 21 21 22 
Average 667 799 812 772 819 
Despite a steady increase in the total numbers of visits from 13331 in 1996 to 18015 in 
2000, the average number of visits per RDT has fluctuated much less, reflecting the fact 
that during this period the number of ROTs itself increased. 
Targeting strategies generally fit regional requirements or are focused on a priority 
target group of firms. For instance these may include very small businesses; SMEs 
acting primarily as sub-contractors in specific industries -as those in the mechanical 
engineering supply chain- and SMEs located in a specific geographical area in the 
region. In other instances targeting strategies are driven by a form of technological 
expertise that would be relevant to a cross-section ofSMEs (Reseau Interregional de 
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Diffusion Technologique, 1998). With the exception of two ROTs (in Rhone Alpes and 
in Limousin), there is no specific financial remuneration of company visits. Indeed. a 
key principle behind ROTs is that of voluntary action - a more detailed explanation of 
how this works is included in section 2.4.4 of this chapter. For Rhone Alpes and 
Limousin, however, a specific 'price' is associated with the conduct of company visits. 
This cost is invisible to benefiting companies but reflects a transfer of funds between 
partners; much in the same way as service level agreements are used in the UK. 
Secondly, and in accordance with the desire to co-ordinate and improve service delivery 
on the supply side, ROTs are very active in terms of professional development. 
particularly for technological advisors. In 1998, diagnostic. project management and 
communication were dominant training and development areas. In fact. they 
represented over 50% of all training and development activities (Reseau Interregional 
de Diffusion Technologique, 1998). Developmental programmes in specialist areas, 
such as, strategic management, quality and regulation, analysis of value creation 
processes, complemented the range oftraining made available to technology counsellors 
across ROTs. Some inter-regional training programmes were also made available that 
year. Involving three to five ROTs and their members, such initiatives were designed to 
foster experience exchange and cross-fertilisation. They made access to very specialist 
training possible, as these would not necessarily be viable -delegate numbers would be 
too low ifrun by one RDT in isolation of the others (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion 
Technologique, 1998). In 1999 a similar set of training programmes were made 
available, however a higher degree of formalisation could be observed as three 
developmental areas were recognised nationally: 
• The advisor function, with a focus on diagnostic. communication. project 
management and mentoring 
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• Generic skills including areas such as marketing, finance etc. 
• Specialist technical expertise (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion 
Technologique, 1999). 
The number of training and development activities across ROTs has remained more or 
less constant between 1998 and 1999 -140 modules covered over 226 days - however 
the number of participants has nearly doubled in the same period (Reseau Interregional 
de Diffusion Technologique, 1999). See table 4.2 below. 
Table 4-2: Number of counsellor training days delivered (1998-2000): 
1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 24 0 147 
Aguitaine 51 357 188 
Auvergne 102 129 79.5 
Bourgogne 90 504 60 
Bretagne 126 122 134 
Centre 54 68 90 
Cham~agne-Ardenne 140 73 98 
Corse 229 160 0 
Franche-Comte 94 144 38 
I1e-de-France 0 0 102 
Languedoc-Roussillon 136 70 110 
Limousin 124 937 66 
Lorraine 183 72 107 
Mid i-Pyrenees 109.5 120 141 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 197 247 151 
Basse-Normandie 209 1262 212 
Haute-Normand ie 196 310 35 
Pa~s-de-Loire 124 97 86 
Picardie 101 82 132 
Poitou-Charentes 52 18 35 
PACA 111 110.5 71 
Rh6ne-Alees 136 181 134 
TOTAL 2588.5 5150.5 2216.5 
The total number of training days is provided by taking into account the number of 
participants. For example, if and ROT provides a 2 day course to 14 delegates. the 
number of counsellor training days provided will be 28 days. The trends shown overall 
are consistent with the sharp increase in training activity in 1999. Hov. ~ver the 
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figures for 2000 suggest that this growth was not sustained, training activity halved that 
year. Indeed the number of modules proposed in 2000 was 132 (against 140 the year 
before). These were delivered in 212 days (as opposed to 226 the year before) (Reseau 
Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 2000). 
Finally an important part of RDTs' operation is the management of the PTR. an 
ANV AR technology transfer grant that can only be accessed and allocated through the 
ROT. By contrast to many government grants, the PTR is a simple kind of support 
designed to prime technological development. It was capped to a maximum of 32,797 
French Francs before tax in 1999 (about £3,000 or €5,000) (Reseau Interregional de 
Diffusion Technologique, 1999). The application process is simple (generally involving 
a company visit by a counsellor -who diagnoses the company's technological needs-
and the completion of one side of A4). Once needs are identified and communicated to 
RDT managers, they tend to be processed very rapidly. 
In 2000, the average value of a PTR was 31000 francs (Reseau Interregional de 
Diffusion Technologique, 2000). The first five regions in terms of number of PTR 
allocated were Rhone-Alpes (18 % of total); Nord-Pas-de-Calais (90/0 of the total). 
Provence-Alpes-Cotes-d' Azur (8.%), Midi-Pyrenees (7%) and Brittany (6.0/0). Table 
4.3 gives an indication of the contribution of all regions to the allocation of the PTR 
grant. The weight of the Rhone-Alpes is particularly noticeable. 
Tahle 4-3: Numher of PTR prant." ner repion (1996-2000): 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 0 7 22 59 62 
Aguitaine 125 133 105 112 79 
Auvergne 3 18 41 32 34 
Bourgogne 10 52 48 47 67 
Breta~ne 81 107 83 100 98 
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Centre 97 108 67 57 69 
Champagne-Ardenne 45 55 36 30 33 
Corse 10 19 1 I 12 8 
Franche-Comte 38 32 39 42 46 
IIe-de-France 0 0 0 0 3 
Languedoc-Roussillon 37 86 87 91 85 
Limousin 29 45 46 43 31 
Lorraine 83 75 54 72 65 
Midi-Pyrenees 124 149 118 108 107 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 93 117 99 98 135 
Basse-Normandie 36 41 33 40 38 
Haute-Normandie 21 44 48 44 60 
Pays-de-Loire 60 75 90 75 77 
Picardie 33 41 42 46 36 
Po ito u-Charentes 61 63 64 66 42 
PACA 102 91 110 128 125 
Rhone-Alpes 267 281 292 232 279 
TOTAL 1355 1639 1535 1534 1579 
Average per RDT 68 78 73 73 72 
Table 4.4 shows that the distribution of assistance follows a very consistent pattern and 
focuses for over half of the support provided on companies with less than ten 
employees. 
Table 4-4: Proportion of PTR grants bv companv size across France (1997-2000) 
Coml!an~ size: 1997 1998 1999 2000 
<10 54% 560/0 550/0 560/0 
10 to 19 17% 15% 18% 160/0 
20-49 19% 19% 17% 170/0 
>49 11% 11% 10% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
This above pattern is fairly consistent in all regions, although there are some 
discrepancies, suggesting that regional targeting strategies vary somewhat. In the case 
of Presence Rhone-Alpes, for instance, the level of support provided to companies with 
less that ten employees (61% in 2000) and that provided to companies with up to 
nineteen employees (180/0 in 2000) are consistently higher than national averages (see 
table 4.5). 
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Table 4-5: Proportion of PTR grants by company size in Rhone-Alpes (1997-2000): 
Coml!an~ size: 1997 1998 1999 2000 
<10 57% 61% 610/0 61% 
10 to 19 19% 14% 15% 18% 
20-49 16% 17% 16% 140/0 
>49 9% 8% 80/0 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 1000/0 
By contrast, in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie the level of support given to 
companies with less than ten employees is significantly lower (45% in 2000) than the 
national average, while the level of support given to companies with twenty to forty 
nine employees is much higher than the national average (300/0 in 2000 as apposed to 
17% at the national level). 
Table 4-6: Grants by company size in Nord-Pas-de-Calais (1997-2000): 
Coml!any size: 1997 1998 1999 2000 
< 10 430/0 480/0 440/0 450/0 
10 to 19 17% 170/0 21% 150/0 
20-49 26% 250/0 180/0 300/0 
>49 14% 9% 16% 10% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
In conclusion, the key aspects of RDT operations include SME canvassmg, the 
allocation of technology transfer grants and counsellor training and development. The 
financial backing of these activities and RDT governance are further explored in the 
next section. 
4.4.2 ROT Governance and Financial Backing 
Two ministries are involved in the support and policy design for ROTs, the Ministry of 
National Education. Research and Technology and the Ministry of Industry. Post and 
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Telecommunications and Foreign Trade. They jointly fund the initiative but delegated 
the management of the network to Anvar, a national agency for the promotion of 
research, and to its regional offices. As such, Anvar is responsib Ie for the initiative's 
monitoring and provides funding ministries with statistical data reflecting ROTs' 
activities (Ministere de I'Education nationale de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 
1995): 
"Since the initiative came from the Ministry of Education and research. and 
since the ministry wanted to get the ministry of industry associated to the 
project, but also wanted an organisation that was very close to SMEs, it 
requested that the initiative be managed by Anvar at the national level. 
Because Anvar is under dual control: education / research and industry. So it 
was an effective means of co-ordinating both ministries, it was a means of 
having a joint operator" (RIOT Senior Manager, 1998) 
Anvar also manages inter-regional co-ordination with the RIOT. a unit formed within 
ANVAR and dedicated to the management and monitoring of ROTs. Coordination 
occurs for example via inter-regional thematic committees, national conferences, a 
website, a newsletter, and provides a unitying brand image. For example, since 1996, 
several interregional commissions have been set up in order to homogenise and set 
operational guidelines on topics as wide ranging as training and enhanced 
professionalism of technology counsellors, public relations, information technology and 
knowledge management. More recent working parties focussed on service quality and 
business needs identification. These groups vary over time and in terms of membership. 
However they are influential in setting national guidelines for the operation of local 
ROTs. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the RIOT superimposes itself over regional ROTs. 
form ing a network of partnerships. 
The three network levels are evident in the three ROTs represented in figure 4.2. These 
ROTs inter-act in two ways. Firstly, neighbouring ROTs (in the example. RDT2 and 
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RDT3) may col1aborate by referring clients to one another. Secondly RDTs are all 
members of the RIDT (Reseau Inter-regional de Diffusion Technologique (the inter-
regional technology transfer network'). 
Figure 4-2: RIDT structure: a network of partnerships 
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Through the RIDT, RDTs share practices and experiences. By participating in RIDT 
committees they also decide upon thematic priorities that wiU be adopted across the 
network. The last network level illustrated in figure 4.2 corresponds to the RDT 
satellites. These are set up when the more than one outlet is required to ensure adequate 
coverage of the region. Satellites normally cover 'departements (equivalent of 
counties). 
Anvar IRDT agreements are drawn up every year on the ba i of neg tiated operational 
targets determining funding levels. In some region an RDT' overall funding b 
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was complemented with European structural funds until 1999. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 sho\\ 
that the increase in overall RDT budgets over time mirrors the rise in RDT numbers but 
also the inclusion ofRlDT operational costs. Overall government participation declines. 
Despite clear trends these figures blur very wide disparities that exist between regions: 
for example, government funding levels reach 22% in the Lorraine region (due to 
income generated with service level agreements), they are about 38% in Auvergne 
(where European funding levels are higher than average) and in regions like the Nord 
Pas de Calais, government funding is over 65% (CM International, 1994). 
Table 4-7 Central Government FundinK: 1990-1999 (in million/rancs) 
1990- 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
91 
Allocated 15 7.5 11 1 1 11.3 11.5 11.3 14 16.6 
funds 
Available 15 12 13.4 13.6 15.7 16.2 13.7 14.7 17.1 
funds 
Number of 4 9 12 13 17 20 20 21 21 
RDTs 
Source: (CM International, 1994) 
Table 4-8 Total RDT budKets 1996-1998 (in millionfrancs) 
1996 1997 1998 
Total 28 28.1 30.2 
Government contribution as a % oftotal budget 50.4 49.8 46.3 
Source: (CM International, 1994) 
4.4.3 Partners and Members at Regional Level 
Large-scale partnership and collaboration have been emphasised since the ver) 
beginning of this initiative. However, it was clearly articulated around two distinct 
levels of involvement. and combined mandated and voluntary participation. 
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The 1989 government prospectus clearly mandated government offices in regions and 
government agencies (in particular Anvar) to collaborate and fonn the backbone of 
RDTs. Government offices in regions are of two kinds: each related to different 
ministries. These are the DRIREI7 (the regional ann of the ministry ofindustry) and the 
DRRTI8 (the regional representation of the ministry of education and research). 
The original call for partnership was very wide indeed; to some extent masking the 
critical role core organisations were to play (including the above mentioned DRRT. 
DRIRE and Anvar). In 1989 a prospectus invited Chambers of Commerce -including 
agencies they run - educational institutions, research centres, as well as a range of 
agencies (public and private) providing specialist services and advice to existing finns 
in the field of technology transfer and innovation: 
"Partners in this initiative may include: 
The regional head of the Anvar, the DRIRE, the DRRT and other governmental 
services represented in regions whose competencies may be relevant; 
Chambers of commerce, ARIST19 (when present in the region) and the regional 
offices of AFNOR and of INPt2° 
Universities and other higher education institutions [ ... ] 
Pub lie sector research institutions [ ... ] technical centres; 
CRIIT21 , technological advisors 
17DRIRE stands for Directions Regionales de l'lndustrie et de la Recherche. It is a regional ann of the 
Ministry oflndustry. '
18 DRRT stands for oeh~gues Regionaux de la Recherche et de la Technologle. These are representatives 
of the Ministry of Education and Research in regions. . 
IQ ARIST stands for 'Agence Regionale d'lnfonnation Scientifique et Technique'. These agencies focus 
on the gathering and dissemination of technical and scientific information. Thl.) are generally managed 
by the local Chambers of Commerce. . . 
20 INPI stands for 'Institut National de la Propriete Industnelle'. The INPI IS a support structure focused 
on industrial property. . 
21 CRITT stands for 'Centre Regional d'innovation et de Transfert Technologtque'. ~Rms. arc often 
industry specific and are designed to provide servin."'S focused on technology transfer and mnovallon. 169 
Generally all other public and private organisations involved in technolog) 
transfer" (Ministere de l'Education nationale de la Recherche et de la 
Technologie, 1989) 
Despite this, large call for involvement, and as indicated earlier, the DRRT, ORIRE and 
Anvar were clearly identified by the government as drivers of the initiative. Their 
partnership at the institutional level was prescribed. While these institutions operate at 
a regional level, they are directly answerable to central government. Consequently they 
could be mandated to form the backbone of the initiative from the very early stages. 
Since 1994, the Conseil Regional joined the core partnership by becoming one of the 
funding bodies. These four organisations are commonly called the 'gang of four', 
suggesting a level of influence that goes beyond that of other partners (ROT Manager, 
1998b). This shared leadership role has de facto been a basic rule of engagement in 
ROTs. 
In some regions, it also proved to be a source of tension as some partners struggled 
against each other in order to claim ownership and sole strategic leadership. Following 
the 1999 national review of all ROTs, this issue was formally recognised. The 
government re-iterated the principle of shared leadership and emphasised the need to 
agree overarching regional technology transfer policies within the RDT framework by 
members of the 'gang offour': 
"The Comite de Pilotage relies on a core made of the DRIRE, the ORRT, the 
Anvar and the Conseil Regional. Its composition may further be specified, and 
where necessary, other institutions may be associated" (Reseau Interregional de 
Diffusion Technologique, 1999 pp. 37) 
"The strategic piloting of ROTs assumes involvement of key institutional 
partners, and the search of consensus without network take over by one of the 
partners" (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999 pp.37) 
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While formal partnership is the mechanism RDTs rely upon at the strategic level. looser 
networking is the process driving service delivery at the operational level. Further. 
involvement is voluntary in the sense that counsellors employed by one partner 
organisation (for example technology advisors employed at the regional ORRT) are not 
compelled, but are given the opportunity to join their regional RDT (therefore obtain 
the status of member). Table 4.9 shows the steady increase since 1996 of RDT 
members across French regions. 
Table 4-9: Number of counsellors per RDT (1996-2000): 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 0 6 55 62 57 
Aguitaine 70 82 69 73 73 
Auvergne 40 48 52 55 56 
Bourgogne 41 44 45 28 30 
Bretagne 96 96 104 108 108 
Centre 68 73 73 67 54 
Cham pagne-Ardenne 42 43 51 43 44 
Corse 32 38 43 45 42 
Franche-Comte 54 51 49 50 50 
lIe-de-France 0 0 0 0 75 
Languedoc-Roussillon 12 31 34 35 35 
Limousin 55 62 56 46 42 
Lorraine 28 28 28 29 29 
Midi-Pyrenees 107 104 102 99 101 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 119 110 99 108 89 
Basse-Normandie 58 45 54 56 52 
Haute-Normandie 61 64 71 69 80 
Pa~s-de-Loire 95 99 61 69 68 
Picardie 34 43 47 45 50 
Poitou-Charentes 49 47 44 38 36 
PACA 37 53 57 60 49 
Rhone-AIEes 149 178 22 34 38 
TOTAL 1247 1345 1216 1219 1258 
Average per ROT 62 64 57 58 57 
This has allowed ROTs to expand the range of services they can provide to SMEs in the 
usual course of their activities (with the capacity to prescribe a PTR. for example). The 
arrangement is very different from co-location or secondment practices in the sense 
171 
that counse))ors remain located in their employers' premises and provide services on 
behalf of their employers. However, by becoming members of the RDT. they agree to 
use a set of standard procedures specific to ROT members, and to dedicate part of their 
time to ROT business (i.e. canvassing). 
Applicants, their employer, and the ROT manager sign a deontological code of practice 
that was devised centrally and is used in all regions. This simple one-page document 
commits members: 
To enhance market penetration levels through targeted and co-ordinated canvassing 
To provide the best service possible 
To be available should one's expertise be required 
To confidentiality 
To be actively involved in RDT internal communications and systems 
To personal professional development 
To the use of services and support provided by the ROT 
To a two year membership (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, Date 
of signature). 
1999 saw the introduction of 'associate member' status designed to differentiate 
between active and less active ROT members. Associate members are resources that 
can be tapped into, should a client require the type of skills or competencies they have. 
However, they cannot prescribe the PTR grant. Table 4.10 shows the recent growth in 
their numbers. 
Table 4-10: Numbero/'Associale' counsellors per region (1996-2000): 
1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 22 31 32 
Aquitaine 57 55 58 
Auvergnc 0 0 
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Bourgogne 13 15 13 
Bretagne 0 0 0 
Centre 0 0 0 
Champagne-Ardenne 44 44 46 
Corse 0 0 0 
Franche-Comte 0 0 0 
lIe-de-France 0 0 0 
Languedoc-Roussillon 0 0 0 
Limousin 0 58 22 
Lorraine 6 6 6 
M idi-Pyrenees 0 0 0 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 26 29 35 
Basse-Normandie 19 29 38 
Haute-Normandie 0 23 24 
Pays-de-Loire 51 47 62 
Picardie 31 28 28 
Poitou-Charentes 10 1 1 1 1 
PACA 0 0 0 
Rhone-Alpes 172 55 0 
TOTAL 451 431 376 
Of all key strategic partners, chambers of commerce generally provide the greatest 
number of members at operational level. Anvar counsellors are also very active, but 
fewer in numbers. Despite this general trend, actual operations vary significantly 
between regions. 
In conclusion, there are two fundamentally different processes that underpin the 
operation of ROTs: strategic partnership on the one hand and operational networking on 
the other. The next section focuses further on structure and control systems, in order to 
shed light on the ways in which this type of arrangement is meant to function. 
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4.4.4 Structure and Decision Making 
ROTs are registered charities, ('associatio~ loi 1901 '). They operate within the 
framework of their legal statutes - which identify institutional partners - and rely on two 
short policy documents - which set out the principles of membership. These documents 
support strategic and operational decision-making processes, and lay the foundations 
necessary for operational networking. 
Strategic decisions are largely made at the level of the 'Comite de Pilotage". Similar to 
a board of directors, the Comite de Pilotage gathers key representatives from all the 
organisations involved in the partnership and the ROT manager. A ·president'. who 
generally is an acknowledged business leader. chairs it. Interestingly, since 1988 all 
ROT statutes have been reviewed (ORIRE Chief Executive, 1999). Until then, the 
representative of the ORIRE and that of the ORRT were formally recognised directors. 
Further, their institutions were identified as being formal partners in the statutes. 
However this changed as it became widely accepted that the government cou Id not be 
partnering with itself. In a sense, the regional DRRT and ORIRE are representatives of 
the government. Since then representatives sit on boards and, as suggested earlier, their 
strategic leadership is heavily emphasised, however their institutions are not formally 
partners in ROTs' statutes. 
Daily operation of the network is the responsibility of the ROT manager. The main 
tasks of an ROT manager inc lude: 
Supporting the networking of counsellors 
Co-ordinating activities. 
Monitoring and reporting on activities 
Contributing to strategic plans as a member of the Comitc de Pilotage 
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A very small team ofadministrators generally supports managers, The voluntary aspect 
of membership has led to the emergence of a rather peculiar concept: that of non 
hierarchical management'. Partnership managers have no formal authority over 
member counsellors; they therefore heavily rely on their persuasion and motivation 
skills. 
The decision-making structures mentioned above, in particular the concept of non-
hierarchical management, require intense operational networking. The rationale behind 
the principle of voluntary participation is encapsulated in this networking notion 
present in the label of the initiative: Reseau de Diffusion Technologique ( Reseau 
meaning 'network'). As indicated earlier, networking occurs at operational level rather 
than at senior level. Figure 4.3 illustrates how individual counsellors employed by key 
partner organisations interact and network in the conduct of their activities form ing a 
'virtual' operational RDT field. Communication lines are primarily horizontal in this 
'virtual operational field' of the RDT. 
Figure 4-3: Networking in the virtual RDT operationaljield 
ROT 
Member 
Organisation 
Technology 
ounsc:Ilor 
Ii .. 
oo'Pllfl)' 
................... .... 
/ .......... . 
......•. 
: .-- ROT 
.... Panncmg licJd 
ROT virtual 
0pcraI ionaI lick! 
Technolo 
IJ1IIlSfcr . 
6dd 
'mrid ' ) 
mpan < > ounsclJor I 
unseDor I 
ounscDor 2 unscl r 
ounse r 
Dor > 
17 
The inter-organisational nature of these operational interactions can be seen as a side 
effect rather than an enforced code of practice. Indeed, social relationships. the 
knowledge that counsellors have of one another and the trust they develop in each other. 
over time, are the real gelling agents in the community they form. The level of 
informality (as opposed to hierarchical control systems), and the reliance on social 
networking, are cultivated in ROTs and are constantly emphasised in policy documents 
(Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999). The assumption is that once 
a counsellor is in contact with a firm he or she is faced with a range of options. One 
possibility is that the counsellor has the expertise required to conduct the most 
appropriate diagnosis, and can refer the company to the most suitable service provider. 
while on the other hand processing the application for a PTR grant, and negotiating its 
terms with the ROT manager. Alternatively, the counsellor may need to tap into the 
expertise of her or his peers. This is where personal networks come into play. This 
individual may contact a range of peers who may be better suited to dealing with the 
company. Some of exchanges may not lead anywhere, while others may be referred 
further until the best person for the job is found and put into contact with the firm. One 
could use the analogy with the World Wide Web: once a signal is sent (for example an 
electronic mail) it will use a random itinerary that will allow this message to reach its 
destination. When the message reaches dead ends it is re-routed. The nature of 
referrals between counsellors is meant to be as random as their social relationships. 
They are meant to cross-organisational boundaries, be horizontal, speedy and 
u npred ictab Ie. 
In conclusion, RDTs provide a fairly traditional range of services -grants. diagnosis. 
specialist counselling services. and counsellor training and development. but the 
initiative is backed by a somewhat usual set of funding partners - central government 
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and regIOns. It is managed and monitored nationally through a fairly standard 
governance structure: funds are channelled into ROTs via the Anvar, a national agency 
with regional offices, also responsible for national monitoring. The RIOT, which is a 
network of ROTs, facilitates this national monitoring, but it is also a platform of best 
practice exchange, and policy making for the initiative. ROTs are unique in the way 
they aim to combine strategic partnership between key regional institutions and 
operational networking based on voluntary membership of technology counsellors for 
the delivery of services. 
4. 5 Initiative Outcomes Nationally 
Most of the government literature presents the ROT initiative as a success. This section 
explores the validity of such claims by considering four basic activity indicators: the 
average number of counsellors, the average number of visits over time, the average 
num ber of PTR granted per ann urn and finally the ratio of visits to grants allocated. It 
also analyses the results of a 1999 national review of ROTs, and considers the issues 
these raise for the study of partnership working. 
Activity indicators have over-time been affected by the progressive enlargement of the 
ROT network. Enlargement (i.e. the creation of new RDTs) has led to the increase in 
total numbers of counsellors. However, the average level of activity (measured in table 
4.11 by the number of visits) has fluctuated in less predictable ways. 
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Table 4-11 Average Counsellor and visit numbers, 1991-1998 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 2000* 
N°ofRDTs 10 12 12 18 20 21 21 21 22 
Tot. 528 747 835 979 1247 1345 1667 1650 1634 
counsellors 
Average / ROT 52.8 62.3 69.6 54.4 32.4 64.0 79.4 78.5 74.2 
Tot. visits 4271 55.86 6227 10020 13331 16772 17044 16215 18015 
Average / ROT 427 465 519 557 667 799 812 772 819 
Visits / 8.1 7.5 7.5 10.2 10.2 12.5 10.2 9.8 1 I 
counsellor 
(*) Including associate counsellors. 
Enlargements between 1991 and 1994 were associated with an overall decline in 
numbers of visits per counsellors. This can logically be explained by the fact that there 
is a gap between the creation of an ROT, and the recruitment of members. The pattern 
breaks between 1994 and 1997 where there was a steady increase in levels of activity. 
Despite the lack of enlargement between 1997 and 1998, the overall number of visits 
per counsellors decreased again, while the average number of counsellors per ROT 
increases, suggesting a renewed emphasis on the recruitment of counsellors in each 
RDT. 
Table 4.12 shows the total number of PTR allocated over time throughout French 
territory. 
Table 4-12 Number of PTR granted 1991-1999: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
PTR total 863 1062 1138 1408 1231 1355 1639 1535 1534 1579 
N° ROTs 9 10 12 12 18 20 21 21 21 22 
N° ofPTR 96 106 95 117 68 68 78 73 73 72 
Eer ROT 
The joint reading of tables 4.11 and 4.12 reveals that the number of visits has increased 
steadily from 1992 to 1998. However, the average number of PTR allocated over 
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the same period does not mirror this trend. In fact, if we compare the ratio of visits to 
the number of PTR allocated over the same period, we get a rather negative picture of 
average RDT effectiveness. This is made clear in table 4.13. 
Table 4-13 VISits per PTR 1991-1998 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Average nO visits / RDT 558 427 465 519 557 667 799 812 772 819 
Average nO PTR / ROT 96 106 95 117 68 68 78 73 73 72 
Ratio visits / PTR 5.81 4.03 4.89 4.44 8.19 9.81 10.2 11.1 11 1 1 
Table 4.13 suggests that the average number of visits conducted for each PTR grant 
awarded has steadily increased between 1996 and 2000, indicating an apparent 
reduction in efficiency levels. At this stage in the research, it is not possible to establish 
the reasons behind this apparent decline. However, it is worth noting that discrepancies 
between regions are very large as shown by table 4.14. 
Table 4-14: Number of visits per PTR grant per RDT 1996-2000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 0 7 6 5 6 
Aguitaine 3 4 5 8 10 
Auvergne 218 101 27 47 59 
Bourgogne 8 7 8 9 6 
Bretagne 13 11 13 12 12 
Centre 1 I II 16 0 0 
Cham eagne-Ardenne 9 7 9 4 7 
Corse 3 5 7 12 0 
Franche-Comte 6 10 14 14 16 
lIe-de-France 0 0 0 0 0 
Languedoc-Roussillon 22 17 21 26 32 
Limousin 21 6 6 7 I I 
Lorraine 6 9 10 8 9 
Midi-Pyrenees 2 1 1 12 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 10 10 1 1 13 6 
Basse-Nonnandie 24 20 23 20 25 
Haute-Nonnandie 13 12 9 8 3 
Pa~s-de-Loire 21 14 12 18 19 
Picardie 9 12 13 9 5 
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Poitou-Charentes 15 17 20 17 32 
PACA 9 11 16 4 2 
Rhone-Alpes 7 7 7 8 8 
The 1999 review of ROTs highlighted: 
"[ ... ] a lack of coordination between institutions in most regions. This not only 
hinders the agreement of common goals for the ROT, but it also leaves 
operational monitoring methods too imprecise. 
Therefore the role and operations of the 'Comrte de Pilotage' need to be 
defined more precisely while taking into account the partnership mission of the 
RDT" (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999 pp. 37) 
In response, the government issued specific guidelines in terms of roles and 
responsibilities to each of the key players that it can directly influence, namely the 
DRIRE, the DRRT and the Anvar: 
"In order to enable a more effective monitoring of the ROT initiative, and 
defme its position relative to other initiatives designed to support SMEs, clarity 
from the state is required. The complementarities in remits of regional 
institutions depending from the government (decentralised services: ORIRE, 
ORRT, EPIC and Anvar) means that it is necessary to specify their respective 
role and responsibilities in terms of management and monitoring: 
DRIRE: relative position of ROT activities and blanket ORIRE 
initiatives; ROT and ROE relationship, and more generally relative 
position of the ROT and other econom ic development initiatives; 
DRRT: relative position of ROT activities and the offer of specialised 
competencies by the ORRT; monitoring and positioning of technology 
transfer resources supported by the ministry of industry made available 
with in the ROT (technology transfer counsellor posts etc .. ) and outside 
the ROT. 
Anvar: monitoring of ROT's technological focus; operational interface 
between the Comite de Pilotage and the ROT (more specifically hetween 
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the RDT manager and the chair of the Com itt! de Pilotage); interface 
between the RDT and the Conseil Regional and the RIOT ..... (Reseau 
Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999 pp. 38). 
These guidelines are interesting in three aspects. First, the government is clearly 
indicating that key regional players need to fonnally agree how their activities are 
positioned in relation to each other, signalling that these institutions will also have to 
define and acknowledge their respective turf: Second, Anvar is clearly cast in the role 
of arbitrator, mediating between the partnership manager and the partnership's chair: 
but also between the partnership and the inter-regional network (RIOT). It is also 
becoming a go-between for the partnership and its other key funding partner: the 
Region. Third Technology Transfer Advisors (referring specifically to a set of advisors 
hosted and under the control of the ORRT) are clearly seen as operating within the ROT 
framework. This is interesting because it is akin to saying that all technology advisors 
working for the local chamber have to work for the ROT. On the surface at least, this 
seems to be an infringement of the 'voluntary' ethic promoted within ROTs at the 
operational level. 
In conclusion, this brief review of the RDT initiative's outcomes highlights a constant 
growth of the network and an increased level of activity at the nationallevel. However, 
it raises questions about the long-tenn trend in tenns of operational efficiency. The 
effectiveness of local partnership arrangements is also an issue that the 1999 national 
review and the guidelines, that emerged subsequently, suggest needs attention. 
4. 6 Conclusion 
This chapter described the slow but steady development of the ROT initiative. 
Launched in 1989, the last metropolitan ROT was established in 1999 in the lie de 
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France region. Throughout that period, the overall rationale (enhancing SME 
competitiveness by giving them easy access to technological competencies) has 
remained constant. However, goals and objectives have become more specific and have 
been redefmed centrally, suggesting increased levels of central government control -
despite a stated commitment to the development oflocally responsive partnerships and 
increased local funding. Since 1994, regions have become an important source of 
funding, in some cases contributing as much as 500/0 of the overall budget of their local 
RDTs. 
Large-scale partnership was emphasised from the very beginning of the RDT initiative. 
Nonetheless, two fundamentally different processes underpin the operation of ROTs: 
strategic partnership on the one hand -key regional institutions are mandated to be 
involved in the partnership- and operational networking on the other -counsellors' 
involvement is based on voluntary membership. This combination presents challenges, 
and produces important concepts such as non-hierarchical management. 
Overall, the outcomes of the initiative appear to be positive: there is evidence of steady 
increase in geographical coverage of the French territory and increased levels of general 
activity. A slightly more refmed analysis however highlights problems such as an 
apparent decrease in efficiency levels. These are reinforced by the outcomes of the 
1999 national review, which recognised that partnering issues existed across the 
network, and that they needed to be tackled by, for example, redefining the roles of 
responsibilities of all key partners, but also ensuring that they developed and 
implemented, within the RDT framework, a shared strategy. 
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5 Presence Rhone-Alpes 
183 
5. 1 Introduction: 
The study of Presence Rhone-Alpes aims to investigate the relevance of learning 
organisation theory to our understanding of partnering dynamics in the field of 
economic development. 
The case starts with coverage of the regional context in which Presence RhOne-Alpes is 
set. Past experiences of collaboration are covered in order to unveil how key decision 
makers were rapidly able to embrace the French RDT initiative and launch Presence 
Rhone-Alpes as one of the first pilots. The partnership's goals and objectives and the 
way they have evolved in the recent past are then investigated. 
All the above constitutes the 'story' of Presence Rhone-Alpes. The following section 
centres on the detailed analysis of that story from an organisational learning perspective. 
By initially addressing the first research question (are value and operational crises 
components of partnership learning?), we aim to examine the relevance and usefulness 
of the partnership learning-spiral as a research framework for collaborative learning. 
Then by focussing on the second research question (what is the relationship between 
partnership learning and the negotiation and implementation of partnership objectives?), 
we intend to determ ine whether there are meaningful links / connections between the 
collaborative learning and goal formation. 
5. 2 The Regional Context 
Rhone-Alpes is the second largest French region after ile-de-France. With 5.6 millions 
inhabitants according to the 1999 national census (lNSEE, 2000b , See Appendix A) 
and the 2 millions jobs it provides, it is comparable to several European countries, 
including Denmark (5.2 million inhabitants) and Switzerland (6.6 million inhabitants) 
(Laurencin & Rousier. 200 I). The regional capital, Lyon. is the third largest town in 
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France with 1.3 million inhabitants, after Paris and Marseilles (INSEE, 2000b). 
Contributing 9.77% of the Gross Domestic Product in 2000, the region is the second 
most significant in the country, well behind iIe-de-France (which contributed 28.13 % 
in 2000) and well ahead of Provence-Alpes-Cotes d' Azur (which contributed 6.81 % in 
the same year) (INSEE, 2000c , See Appendix B) 
The economic vitality of the region is underpinned by a very strong web of SMEs (here 
defmed as having less than 50 employees). According to Linossier (2001) these 
companies represented 92.5% of all businesses in the region. Small finns (i.e. less than 
10 employees) represented 86% of the total. Businesses with more than 500 employees 
represented less than 0.1 % of the regional companies. Although the more recent 
figures released by INSEE are not entirely comparable because of variations in 
categories used to classifY SMEs, they corroborate largely Linossier's analysis. Indeed, 
in 2000, the INSEE recorded that 91.88% of companies in the region had less than 10 
employees (INSEE, 2000a) (compared to the 86% Linossier puts forward for 1999). 
Further, according to data published by INSEE, 80/0 of companies had between 10 and 
499 employees, while only 0.050/0 of these had more than 500 employees (See appendix 
7 for detailed figures across France and table 5.1 below for regional figures). The 
significant decline in the number of larger finns in the region may be explained by an 
increased level of mergers and acquisition affecting regional businesses and leading to 
the transfer of head offices to other geographical areas, mainly to Paris and its region 
(Laurencin & Rousier, 2001). While this trend is clearly identified by INSEE, the 
detrimental effects this may have on the regional economy are considered minimal. 
because outside tle-de-France, Rhone-Alpes is the second most significant pole of 
corporate decision-making in France (Lacroix & Pothier, 1999). 
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Table 5-1 Number and percentage of companies by size in Rhone-Alpes: 
Rhone-Alpes Total 0/0 
Self employed 134209 48% 
Ito9 122386 44% 
10 to 499 22353 8% 
500 and above 153 0% 
Total 279101 1000/0 
Source: (IN SEE, 2000a) 
The region has developed a strong potential in services to industry, including areas such 
as logistics, transport and inventory management services (Linossier, 200 I ~ Laurencin 
& Rousier, 2001). According to these authors, its industrial potential is hardly matched 
in France, making Rhone-Alpes one of the rare French regions which combines 
successfully strong secondary and tertiary sectors: 
Table 5-2: Employment by sector in France and in Rhone-Alpes: 
Agriculture Manufacturing Building Trade Services Total 
Rhone-Alpes 0.9 24.6 5.5 69.0 100 
France 1.5 20.1 5.5 72.9 100 
Source: (Laurene in & Rousier, 2001) 
Within the regional SME sector, most of the industrial activity is undertaken by 
subcontracting SMEs. In 1996, these dynamic and specialised businesses created in 
28.6% of the regional value added (against an average of 23% at the national level) 
(Linossier, 2001). Services created 64.40/0 of the regional value added in the same year 
(against a national average of 700/0) (Linossier, 2001). The breakdown by size of 
businesses showed an overwhelming dominance of companies with less than 10 
employees, however, a further breakdown of manufacturing SMEs by size shows that 
this is not mirrored in the sector: 
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Table 5-3 Manufacturing businesses by size in France and Rhone Alpes: 
Less than 20 20 to 49 50-99 100-499 Above 500 Total 
Rhone-Alpes 2.7 21.8 15.7 39.7 20.1 100 
France 2.8 18.1 13.1 37.9 28.1 100 
Source: (Laurencin & Rousier, 200 I) 
The above suggests that manufacturing companies tend to be larger than in other sectors 
in Rhone-Alpes; further, the proportion of companies with less than 50 employees 
(24.50/0) is higher than the national average (20.90/0). 
In addition to the very significant role of SMEs have in the economy, the presence of 
geographical clusters of firms specialised in a particular type of economic activity. akin 
to the Italian model of industrial districts, is noteworthy (Laurencin & Rousier. 200 I). 
The spatial localisation of firms (particularly SMEs) in the same or related sectors 
generates economic benefits derived from both collaborative and competitive 
relationships (Gregoire, 1998; Lescot & Sinou, 2000; Ministere de l'Education nationale 
de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 1989). Keeble and Wilkinson (1998) further 
argue that in high technology sectors the presence of such clusters is tightly linked with 
regional innovative capability because it fosters collective learning and knowledge 
development in the region. According to Laurencin and Roussier (200 I) Rhone-Alpes 
has three significant industrial districts located in the "Vallee de L'Arve', the Roanne 
area, and the Oyonnax sector, respectively specialised in metalworkini2, textiles and 
plastic moulding. 
In conclusion. the above outlined the significance of the SME sector and the presence of 
several industrial districts within Rhone-Alpes. Both are fundamental to the economic 
vitality of the region, and it is in this context that business support activities, including 
21 Specialist activit~ called 'decolletage' in French. 187 
specific initiatives to promote technology transfer and innovation, have taken place 
since the 1980s. These are covered in more detail in the next section. 
5. 3 Past Experiences of Partnership and Early 
Development Stages 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Presence Rhone-Alpes IS one of the first pilots of the Reseau de Diffusion 
Technologique initiative. Like many of its counterparts, the partnership had a history of 
earlier collaboration between key actors; but unlike most, it has witnessed important 
upheavals in the course of its short history and is currently bandied as one of the success 
stories of this government policy. 
In this section, we describe how partnering efforts in the field of technology transfer 
started in the region in the late 1970s and were formalised with the creation of Presence 
Rhone-Alpes in 1990. We then present how the principle of using existing 
infrastructure (as opposed to creating new support structures) and the principle of 
relying on private business managers emerged as fundamental values which over time 
led to tension, then crisis. 
5.3.2 Early Experiences and Formalisation with the ROT 
Large-scale collaboration in the field of technology transfer can be traced back to the 
late 1970s in the Rhone-Alpes region (DRIRE Chief Executive. 1999: Senior Conseil 
Regional Manager. 1999). In 1977 the Conseil Regional and the DRRT initiated the 
GRITf (a regional group for innovation and technology transfer). The GRITT was 
originally constituted by business leaders who were committed to innovation and 
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technology transfer and saw these as means of enhancing business effectiveness (Senior 
Conseil Regional Manager, 1999; Reverdy, 1992). Originally, this organisation was 
purely constituted of private sector entrepreneurs, who would infonnally meet to discuss 
innovation and technology transfer issues. However it progressively evolved as 
technology service providers joined the group (Senior Conseil Regional Manager, 1999~ 
Reverdy, 1992; ARIST Managing Director, 1999). As the G RITT grew, it became a 
rather wide and diverse network of individuals and institutions: 
"At the time, one could fmd in the network chambers of commerce, which 
accounted for about 80% of activities on the ground. There were the CRlTT: 
Regional Centres for Innovation and Technology. Representatives from 
University Research Laboratories also took part, alongside representatives 
from public schools. Technical Centres were also involved in the group -there 
is a large number of technical centres in this region, about twenty I think- So 
there were intermediaries as well as people capable of offering high value 
added services in technology." (ARIST Managing Director, 1999) 
In parallel to the increasing level of involvement from a range of stakeholders, the 
amount of strategic reflection within the group grew too, leading to a recognition that 
innovation was indeed important to SMEs growth and survival, but that these were not 
sufficiently guided in their search for technological competencies. A consensus that 
something needed to be done to address the situation emerged: 
"Originally, it [the GRlIT] was purely a group of industry leaders, and very 
rapidly, it included businesses and technology service providers. Therefore it 
anticipated what was more formerly established later with the RDT. So, in the 
region we already had a structure that had identified the need to bring closer 
businesses and business support offer." (Senior Conseil Regional Manager. 
1999) 
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" This network [the GRITT] was primarily a gathering of actors who would 
generally meet informally. That's how it started. Then, it evolved. It evolved 
because actors realised that while the meetings were useful, there was a need 
for shared objectives; there was also a need for proposals that cou Id be made to 
businesses. In other words we needed to move and indeed get results. [ ... ] 
There are technological resources in this region, in fact more than we need. 
But SMEs, firstly, do not necessarily know how to formulate their 
technological needs; secondly, even if they can express their needs, they do not 
know how to find the resources that they need. So, in some ways, Presence 
Rhone-Alpes, well it was not called that way then, I can tell you that, so it was 
a signposting system, a way of establishing a link between SMEs and 
technological resources" (ARIST Managing Director, 1999) 
The need to narrow the gap between SMEs and technological expertise provision was 
established following a consultancy report, which was commissioned by the Region 
between 1986 and 1988 (Senior Conseil Regional Manager, 1999). The exact date of 
this study could not be established in these interviews, despite the large number of 
references made to it, perhaps mirroring the long lasting effect the study had on 
partnership debates. Initial steps focussed on establishing and intensifying links 
between businesses and public sector research institutions: 
" To be short, the region commissioned a study at one point in time. A 
consultancy agency was employed to conduct an analysis of the potential of 
research and development in Rhone-Alpes. They concluded that given existing 
potential, the level of interaction between laboratories, universities and 
technical centres and businesses was limited. Therefore the goal was initially 
to intensify exchanges between universities, laboratories, technical centres. one 
could say public sector research and businesses, specifically, SMEs .... This 
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proved rather difficult to achieve" (Chamber of Commerce Senior Manager. 
1999) 
As the experience lasted over time, the joint leadership of key institutional players 
within the Conseil Regional, the Anvar, the DRRT and Chambers of Commerce became 
more prominent, while at the same time a continued emphasis was placed on the 
infonnal nature of the emerging partnership: 
"You see, I lived the history of this partnership. When I joined the Chamber 
of Commerce in 1988, the network was primarily infonnal and based on a 
small number of key people at the time. It was more of a "people's network". 
[ ... ] At the time the main goal was to ensure collaboration between 
institutions, but without fonnalisation." (Chamber of Commerce Senior 
Manager, 1999). 
"So, we, public service institutions, DRRT, Anvar, the Region, we responded 
to these expectations and made proposals. This group of people would meet 
and debate the nature of technological support delivered by counsellors, they 
would exchange and share experiences. In the same spirit, we created a 
network of people. Voluntary action, a network ofpeople, in order to address a 
rather heterogeneous demand coming from different stakeholders, within a new 
profession, technological support, signposting and industrial research. This 
was the beginning of the adventure about ten years ago. (DRRT Chief 
Executive., 1999) 
"'From a historical perspective, the establishment of a network concerned with 
technology transfer was initiated by us, the Anvar and the region. How did we 
initiate this? We started from the need expressed by newly created actors in 
technological development and business coaching. Many of these felt indeed 
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isolated, lacking both methodological tools and logistical support. This 
hampered their ability to perfonn their newly developing function, the 
technological support of businesses wishing to grow or seeking technological 
support." (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
The above shows that respondents (with the exception of the Conseil Regional 
representative, who were all in post as these events took place) reached a consensus that 
provision of technological support in the 1980s could by and large be characterised as 
the emergence of a new profession. Interestingly, there seems to be a divergence in 
their recollection of the rationale behind the emergence of this infonnal network 
between key actors. While the chief executive of the DRRT seems to focus on a supply 
side argument, i.e. that newly created technology support structures needed support 
themselves to develop appropriate intervention tools in the small finn sector leaning 
towards a supply side argument (Ricorde~ 1997); the representatives of the chamber of 
commerce and the region tend to argue that SMEs needed clearer access routes to 
support therefore leaning towards a demand based argument (Brachet, 1995; Mawson, 
1997; Parker, 1999; Cosh & Hughes, 1998) or a market failure type of rationale. 
In the late 1980s, it was primarily the latter that guided national debates on technology 
transfer infrastructures in the country (Parker, 1999). Developments in the Rhone-
Alpes region coincided with the formation of the RDT policy nationally (Reverdy, 
1992). It was therefore not surprising that the region should be picked as one of the 
national pilots for the scheme. Given that much was already in place, albeit on an 
informal basis, the official launch ofPrt!sence Rhone-Alpes took place speedily in 1990, 
the partnership was originally called "Presence Technologique Rhone-Alpes', but it 
soon became known as ·presence'. Interviewees seem to be ofmixed feelings about the 
work they pioneered becoming part of a national policy. Some emphasise the 
traditional budget enlargement arguments (Mackintosh. 1992). by arguing that the 
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sustainability of the partnersh ip was strengthened as ded icated sources of fund ing were 
associated with ROTs, but others stress equally the difficulties of fitting their regional 
approach into the straightjacket formed by nationally defmed guidelines: 
"Partnering and collaborative work were established in the region before the 
national offices of Anvar defmed what an RDT was meant to be and before 
pilots with specific guidelines were set up. [ ... ] So, in Rhone-Alpes, I will not 
go through historical details again, this was a shock to the system; it affected 
established networking practices. [The national initiative] constrained in order 
to formalise. It also brought additional finances, which guaranteed the 
sustainability of these structures. But initially, it could be seen as a national 
reframing of systems that were already in place in Rhone-Alpes. So with the 
exception of additional finances, the national RDT policy did not help much in 
Rhone-Alpes." (ORIRE Chief Executive, 1999) 
"The network was very formal at the beginning, it was somewhat forced into 
implementation by the public sector, with a financial carrot, targeted to 
Chambers of commerce among others." (Chamber of Commerce Senior 
Manager, 1999) 
Like many other economic development initiatives that require partnership, the birth of 
Presence Rhone-Alpes was characterised by a desire to access financial resources 
(Parkinson, 1996; Martin & Pearce, 1999; Haughton et aI., 1997) leading to budget 
enlargement (Mackintosh, 1992). It was also characterised by a policy framework 
'imposed from the top' which local partners found difficult to accommodate originally 
(Parkinson, 1996: Geddes & Martin, 1996; Dunsby, 1997) . 
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The Presence Rhone-Alpes partnership that emerged was led by the gang of four 
partnering at the strategic level and shaped as a wide network of organisations involved 
in technology transfer (as service providers, as specialist diagnosis services. as research 
led bodies and education institutions or simply as representatives of the private sector) 
at the operational level: 
"In the legal documents at the time, one could clearly see that Presence Rhone-
Alpes focused on all businesses in the region, and that founding members 
included all research institutions, all regional chambers, the Anvar, alJ regional 
public sector bodies ... really everyone was meant to be there." (Senior Conseil 
Regional Manager, 1999). 
5.3.3 Founding Principles 
Two fundamental principles emerged as partners reached agreements about the ways in 
which they intended to operationalise the RDT. These were the use of the existing 
technology transfer and business support infrastructure and the involvement of the 
private sector. The rationale behind these choices is discussed below. 
5.3.3.1 Use of the Existing Infrastructure 
In the late 1980s, informal collaborative networks had been growing in the region and 
key partners could anticipate the requirement to launch an ROT in the near future. It is 
with this context in mind that the Conseil Regional had commissioned the consultancy 
project discussed earlier. The latter indeed confirmed that access to support services 
was an issue for SMEs. However. it also recommended the establishment of an entirely 
new organisation. which would employ its own technological counsellors and act as a 
single point of access for technological advice and support. This was strongly opposed 
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by Chambers of Commerce and led to the fIrst important stream of negotiations and 
discussions in the partnership. 
Although Chambers' activities were primarily generalist and therefore lacked some the 
expertise required to diagnose SMEs needs, particularly in relation to technological 
development and innovation, they were the most active organisations in the field 
providing general diagnosis and counselling services to SMEs (Reverdy, 1992). 
Following political manoeuvring and jockeying, the partnership rejected the idea that an 
entirely new structure should be created and opted in favour of a networking solution 
whereby Presence Rhone-Alpes would rely on counsellors from partner organisations 
and in particular from Chambers: 
"Well, if we go back in time, to the period where the Conseil Regional 
commissioned -I was told this, 1 was not there at the time- a study by a large 
consultancy fIrm. This study concluded [ ... ]that SMEs did indeed fInd it 
difficult to find their way in the labyrinth of business support and financial and 
technological support that was offered to them. They recommended that an 
entirely new structure should be created, with about twenty counsellors 
recruited for the sole purpose of visiting companies. So that was a big danger 
at the time. It required political interventions and it was blocked. From there 
we got to the service level agreements. The argument was that there was no 
point in creating something additional to what is already in place. Let's use 
what is already established. Let's federate. Let's coordinate and enhance 
professionalism in existing provision. This rationale persists to date." (ARIST 
Managing Director, 1999) 
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"The RDT is not there to do things, it is there to enable others to provide 
services or improve their service provision. Since the very beginning we chose 
to work from what was already in place. The alternative could have been to set 
up a specific body with its own technology counsellors, given that this was 
designed to address a new emerging demand for technology transfer. That's 
precisely what we did not do. OUT choice was made after debates, discussions. 
We decided to favour another solution, which was about recognising that at 
that time, there were a number of organisations, which were mandated to 
intervene on the ground for the provision of technical assistance to businesses. 
These included among others Chambers of Commerce." (DRRT Chief 
Executive., 1999) 
Further, this decision was tied with client visit targets that focused dramatically 
counsellors' activities on market penetration goals and in particular on the signposting 
to public sector service providers: 
" I believe that the catalyst for Chambers involvement, was the target based 
contractual agreement with the region. [ ... ] These agreements initially 
involved new resources that were designed to enable chambers to increase the 
number of client visits in order to identify and foster technological 
development projects. The desire to use more effectively the resources of 
technical centres laboratories, well public sector research, was implicit in this. 
O.K. so much has been done since." (Chamber of Commerce Senior Manager, 
1999) 
The contractual system adopted in Rhone-Alpes is very similar to the principle of 
service level agreements that are commonly used in the United Kingdom. Each year the 
region negotiates with regional chambers of commerce the number of client visits 
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that counsellors will conduct. Chambers of Commerce receives a level of funding for 
each visit conducted. Therefore, there is a direct financial benefit for partner 
institutions whose counsellors are canvassing the region. 
The nature of targets negotiated between the region and the chambers has evolved 
dramatically from the early years of the Presence Rhone-Alpes to the current day. This 
evolution will be discussed further in the review of the partnership's operational 
activities. It is nonetheless worth noting that the performance-related funding system 
established in Rhone-Alpes was at the time ground breaking. Very early in the history 
of this partnership, it paved the way to intensive counsellor training and development 
(especially in the specialist technology related skills). 
professionalism in service provision: 
It also emphasised 
"The target based contracts enabled the partnership to move onto the next 
stage. There was a transition between the friendly meetings, where everyone 
got to know the other partners, to a stage where we could demand things. We 
have to acknowledge that this was achieved thanks to the Conseil Regional. 
We said to people: "now, you will need to enhance your professionalism; to 
work against targets and get involved progressively in more sophisticated and 
intelligent approaches'" (ARIST Managing Director, 1999) 
"'The gamble we made was about opening these people to technology by telling 
them: "be careful, business support from a management and coaching 
perspective is not enough. Increasingly, technology and innovation will take 
an important part in competitiveness. You must be operating in this area. That 
was the gamble, I believe we won." (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
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Similar scenarIOS to the above have been unveiled in other European studies of 
economic development policies (Parker, 1999; Le Gales & Lequesne, 1997; Balme, 
1997). It is not unusual that new national or European initiatives become threats to the 
activities and remits of organisations, institutions already operating in areas such as 
business support (Haughton et aI., 1997; Martin & Oztel, 1996; Geddes & Martin. 
1996). In the case of Presence Rhone-Alpes, partners' ability to reach a consensus (that 
existing support structures should be used) is outstanding given the implicit 
acknowledgement that their capabilities were deficient and needed to be built up for the 
partnership to deliver its mission. Despite criticisms by local commentators (referring 
to national policy straightjackets) partners seem to have enjoyed a level of operational 
flexibility that may not always be the hallmark of governmental initiatives. In the case 
of the British Business Link initiative, for instance, the more rigid guidelines spelt out 
in the successive prospectuses and in tum tied into partnership bid evaluation processes 
reduced scope for local flexibility to the extend that Dunsby (1997), then Chief 
Executive of the Association of Business Advisors, asked in his report to the British 
Minister for Small Firms whether Business Links were partnerships or dictatorships. 
referring particularly to the dominant roles some TECs have come to assume in these 
'collaborative' structures. 
In parallel to Presence Rhone-Alpes's desire to use exiting business support and 
counselling resources with a commitment to the development of their expertise. 
particularly in the field of technology transfer and innovation; the partnership was 
strongly driven by a commitment to involve the private sector in strategic decision 
making, as shown below. 
5.3.3.2 Private Business Managers Involvement 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the GRITI was originally a gathering of private 
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sector business managers (Reverdy, 1992). Private sector involvement remained a 
driving force in the establishment and development of Presence Rhone-Alpes. 
However, the modus operandi of this involvement and the type of private sector 
representatives evolved quite significantly. 
Historically, PRA had always emphasised the involvement of business managers in the 
partnership's decision making, with in particular the establishment of a 'Com ite des 
Industriels' (Industrial Committee) which had been given specific strategy definition 
remits in the legal documents that established the ROT (RDT Manager, 1999a). 
However, the limitations of this policy soon emerged for the ROT, as its growing focus 
on the very small businesses became apparent: 
"In our efforts to recruit private sector business leaders, we defined a generic 
profile. Specifically we wanted owner-managers of very small businesses, 
because, 7 or 8 years ago, there was also a private sector comm ittee. but it 
primarily included chief executives of medium and larger businesses. How 
could one realistically expect the chief executives of these businesses to 
understand the very sma II business? [ ... ]. The very small business has 
characteristics that we must absolutely take into account, but which are most of 
the time overlooked. We cannot use the same intervention tools as those used 
in medium sized businesses. We can not fully transfer these action across to the 
very small businesses." (RDT Manager, 1999a). 
Latter recruitment efforts aimed at incorporating within the strategic apex of the 
partnership owner-managers of very small and small businesses (I to 50 employees. 
with a special focus on those with less than 20 employees). As suggested above, the 
rationale is primarily to focus with greater effectiveness on the needs of this market 
segment (RDT Manager, 1999a). This is achieved by using the Committee as a 
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powerful validation mechanism for strategic decisions made by the gang of four: 
"The creation of the Industrial Committee was importan~ because it allowed 
Presence Rhone-Alpes to demonstrate that it could involve the private sector: 
this is not to be taken for granted. As a consequence. institutional partners can 
have immediate feedback on their lines of thought on a range of topics" (RDT 
Manager, 1999a) 
"So, I progressively got involved, because I believe that these people, who are 
committed to progress, need in front of them business leaders who are prepared 
to commit time to assist them. They need this interface. They really are 
looking for it. I see the meetings that we have held jointly. I see the creation of 
the industrial committee by person named [the current partnership manager]. 
We bring ideas. It enables us sometimes to destabilise [the institutional 
representatives], on the contrary sometimes we strengthen their conviction that 
they are doing the right thing." (RDT Private Sector Director, 1999b) 
The above clearly emphasises the synergies that are sought through the interaction 
between small business representatives and institutional players striving to implement 
support policies that are relevant. This type of private sector involvement has 
extensively been sought in the United Kingdom, where the notion of 'public-private' 
partnership became a favoured means of implementing policies from the late 1980s 
(Hambleton, 1991; Pacione, 1992), throughout the 1990s (Parkinson, 1996) even after 
the rise to power of New Labour(Glaister, 1999) (Clarence & Painter, 1998; Darwin. 
Duberley. & Johnson. 1999). In this context. private sector involvement was not only 
seen as part of the legitimisation discourse underpinning governmental initiatives 
targeting business (Sanderson, 1996), it was also viewed as a means of 'transfonn ing' 
the public sector by importing management practices expected to improve public sector 
perfonnance (Mackintosh, 1992; Martin & Sanderson. 1999). 
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The notion of public-private partnership in France is rather different from that which 
was pioneered in the US or developed in the United Kingdom (Le Gales, 1992). This is 
largely due to the legislative infrastructure that applies to the modus operandi of public 
sector intervention and the one that applies to commercial enterprises. Indeed public and 
private sector interaction are more often than not set and ana lysed in the context of 
ownership, legal status and type of contractual arrangement that exist between the two 
sectors (Lorrain, 1988; Douat, 1995). However, customer / private sector involvement 
and interaction with service providers are becoming part of changing perspectives on 
public sector service delivery, which emphasise the suitability of these services 
(Brachet, 1995). Further, business services is the area where private sector involvement 
is most developed in France: 
"While private sector entrepreneurs may be involved in 'think tanks' or 
business associations, for example via the Chamber of Commerce, cases of 
active collaboration are rare in France. Most of the involvement in economic 
development comes from groups of entrepreneurs or owner managers of 
med ium sized enterprises." (Le Gales, 1992 pp. 89) 
As suggested by respondents in Presence Rhone-Alpes, private sector representatives' 
involvement was driven by service improvement and a will to shape local policymaking 
rather than a governmental desire to alter public sector management processes. Despite 
the legitimacy that private sector brings theoretically to a partnership, one could argue 
that, in Presence Rhone-Alpes, the earlier and more awkward private sector 
involvement efforts in partnership management had sawn the seeds of crisis. The next 
section presents an account of one of the most difficult periods in the history of 
Presence Rhone-Alpes. 
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5.3.4 Crisis Strikes 
Like early members of the industrial committee, the partnership's managing director 
was a private sector business leader. However, instead of bringing the partnership 
legitimacy, or effective focus on small businesses needs; this appointment set in motion 
conflicting approaches that climaxed with his resignation and Presence Rhone-Alpes' 
entry into a three-year vegetative period. Interview data suggests that tensions were 
underpinned by management style issues, advertising policy decisions and the contlict 
of interest that emerged between service providing and service prescribing partners. 
Most of the rare references to this conflict-laden period tend to converge on differences 
in opinions and strategies between the managing director and institutional partners: 
"When I joined this partnership, five years ago, it is not certain this orientation 
was there. The managing director, at the time, did not fully embrace 
technological transfer. This was not a policy he fully endorsed. Managing 
directors changed. The problem was resolved. Then at the partnership level 
we needed to see ... I think since Rame [the current partnership manager] 
joined, we re-established the balance between the political and the 
partnership's priorities." (DRIRE Chief Executive, 1999) 
"At the time, I was not here, but I still experienced it as a member, the crisis 
that took place ... I think that at one point in time, the partnership's managing 
director, who was leading a business of more than a thousand employees - so 
not the kind of business we deal with every day - saw things differently from 
institutional partners. The managing director and the chief executive he 
appointed and institutional partners had diverging points of view." (RDT 
Manager, I 999b ) 
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The above statements are rather broad, and interview data do not allow us to establish 
clearly the specific nature of these diverging opinions. On the other hand, there seems 
to be more specifIC suggestions that the managing director's management style could 
have been an aggravating factor in the genesis of tensions between himself and his key 
institutional counterparts, the so-called gang of four: 
"Well I told you, at one point in time, institutional partners were not m 
agreement with the MD's line. Roughly, the MD wanted... If you like I think 
that he wanted to structure the partnership and manage it like his business. So 
he wanted to formalise, when he needed to operate at the informal level. [ ... ] 
And institutional partners were not... that was not the point. I think that he 
indeed started to create a problem the moment he decided to structure, 
organise, dictate this or the other. The problem is that you can only achieve. 
You cannot dictate. You need to get people working by convincing them 
instead of dictating them." (ROT Manager, 1999b) 
The managing director's desire to formalise was accompanied by a commitment to 
establish the Presence Rhone-Alpes brand in the minds of his target market. He 
therefore implemented an advertising campaign, described by the current partnership 
manager as 'ambitious': 
"Secondly, he [the partnership's MDl implemented a large PR campaign for 
Presence. And I think that institutional players did not agree with that. But. 
you know, it is always the same thing~ when institutional players have in front 
of them an MD, they do not dare risk a confrontation, etc .... Often the schism 
appears, the abyss gets deeper, nobody talks to anybody. There are 
misunderstandings; these get bigger over time... It creates an atmosphere 
where suspicion prevails and one day divorce is necessary. The reality is that 
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people did not explain their positions. It is often like that. I must say howe\er 
that the PR campaign was particularly ambitious. Heavy communication and 
advertisement to raise awareness of Presence Rhone-Alpes, the logo etc ... The 
advertising budget was very strong. I believe it has had an impact. But 
institutional partners do not like that their money is used for advertising 
purposes. That is a kind of recurrent problem, one that is understandable too. 
They do not like that their money, [ ... ] is used in advertising efforts. No 
problem with the production of documentation, as we do now, that's fine. But 
a strong PR policy ... they do not like that." (ROT Manager, 1999b) 
Beyond these conflicts that were very closely related to particular individuals and their 
inability to reach an open and clear agreement on strategic priorities; the partnership 
suffered the side effects of the all-encompassing partnership policy that was adopted for 
the establishment of the ROT. Indeed the fact that service providers and service 
'prescribers' were all involved created conflicts of interests: 
"From the very beginning public sector organisations, so governmental bodies, 
the DRRT and the region, felt that there was a problem in gathering [ ... ] 
organisations that are service providers, organisations which were designed to 
visit companies -to promote technological development- and companies that 
were themselves supposed to be clients for services. So a debate emerged on 
the gathering in the same organisation and the collaboration of people who 
were service providers, service prescribers, and potential clients. Again, I was 
not there, I do not remember this, I work from written exchanges and meeting 
minutes, where the issue is clearly identified." (Senior Conseil Regional 
Manager, 1999) 
Tensions mentioned above have had two implications. Firstly, the expectations of some 
of the service providers were raised as they assumed increases in business as a direct 
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result of their membership, in particular research and development institutions (e.g. 
specialist engineering schools, public sector research laboratories etc.). The second 
outcome was self-prescriptio~ (in other words, counsellors from a particular partner 
tended to prescribe their own organisation's services) (Senior Conseil Regional 
Manager, 1999). Both of these trends were unhealthy and undermined Presence Rhone-
Alpes: 
"In addition, the crisis was accelerated by the fact that partnership gathered 
service prescribers and service providers. Service providers had therefore an 
ambiguous role. They considered that service prescribers should act as their 
commercial representatives: 'what's this? The partnership does not generate 
business for me' etc... To set this in context, most of these service providers 
are from the public sector, hence official partners; on the other hand private 
sector representatives were not included yet 60% of our work is with them. 
The most virulent providers were the universities and technical centres. The 
partnership'S target market is really not in suitable for their services. So you 
mix all that, and progressively, over the months the mistrust increased leading 
to a breakdown." (RDT Manager, 1999b) 
"There was a misunderstanding at the beginning. Laboratories and universities 
had high expectations from company visits. As the public sector was focussing 
on identifying company needs, they thought that they were going to get 
increased levels of interaction with businesses and indeed more business. In 
parallel [ ... ] some universities and public schools set up dedicated technology 
transfer units [ ... ]. There could have been a misunderstanding there, because 
we very rapidly realised that SMEs needs were remote from what these 
structures offered, priority issues were not of technological nature. Over time. 
people realised - the public sector in particular, that the partnership could not 
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be the commercial arm of public sector technological research. It did not work. 
This was the general feeling. We could not be commercial reps for public 
sector research. Indeed, the generalist counsellors, people who work in 
chambers of commerce, or technical centres, are industrial development 
counsellors. They rejected the approach."." (Chamber of Commerce Senior 
Manager, 1999) 
Between 1992 and 199323, the chair of the partnership resigned. According to the 
current partnership manager, the then partnership's chief executive, was then "made to 
understand that he needed to leave' (ROT Manager, 1999b). No sustainable 
appointments were made for the next three years. For a short while, a partnership 
manager on a short-term contract was appointed. Later, a formal appointment was 
made, but the appointee stayed for less than three months. The situation finally 
stabilised with the appointment of the partnership's current Managing Director (ROT 
Manager, 1999b). 
In conclusion, very few interviewees referred that this period of the partnership's 
history, and even fewer called it 'crisis'. Most respondents felt more comfortable 
presenting a process, a set of long and difficult negotiations that have recently 
culminated with a unanimous agreement of new strategic priorities and mode of 
operation for Presence Rhone-Alpes. 
The experience, however, seems to have had long lasting legacy. The recruitment of 
private sector representative is a very carefully managed process. It aims to identify 
dynamic owner managers from a very small firm background. Further, tensions that are 
inherent to bringing together service providers and diagnostic specialists have recently 
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been resolved and led to a complete reconfiguration of partnership membership and 
mode of operation. Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail in the review 
of the partnership operational dynamics in the next big section. Before, this case study 
will focus on the partnership's objectives, their evolution and the negotiation processes 
involved. 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
Like many partnerships of its kind Presence Rhone-Alpes has got a rich history of past 
collaboration. Its legacy has both been positive, with for example the collaborative 
experience key players have acquired, and constraining, as some early partnering rules 
became impediments to the partnership's sustainability. This was the case with the 
principle of private sector involvement /leadership which has been fundamental since 
the very early collaborative attempts in the region. Presence Rhone-Alpes found at its 
own cost that any private sector representation was not satisfactory~ an acute knowledge 
of the client base (the very small firm owner managers) was necessary for successful 
partnership leadership. 
The leadership crisis that emerged in 1992-93 was also symptomatic of weak and 
insufficient communication amongst key decision makers in the partnership. This has 
had to be addressed in order to ensure that Presence Rhone-Alpes could deliver its 
mission effectively. The next section analyses the partnership's goals and objectives 
and specifically focuses on the way in which partners have since this crisis, been able to 
build a shared meta-strategy. 
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5. 4 Goals and Objectives 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This section synthesises some of the most significant changes that occurred in the 
partnership's meta-strategy and the challenges they raised subsequently. Earlier in the 
chapter, we have shown that the all-inclusive nature of the partnership, prescribed 
centrally, was an underpinning cause of conflicts of interest between service providers 
and service prescribers. Presence Rhone-Alpes' directors and patrons have 
acknowledged these a long time ago, but were able to address them only recently, with 
the formal changes of status in 1998 affecting all three areas of membership, activity 
areas and target market. 
The first part of this section presents the events that led to a dramatic focus on demand, 
with in particular the exit of all service providers from the Presence Rhone-Alpes and 
the emergence of debates on a service provision networ~ with the European RITTS 
programme. In a second section, emerging discussion favouring opposite views on the 
nature of Presence Rhone-Alpes' services will be summarised. Such jockeying is 
absent from Presence Rhone-Alpes ambition to strengthen its regional presence with the 
development of satellite local networks, for local service delivery. The third section 
mirrors partners' reflections on the negotiation and implementation of strategic goals 
regionally and the implications such processes have had on their respective 
organisations as well as their leadership in the field of regional econom ic deve lopment. 
5.4.2 Focus on Demand 
Two aspects of Presence Rhone-Alpes' recent developments mirror its increasing focus 
on demand. These include changes to the partnership's legal status in 1998. which 
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led to a formal exit of service providers from the partnership, and they include (in the 
context of the EU's R1rrS) preparatory work for the launch of a new supply side 
network. Each of these developments in the partnership's meta-strategy is discussed 
further in the next two sections. 
5.4.2.1 Separation Between Service Prescription and Service Provision 
Although partnership members clearly identified the co-existence of the service 
prescription and service provision activities in the partnership as a source of contlict of 
interest, they were able to resolve this tension only recently, with the formal change of 
membership and target market. This occurred with the signature of amended 
partnership status in the summer of 1998. The effect of these changes were dramatic, as 
past member organisations, including for example the enterprise agency run by the 
chamber of commerce, were asked to formally leave the partnership: 
"We started off with this ROT, which in its operation and goals mirrored 
national guidelines. We progressively specialised it, but this required a long 
time, we specialised it on small businesses and focused it on market 
penetration goals. The formal conclusion of this long trek was in 1998 
Presence Rhone-Alpes' change of status" (Senior Conseil Regional Manager, 
1999) 
"Our interest is to ensure that Presence Rhone-Alpes provides support for 
service prescribers. This is in short the strategic orientation that we all agree 
upon, with our colleagues from the Region, the DRRT and the Anvar. Focus 
on prescribers and support the professional development of service 
prescribers". (DRIRE Chief Executive, 1999) 
These clients, originally defined as small and medium enterprises have been redefined 
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and the partnership now aims to serve the most challenging segment of the SME sector, 
the very small and small companies: 
"Mid-I998, the change in status meant that Presence Rhone-A lpes retained 
service prescription as its main mission. Therefore we had a diagnosis and 
prescription service focussed on demand on a very specific target market: the 
small industrial and artisan businesses of this region. That is businesses with 
less than 50 employees and in particular those with less than 20 employees." 
(ROT Manager, 1999a) 
The separation between service providers, who formally left the partnership, and service 
prescribers is clearly presented as a focus on demand by the partnership manager. He 
inc ludes it in an overall drive to reflect clients' needs. He suggests that the 
partnership's heavy reliance on its private sector directors, themselves small firm owner 
managers IS consistent with the overwhelming demand focus adopted by the 
partnership: 
"Our board of directors is constituted of elected members representing the 
small business sector. We do not have permanent board directors from 
institutions. This has got advantages: we can say that we truly represent 
demand. The challenge is to get them involved. One can argue that an elected 
entrepreneur, even if he or she also represents an institution, like the Chamber 
of Commerce, will always retain an entrepreneurial attitude in decision-
making. On the contrary a permanent representative from one of the 
institutions will always retain the culture and will keep in mind the objectives 
of his or her organisation. [ ... ]. So with this structure we are far c loser to 
demand. Institutional representatives, roughly the gang of four (government 
region and Anvar etc ... ) are invited to board of directors' meetings. But thc~ 
are not directors themselves, for legal reasons." (ROT Manager. 19998). 
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The above is corroborated by directors from the private sector, who see their activities 
as fostering the partnership's sensitivity to smalJ firms' needs. They also share a view 
that as entrepreneurs who have benefited from a set of public sector services they have 
some responsibility towards the good functioning of these services: 
"As a network user, I believe it is also important to question its good 
functionin~ and wonder whether it is improving. Are there other owner-
managers who benefited from the services offered? But benefiting from it is 
also about sustaining it. So, some training took place within the Industrial 
Committee. And indeed we used this Industrial Committee to redirect 
Presence Rhone-Alpes, once again to ensure that it is listening and effectively 
supporting industrial owner-managers." (ROT Private Sector Director, 1999a) 
However, the shift was not straightforward. It meant that the gang of four needed to 
convince service providers that the formation of their own, separate, network was the 
best organisational set up in the region. This involved open recognition of the shortfalls 
in combining service prescription and service provisions: 
"It is true that from the point of the service providers it was not easy; because 
there was an acknowledgement that they were not alone on the market place. 
There are intermediaries whose mission is about providing the best service 
possible to SMEs, they don't selJ services, their mission is global and aims to 
promote technological development, rather than providers' specific services. 
Besides, as providers they will no longer be able to prescribe their services in 
order to access public sector development funds." (Senior Conseil Regional 
Manager, 1999) 
The creation of a supply side network seems to have been one of the important elements 
that facilitated providers' exit from the partnership in 1998. While this case study 
focuses purely on Presence Rhone-Alpes. it also acknowledges that early 
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discussions and progress in the establishment of such network may have implications 
for Presence Rhone-Alpes; they are therefore covered in the next section. 
5.4.2.2 Co-ordinating Supply with the RITTS Programme 
RITTS stands for 'Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategy'. It is a 
DG 13 programme targeting regions. It aims to enhance the level of coord ination 
between public and private sector infrastructures in the fields of technology transfer. 
innovation and research (Chamber of Commerce Senior Manager, 1999). In Rhone-
Alpes, the gang of four have used this initiative to speed up the 1998 status change and 
have expressed clear support for the creation of a supply side network. The Chamber of 
commerce manages the project and private consultants have been brought in to set up 
this new network by 2000: 
"Given that we are working on industrial needs and demand, the Ministry of 
Education, Research and Technology pushed us to work on supply, to reflect 
on ways of improving its level of visibility, its co-ordination and cohesion. 
This involves getting around a table universities, public schools, research 
laboratories, and technical centres in the first instance. There are multiple 
actors offering service in the field of technology transfer. These include 
technical centres, the laboratories run by universities, the public schools -
which are all together a world apart-. One can argue that technical and 
vocational training colleges are part of the infrastructure, alongside laboratories 
from the CNRS, or the INSER ... So as part of the RITTS initiative. we are 
currently initiating a programme together with the DRRT, the DRlRE, the 
Anvar. It aims to federate to a greater extent the supply of technological 
services." (Chamber of Commerce Senior Manager, 1999) 
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" The supply-side network will be set up by the end of the year. It will be born 
in the XXth century. Its mission? This network will not be solely a structure 
where service providers will benefit from professional development. We will 
tackle a much broader agend~ which is about enhancing the value created by 
public sector research." (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
" In other words, and much in the same way as we tried to federate people 
prescribing services, we are trying to federate those who are likely to provide 
technology transfer services and who belong to the public services, given that 
the private sector is beyond our remit" (Senior Conseil Regional Manager. 
1999) 
This supply-side partnership was not yet born at the time of the study, yet challenges 
were already clear. For one of the private sector directors, the supply-side is way too 
fragmented and organised according to organisational turf and ministerial departments. 
Such fragmentation does not respect the need of small firms for an integrated approach: 
"One of the first issues we raised at the Industrial Committee, is what we called 
"global otTer'. Service provision is not global. It is split into thousands of 
pieces. Our projects as small firm owner-managers are not. We are not split 
into multiple specialities. We deal with all aspects of our business. We find in 
front of us highly specialised people. Ifwe want to develop an overview of the 
business, we need to go through our life histories 36 times over, because each 
of the 36 counsellors we will see will focus on a tiny part of our life. Nobody 
is interested by the whole. So to our civil servant friends we say: "you are 
really very kind, really nice. But you are certainly not organised according to 
our requirements as small companies; you are organised according to your own 
constraints of ministerial representation and of various other remits and 
213 
functions you have been given. Therefore you will only be in a position to 
support the small fIrms effectively, the day you will be able to put in front of us 
a global offer. '" (ROT Private Sector Director, 1999b) 
In conclusion, the 1998 change of status for Presence Rhone-Alpes signalled the dawn 
of a new area for the partnership. Separating from service providers, Presence Rhone-
Alpes fully focused on the provision of counselling and diagnosis services. Their remit 
remained growing the market of services users, by signposting towards the most 
appropriate services, whether public or private. However, the sources of conflict that 
could arise when service prescribers were also potentially service providers were 
removed. This major restructuring exercise was achieved thanks to Presence Rhone-
Alpes's focus and on the most challenging segment of the SME sector (the 1 to 50 
employees - acceptable to service providers who in the main are more comfortable 
working with medium sized companies). It was also made possible thanks to the clear 
support of the gang of four, who offered service providers the opportunity to create their 
own network and subsequently led the process with the appointment of the Chamber of 
Commerce as the project managing institution for the RITTS programme. 
Overall, the implementation of this meta-strategy demonstrates a remarkable 
congruence in institutional leaders strategies and highlights their ability to reach 
agreement in circumstances where opposition is to be expected. However. hidden 
behind this success story lies an unacknowledged policy failure. As we have shown in 
chapter 2, the need to structure the supply of technology transfer services was one the 
primary objectives of all RDTs nationally. By separating from service providers. 
Presence Rhone-Alpes acknowledges implicitly its failure to deliver on that account. 
The partnership's focus on demand is overwhelmingly welcome by regional policy 
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makers. But the challenges that face the new supply-side network (developed under the 
auspices of the European RITTS programme) seem rather like those that presented 
themselves to Presence Rhone-Alpes 10 years ago. This study does not aim to establish 
whether Presence Rhone-Alpes is to blame or whether the national policy in itself was 
or stil1 is flawed. These innovative regional developments do however highlight the 
significance of interactions that may exist between the national and the regional spheres 
of policy making and the practical implications they may have in terms of 
implementation. 
5.4.3 Broader and Wider Service Provision 
The above calls for an integrated range of public sector services reflects debates on the 
need for more generalist diagnosis and counselling services within the partnership. In 
parallel to these debates, the establishment of mini-networks designed to enhance local 
support availably is progressing, paving the way to extensive local coverage of the 
region by Presence Rhone-Alpes. Developments towards a broader and wider range of 
services are considered in tum in the next two sections. 
5.4.3.1 Call for More Generalist Support 
Partners within Presence Rhone-Alpes are engaged in numerous discussions on the 
nature of their partnership's services. It is clear from earlier sections that the 
partnership will only provide diagnosis and counselling services. However. 
counsellors' high level of technical specialisation is questioned by some who wish to 
see the development of a more generalist approach to diagnostic. While most 
interviewees recognised that this was an important issue for them, the range of ideas and 
points of view is so wide that the partnership appears to be still at the very early stages 
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of negotiation on this topic. 
The Chamber of commerce representative suggested that a way forward would be to 
extend the use of the PTR to more generalist types of suppo~ while at the same time 
recognising that the partnership may need to build on it current successes rather than 
push for a development that other partnership members are likely to oppose. 
Interestingly, the ANV AR, which is the body providing funds for the PT~ does not 
openly reject the idea, however they emphasise that such types of consideration are part 
of an ongoing debate within Presence Rhone-Alpes and changes are not foreseeable in 
the near future: 
"Perhaps new tools that will be put in place. I do not believe that we have 
exhausted the range of services currently available, in any case I do not believe 
that our services do not meet demand. So, if you like, the 'toolkit' is not meant 
to evolve, other than having a wider implementation scope for the PTR ... But 
I do not foresee major evolution ... I might be mistaken ... One should not 
necessarily change things that are working well. It took us ten years to build 
the network. I think that we now need to take the time to maxim ise the value it 
creates". (Chamber of Commerce Senior Manager, 1999) 
"This is a possible development. We did not do anything about it, not because 
it is a source of conflict, but because it remains a debate within the partnership. 
IT is about asking ourselves whether we could extend the use of the PTR, and 
what would the necessary conditions to do so ... We are asking whether this 
grant for technology could be turned into something, which would be 
addressing economic issues as well. At the moment I have no definite answer 
to this question. The debate can be included in our assessment of demand, 
small firms needs and the adequacy of supply." (Anvar Deputy Chief 
Executive. 1999) 
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Those one may least expect to do so, reject the very principle of financial support. 
Indeed one of the partnership's private sector directors highlighted the unhealthy 
consequence of such practice: the emergence of a breed of unwelcome entrepreneurs, 
labelled 'grant hunters' accompanied by an even less welcome species of consultants 
who sell their services on the basis that their fees will be covered by financial support 
raised for customers. The private sector director, who made these comments, then 
outlined how suspicious small firm owner / managers become of services that are 
promoted to them weekly by a range of unconnected and sometimes unprofessional 
individuals: 
"In fact, I believe that the grant system, the handing over of money. is a 
polluting practice. Firstly because it creates a specific bread of grant-hunters. 
And it creates a suspicion between the company and public sector service 
providers: 'these people are looking for money? Does this correspond to some 
kind of reality? Is this a legitimate application?' So we end up with a huge 
control trail... and suspicion. [ ... ] There are even consultancy agencies that 
offer you their services and recoup their fees with the grants. As small firm 
owner-manager you are visited every week by professional grant hunters who 
tell you that you are entitled to a whole range of things and that if they were to 
intervene, they would get their money through the grants and therefore we, 
businesses, would not need to pay a penny. It is extremely unhealthy, it creates 
a whole range of wrong assumptions and distrust between public service 
representatives and small firms" (ROT Private Sector Director, 1999b) 
Both ministry-representing bodies in regions, the DRRT and the DRIRE, formulate the 
debate on services slightly differently: instead of focussing on the possibility of 
extending the scope of the PTR grant, they move towards a broader discussion of 
service improvement. More specifically the DRRT sees the need to accompan~ 
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companies and coach them through their development process. Their approach is 
consistent with that of the DRIRE, who suggest that the partnership's new status created 
scope for such an evolution: 
"This may indeed suggest that we will have to develop specific tools, a kind of 
tailored services for these people. New factors have emerged. The request for 
long term coaching for example is entirely new. It was not included in the 
partnership'S range of services at the outset; they focused on signposting to the 
most suitable service provider. Today, owner-mangers tell us that when 
signposting we don't do our job properly, they want technology counsellors to 
coach them [ ... ]. They are blackmailing us. But it is sometimes difficult to 
reject their request, because these days each job is counted." (DRRT Chief 
Executive., 1999) 
··So, the evolution that we may expect in Presence Rhone-Alpes, is the 
following: always starting with technology, the RDT acquires a ranges of 
competencies, and becomes capable of sustaining a dialogue with owner 
managers, which takes into account their entire business. In relation to 
Presence Rhone-Alpes, we have built in provisions for this development" 
(DRIRE Chief Executive, 1999) 
This desire for a more generalist interface is highly consistent with private sector 
partnership directors who commented on the issue. Like the DRIRE and the DRRT 
speakers, one of them associates coaching with the development of a broader range of 
skills by counsellors. His argument is that when a firm identifies technology as a 
problem area, it is likely to have developmental issues that need to be addressed in other 
parts of its organisation, including for example marketing etc. The same commentator 
also acknowledges that this represents a dramatic shift from PRA's culture. For long. 
the partnership's culture revolved around service provision -that is a supply driven 
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rationale. The other director acknowledges that the issue is a destabilising one because 
it challenges the balance that Presence Rhone-A Ipes has achieved to date and raises 
issues that remain contentious between partners: 
"Our analysis in the Industrial Committee, focuses on the need to enhance 
counsellors competencies. When required, they need to be able to shift from a 
technological diagnosis, towards something a lot more holistic. This 
necessitates the establishment of a strong trust relationship. If a business is 
asking questions about technological development and the ways in which this 
can be financed, it almost certainly has issues somewhere else. (fwe intervene 
on an isolated element, we will not necessarily be successful with that 
company. Hence the need to move towards a more global approach of the 
business, by looking at marketing, organisational processes, changes processes 
etc ... [ ... ] This represented significant work by the Industrial Committee on 
deeply rooted values. In the past, the culture was one of service provision. For 
example if Presence Rhone-Alpes was needed on a technical problem, we 
would send in the technical expert that fitted. To achieve successful 
development in a business one needs to dig a bit deeper" (RDT Private Sector 
Director, 1999a) 
"This is an issue we have raised many times internally: we say that Presence 
Rhone-Alpes is all about technological development ... What does this mean? 
Where does technological development stop? Technological development is 
tightly linked to other business processes [ ... ]. For partners it raises issues in 
relation to the coherence of service provision ... [ ... ] So, here. we are dealing 
with a destabilising matter, focused on the need to offer a more generalist 
approach. This challenges our institutional partners." (ROT Private Sector 
Director, I 999b) 
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And indeed, this potentially creates a conflict within the partnership, with the signs of a 
schism appearing between government representing bodies and the Region. We have 
seen earlier that both DRlRE and DRRT accepted the principle of a broader service, 
however this is strongly rejected by the Region: 
"At the moment there is a natural tendency to push for a global approach to 
small businesses, that is to consider all their dimensions. This is a big issue for 
us, because, on the contrary, we wish to say: yes, small businesses have a 
multitude of problems, yes everything is linked, and technology may not be 
what needs to be resolved first. In any case, we maintain the position that 
technology is an excellent entry point. We maintain that the network must 
remain focused on technology. The natural tendency, mainly from 
metropolitan areas and to some extend for [the partnership manager named] is 
to suggest that the counsellor hardly ever restricts his or her activities to 
technology and sometimes there may not be a technological issue. We are 
extremely suspicious about this." (Senior Conseil Regional Manager, 1999) 
In conclusion, partnership members have initiated a range of discussions about the need 
to provide SMEs a range of services that are broader and that allow long-term client 
mentoring. They have nonetheless not established the means by which this goal should 
be achieved, indeed some respondents refer the range of skills counsellors possess, 
while others focus on the possibility of extending the scope of the PTR to non-
technology areas, while others actively criticise the use of grants altogether highlighting 
the negative impacts they have. 
Therefore, debate on services is largely open. At the time of the interviews, the nature 
of changes and even the need for change were by no means unanimously agreed. Not 
only were there variations in the range of approaches suggested, but also some, like the 
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Conseil Regional representative- strongly oppose the possible inclusion of non-
technology focused element in RDTs remit. 
5.4.3.2 Creation of mini-networks at local levels 
While the above discussions and debates on services are gomg on, the RDT has 
validated the need to extend its geographical coverage across the region and in 
particular to develop its presence at the local leve~ with the establishment of mini-
networks. Given the nature of these networks and the local actors likely to be involved 
in them, the mini-networks may well turn out to become the Trojan horse for those in 
the partnership who wish to see Presence Rhone-Alpes broaden the range of services to 
small businesses. 
In this section, we will initially present what these mini-networks are and we will then 
illustrate how they could pave the way to the generalisation of a broader approach to 
small businesses. 
The establishment of these mini-networks is clearly seen as one of the next big 
challenges for the partnership. It is an interesting form of expansion, because it entirely 
relies of the partnership's network operating philosophy, the only difference is that the 
creation of these mini-networks takes place at the local (e.g. metropolitan or 
departements) level. 
The challenge is undeniable: current partnership members aim to replicate many times 
over the operating structure that they were able to grow into a successful structure (from 
their point of view) over a 10 year period. The importance of the 'human dimension' is 
highlighted in interviewees comments: getting to know new partners. opening up to 
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their perspectives, engaging them in the partnership's mode of operation and activities, 
developing a collaborative culture amongst people and organisations that would 
normally operate in isolation of each other are the type of hurdles that are expected: 
"I believe they will have to learn to work together, to develop a common 
sensitivity, which ultimately will emerge and conflict with ours. Our approach 
is regional. They [the mini-networks] can bring us a local, territorial 
perspective. There is a whole history behind all this. There are different 
levels. The State has acknowledged that Regions had souls. The region needs 
to accept that there are local authorities, and institutions with which it needs to 
work. We need to equip them, we need to structure them differently, hence the 
valuable contribution of local authorities (beyond the financial contribution, 
since they contribute financially). Beyond this aspect, there is an enormous 
wealth, which will demand an adaptation period." (ORRT Chief Executive., 
1999) 
In conjunction with these concerns, the rather directive and rigid approach to setting 
goals and defining mode of operation for these mini-networks, even the fact that local 
authorities contribute financially - in the same way as regions co-finance with the 
government regional ROTs - mirror central government's approach in dealing at the 
regional level: 
"There are some rules that are explicit ... If needed, I believe, we will make 
them explicit. We started to do that in two thematic areas [ ... ] numerical 
technologies and new information and communication technologies. In these 
areas, we very clearly expressed the way we function by saying that we wanted 
to extend our model through their participation, and by no means did that mean 
setting up or developing another one. We also very clearly articulated the rules 
reflecting our ambition in terms of operation, the minimum regional ambition. 
So starting from there, when we establish structures and tools the regional 
interest will prevail over specific interest." (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
The strategic role of these mini-networks is likely to stretch beyond enhanced 
geographical coverage. Indeed their establishment already outlines potential turf 
conflicts with economic development organisations established or being set up at 
departement level. The DRRT and the region have identified this potential source of 
contlict, but their emerging responses vary dramatically and mirror their differences 
over the debate of broader service provision. From the point of view of the regional 
representative, generic business support and economic development service providers 
exist, or are growing in numbers, partly due to the governmental push for the 
establishment of 'economic development networks' at the level of the departemenr4 . 
The interviewee, highlighted that if Presence Rhone-Alpes was to change its approach 
to service provision, and offer a generic diagnosis service as opposed to a technological 
diagnosis (something they oppose as seen above), it would be trespassing on these 
organisations' turf: 
"We need to stay on what we are good at. It's true that in the landscape, these 
people who are trying to promote a global approach to small firms ... It is true 
that in our region there is already a multitude of local development agencies. 
people engaged in that direction ... " (Senior Conseil Regional Manager, 1999) 
On the contrary, The DRIRE director presents the growth in numbers of these 
development organisations as the very reason why Presence Rhone-Alpes needs to 
address other small firm issues than technology. Service development is seen as a 
means of tackling the growth of organisations that are presented as disturbers of the 
24 These RDE (Reseaux de Development Economique) or Economic Development Nt."tworks., mimlr in 
their structure the RDTs, but are meant to be established at the dCpartemcnt level (a'\ aprx>sed to the 
regional level) and are meant to address broader business issues (as opposed to purely .tech~logi~ 
issues). However. their nationaJly defined target market is the same as that of ROTs. Llkcwlse. their 
cstablishnx..'I1t throughout the French territory has been promoted by the government since 1999 (alhough 
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regional institutional balance. As these Economic Development Networks are to be 
established at the departement level, they theoretically will clash with the mini-networks 
set by Presence Rhone-Alpes, hence the need for urgent action: 
"In the ORlRE, in Rhone-Alpes, this got red flashing lights going. because if 
we imagined that each of the eight prefects in the departements were to 
implement [the RDE policy], we were creating for ourselves positioning 
conflicts between these Economic development networks and Presence Rhone-
Alpes's mini-networks. For me, it could be perceived as a menace endangering 
the entire set up. I told you in some cases the RDE was set up and in others it 
was being set up etc ... Therefore, this may have accelerated the orientation I 
referred to earlier, which is to broaden mini-networks' services beyond 
technology. [ ... ] So, I believe that the way we took the ROE initiative into 
account in Rhone-Alpes is such that we transformed it into something positive, 
which enabled us to validate the principle that the RDT can go beyond 
technology and we were able to progress implementation in some 
departements" (ORIRE Chief Executive, 1999) 
In conclusion, partners in Presence Rhone-Alpes have set out to enhance its local 
coverage in a very deliberate manner, aiming to replicate at the level of departements 
the network-based operational structure it took them over 10 years to fine tune at 
regional level. While there is recognition of the challenges involved in building 
collaborative relationships with new partners in the proposed 'mini-networks', partners 
appear to be replicating the rigid and directive manner central government used with 
them for the establishment of Presence Rhone-Alpes. Indeed. ground rules are set and 
regional partners established them. 
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In parallel to the implementation of this growth strategy by Presence Rhone-Alpes. 
RDEs (Reseau de Development Economique) are being established in the same 
geographical units (departements) and are supported by the government. While ROEs' 
service are generalist their mode of operation (network structure) and their target market 
(small firms) are the same, creating immediately potential turf conflicts. This situation 
is read differently by two of the leading partners. From the point of view of the DRIRE, 
this development pushed Presence Rhone-Alpes to provide services that stretch beyond 
technology, particularly at its mini-network level. Therefore what they perceived as a 
threat initially has given them the latitude to forward the agenda of those who are 
campaigning for generalist and holistic support by Presence Rhone-Alpes... to the 
apparent detriment of the Region, expressing caution and concern as organisational 
remits are being blurred further. 
5.4.4 Building a Shared Culture 
The DRRT representative highlights and illustrates with detail how the partnership'S 
strategic leaders have over time established new ways of working. Collaboration was a 
challenge for these individuals, who had been accustomed to being masters in their 
castles and whose turf was clearly delineated and separate from that of their 
counterparts in similar types of public sector organisations. The changes meant that 
they had to develop an appreciation of collaborative work, its impact on control and 
leadership. They needed to progressively develop a set of shared meanings and values 
that underpinned their collaborative efforts from there on. This process required a long 
time: 
"'Everyone used to work in their own backyard, with their own network and 
variable performance. Here we pooled common needs and interests, which 
enabled us to share a range of things . ., (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
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"Everything was difficul~ if I may say. Everything was difficult, obviously, 
because we had to learn to work together, and we did not know how to do it. 
[ ... ] We too had our territories, our responsibilities, our practices, our ways of 
doing things. Suddenly we had to share, define together, we had to 
understand ... It took us a few years to ensure that this network did not become 
a power stake~ but indeed a developmental tool designed for businesses. [ ... ] 
Since the very beginning~ it was very clear in meetings that this was a 
developmental tool for businesses, but the most important question remained 
unspoken and plagued the partnership: who was going to control it all?" 
(ORRT Chief Executive., (999) 
"The natural consequence then... In fact nothing occurred 'naturally'. 
everything was difficult ... Over ten years, we moved away from a structure 
that gathered everyone, towards something that is focused on service 
prescription and very small firms. This means that the ROT in Rhone-Alpes is 
quite unique." (Senior Conseil Regional Manager, 1999) 
The emergence of a set of individuals (and the organisations they managed - the 
ORIRE, ORRT, the Anvar and the Region) as strategic leaders was not an accident, as 
they were among those mandated to pool efforts for the implementation of the ROT 
policy by central government (See chapter 2). However, their status as funding partners 
and the legitimacy they had either as representatives of central government (DRIRE, 
ORRT, and Anvar) or as the locus of regional governance (the Region) meant that they 
soon were acknowledged as the leaders of the initiative in the region, even though they 
could not be formal members of Pn&sence Rhone-Alpes' board. As the number of their 
meetings increased, they created an informal leadership structure that still prevails today 
: the so-called 'gang offour': 
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"Then started the vicissitudes of marriage between the State (represented by 
the DRRT for technological research related issues; by the DRIRE for industry 
related issues, the Anvar, which is one of our public sector bodies responsible 
for innovation and the Region. We have had to get to know each other, to learn 
to work together, to define a common strategy. This indeed created the 'gang 
offour'." (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
Collaboration, tension and conflict seemed to be intertwined, as most individuals in the 
'gang of four' were not accustomed to this form of work. In some cases, outside 
intervention was required to resolve conflicts that could not be addressed by the key 
players themselves. In other cases the pace of development and change reduced 
dramatically, merely allowing the partnership to survive: 
"So we went through all the classical throes and difficulties; or to avoid 
problems, which was not better, we would have a 'soft consensus'; and in some 
cases, because we went through very difficult times, we retrenched, the 
network would operate without direction. [ ... ] At a particularly difficult time. 
we accepted the principle of outside intervention, in order to analyse the way 
we functioned. Given the situation, the work was more of a diplomatic and 
political nature than of a technical one. Our mode of operation was not at 
stake, the issues were related to the personalities of those involved in the 
group, and sub-groups. It was about conflicts of interest, a whole range of 
things ... a very classical set up .... [ ... ] A 'soft consensus' is what pleases 
nobody but satisfies everyone, knowing that no advances are made on the topic 
at hand. [ ... ] One agrees to the minimum, nothing is gained but one does not 
go backwards either. At some points in time, this 'consensus mou' delayed 
significantly a range of improvements, including the separation between 
service providers and service prescribers we mentioned earlier. It took us two 
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years to get that through." (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
The practical implications of successful collaborative leadership at regional level turned 
out to be far reaching and enabled a level of policy co-ordination not attained before: 
"At a political level, in Rhone-Alpes, the entire civil service, (so the DRRT, the 
DRIRE, the Region, and the Anvar) shares the same analysis. As a result, all 
potential sources of funding for economic development structures share the 
same strategies, so these structures are piloted. This is important for the good 
operation of the network. I believe that the political consensus on these issues 
was in my view critical to the success of this initiative" (Senior Conseil 
Regional Manager, 1999) 
"This is a caricature, but it shows well our willingness to work together. 
When we meet around the table ... (This happens frequently between the 
Anvar, the DRIRE, the DRRT and the Region ... ) We do not always have 
converging views. Our [ministerial] affiliations are different too. We also have 
specific [institutional] objectives. Nonetheless this enables us to have a debate 
and a common understanding of key policy orientations." (Anvar Deputy Chief 
Executive, 1999) 
This increased level of collaboration at the highest levels is seen as a clear strength 
when dealing with regional policies. Bodies representing different government 
departments consult each other and are able to present a very coherent message to 
regional interfaces. 
"Afterwards, we pool efforts towards sharing the same bed. that is sharing 
goals and setting up strategies because in all cases the general intcrest will 
prevail. As far as government representing bodies are concerned - because 
often the "gang of four' will pull othcr partners from the region and there is the 
228 
regIon itself... For the State the challenge is to ensure that despite the 
sensitivities of each individual, that there is a unique 'governmental' line, this 
is really very powerful, it is also an essential safeguard. This is part of the 
partnership's achievements, all the more as the region is very strong thankfully, 
she is more important, and she has her own history." (DRRT Chief Executive., 
1999) 
Formal policy debates seem to be preceded by informal meetings and discussions where 
key issues are resolved. The modalities of collaboration appear to be very specific to 
the gang of four. Features amongst these an acknowledgement of mini-coalitions, and 
the critical importance they can have in decision-making because of the legitimacy 
acquired by multi-party support. 
"Nowadays, you go and see people and tell them: 'this is what they want to do, 
what do you think? This is really powerful, I believe it is a fundamental 
achievement" (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999) 
"These [coalitions] are very explicit in the debates we have had. There are 
alliances. [ ... ] The advantage of having an ally is that you can defend an idea 
as opposed to a personal point of view. It is not about saying something to 
annoy others, but we are four and there are a number of us who think the same 
way. It lent weight to the argument. It meant that it was not a technical 
argument designed ultimately to control, or justify political strategies. But it 
was indeed about promoting small businesses happiness." (DRRT Chief 
Executive., 1999) 
The formation of this social network, or 'community of practice' appears to be a 
powerful moderating force when new governmental initiative are announced, which 
could potentially upset regionally achieved balance I equilibrium in intcr-organisational 
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relationships. This was particularly the case of the ROE initiative. more recently 
launched by the government. The regional reaction was to tum that into an opportunity 
as seen earlier (repeated quote): 
"In the ORIRE, in Rhone-Alpes, this got red flashing lights going. because if 
we imagined that each of the eight prefects in the departements were to 
implement [the ROE policy], we were creating for ourselves positioning 
conflicts between these Economic development networks and Presence Rhone-
Alpes's mini-networks. For me, it could be perceived as a menace endangering 
the entire set up. I told you in some cases the RDE was set up and in others it 
was being set up etc... Therefore, this may have accelerated the orientation I 
referred to earlier, which is to broaden mini-networks' services beyond 
technology. [ ... ] So, I believe that the way we took the ROE initiative into 
account in Rhone-Alpes is such that we transfonned it into something positive. 
which enabled us to validate the principle that the RDT can go beyond 
technology and we were able to progress implementation in some 
departements" (ORlRE Chief Executive, 1999) 
The 'uniqueness' of Presence Rhone-Alpes structure and operations described by the 
regional representative is indicative of another feature of the relationship between 
regional players and central policy makers; which could be caricatured with a tale of 
turtles and hares. It is indeed clear from the above discussion that partnering in Rhone-
Alpes proved a difficult art to master, and it took partners a very long time before they 
cou Id be confident in the ir collaborative capability. Yet. it seems the ir umq ue 
partnership suggests that they nonetheless are ahead of central government: 
'"I think we have always been a train ahead of government and their national 
guidelines. The national policy on RDT is still about gathering all service 
provider and service prescribers together. It is still that. This did not stop us 
230 
move beyond that in Rhone-Alpes and we refocused on service prescription. 
The trend is set and developments are taking place in other regions too. 
Aquitaine for example." (DRIRE Chief Executive. 1999) 
It seems that the collaborative working practices of the partnership have become 
embedded in each of the partners' organisational routines. Indeed some interviewees 
argue that even though individual leaders may change, the collaborative work ethic as 
well as its inherent fragility are likely to persist: 
"People will change of course, there may be a number of things that will be 
able to evolve, but I believe that the underpinning structure is embedded. We 
can not go back, we have to work in this way. [ ... ] I refer to classical issues 
associated with group dynamics, we were not accustomed to these in the 
French civil service. [ ... ] We have had to talk, take time, I believe that today 
much depends on people, because that collaborative work also remains fragile" 
5.4.5 Conclusion: The Difficult Birth of a Prodigy Child 
"In conclusion, the unanimous position that Presence Rhone-Alpes' birth was 
a very difficult one. It is always the case, because there are political 
constraints, power struggles. personality clashes, communication problems, 
etc ... There is also a history. But we are also unanimous in thinking that it is a 
success." (Chamber of Commerce Senior Manager, 1999) 
The above statement best summarises the story of Presence Rhone-Alpes. The building 
and strengthening of the partnership was fraught with difficulty, conflict and crises. The 
open and sometimes forced acknowledgement of these; the acceptance that such hurdles 
are part and parcel of partnership negotiation processes, have enabled partners to 
implement bold and innovative moves. Such evolution has had costs, including the 
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time required to build consensus (measured in months and sometimes years). These 
costs also incorporate unrecoverable conflicts, which have led to the departure of the 
partnership manager, the status quo that resulted from the subsequent lack ofleadership. 
Has Presence Rhone-Alpes as an inter-organisational set up and an entity in its own 
right learnt anything from these experiences? Are there discernable organisational 
learning processes that can be surfaced from the stories that members tell? Are there 
clearly shared norms and values that can be attributed to the partnership? If so, which 
processes underpinned their formation? The next section analyses these issues. 
5. 5 Inter-organisational Learning at Presence Rhone-
Alpes: 
5.5.1 Introduction 
This study's overall aim is to analyse inter-organisational learning processes. In order 
to do so it is relies on the assumption that learning and associated concepts can be 
'surfaced' from participants' stories and testimonies on a set of broad themes. 
(partnership history, goals and objectives, operations etc.). These themes were so far 
used to build a detailed account designed to give readers a good understanding of 
Presence Rhone-Alpes. 
In this section we aim to conduct a conceptual analysis of learning processes that 
underpinned Presence Rhone-Alpes's development. We will therefore examine the two 
research questions in turn. 
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5.5.2 Question 1: Are Value Crises and Operational Crises 
Components of Partnership Learning? 
5.5.2.1 Introduction 
Value and operational crises were defmed as events which threaten the continuity of the 
partnership either as a result of actions and decisions inconsistent with the partnership' s 
values and norms (value crisis) or as a result of failure to implement agreed decisions 
(operational crisis). These constructs were put forward following the review of the 
literature on organisational learning. It was proposed that learning in a partnership 
context is linked to the emergence and resolution of either form of crises. 
This section's objective is to empirically test whether value crises and operational crises 
are components of partnership learning. 
To do so, the analysis will centre on private sector involvement in the partnership and in 
particular on the crisis that led to the departure of the partnership manager. for which an 
account was given in section 5.3.4. 
5.5.2.2 Private Sector Involvement: Value Crisis and Operational Solution 
The story behind the resignation of the partnership's managing director is rich In 
learning processes. The analysis of segments of learning which rely on the principle of 
private sector involvement illustrates how useful the partnership learning spiral is in 
modelling empirical data: 
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Figure 5-1: Involving the private sector: value crisis and its operational solution 
2. Value crisis : Failure t:> 
unders1and the very small 
businesses 
~--------~==~~~ 
1. Value : Involve the 
private sector 
3. Operalial: guidelines for 
private secta director 
-- /~...... recruitment 
Figure 5.1 above shows that the principle of private sector involvement, an 
underpinning value of the partnership since its inception, became the source of a value 
crisis in the partnership, as the appointed partnership managing-director failed to be 
sensitive to the needs of the very small frrms despite of his private sector background . 
The operational solution that emerged as a response to this crisis was the creation of 
clear guidelines for the recruitment of future private sector partnership directors. The 
learning that resulted from this process is a redefinition of the partnership ' s original 
value ' involve the private sector' . Far from rejecting the principle, we observe here that 
the partnership reinforced it by refining its scope to ' involve private sector directors 
who have experience of the very small firm context the new redefined value. In thi 
instance the learning is akin to what Argyris and chon (1978) call double I p 
learning in which there is a double feedback loop which connects th d li cti n f rr r 
not only to strategies and a sumptions associated for effective perf; rmance but t th 
very nonn which define effective p rfonnance (Argyri & ch "n 1978p. 22 , H re 
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the original organisational norm for performance was the requirement for the 
partnership manager to represent the private sector. The evolved norm is more specific 
in the type of private sector experience required given the focus on the very small firm. 
The involvement of private sector representatives in public-private partnerships is a 
significant theme in the literature that accompanied the growing reliance on this form of 
governmental policy delivery in the UK or France (Harding, 1990; Kirkpatric~ 1999; 
Lorrain, 1988). While some commentators present private sector involvement as a 
legitim ising device or a means of initiating change in public sector management 
practices (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), others emphasise the risks associated with the 
surrender of public accountability and policy ethos that accompany partnership working 
(Bailey, 1993; Greer & Hoggett, 1999). Most ofthe discussions on the nature of private 
sector involvement revolve on the business benefits that can be derived from investment 
in the partnership (Boyle, 1989; Glaister, 1999; Tilson et aI., 1997). Unfortunately, 
there seems to be very little published on the suitability of different kinds of private 
sector involvement to specific projects or initiatives. Considering that the theme of 
private sector involvement as a whole is invaluable, particularly in relation to its broad 
implications in terms of governance, accountability and the notion of welfare (Davies, 
2002; Hudson & Hardy, 2001; Pacione, 1992; Sanderson, 1996; Geddes & Martin, 
1996) a more detailed analysis of the nature of private sector involvement may be 
required in order to understand why in some cases private sector involvement fails 
while it succeeds in others. 
Indeed, the partnership learning cycle analysed above suggests that private sector 
participation per se may be a fruitless legitim ising device, which in some cases can 
endanger rather than benefit the partnership. Private sector partners need to have a deep 
understand ing and a high level of empathy with the goals and objectives of the 
partnership to which they contribute. In the case of Presence Rhone-Alpes. a strong 
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personal background in the very small companies (the target market of the partnership) 
turned out to be a fundamental requirement. 
5.5.2.3 Tailoring Services to the Needs of the Very Small Firms: Unexpected Path 
for Value Formation: 
Systematic coding for the value 'involve the private sector' leads to additional findings 
highlighting aspects of partnership learning not originally anticipated. Indeed the 
recognition that private sector directors needed to have experiences of the very small 
firm context in order to make valuable contributions to the partnership seem to have 
triggered a parallel learning sequence, this time focussing on the suitability of services. 
Figure 5.2 suggests that the emergence of a new value "involve private sector directors 
who have experience of the very small firm context' has in itself triggered the formation 
of another value 'services need to be tailored because the needs of the very small firms 
are unique'. This type of learning path (formation of a new value, followed by the 
formation of another value) was not anticipated. The original design of the learning 
spiral relies on the assumption that there is an iterative relationship between conceptual 
and operational learning. 
The evidence here suggests that new values can in themselves lead to other new values. 
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Figure 5-2 Involving the private sector: conceptual learning re-itera1ed 
3. New Value: Senrices need to 
be tailored becaJse the needs d 
o 
2. Value: Involve private Secta L--_~* 
directors who have experience d 
the very small firm CO'ltect 
1. Oper.lticrl: guidelnes fa 
private sedor directa 
recruilment 
In his work on organisational learning, Kim (1993) distinguishes two elements within 
the generic terms 'organisational mental models ' . These are weltanshaung , i.e . the 
locus of an organisation's values and deeply held beliefs and ' routines i.e. the 
organisation's memory of common practices and operational solutions, which may be 
explicit or implicit. This distinction is helpful because it shows that organisational 
learning can take different forms. It can manifest itself as a very tangible/operational 
change of practice (perhaps a new way of conducting a task), or it can be less tangible 
and affect organisational values and principles. These ideas were precisely those upon 
which the learning cycle was built. It is implicit in Kim ' s work that the formation of 
new values and principles (contributing to its weltanshaung) follows from operational 
learning. Like most writers on organisational learning he emphasizes the iterative and 
cyclical nature of organisational learning. Data however show that thi may n t alway 
be the ca e. 
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In Organizational learning, a theory of action perspective, Chris Argyris and Donald 
Schon (1978) present organizational learning as a continuous dialectical process 
triggered and focused on solving problems, contlicts and dysfunctions. They argue that 
good dialectic does not seek to achieve a stable organisational state where contlict or 
dysfunction would not occur. Instead, they suggest that the effectiveness of 
organisational learning "is inherent in the ways in which error is continually interpreted 
and corrected, incompatibility and incongruity are continually engaged, and contlict is 
continually confronted and resolved." (Argyris & Schon, 1978p. 146). Indeed, the very 
nature of dialectical inquiry means that it IS likely to lead to "new 
organizations/environment situations which give rise to new contlicts of objectives" 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978p. 147). These, in tum, generate new learning cycles. 
In the case above, learning about the range of skills and experience the partnership 
manager has changed the partnership's task environment and as such led to the 
questioning of services offered to the very small firms. This evolution however could 
not be characterised as a 'contlict of objectives' on the basis of interview evidence 
gathered. Instead, the change in norms and values appears to have followed a rational, 
if not natural, progression. 
The above suggests that in our exploration of partnership learning processes, it may be 
more suitable to refer to dialectical processes (as opposed to iterative processes). This 
in tum calls for further exploration of the ways in which partnership learning is 
represented. 
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5.5.2.4 Reshume: A Three-Way Crisis Precipitates the Manager's Departure 
Figure 5.3 shows that the crisis that resulted from the recognition that the partnership s 
managing director's background did not provide him the skills to be sensitive to the 
needs of the very small fIrms was in fact doubled by another significant crisis related to 
the value' Informality' . 
Figure 5-3: Learning from a three way crisis: private sector involvement, informal 
manapp.mp.nt and Ip.adp.~hin hrp.akdnwn 
0nceptual Leamin0 
3. Value crisis: The Managing 
Director, a prwle sector 
representative, fails to 
understand the very small 
businesses. 
1. Value crlsis: Informality; The 
principle of informal decisioR 
making and collaboration is not 
followed by the partnership 
Managing Director. 
Shared Mental 
Models 
~rational Leamin0 
5. Operation : guidelines for 
private sedor director 
recruitment. 
4. Operation : Partnership Managing 
Director is 'made to underst.and' that he 
needs 10 leave 
2. Operational Crisis: 
Collaborative Leadership fails. 
' Informality' is an ' in vivo' code (Glaser & Strauss, 1999; Strauss, 1987)" therefore the 
meaning of this vaJue is specific to this partnership' s context. It refers to collaborating 
parties' reliance on informal decision-making, informal structures and infonnalliasing 
amongst partners. This value seems to have evolved over time and mirrors to some 
extent institutional partners desire to emphasise collaboration within Presence Rhone-
Alpes as apposed to its possible institutionalisation. 
The crisis related to the informality value stems from orne of the unilateral deci i n 
that were taken by the partnership managing director in particular in r lati n t 
marketing and P~ which de facto increased Presence Rhone-Alpes' profile in the target 
market. However, it also contributed to a degree of institutionalisation of Presence 
Rhone-Alpes; the collaborative ethic within the partnership became to some extent 
second to what the collaborative body could do for its target market. Further, 
collaborative leadership broke down as partners drifted apart and stopped interacting 
with one another for the strategic management of the partnership (a process called 
'distancing' in Argyris and Schon's 1978 publication), leading to the ultimate 
resignation of the partnership's managing director. 
In the study of this particular learning sequence, the order in which crises occurred is 
difficult to establish on the basis of empirical data. Therefore, the numbering of labels 
in the figure is merely to facilitate reading; the sequence is only illustrative. It was 
shown in the historical review of the partnership, that respondents found it difficult to 
discuss this episode of their past, and only some offered insights about the triggers 
behind the managing director's departure. When this was the case, there tended to be an 
association between the partnership's managing director's weak understanding of the 
very small sector and his ultimate departure. There also were associations with 
leadership and management style and his departure. This is well illustrated by the co-
occurrence of the two value crises discussed above and illustrated in figure 5.3. 
The original partnership learning cycle suggests that a specific crisis leads to a 
corresponding operational solution. Here however, interviewees' responses seem to 
intertwine two different types of crisis. Did these two co-occurring crises amplify one 
another and precipitate an operational solution that involved the departure of one of the 
key decision makers? 
The context specific nature of the "informality' value coupled with the general difficulty 
interviewees had to discuss these events suggests that \\c are dealing with 
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organisational theory in use as opposed to organisational espoused theory (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978). According to these authors an organisation's espoused theory of action 
tends to 'conflict with the organization's theory-in-use (the theory of action constructed 
from observation of actual behavior) - and the theory-in-use is often tacit.' (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978p. 15). In this instance most of the comments on the crisis come from the 
partnership manager who at the time of crisis was a member of the partnership and 
therefore observed events as they unfolded. As he recounted these, he was (as current 
manager) conducting his own reflection on these events. In the process he was making 
explicit some of the implicit rules ofpartnering conduct he had observed. This has been 
described has 'surfacing mental models' by Peter Senge (1990a), who built on the 
pioneering work of Argyris and Schon on the notion of organisational images and maps. 
Senge defines metal models as 'deeply held images of how the world works, images 
that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting' (Senge. 1990a p. 174). An 
organisation's theory in use, evolved over the years, largely tacit and by and large 
determining how individual members act within it, is a fundamental part of 
organisational mental models. Because these rules of conduct and mental models are 
tacit, they are often taboo. In some instances, they may be inaccessible, unclear or 
inadequate, hence creating conditions for error and dysfunctional organisational 
dynamics (Argyris & Schon, 1978). 
The reasons why the partnership director did not follow the tacit rule of informal 
consultation before he launched a range of initiatives within the partnership are not 
clear. With the data available, we cannot determine whether he was not sufficiently 
socialised within the tacit rules of the partnership, nor can we determine whether he 
simply judged this rule as inappropriate for the effective management of the partnership. 
Chris Argyris and Donald Schon's work (1978). however. shows that organisational 
theory in use cannot be ignored. According to them, undiscussability and rigid ity 
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reinforce conditions for 'limited' learning systems. In such systems, errors could be 
corrected through single loop learning, which occur when corrective actions are 
consistent with the organisation's framework of norms and values (Argyris & Schon, 
1978; Argyris, 1982). However, uncorrectable errors 'tend to be camouflaged (that is. 
hidden, denied, or disguised). The camouflage of uncorrectable error leads to new 
primary loops which make organisational double loop learning [ ... ] unlikely and, for 
individuals, make double binds likely. '(Argyris & Schon, 1978 p. 109). These authors 
defme double binds as situations where 'one is caught in a no win game, and the rules of 
the game are undiscussable' (Argyris & Schon, 1978 p. 118). They illustrate such 
scenario with their study of an academic institution. Describing the attempts of a new 
Dean to reform the business school, the authors show how he encountered resistance 
from faculty members despite his initial attempts to involve them, how his attempts to 
build an inner circle of newcomers increased further the gap between himself and the 
faculty, how this distancing encouraged reciprocal undermining, which ultimately 
meant that the Dean had to go. Indeed, 'the faculty "knew" that time was on their side. 
If they waited long enough, the university administration would have to enter the 
picture.' (Argyris & Schon, 1978 p. 150). This example and the underpinning 
theoretical concepts and reasoning shed a new light on the primary cause of the 
manager's departure. Was it because the partnership manager 'saw things differently 
from institutional players' (see p. 21) as suggested by the current partnership manager? 
It seems that behind the crisis there was also the important fact that the partnership 
manager had breeched one of the most significant tacit rules of decision-making in 
Presence Rhone-Alpes. 
Overall, the learning sequence studied highlighted the importance of tacit organisational 
theory in use. More specifically it showed that when socially evolved tacit rules of 
conduct are ignored, radical forms of adjustments are made (in this instance. the 
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partnership manager had to leave). These types of situations are described as "limited 
learning systems' where unpinning values and norms are not questioned. 
The tacit rule that informal consensus has to be reached before decisions can be 
formally implemented in the partnership remains a fundamental underpinning value of 
the partnership. 
5.5.2.5 Summary of Findings 
The learning sequences studied showed that operational and value CrIses were 
components of partnership learning. They contribute to the formation of shared values 
and norms and organisational mental models. 
However, there is also evidence to suggest that the learning process is not most 
adequately described as cyclical, and terms such as dialectical (because they do not 
necessarily infer a particular order in the learning process) may be more suitable. 
Indeed, the assumption that there is an archetypal sequence whereby value formation 
follows operational crisis or that operational solution follows value crisis did no hold. 
There were instances where for example value formation followed value formation. 
The detailed analysis of learning sequences highlights the significance of partnership 
theories of action and the impact these have on single and double loop learning. Indeed 
the learning sequences studied had characteristics of both single and double loop 
learning, suggesting that the partnership is neither a perfect learning system (model 2 
learning system according to Argyris and Schon), nor a limited learning system. The 
effectiveness of partnership learning seemed to be related to the nature of the conflict or 
crisis that had to be addressed. 
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When an individual's behaviour did not conform to partnership theory in use, learning 
appeared to be single loop and part of a limited learning system. Inter-organisational 
theory in use prevailed, as non-conform ity led to the departure of the non-conform ing 
ind iv id ua I. 
When the principle of private sector involvement proved to be insufficient to guarantee 
partnership effectiveness, engagement with the issue led to a refinement of the principle 
to foster the involvement of private sector representatives who had experience and 
knowledge of the needs of the very small businesses. The process in tum led to further 
questioning on the nature of services provided to customers. This continuous dialectical 
engagement is akin to double loop learning as described by Argyris and Schon (1978) 
because it contributed to the alteration of some of the basic principles (mental models), 
which prevailed within the partnership. 
5.5.3 Question 2: What are the Relationships Between Partnership 
Learning and the Negotiation and Implementation of 
Partnership Objectives? 
5.5.3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, we have shown that the concepts of operational and value crises 
usefully contributed to our understanding of organisational learning in Presence Rhone-
Alpes. Through the study of a series of learning sequences we were able to demonstrate 
how new norms and values or operational solutions emerged in the partnership. 
In this section we intend to push further the inquiry by focussing on the links between 
learning and the negotiation and implementation of partnership goals and objectives. 
To achieve this we wil1 first analyse a double bind (or no win) situation affecting 
Presence Rhone-Alpes's advisors and seek to highlight how the resolution of double 
binds meant restructuring the partnership and dramaticaHy changing its organisational 
mission. We will then analyse a learning sequence, which underpinned the progressive 
transformation of the goal to enhance awareness and access. We will investigate how 
partners achieved a trade off between their public sector ethos and their survival 
imperative. 
5.5.3.2 Resolving Counsellors Double-Bind: Goal Redefinition and Partnership 
Restructu ring 
One of the most significant changes in the recent history of Presence Rhone-Alpes is its 
restructuring in 1998. It has meant that one of the key government guidelines, the need 
to build an inclusive partnership that pooled everyone involved in technology transfer 
within the region, was 10caHy rejected in favour of selective membership. Figure 5.4 
represents the learning sequence that underpinned this change. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates that the combination of a requirement for inclusive coHaboration 
and impartial advice has generated tension within the partnership as service providers 
found themselves grappling with diverging interests. Given that they were involved in 
service prescription as weH as service provision, the temptation to prescribe their own 
service was significant. While this satisfied counseHors' needs to promote the interest 
of their parent organisation, it directly undermined the principle of impartial advice 
boasted by the partnership. If on the contrary they were to always signpost to 
alternative providers, their direct line managers could see them as not generating 
enough business for their parent organisation. 
Figure 5-4: Strategy redefinition as a result of inter-organisationaiiearning 
4. New Vatle: PRA's 
mission should sdefy 
focus m serW;e 
presaiption 
2. Vaue: PRA aims to provide 
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most suitable sef\Iice provider. 
1. Vaue: CoiabOIaIion: cenIraI 
government's guideines fer 
indusNe partnersh.,s: 
E\oIIefYOM in\d\led in technoogy 
tra1sfer should be pa1 c:I PRA. 
5. 0perai0naI SoIuIim: 1998 
restrudlrilg, mecn the depar1ure at 
service pnMders ald PRA's focus m 
presaiption ald sigllpOSlii IQ. 
~_-' 3. Operctional Crisis: SeIf-presaiption: 
Se-vice pnMders in\d¥ed in serW:e 
presaiption tend to presaibe their ~ 
services. 
This is akin to the double bind situation or no-win game described by Argyris and 
Schon (1978) and discussed earlier in this chapter. As shown by these authors, double 
binds are symptomatic of incompatibiJity in governing values and/or of incongruity 
between an organisation's espoused theory and theory in use . 
In this case, there was a conflict between the partnership's espoused theory that it would 
provide impartial advice and signpost to the most competent service provider and the 
actual behaviour of its members (i.e. its theory in use), evidenced by counsellors 
tendency to prescribe their parent organisation's services, whether they are the most 
suitable or not. 
Commentators indicated that they had known of these conflicts of intere t mce th 
early stages of the partnership. However it took partners a number of year b fore the 
could openly address them by formally changing the tructur of their partner hip. nc 
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again highlighting how difficult it can be to alter tacitly accepted conduct that has 
become embedded within that organisation's shared mental models. In such 
circumstance~ significant variables within the learning system have to change or be 
changed, so that the organisation's governing values can be redefined and the 
organisation's theory in use can be approximated. This requires double loop learning. 
According to Argyris, 'such a learning process should decrease dysfunctional group 
dynamics because the competitive win/loose, low-trust, low-risk-taking processes are 
replaced by cooperative, inquiry oriented, high-trust and high-risk-taking dynamics: 
(Argyris, 1982 p. 106). 
Indeed the strategy that emerged from this learning cycle was risky. Important players, 
such as the chamber's enterprise agency, the ARIST had to agree to fonnally leave the 
partnership. They stood the risk of loosing parts of their revenue. For this to happen. 
there had to be a strong incentive to leave and a commitment to their continued 
involvement with Presence Rhone-Alpes. As illustrated in the section 'Co-ordinating 
supply with the RITTS programme', the European RITTS initiative provided the 
opportunity to address both of these concerns by setting the scene for the creation of a 
parallel 'network' of service providers. 
What are the implications of the above for central policy makers who see one of their 
fundamental guidelines sidelined in this region? Central policy makers and 
administrators have tended to highlight the flexibility with which the initiative was 
rolled out in regions, allowing local circumstances and dynamics to detennine the 
structure to be adopted by the RDT. Can the same level of flexibility and local 
discretion be maintained on the issue of membership? From central government's point 
of view the issue does not simply reflect on the suitability of the policies they generate. 
it also needs to be considered in the light of its possible impact on other regions where 
stability could only be achieved at the cost of all encompassing partnerships. 
The learning sequence illustrated and described above is very significant because it is 
more than an illustration of how operational crises lead to the emergence of new values: 
Here the governing values that arose as a result of double loop learning contributed to 
the partnership's re-focus on goals of impartiality in service prescription and provision. 
This ultimately led to the emergence of strategies, which challenged those imposed 
upon them centrally. Specifically Presence Rhone-Alpes restructured around service 
prescribing agencies, as service providers formally and voluntarily gave up their 
membership. 
Therefore learning sequence analysed above provides a useful illustration of a double 
bind situation where key personnel find themselves trapped between conflicting 
organisational theory in use and espoused theory. It raises questions about the triggers 
behind the double loop learning sequence described above. In particular, it would be 
interesting to investigate further whether this change of strategic direction could have 
been possible had there not been changes in the partnership's environment, i.e. was the 
RITTS initiative a significant trigger for change? 
5.5.3.3 Moving Away from Awareness to a Focus on Signposting: The Trade-Orr 
Between Public Service Ethos and Organisational Survival 
In this section we examine the learning sequence, which underpinned the partnership's 
redefinition ofRDTs goal to enhance 'awareness and access' (See figure 5.5 below). 
The interesting aspect of this section of Presence Rhone-Alpes's learning cycle is that 
the threat of an operational crisis has been enough to fuel negotiations and ultimatel) 
redefine its original goal of enhancing awareness and access as a strategy to enhance 
signposting. In the process a new value emerged within the partnership. Figure 5.5 
248 
shows that principle of involving existing organisations (as opposed to creating ne 
ones) in order to tackJe technology transfer challenges at the regional level has 
subsequently become an important pillar of the partnership ' s expansion choices at local 
levels with the creation of 'mini-networks' of metropolitan organisations. 
Figure 5-5: Strategy redefinitionfollowing the risk of operational crisis 
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The issue of service awareness in the literature on economic development is a pervasive 
one ( For a review see Hutchinson et aI., J 996). It is argued that confronted with a 
clutter of organisations and initiatives smaJl finn owner-mangers do not know where to 
go to access the most suitable services. 
This reasoning was largely behind the idea of creating a single point of acces to all 
small firm support services in the United Kingdom with the network of Bu ines Link 
across England (Oztel & Martin 1998). While RDTs never intended to c ntrali all 
SME service French government policy makers did formulate a de ire t p I all 
technology transfer related services (Ministere de I' ducation nationale de la R ch rch 
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et de la Technologie, 1989). In Rhone Alpes, this led to confusion about who the 
service providers should be. As seen earlier in this chapter, the region had already 
commissioned a feasibility study for the establishment of such a structure, however the 
external consultant's recommendation that a stand-alone, new and specialised 
organisation should be created was perceived as a threat. The fear was that such an 
organisation would become a source of competition and could potentially threaten the 
existence of established players in the field of business support. Further, the notion that 
the RDT should recruit its own specialist counsellors was rejected too. Key regional 
actors argued that their existing advisors should provide this service within the 
framework of the regional RDT's collaborative set up. This meant that the more 
generalist counsellors of the chamber of commerce and the ARIST were to become the 
backbone of the Presence Rhone-Alpes's market penetration strategies. 
As a consequence, the partnership needed to ensure that advisors employed by member 
organisations had the skills to diagnose small finn's technological needs so that they 
could then reliably signpost these companies. To ensure that this could take place 
effectively, training programmes tailored to counsellors were set up and ran. 
This learning cycle is a case of double loop learning, given that the partnership gains 
new values and that these become part of members' theories of action. Indeed. 
underpinning this learning sequence there is a fundamental shift in values from an 
emphasis on 'awareness and access' to 'signposting'. 
It shows that double loop learning, associated with effective learning systems, can be 
seen from the point of view of two fundamental organisational stakeholders as 
detrimental. In this instance, it seems that organisational interests prevail over the 
interest of clients (the perceived 'clutter' of services is not directly addressed. 
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instead a signposting system is developed as a 'coping' mechanism), much in the same 
way as it prevails over the interest of central government, (their interest is to ensure that 
the initiative is able to meet the needs of client SME, for whom it was designed). It 
seems indeed that members had to fmd a trade off between their public sector service 
ethos, the needs of their customers and their own organisational survival. In this 
instance, we see that organisational survival over-rides any other objectives the 
partnership may have. 
It also shows that this instance of double loop learning strengthens the ability of 
partnership members to enhance their role in the existing support infrastructure and in 
so doing reinforce their chances of survival. It also highlights the design of an 
operational solution (use existing counsellors, and train them to become competent in 
technology transfer needs diagnosis), which effectively increases the level of 
operational integration and interaction amongst partners and therefore contributes to the 
local collaborative ethos. 
5.5.3.4 Technology Transfer Focus Under Scrutiny: Creating the Conditions for 
Changing Service Delivery Strategies? 
The beginnings of an analogous strategy redefinition process can be identified in 
relation to the partnership's goal to focus on technology transfer. At the time of the 
interviews, this process was merely starting and negotiations and bargaining associated 
with it could be identified. The outcomes were still open at the time. Should a change 
occur in this area, one of the most fundamental principles behind the RDT initiative ~ 
that it should focus on technology transfer- would be changed to such an extent that in 
turn the policy at regional level would have undergone a fundamental transformation. 
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Currently partners are engagmg m a jockeying 'game', stating their position, and 
attempting to rally support from other members. It is clear that some are strongl) 
against any change to the 'pure' technology transfer remit of Presence RhOne-Alpes. 
while others are keen to extend it, justifying mainly their position with 'market need' 
type of arguments. It would be very interesting to find out how this debate evo Ives and 
how events / initiatives within the partnership's environment affect change in this field. 
In terms of relevance to the learning cycle, the ongoing follow-up of this theme (which 
requires a different type of research from that which was undertaken) could enable the 
researcher to determine whether 'operational crises' could be 'constructed' or 'picked' 
to suit a change in organisational norms and values that had long been planned and 
argued for by key decision makers. This goes back to the issue of leadership and the 
bearing it has in Presence Rhone-Alpes' learning, it also feeds into academic debates 
about the very nature of strategic management and strategic change. 
5.5.3.5 Summary of Findings 
This section shows that the formation (i.e. negotiation and implementation) of 
partnership objectives is to a large extent an incremental alteration of planned top-down 
strategies facilitated by operational and conceptual learning. 
In the case of Presence Rhone-Alpes. lengthy local negotiations and bargaining within 
the partnership have enabled members to redefine progressively the partnership's 
activities and reformulate goals originally imposed upon them by central government. 
The most significant of the above is a refocus of the partnership on service prescription 
and its distancing from service provision. The process has required the departure of 
institutional partners who have been involved with Presence Rhone-Alpes since its 
inception. 
This has also required the resolution of double binds that limited the effectiveness of 
counsellors' activities. Likewise contradictions between the partnership's espoused 
theories of action and its theories in use needed to be overcome. Overal~ the process 
has been lengthy and environmental changes, such as the launch of the European 
programme RITTS have been harnessed by collaborating parties in their endeavour to 
resolve conflicts of interests they had recognised a long time ago. 
5.5.4 Conclusion: 
The study of Presence Rhone-Alpes has proved a very rich source of data on partnership 
learning processes. It has enabled the researcher to validate the partnership learning 
cycle as a useful model for inquiry. It has also shown some of it limitations. Indeed. the 
'neat' sequential representation of operational learning following conceptual learning 
did not hold true. This in turn requires re-examination and improvement of the way in 
which the learning process is represented. 
Further very useful links could be made with existing organisational learning theory. 
Developments that can be traced back to the late 1970s, with the work of Argyris and 
Schon, have proved to be most useful in making sense of learning dynamics at a 
conceptual level. The idea that organisational theories of action are of two kinds (i.e. 
espoused theories and theories in use) enabled the researcher to appreciate the deeply 
rooted causes of some of the operational or value crises that were diagnosed. The 
notion of double bind was used to appreciate why in some instances crisis was almost 
inevitable. Likewise, concepts such as single loop and double loop learning enabled her 
to unveil why in some instance new partnership norms and values emerge (and therefore 
contribute to partnership shared mental models), while in others they don't. 
6 Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie: 
6. 1 Introduction 
The 'Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie' was created in 1993. Tenth on the list of 
ROTs set up throughout France (therefore one of the oldest), it evolved as a very 
distinctive venture with distinctive characteristics (it is for example one of the largest 
ROTs) that make it an ideal 'polar case' in studies of partnerships in economic 
development. 
This case study's structure mlITors the analytical framework presented in the 
methodology chapter. First, the historical context of the partnership is presented. This is 
then followed by an analysis of the partnership's goals and objectives and the processes 
that underpin goal definition. The third section investigates how the partnership 
implements these goals by analysing key operational processes. The final section 
analyses the role of strategic partners by focussing on formal as well as informaV local 
institutional influence. 
6. 2 Past Experiences of Partnership and Early 
Development Stages 
Moves to create a ROT in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region were made early in the history 
of this government initiative. The official launch took place in 1993, however the 
operationalisation of the partnership and its network of advisors rapidly turned into a 
slow process. This was partly due to the delicate legacy of earlier partnering 
experiences. In this introductory section, we explore the impact of these past partnering 
experiences on the early stages of development of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie. 
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The Centre Regional de Genie Industriel (CRGI) was the most significant partnering 
experience in the region before the creation of the ROT. It was created in 1989 by some 
of the key institutional players in the region, including the Conseil Regional. the ORIRE 
(regional office of the Ministry of Industry), the ORRT (regional office of the Ministry 
of Education and Research). The CRGI focused on technology transfer, had 8 directly 
employed advisors, it also covered the entire region Nord-Pas-de-Calais. It therefore 
could have been a suitable candidate to take over the new Reseau de Diffusion 
Technologique. Its operations were negotiated and included in a contractual agreement 
between the Conseil Regional and central government, within the 1989-1993 Contrat de 
Plan. This de fact facto meant that 1993 was a key deadline. Partners involved in the 
CRG] had to make a positive decision to carry forward its operations and negotiate its 
funding as part of the following round of contracts. They decided against that option. 
Two elements of explanation emerge from interviews. Firstly, as a structure, the CRGI 
was presented as expensive to run. The overheads it carried encompassed salaries for 
the 8 counsellors, as well as administrative support and advertisement costs. Its main 
source of revenue stemmed from contract management fees for projects generated by 
counsellors. The CRGI would typically take a commission that would represent 4 to 50/0 
of the total contract value. Its turnover was not high enough for the organisation to 
become self-funding. Whether this was a stated objective of the eRGI cannot be 
reliably established from the interview data. One respondent however questions that 
possibility: 
.... To justify the termination of the CRGI, the disproportion between the funds 
made available for its operation and the income it generated was the main 
argument put forward. Funding bodies knew very well that it was not possible 
to generate a high enough turnover, given the very small commission taken for 
each contract signed." (Past CRGI Technology Transfer Counsellor, 1998). 
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Second, it seems that the CRGI was perceived as a competitor; too visible and therefore 
shadowing parent organisations: 
" As a matter of fact all key players had a negative opinion of this organisation 
[the CRGI], because it was perceived as competing with more or less 
everyone" (ROT Manager, 1998a) 
Therefore work began for the creation of the ROT in the region. Given the CRGI 
experience a fundamental principle guiding the establishment of the 'Reseau Nord Pas 
de Calais Technologie' was 'transparency'. In this particular context, 'transparency' 
meant that while acting as a support function and a federating structure for all member 
organisations (hence the use of a 'network' label as opposed to the partnership label) the 
ROT would not be visible to client SMEs. This according to several interviewees was 
meant to prevent the creation and growth of yet another LED structure (perceived as 
independent from its parents and with its own 'existentialist' concerns) in what was 
already seen as a very cluttered institutional landscape: 
"Well, to get a consensus, we needed to create something rather modest, not 
too visible. We primarily developed support services for partners, besides, 
there was very little advertising targeted at businesses" (Regional Anvar 
Representative, 1998) 
"The goal was not to create an additional organisation, because, anyway, that 
would not have been accepted by people on the ground. Anyway, I am not 
convinced that it would have resolved the issue, because, well, there would be 
something extra, and that would be it. Therefore, it was decided to create a 
feather-light structure, to enable people to work together, without at the same 
time generating something rigid" (RIDT Senior Manager. \998) 
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The decision to dismantle the CRGI was by no means unanimous and led to a schism in 
the partnership as the DRRT opted to continue a CRGI form of operation and minimised 
its mandatory involvement within the RDT network. Indeed as one of the key players.. 
the DRRT developed its own team of directly employed technology counsellors., still in 
existence to date. This is quite significan4 because the level of involvement of the 
DRRT in the Reseau Nord-Pas-de-Calais Technologie by no means matches the level of 
involvement equivalent structures would have in other regions. Indeed, while key 
decision makers in the Reseaux de Diffusion Technologique across France are presented 
as 'Ia bande des 4' (the team of four) including the Conseil Regional, the DRIRE, the 
DRRT and ANV ~ in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region decision makers are referred to 
as 'Ia bande des trois' (the 'famous three' including DRIRE, the Conseil Regional and 
the ANVAR). The distancing of the DRRT still prevails today. It operates its own 
technology transfer structure, independently and it seems in direct competition with 
Reseau Nord-Pas-de-Calais Technologie: 
"The DRRT was one of the founding fathers of the CRGI at the time. Since 
the CRGI operations ceased, and of course in agreement with the other fund ing 
partners, the DRRT said: "I still want to pursue this line of action in another 
shape". So it progressively built its own team of technological advisors. The 
intention was to cover as many sectors as possible, with the extra help of a 
more generalist advisor" (Past CRGI Technology Transfer Counsellor, 1998) 
"Therefore, my view is that the fact that the DRRT did not follow at the time 
was also a sign of a lack of consensus, lack of agreement between the three 
regional fund ing partners .... That was one aspect. At another level there was 
also an issue of political commitment. I do not know whether we will ever 
know one day" (RIDT Senior Manager, 1998) 
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As negotiations continued for the phasing out of the CRGI and the phasing in of the 
RDT, the next issue partners had to address was whether the RDT should rely on an 
existing structure (that is an established 'Ioi de 1901 association', a not for profit 
organisation that would run the operation). The French system distinguishes between 
legaIJy established host structures (which carry 'Ioi 190 I association' statutes) and the 
operational activities that may be conducted in a less formal basis. It was suggested the 
ADRINORD should be used as the host structure for the RDT. ADRINORD was 
indeed the structure that ran the CRGI. It therefore had experience in provid ing a 
shared forum for partnering organisations. Discussions were tough. Quotes below 
suggest that the opposition that existed between partners stemmed from fundamental 
differences in institutional cultures. Indeed ADRINORD was primarily an employer led 
organisation and the Conseil Regional wished to promote its own public sector agenda. 
Hosting the RDT became a power stake not only because of the potential for influence 
on policy, but also because of possible control of the information gathered and managed 
by the RDT: 
"The situation in the Nord Pas de Calais region, were the ROT was established, 
was rather complex. In particular, there were a number of local actors involved 
in technology transfer, and these actors were not unanimous in terms of 
political commitment. So, the director of the ORRT wanted at the time that the 
RDT relied on an existing not for profit organisation, AORINORD. But the 
Conseil Regional was completely opposed to the idea that ADRINORO 
piloted. I think this was again because of political contlict. Indeed 
ADRINORD was more of a business led organisation. On the other hand the 
Conseil Regional wished to have full control over the development and 
implementation of its policies." (Past Anvar Regional Office Managing 
Director, 1998) 
"Therefore, the option that appeared most neutral was to create a new support 
structure. We did differently in other regions. But in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
there was just too much hostility; there were too many vetoes on one or another 
support structure, or the role of one or another partner. We could not use an 
existing structure. So we created a new one" (RIOT Senior Manager. 1998) 
" ... The legal structure is that of an 'association', it is called 'Reseau Nord-Pas-
de-Calais Technologie', it has that sole activity. It was created for that purpose 
at the time; simply because there was no consensus on the possible delivery 
through another 'association' when the network Nord-Pas-de-Calais was 
created. Because they could very well have joined an existing structure." 
(ROT Manager, 1998a) 
"The classic problem in France, I do not know whether it is true in the UK, is 
that through networks, one deals with information, and for some, information 
means power. So becoming the host structure for the partnership became a 
power issue [ ... ]. To avoid that pitfall, in the region Nord-Pas-de-Calais, we 
decided to create a new structure. This was not the case in other French 
regions" (Past Anvar Regional Office Managing Director, 1998) 
As a result, Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie was created as a not-for profit 
organisation. Its primary function was to run the RTD operation in the region. The core 
partnership involved all the most significant regional institutions shaping and fund ing 
economic development policies. These were the ANVA~ the Conseil Regional, the 
DRRT and the DRIRE (i.e., the commonly called 'bande des quatres'). However the 
partnership's institutional membership was much wider than this, as it included the 
regional prefect the two Conseils Generaux, the Conseil Interprofessionel Social 
Economique (CISE- which is an employers' federation) and the Regional Chamber of 
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Commerce. The Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie was meant to co-ordinate 
technology transfer activities of these players, including their independently set up 
initiatives. 
Such a wide membership partly explains why the full operationalisation of Reseau 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais Technologie took over two years. The influence of the regional 
director of the ANV AR at the time was pivotal to this. Responsible for the 
establishment of the regional ROT, he wanted to ensure that all institutional 
stakeholders were involved in the conception and development of the initiative. This 
large-scale involvement was seen as a pre-condition for the effective networking of 
everyone dealing with technology transfer on the ground. Such comprehensive 
collaborative effort was novel in the region. The eRGI experience clearly set the trend 
for partnering locally, but all those involved had not experienced it as an entirely 
positive initiative. Further, it did not encompass all the actors that were collaborating in 
the RDT. For the first time in the region the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie 
created a forum for discussion of all key players: 
"Therefore there were many actors. The philosophy behind the structuring of 
this network was about enabling service providers to carry on operating freely. 
So we had to ensure that the hierarchy (that is all the institutions which finance 
service providers) was in agreement, so that there would not be daily hurdles 
afterwards. That's why the partnership identified all fundamental actors, and 
invited them to become members" (Past Anvar Regional Office Managing 
Director, 1998) 
An interviewee commented this was so rare and novel, that the president of the 
partnership, the regional prefect at the time. used some of the early meetings to debate 
issues related to his own agenda rather than that of the partnership: 
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'"At last every actor met. Before this organisation there was nowhere for them 
to meet. It was quite amusing, the early meetings, which were chaired by the 
regional prefect (because the prefect wanted to be involved in this kind of 
infrastructure) ... Well since everyone was there, it was not rare for the prefect 
to talk of other things. He had the opportunity to have everyone around the 
table ... (laughter)" (Past Anvar Regional Office Managing Director, t 998) 
However, comprehensive consensual decision-making also meant no decision or slow 
decision-making, as illustrated by the fact that it took about eight months to recruit the 
partnership manager, after the job was advertised: 
"Yes, yes a very large partnership. Therefore difficult to establish, because to 
gather so many people and make them reach an agreement, obviously it is time 
consuming. Just to let you have an idea, I answered the job advertisement in 
July 1992. And I started the job in February 1993" (RDT Manager, t 998a) 
In summary, this review of early partnership experiences and the early stages in the 
establishment of the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie showed that the 'birth' of 
the network was a difficult one. As a result of the earlier CRGI partnering experience, 
important constraints were placed on the partnership. They still persist today. Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie cannot be visible to client companies and should act as 
a light support structure to partnering institutions and not as another organisation by 
their side. Decision-making still has to be consensual. And significantly the local 
DRRT, normally a key partner in RDTs, seem to minimise their involvement, while 
running in parallel a competing structure. 
6. 3 Partnership Goals and Objectives 
ROTs goals and objectives are outlined in the 1995 'Cahier des Charges du Reseau de 
Diffusion Technologique'. Discussed in the previous chapter, this document acts as the 
French government's prospectus for RDTs. It outlines national objectives for ROTs and 
sets out the regional goals that they should be pursuing. 
This section of the case study aims to address two sets of questions. The first reflects 
the need to compare nationally defmed objectives and locally defined ones: How well 
do these national guidelines and local partners' goals and objectives match? Are they 
consistent or do they diverge? What issues arise from the comparison of national and 
local objectives? The second series of questions requires a more fine-grained analysis 
of convergences and divergences in local partners' perceptions of Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie's goals and objectives: Is there a shared understanding of the 
partnership's goals and objectives? To which particular objectives do partners shared 
views relate? In which areas are there differences and how significant are they likely to 
be for the partnership? 
6.3.1 National vs. Local Objectives: An Overview 
The overall rationale here is to conduct a comparison between national guidelines and 
the way local partners perceive their goals and objectives. This section first summarises 
these and then presents a simple analysis designed to determine whether nationally 
defined objectives are also adopted locally. Thereafter, a more detailed analysis 
compares prioritisation locally and nationally in order to identify similarities and/or 
discrepancies. 
Table 6.1 summarises the objectives defined in the 1995 Cahier des Charges (Ministcre 
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de I'Education nationale de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 1995). The succinct and 
descriptive labels are indicative only and mirror the 'nodes' used while conducting 
computerised analysis of data. The second column presents the statements of goals and 
objectives drawn the Cahier des Charges. 
Table 6-1 Goals defined in the 1995 RDT Cahier des Charges 
Label 
Market 
penetration 
Networking / 
sign posting 
Technology 
transfer 
Access and 
awareness 
Co lIaboration 
National policy 
co-ordination 
Training 
Meta-strategy 
Providing and 
managing PTR 
Goals and objectives stated in the 1995 Cahier des Charges 
Formalise and enhance technological demand and associated 
needs, through canvassing and awareness raising 
Co-ordinate canvassing of industrial SMEs and 'artisanales' 
enterprises25 . 
Help companies find the most appropriate competency centres. 
whether public or private, and the most suitable services to 
satisfy their needs 
Coach companies that so desire in the development of their 
techno logies 
Ease access to public services 
Support more generic awareness raising initiatives to sensitise 
SMEs to technological challenges and opportunities 
Favour and stimulate collaborative exchanges between public 
and mixed sector regional actors 
Extend their scientific and technological support to the national 
level, even European level, through active involvement in the 
inter-regional network of ROTs [RIOT] 
Enhance the coherence of the national technology transfer 
systems through inter-regional co-ord ination 
Enhance the overall professionalism of all 
Become a federating relay for the implementation of regional 
technology dissemination policies 
Manage the allocation of technology transfer grants [Prestation 
Technologie Reseau -PTR]. This form of financial support to 
businesses is made available by Anvar to the RDT. which then 
manages the application process." 
In order to determine whether nationally defined objectives are also adopted locally an 
assay analysis has been conducted on interview data. Assay is a term borrowed from 
disciplines such as chemistry and physics. In these disciplines it would, for example. 
refer to the analysis of a solid rock to determine its composition. 
2\ 'Enterprises artisanales' is a label covering small businessl.-s with a specific legal status in Fr.mce. 264 
Table 6-2 Local and national poal orioritisation: 
Number of times a type Service Access & Collaboratio National Trainin Providin Meta- Market Networki Technolog! 
of goal IS quoted 10 tmprovemen awareness n coord inatio g gPTR strategy penetratio ng & y transfer I 
transcript signpost. 
I 
t n n 
ANVAR 6 0 1 0 1 3 3 3 2 2 
RIOT Tot. Includes: 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 4 4 2 
.. ---_ ....... -----..... - .... ----- ~--------------------- -------------..... ----- f------- ---------- --... -------_ ... _---f-.---- >--. 
1 - RIDT - Cah ier 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 2 
2 - RIDT interview ---------------------
----_ ..... _--_ ... --------
----------
--
---------... _-
--
-----_ ... _----------f----- ~-
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
RDT partnership 3 0 1 0 1 6 9 9 3 5 
Development agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 
Chamber of Commerce 1 0 0 0 1 3 11 5 1 3 
Conseil General 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 
Conseil regional 0 0 1 0 3 1 7 1 0 4 
TOTALS 12 2 7 3 7 19 35 23 10 17 
265 
In the context of this study, the assay analysis can determine whether goals defined 
centrally can be found in the local institutional representatives' interview transcripts. 
The assay search was complemented by a matrix intersect search, both performed 
within N'Vivo. Results are displayed within table 6.2. 
The table shows for example, that none of the interviewees refer to the full range of 
goals that are defined in the prospectus. The RDT manager comes closest, as he refers 
clearly to 8 of the 10 nationally defmed goals. 
Furthermore, representatives from the Conseil General and the Regional Development 
Agency seem to focus on a very limited number of nationally defined goals. Does this 
indicate a very narrowly focused use of the partnership by the organisations 
represented? The goals that are discussed most widely within the partnership are about 
the definition of a regional technology transfer strategy ('meta-strategy); the provision 
and management of the PTR grant; the need to increase market penetration levels of 
ROT services and promote continued efforts to increase overall technology transfer in 
the region. By contrast, the desire to raise companies' awareness of technology transfer 
services and to improve access (key national objectives) appear in the interview 
transcripts of none of the partners, further the need to influence the co-ord ination of 
national technology transfer policies seems to be a low priority too in this partnership. 
The table further shows that operational objectives, in particular the management of the 
technology transfer fund (PTR) and the conduct of client visits to increase market 
penetration are heavily emphasised within the partnership. This is highly consistent 
with national guidelines where market penetration goals are prioritised. 
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There is a strong emphasis on the discussion of meta-strategies, however a small group 
of three organisations lead the debate. These are represented by the chamber delegate. 
the partnership manager and the Conseil Regional representative. 
There is a notable contrast in emphasis: A fundamental goal in the national guidelines is 
related to the networking of technology transfer counsellors and the enhancement of 
signposting procedures in order to ensure that client firms always access the most 
suitable set of competencies. Overall, this goal tumbles down from being priority 
number one at the national level to being priority number five locally. Even then only 
four of the organisations consulted out of seven do refer to this objective at all. 
In conclusion, the two analytical devices used allowed the broad mapping of the way 
national priorities drive (or not) local views about the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie's goals and objectives. At this stage it is clear that none of the partners 
embrace or refer to all of the nationally defined goals. Indeed a couple of partners seem 
to associate with the partnership a very narrow range of objectives. Furthennore, 
respondents seem to emphasise a great deal operational goals (including the need to 
increase market penetration levels), which does reflect national priorities. However a 
key national aim, that of increasing companies' awareness of services and facilitating 
access seems indeed to be a very low priority locally. This local approach seems 
paradoxical. What are its causes and how is it sustained? The next section explores 
these issues, by analysing the content of the interviewees' statements on the subject. 
6.3.2 Meta-Strategy Rejected 
The need or desire for an over-arching regional technology transfer strategy embraced 
by all institutional players was by far the national objective that generated most debate 
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during interviews. Interestingly, this subject is also the one that attracted the least 
consensus. 
The position of the partnership was very well summarised by the partnership manager 
who illustrated how little attention the board of directors paid to strategic issues: 
"Really these are things we never discuss. When we do the business review. 
we go through a number of indicators. We reassess training programmes etc ... 
When I prepare a business plan, there is no over-arching strategy. That's true." 
(RDT Manager, 1998b) 
"[ ... ] This is one of my critic isms of the board of directors. There IS no 
strategic vision of the RDT. [ ... ]"(RDT Manager, 1998b) 
This situation can perhaps be explained by the apparent lack of consensus on what could 
become a shared meta-strategy between all of these institutional partners. Indeed the 
overall emphasis on technology transfer at a national level and its subsequent adoption 
locally is questioned by partners for whom real economic benefits can only be reaped 
from policies focussing on innovation: 
"The original thrust behind all this comes from this famous 'research-industry' 
link: we must establish links between research centres and industrial 
companies. Everything stems from this concept, which has not changed. Yet 
we all know it is a failure. [ .. ]. To use the jargon, the company will innovate. 
It will not innovate because it has a partner [e .g. research centre]. It innovates 
because it has developed its innovative capability. It has bu ilt the necessary 
conditions to innovate. We must work on this theme: Can this company 
innovate?" (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998) 
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"WeI) we think that there is a gap, because most of the technology transfer 
services offered to businesses are primarily focused on maximising the use of 
existing regional potential; in particular, research institutions... therefore 
service offer is primarily about transferring technology. However there is a 
huge difference between technology transfer and innovation" (ARO Senior 
Manager, 1998) 
"The partnership's overarching mission is to enhance companies' technological 
development, in particular that of companies which never use external 
resources, public services, research centres, educational institutions etc." (ROT 
Manager, 1998a) 
As a result of these conflicting views, prospects for the progressive adoption of a shared 
meta-strategy seem rather bleak: 
"In my view, there is a common rationale among all partners, but perhaps this 
rationale is biased given that partners account to their own institutions and 
these may well have goals which diverge from the partnership's, even ifoverall 
there is a common desire to contribute to businesses technological 
development." (Conseil Regional Senior Manager, 1998) 
"Everyone agrees on the basis, given that it is the stated goal of all partners. 
However we are likely to encounter a lot more problems when there is a desire 
to evolve the strategy." (Conseil Regional Senior Manager, 1998) 
In conclusion, Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie lacks a locally shared vision and 
strategy for technology transfer. National guidelines, mostly expressed in broad terms. 
are accepted. however. partners seem to disagree on their meaning and focus. This is 
turn suggests that change or evolution are unlikely to be on the agenda of the 
partnership in the short term. 
6.3.3 Strong Focus on the Provision of PTR Grants and the Increase 
of Market Penetration Levels 
Symptomatic of the above lack of agreement on evolutions of the shared strategy, the 
partnership's focus on the implementation of operational goals seems to be inevitable. 
But here again, there are signs of concern among partners. 
All partners accept the provision of PTR grants as a distinctive feature of the Reseau 
Nord Pas-De-Calais Technologie and see these as enhancing the counselling process 
(ROT Manager , 1998a; Conseil Regional Senior Manager , 1998; Director Conseil 
General Nord , 1998; Past Anvar Regional Office Managing Director, 1998; Regional 
Anvar Representative, 1998). For the partnership manager, PTR provision and 
management is a driving force for ROT partnerships across France: 
"There is the basic mission which is about client visits, the management of the 
PTR grant, really these are more 'functions' than they are missions. That is 
common to all regions". (ROT Manager, t 998b) 
The above statement also shows how important it is for the partnership to increase 
market penetration levels. These two goals are meant to feed of each other, as the 
ability to provide PTR grants makes it easier for counsellors to set up client visits for 
example. 
However, some partners expressed reservations on the way in which client visits are 
conducted. In line with earlier remarks on meta-strategy. some partners showed 
concern that the ROT may focus too closely on marketing partner institutions' 'off the 
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shelf services and restrict its activities to isolated one-off support projects, hence 
damaging its credibility towards clients and restricting the economic benefits that could 
be drawn from long term, less project-based, coaching approaches: 
"The RDT has a project based mission. Its goal is to get projects and "feed' 
institutional providers. [ ... ]. You visit a company. Is there a project? Yes, 
great. We take it on. There isn't a project; we visit another company. We let 
the previous company get by for the next three years. It is completely absurd. 
We are in a completely absurd structure. Or else I could insist on supporting a 
useless company. I'd have to visit 10 times, then I may generate, start off 
something. No, if there is nothing, you leave and check out some other place. 
It is entirely negative. There is a fundamental loss of efficiency" (ARIST 
Senior Manager, 1998) 
These criticisms were compounded with the view that the partnership placed unrealistic 
demands on members' time by pushing for increases in the number of client visits 
conducted by each of them given that they agreed to spend about 20% of their time on 
RDT business (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998). 
In conclusion, there is a wide spread agreement that the inclusion of PTR grants in 
counsellors' service portfolio has had positive effects, there is also a general recognition 
that small firms deficiencies in technology transfer and innovative capabilities need to 
be addressed. As a result of this consensus, the partnership is heavily focused on two 
operational goals, the management of the PTR grant and the increase of market 
penetration levels. However, concern about the ways in which the partnership currentl~ 
implements these goals have been expressed, in particular the partnership's emphasis on 
technology transfer (as opposed to building innovative capability) and its project based 
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approach (which was contrasted with more long term coaching methods) attracted 
criticism. 
6.3.4 An Historical Veto on RaiSing Customer Awareness and 
Access 
The above focus on operational activities (rather than the development of strategic 
leadership in regional technology transfer) is compounded by the 'low profile' policy 
imposed by partners. In the review of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's 
historical background, and in particular the review of the CRG] experience. it was 
clearly shown that key institutions were keen to avoid the creation of a structure that 
would be too visible and could be in a position to compete with them. 
The impact of the above is significant at the operational level and is reflected the lack of 
labellinglbranding of ROT services. Typically, a client company will be dealing with a 
Chamber representative acting as an agent capable of accessing financial support made 
available through the ROT: 
"In my view a key weakness of the partnership is that it never puts its name 
forward, it is never directly involved with clients. Service providers, such as 
chambers of commerce counsellors, always act as intermediaries responsible 
for advising, offering financial support etc.. The partnership' s identity. its 
name is always 'behind the scenes' and not communicated to businesses. On 
the ground this may cause difficulties in terms of access and understanding of 
the service provision infrastructure." (Director Conseil General Nord . 1998) 
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Furthermore, there has been constant opposition to large-scale partnership advertising 
and public relations (PR) exercises over time. Notably, the creation of the partnership 
was itself very low key: the principle of a promotional campaign planned by the newly 
appointed partnership manager was rejected at the first board of directors meeting (ROT 
Manager, 1998a). As discussed in the section covering the partnership's history. the 
partnership's motto seemed to be 'transparency', the meaning of which is very specific 
this partnership: 
"Transparency meant that the RDT structure cou Id not be seen from outside, it 
had to be 'invisible'. It meant in fact that Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie should not be known. Members were responsible for spread ing 
the message." (ROT Manager, 1998a) 
In 1996 partners agreed to make an exception with an advertising campaign promoting 
counsellors (as opposed to Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie as an agency 
integrating business support in technology transfer). The purpose of the campaign was 
to increase market penetration levels by relying on a free phone number. It was 
anticipated that inquiries would then tum into full-blown counselling and technology 
transfer projects. However, the campaign (which cost 200000 francs - about £20000), 
failed to meet expectations by a large margin. Posters and leaflets were designed, a 
total of 10500 companies were contacted via three separate mail shots, but only 70 calls 
were received (RDT Manager, 1998a). Given the poor results, the free phone number 
was discontinued. 
The effects of this failed campaign have been long lasting. Only small-scale internal 
communication projects have since been allowed to proceed. This is the case of the 
partnership's vademecum, which is a reference handbook, primarily designed for 
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counsellors. This handbook has evolved over time. It initially included a list of the 
partnership's counsellors, their areas of expertise and their contact details. Its purpose 
was simply to ensure that members knew each other and could signpost clients when 
needed. More recently a synthesis of all sources of support and types of grants that 
firms can apply for and their eligibility criteria have been included in the same 
publication. This addition has made the vademecum attractive to a wider range of 
people, including fmancial advisors, accountants and other professionals who 
occasionally interact with members but also deal with small firms regularly. Recently 
the partnership's board recognised this broader level of interest and agreed to make the 
vademecum more easily available to externals (ROT Manager. 1998a). 
Despite the fact that the partnership still lacks leaflets or brochures that present its 
purpose and activities, the manager sees the evolution described above as positive. 
Some of the partners do indeed seem to have changed their position on the matter, and 
the DRIRE for example has adopted a more relaxed approach to partnership advertising. 
Nonetheless change did not occur across the board and others, like the DRRT, m 
particular remain very hostile (Regional Anvar Representative, 1998). 
The resulting partnership consensus on public relations, which is in fact an agreement 
not to have any PR, seems to be fundamentally undermining its ability to achieve 
nationa lIy defined goals: 
""The fact that we do not communicate, I think .... I don't know. We could not 
call it an issue, given that it was a partnership decision ... But I do not think it 
was a good idea. In the regional context perhaps. But given the national goals 
that we have [ ... ] the objective of 'transparency' should not hamper the need to 
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federate. Yet to federate one needs to be visible." (RDT Manager, 1998b) 
"'Indeed, I think that the lack of public relations really damages the basic 
mission. This basic mission is defined in the ROT prospectus; it is about 
offering companies a coherent, harmonious support system etc.. so that 
companies can fmd their way in it. If they do not know that a structure has 
been set up precisely to achieve that, there is very little chance that they do 
manage in the maze. Recently I attended meetings where business managers 
were present, well they do not know about Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie or the counsellors. They are not aware of the vademecum. When 
you show it to them, they ask: "that's great, why don't you publicize itT'. 
Businesses relentlessly and publicly say that the system is obscure, that they do 
not know service providers. We set up something designed to help, but we do 
not tell them. I don't think it is coherent." (ROT Manager, 1998b) 
In conclusion, the partnership manager accepts that partners consensually agreed to 
reject any major public relations activity; however, he also emphasises the restrictions 
this places on the partnership's ability to achieve increased customer awareness and 
enhanced access to services. While some partners have become less intransigent on the 
issue, others continue to oppose any form of partnership advertising. They mainly 
argue that the ROT was never meant to become an institution per se; instead its key role 
has always been about the co-ordination of existing institutions' activities. The 
partnership as a whole has coined this 'a desire to be transparent linvisible'. This policy 
has meant until now that public relations activities have been kept to a strict minimum, 
as illustrated by the lack of branding! labelling of ROT services. 
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6.3.5 Conclusion 
The general consensus on the role and remit of the RDT was difficult to obtain in the 
NPC region. It seems that the trade off for a strong desire for inclusiveness (which was 
discussed in the historical background section) has been a fragile consensus and a very 
minimalist mission for the RDT. This minimalist mission centres on the increase of 
market penetration levels and the management ofPTR projects. The areas in which the 
RDT is restricted include its communication strategy: it is not allowed to directly 
market its activities to client companies. This in turn restricts its ability to implement 
one of the key missions defined centrally, which is to facilitate service awareness and 
access. Further, a key aspect of the RDT policy, the desire to facilitate and enhance 
networking, referral and signposting, is acknowledged only by some of the local players 
in the partnership. 
The above difficulties may simply be symptoms of the strong rejection by some partners 
of the RDT's strategic role in the region. Most of the discussion on the board of 
directors centres on the review of operational activities and the achievement of 
operational goals, to some extent masking strongly opposing views on the ways in 
which the technological potential of the region's small firms should be unleashed. 
6. 4 Operational Dynamics 
Given the minimalist mission of the partnership and some of the conflicting views on 
goals and objectives, how does this partnership operate? This section first presents 
partnership funding. then analyses partnership activities, with a specific focus on market 
penetration strategies, the provision and management of the PTR grants. counsellor 
training and membership management. 
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6.4.1 Partnership Funding 
As shown earlier, funding sources for RDTs are multiple. These will typically involve 
financial support from government (in particular the Ministry of Industry and the 
Ministry of Education and Research), from the regions and sometimes from the 
European Union (through structural funds). In addition to base funding, the ANY AR 
covers the cost of all successful applications for technology transfer grants (PTR) that 
can only be prescribed by RDT members. Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie is no 
exception to this model, therefore the combination of the base funding and allocated 
PTRs gives a good indication of the fmancial resources that are made available to 
enable its technology transfer remit. Table 6.3 presents these resources. 
Table 6-3 Budget of Reseau Nord-Pas-de-Calais Technologie 
1997 1998 1999 
Operating Costs 
EDAW (1999) (24 100 OOOFF) (26 000 OOOFF) Not Available 
PTR 
(3 411 OOOFF) (2 881 OOOFF) (3 010 OOOFF) 
Total 24441 100FF 28881000FF Not available 
6.4.2 Partnership Activities 
Earlier in this chapter, we highlighted the acknowledged importance of market 
development objectives, and of the PTR allocation. We also highlighted that the 
networking (address book node) is strongly emphasised in policy documents and by 
policy makers, however in the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie it seems to be a 
far less prominent goal. This section aims to review how each fonn of operational 
activities underpins the achievement of these goals. 
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6.4.2.1 Market Penetration Strategies 
This section outlines the evolution of market penetration strategies used in Reseau Nord 
Pas de Calais Technologie and investigates some of the potential causes for the changes 
introduced over time. 
Canvassing efforts were originally heavily relied upon. The purpose was to increase the 
number of client visits and, in the process, increase the proportion of first time users of 
technology transfer support. The other goal underpinning these efforts was to ensure 
that client visits were co-ordinated and that different counsellors would not visit the 
same company. The Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's manager organised 
conventions that were attended by members and where market penetration goals were 
discussed and targets agreed. Despite the fact that both sector-based segmentation and 
geographical segmentation were used and mirrored the segmentation strategies of 
members' own institutions, poor results were recurring. 
During these canvassing meetings, members would identifY about 300 target companies. 
This meant that individually they agreed to conduct between 5 and 10 company visits 
targeted at new prospective clients. However, the overall goal of200 to 250 visits was 
never met. Irrespective of the style and focus of these market penetration plans, visits 
seem to have reached a ceiling of about 100. The original focus on enterprises between 
5 and 20 employees (those that are normally most difficult to reach) did not improve the 
chances of success (ROT Manager, 1998a). As a consequence they were abandoned: 
.... At the beginning, the market penetration strategy was simple. I would 
prepare a list of companies to visit. Then, there would be three or four regional 
meetings. At each of these meetings, members had to pick the companies they 
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wanted to visit. So, that enabled us to have a co-ordinated operation [ ... ]. That 
was the first market penetration plan. That was all: they chose and they visited. 
The last one was based on a sector study. The regional development agency 
conducted a study on company typologies; the problems they encountered. 
their growth prospects... Really, the purpose was to enhance knowledge and 
understanding of SMEs' economic situation. This was followed by a two-day 
training workshop. We covered technical centres etc. Well in sum. we did the 
lot [ ... ]. And it ended as before, in other words relatively little was achieved. 
Since then, I decided to stop these." (ROT Manager, 1998a) 
Given the poor results, the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie manager focussed 
efforts on visit co-ordination instead. These are still ongoing. 
Coordination team meetings are organised following the same geographical and sectoral 
rationales, again reflecting the way partners are themselves structured. Indeed 
Chambers of Commerce and ORIRE offices operate according to a geographical 
rationale. Other partners, such as specialist technical centres have on the other hand a 
sectoral focus and provide their services across the entire region. 
Small counsellor teams regularly meet to discuss their activities, review companies 
visited and exchange information. The Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie 
manager attends these meetings and acts as a go-between, infonning on other teams 
activities and ensuring that potential overlaps are identified and avoided. These local 
and sectoral meetings are described as the 'minimum' that the partnership could do, 
they are meant to incite client visits (rather than impose a quantitative target): 
"We cannot reasonably speak of market penetration plans. We refer to group 
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co-ord ination and exchange in relation to canvassing" (RDT Manager, 1998a) 
Geographical teams are primarily constituted of generalist counsellors and service 
providers. They are centred on one of the thirteen chambers of commerce established in 
the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. In addition to Chamber counsellors, these teams also 
include counsellors from the ORIRE, and the Anvar. In some instances they may 
involve representatives from 'high priority conversion zones,26 and local incubators. 
which are respectively answerable to the regional prefect and the Conseil General du 
Nord. In principle ORRT counsellor are also meant to attend these meetings. 
Thematic teams complement the grid formed by local teams. These will tend to involve 
specialists of a specific economic sector. In the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, 
there are three thematic teams. They include the mechanical sector team, the agro-
business team, and the textiles team. Each of these operates region-wide. They bring 
together mainly representatives from 'Technical centres' (which are primarily 
specialised service providers). Anvar representatives may also be present (Anvar relies 
on both geographical and sectoral modes of operation, so they will have sector 
specialists). Specialist educational bodies are also likely to be present at these meetings. 
The effectiveness of these sector-based teams vary: the agro-business team is very 
dynamic and effective, the operations of the mechanical sector team is satisfactory, 
however the textiles team was in the process of being phased out due to low levels of 
activity (ROT Manager, 1998a). 
Most of the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie ROT activities are very generalist. 
Recently the 'Comite de Pilotage' asked Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie to re-
~b Illese are called 'Poles de Conversion' in I-'rench and aim to pool together all govemml.'fIt services in 
order to ti)ster the economic restructuring of highly dl..-privcd geograp,ical arca'i. 
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focus its activities on technology; as a result there was a deliberate effort to invite to 
team meetings counsellors with a specialist technical or engineering background. This 
is meant to serve a dual purpose: on the one hand there is a clear re-alignment with the 
initiative's technology transfer mission and on the other hand counsellors' overall 
knowledge of their colleagues technical area of expertise is enhanced, creating greater 
opportunities for signposting, experience sharing, etc. This is a significant hurd Ie in 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, given that it is one the two largest ROTs: 
"Wel~ here, a lot of our members are chamber or ORIRE counsellors. They 
will deal with recruitment, relocation issues etc ... The board of directors asked 
me to focus to a greater extent on technology transfer. Given that these people 
are not necessarily comfortable with technology related issues, because they do 
not necessarily have the appropriate training background, J will ask specialists 
to attend meetings. The goal will be to cover more extensively technological 
issues and at the same time ensure that the more generalist counsellors get to 
know these specialists" (ROT Manager, 1998a). 
There are no defmite explanations fro these consecutive failures in market penetration 
strategies, however interview data shows that a number of factors may have contributed 
to the disappointing results. 
First, the partnership manager himself acknowledges that his level of expertise of small 
and medium sized enterprises was limited when he took his functions. By defining the 
very small firms (5 to 20 employees) as the target client group in the first market 
penetration strategy, he overlooked the fact that these were the most difficult to reach. 
Therefore, in these early stages the opportunity to build on early and small successes 
was foregone: 
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"Then, in the first market penetration plan, I said: 'well [ ... ] let us visit 
businesses with 5 to 20 employees'. In fact, I had it completely WTong. 
because, I realised that these companies were the most difficu It ones. [ ... ] 
[These] are the most difficult to visit, because the managing director is not 
available. He does everything. This really was not where I should have 
started. Too bad ... I was full of good intentions ... " (RDT Manager, 1998a) 
Another issue that may have had some impact on the lack of improvement in overalI 
market penetration rates could be the flip side of voluntary activity. Counsellors do not 
necessarily benefit from tangible and direct rewards for the identification of new clients. 
nor do their employers. The previous chapter showed that regional institutions make 
their staffavailable for the conduct ofRTD business in addition to their usual duties and 
on a voluntary basis. In exchange these organisations are formal partners within the 
RDT. As such, they extend their product portfolio with the PTR. However, within the 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie they do not commit to a particular level of 
activity. The partnership manager in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie made an 
analogy with a private business to explain the hurdles this represents for his 
organisation: 
"When we are asked to canvass businesses, I feel like a company's commercial 
director who does not have the means to gives bonuses to his sales staff. [ ... ]. 
In a company, sales people are rewarded according to the turnover they 
generate. Here we are told that we need to increase market penetration rates, in 
particular in small businesses, where nobody wants to go because they are thc 
most difficult to reach... And we have no means to motivate counselIors 
whatsoever ... " (ROT Manager, 1998b) 
Arrangements vary betwecn regions. Indeed in some cases contracts (similar to service 
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level agreements) are in place and every visit is compensated. This is the case in 
Rhone-Alpes (the second French case study in this thesis) and in Lorraine. According 
to the partnership manager, such service level agreements could be used to enhance both 
service quality and market penetration levels: 
" In my view, service level agreements are the 'healthiest' way of managing 
the partnership's operations. Since each visit is financed, one can be more 
demanding in terms of visit protocol, conten~ conduct and the reports that are 
fed back [to the RDT]. [ ... ] [Otherwise -i.e. relying purely on good will] one 
can hardly direct or demand much from company visits ... [ ... ],"(RDT 
Manager, 1998b) 
Given oppositions to the introduction of this type of contractual arrangements in the 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie (RDT Manager, 1998b; RIOT Senior Manager. 
1998), less prescriptive and subtler means are used to motivate counsellors as well as 
their employers to enhance and/or sustain their involvement. Direct communication, (in 
the form of simple feedback on content and number of visits conducted within the ROT 
framework) with counsellors' hierarchical managers is emphasised. The purpose is 
primarily to foster dialogue about market penetration targets within the partnership: 
"When the director of a partner organisation receIves correspondence 
requesting information on the canvassing objectives of its counsellors -also 
members of the ROT, a questioning process starts. As past perfonnance 
statistics are included [ ... ] he will see that his organisation' s contribution is 
rather poor or on the contrary very good or even average. In any case, we hope 
to get some kind of reaction. This director may be happy with a very low level 
of involvement, why not? At least a dialogue on the subject is established. 
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[ ... ]" (RIDT Senior Manager, 1998) 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there is strong opposition from some 
respondents to the types of strategies adopted by Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie. The rationale driving pro-active canvassing was set out at the outset of 
the initiative and was designed to compensate for low levels of technology transfer in 
the region. Previously technology transfer institutions tended to respond to clients when 
contacted; however overall transfer levels in the region were still considered too low. In 
order to tackle the problem, a more pro-active stance was promoted from the very 
inception of the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie: 
" The idea was to 'reveal' demand, while previously the focus had always been 
on supply. In other words, institutions 'sold' their technological expertise 
when customers came along, whereas here we wanted to invert the process. 
We wanted to ensure that 'ground sensors' [i.e. counsellors] could 'lift' latent 
demand, i.e. capture and transform it so that it can be satisfied [ ... ]" (Past 
Anvar Regional Office Managing Director, 1998) 
Each subsequent market penetration plan relied on this rationale. However, the earlier 
discussion of goals and objectives showed that there is no unanimous agreement on the 
value of this approach. In fact, the Chamber representative rejected outright this 
approach to client visits: 
"Why should there be any demand? There will never be any demand. That is 
the problem. All the partnerships and networks of the world will not make any 
difference. A company that has got a project will always find partners. There 
is no problem at all. I have never seen a managing director who sat saying to 
himself: 'I have a wonderful idea, but I do not know how to do if. No, they 
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always find a solution. They naturally come to see us. No need to go and see 
them." (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998) 
Some interviewees, in fact highlighted the adverse effects forced awareness campaigns 
and canvassing could have on institutions' reputation and the effectiveness of their 
activities: 
" Sometimes these hap-hazard awareness campaigns make more damage than 
good. I'd say that we could have a negative effect on the people we are 
supposed to make aware of sources and types of support. I mean these 
campaigns may be badly conducted, raise customers' expectations without 
meeting them. It's for show. It is not important. There must me a level of 
quality and .... a level of professionalism as much in innovation promotion and 
awareness campaigns as in actual delivery and coaching of project holding 
companies." (ARD Senior Manager, 1998) 
This problem is compounded by the difficulty Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie 
is likely to experience when aiming to co-ordinate client visits. Indeed, the overall 
attitude communicated during the interview by the Chamber representative towards this 
issue is plainly undermining the co-ordination goal: 
"What is this philosophy? At the beginning it was perfectly clear: that is 25 of 
us do not go and bother the same company. But we know it is not the case! 
(Repeated twice) If I want to find clients, I visit companies. If a lab wants to 
find customers, it does the same thing. In any case, we will all go and visit the 
same companies, particularly if these have 'value'. If they have no value. 
nobody goes to see them. There isn't any business to be made." (ARIST 
Senior Manager. 1998) 
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This may potentially be a serious issue given that in the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie, Chamber counsellors (including those affiliated to the enterprise agency 
which they host -the ARTIST) have in 1999 prescribed 23 PTR grants out of a total of 
98 (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999). This 23,50/0 activity level 
was the highest of all partners. In other words chamber and ARIST counsellors are 
heavily relied upon in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie. 
In conclusion, market penetration strategies can be summarised by a shift from pro-
active canvassing to a more re-active co-ordination of client visits and a greater focus on 
technology related matters. This shift took place over time, as structured market 
penetration plans led to little improvement in overall client visit numbers and in market 
penetration levels. Interview data shows that the lack of incentives to increase the 
number of new clients, the partnership manager's limited prior experience of the sector. 
and in some instance a questioning of the very rationale of market development 
strategies by some members could have been significant hurdles in the case of Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie. The next section analyses another fundamental aspect 
of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie operation, which is the provision of PTR 
grants. 
6.4.2.2 Providing PTR 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the PTR grant is a key differentiating feature of 
all ROTs. Unlike most grants administered by public administrations, it is very easy 
and quick to set up~ further, decisions are made very rapidly. This makes it a valuable 
pump-priming fund for technology related business projects. However, is this 
differentiating feature important and valued by institutional partners and individual 
members? In this section we analyse partners' perceptions of the role and importance of 
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this grant in the overall operation of the partnership. 
ROTs remit is clearly stated in the 1995 prospectus released by the government. It 
requires ROTs to: 
"Follow, in particular, the PTR (Prestation Technologique Reseau), a financial 
support made available to ROTs by the ANV AR" (Ministere de l'Education 
nationale de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 1995) 
The above statement may be underplaying the importance of the PTR. From the point of 
view of local partners in the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, it could be 
considered as one of the 'gelling agents' in the partnership. The financial support it 
represents (albeit limited in amount, as shown in the previous chapter) is appealing to 
partner institutions, it therefore promotes their involvement in the partnership: 
"'The PTR is a carrot, particularly for Chambers of Commerce, because it 
provides them with a decision-making instrument, that they do not have in 
other intervention tools. [ ... ] The PTR enables the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie to sustain its activity levels" (Regional Anvar Representative, 
1998) 
There seems to be consensus amongst interviewees that the PTR acted as an incentive 
for partners' counsellors to become members of the network: 
"Well, I think that there was a significant effort from the partnership manager 
to share the networking concept with partners. In my opinion, the financial 
aspect must have helped. The PTR aspect. .. There was nothing equivalent. 
Then this tool was made available and may have been an incentive to become 
member, even for those who were nervous about the initiative" (Director 
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Conseil General Nord , 1998) 
'vrhis is like a carrot for network members. Since they are members of the 
network, they must have something extra on offer for clients. That's an 
incentive for people from the Chambers, the Technical Centres etc. to become 
members. It was not sufficient to say to them 'Listen, this is nice, we will 
teach you how to work together ... ' (Laughter) It would not have worked!" 
(RIDT Senior Manager, 1998) 
However partners seem to perceive different benefits derived from members' ability to 
prescribe the PTR. The partnership manager, for instance, emphasises the legitimacy 
counsellors' activities acquire as a result of this public sector mandate and highlights 
how their status is enhanced: 
"When you are a member you can prescribe a PTR. I'd go even further and 
say that to prescribe a PTR you have to be a member, because all PTR 
applications have to be signed and backed up by an ROT member counsellor. 
And this, too, is a little advantage, because it allows them to enhance their 
profile in the eyes of business people: '1 am a network member, therefore 1 will 
get you a PTR grant'" (ROT Manager, 1998a) 
By contrast, a less positive view was also expressed, and indeed the partnership's 
chances of survival without the PTR were questioned: 
"'So, why does it work? It works because there is the PTR. Therefore if I visit a 
company, 1 will say: 'you can have a discount on this feasibility study'. It is 
easier to engage the company than if 1 were to say; 'Well we need to think 
about this. You will have to spend money etc: .,. So that's the trick, it's the 
carrot. That's why the network functions. But you take this carrot away. it 
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won't operate any more" (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998) 
Furthermore, there seemed to be a consensus that partners, particularly specialist service 
providers, considered important the opportunity to boost their revenue when servic ing 
RDT customers: 
"So, each organisation contributes to the partnership accord ing to their 
institutional interest. Technical service providers, in general... at the 
beginning, see primarily an opportunity to increase their revenue" (Regional 
Anvar Representative, 1998) 
"It [the network] is very directed too ... I can say that I would have thought. .. 
In fact, very directed to generate business for institutional service providers" 
(ARIST Senior Manager, 1998) 
In conclusion, this section showed that the PTR is seen as important for everyone 
involved in the partnership, but for different reasons. Some partners have cynical views 
about it and argue that without it the partnership would fall apart. This attitude mirrors 
a strong focus on organisational (as opposed to partnership) interests and also reflects 
what has been described in the literature as budget enlargement motives for partnering. 
At the other extreme, some partners underline the legitimisation that a public sector 
mandate carries. Despite these variations in perspectives on the PTR, there seems to be 
a general consensus that in some ways the PTR is a 'carrot' both for companies, which 
benefit from the pump-priming funds very rapidly, and for counsellors for whom the 
ability to prescribe it is presented as a status symbol. 
6.4.2.3 Counsellor Training 
Visiting clients and providing PTR are routine activities within the Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie. The provision of training is more likely to be organised annually 
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and content likely to vary depending on identified needs. Training provIsion IS 
generally associated with upgrading skills and competencies. Is this the role it fulfils 
within this partnership? Can training be a function that strengthens collaboration? This 
section analyses interviewees' perceptions of the role of training within Reseau Nord 
Pas de Calais Technologie. 
The 1995 prospectus specifies that as part of their remits, ROTs should: 
"Contribute and enhance each counsellor's professionalism" (Ministere de 
l'Education nationale de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 1995) 
In Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, training programmes are set up to fulfil this 
mission. It is one of the most active ROTs in terms of training provision with the 
equivalent of 247 delegate days provided in 1999 (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion 
Technologique, 1999). In total it offered II different programmes, while most ROTs 
tended to have half as many (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999). 
Training events are generally organised in independent premises, sometimes as summer 
schools or one-day events, and tend to focus on a small range of themes directly 
relevant to counsellors' activities (for example, communication, diagnostic, project 
management, marketing fmance etc.) as well as the market penetration objectives of the 
ROT (with for example training days centred around issues faced by companies within 
the textile industry and the technologies that are relevant to them (ROT Manager, 
I 998a). 
This dual focus is reflected in respondents' perceptions of RDT training. Indeed some 
of the counsellors clearly value the possibility they have of enhancing their skills and 
competencies (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998; EOA W TSO, 1998). In that sense the 
ROT performs an HR function for them. Such training is also directly linked to Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's objectives, and in particular that of overall 
professionalism and homogenisation of practices: 
"The internal mIssIon is centred on membership. It is about gathering 
members on neutral ground (therefore neutral from ministries and other 
institutions and organisation). So gather members on neutral ground in order 
to develop a shared culture and enhance the professionalism with which 
businesses are supported" (ROT Manager, 1998a) 
The quote above shows that the desire to generate a shared culture among counsellors is 
part of the rationale for the provision of training via the Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie. However, once again, the chamber representative questions whether this 
occurs at all: 
"Sure the RDT provides a range a training programmes etc .. These provide 
additional competencies normally. Now, whether these lead to changes in 
attitudes ... I am not convinced that there is much evolution." (ARIST Senior 
Manager, 1998) 
In conclusion, counsellor training is a significant aspect of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie's operation. With targeted training programmes and away days the 
partnership adds tangible value to members, whose professional skills can thus be 
enhanced. Both counsellors and their parent organisations value this. In a sense the 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie performs a significant HR function that 
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uhimately benefIts them. Beyond this, and from the perspective of the partnership, 
large scale training sessions focused on topics directly relevant to the target markers 
needs are seen as ideal means of homogenising counsellors' approaches and practices. 
More importantly and in the long run, they may be means of enhancing the overall 
professionalism with which service delivery takes place, a key remit included in the 
1995 prospectus. 
Respondents emphasised the socialisation that takes place during these events and 
highlighted its importance in the effective management of the Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie's membership. This aspect is further explored in the next section. 
which focuses on the benefits associated with membership and the evolutions to which 
it was subject over time. 
6.4.2.4 Membership Management 
Large-scale training events are the main means by which counsellors from different 
institutions get to know each other. Often residential, these focus as much on 
socialisation as they do on training content. Indeed a key priority of the partnership is 
to ensure that members know each other well and can collaborate irrespective of 
organisational boundaries. 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's membership is -with that of RDT Brittany-
the largest of all RDTs. In 1999 the partnership had 108 members (down from 133 in 
1998- (RDT Manager, I 998b)). This is to be contrasted by a membership of 29 in 
Lorraine the same year (Reseau Interregional de Diffusion Technologique, 1999). The 
sheer size of membership makes it d ifficu It to ensure that everyone has a good 
knowledge of the others. The vademecum therefore. is a useful complement to the 
regular meetings and training sessions that members attend. 
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However, these all-encompassing figures mask varying degrees of involvement and 
activity within Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie. In order to focus efforts and 
energies on counsellors actively using RDT resources, the partnership decided in 1998 
to create an associate membership status. Those who were only occasionally called 
upon, or who would not necessarily spend time on canvassing, became associate 
members. As associate members, they may provide counselling in their area of 
expertise, however they cannot prescribe a PTR grant, a privilege of full members (ROT 
Manager, 1998b). 
The above mirrors, to some extent, choices that members have to make in tenns of 
commitment to the partnership. They are neither co-located nor seconded full time to 
the partnership (see chapter IV). In fact, sometimes the proportion of time they can 
dedicate to RDT business is rather limited: 
.. The parent organisation says: 'that's what you must do.' Very well. 'But we 
allow you to use 20% of your time for a specific mission. defined as part of our 
regional policies ... ' But that's 20% of their time! One can not imagine 
counsellors making their own this global mission: they do not have the means 
to do so!" (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998) 
The above may have compounded the partnership's difficulties in raising levels of 
market penetration discussed in previous sections. It also links with a fundamental 
issue: that of service branding and counsellor 'identity' when dealing with companies. 
As highlighted, when the partnership's public relations policies were analysed. members 
relate to customers as employees of their parent organisation rather than partnership 
members. This is the result of the partnership'S own policies: 
"Member counsellors are not partnership counsellors as such. Their 
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contribution is more of a fundamental, basic activity [ ... ]. They are partner 
institution employees, and they carry on with their normal job. But they have 
to keep in mind that they are members. Therefore we do not impose their 
approach to clients. Those who meet clients do not necessarily make reference 
to the partnership. At the beginning we did not ask them. At the moment, this 
approach is changing a little." (ROT Manager, 1998a) 
The 'change' referred to by the partnership manager is part of small steps to make the 
partnership more 'visible' than it is. In practice counsellors wear several hats, the 
partnership is asking them to make their membership of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie more explicit to clients. This however, seems to be met with hostility by at 
least one partner: 
"At the moment, the partnership is making a mistake. Service providers want 
members to represent all partners -to wear several hats- The partnership 
manager must have used this expression: 'I would like members to represent all 
partners'. Well that is not their objective. [ ... ] The partnership is about 
networking counsellors, that is people, not their activities. We are confusing. 
Membership of the ROT does not mean that counsellors' activities are those of 
the ROT." (ARIST Senior Manager, 1998). 
In conclusion, for the counsellors' network. to operate, and in particular for ad hoc 
(non-mediated) contacts between counsellors from different parent organisations to take 
place, a level of social interaction and knowledge is seen as necessary. Given the size 
of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's membership and to facilitate this 
socialisation among active partnership members. the partnership introduced the 
'associate member' status. This status is used for members whose expertise is valued, 
but who tend to engage with the network less than full members. The role of memhers 
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within the partnership has focused on providing access to business support. The 
partnership tended to interfere very little with the way counsellors conduct their 
business with clients. As a result clients are mostly unaware of counsellors' ROT 
affiliation. The partnership aims to alter this slightly, however there are signs of 
opposition to the redefinition of members' role in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie. 
6. 5 Inter-Organisational Learning at Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie 
6.5.1 Question 1: Are Value and Operational Crises Components of 
Partnership Leaming? 
6.5.1.1 Transparency as a Tacit Partnering Norm 
The CRGI experience has had a lasting influence on partnering norms adopted by key 
economic development institutions in the Nord Pas de Calais region. In particular, the 
organisational prominence, the CRGI has come to assume during the four years of its 
existence, has been an issue for the funding partners see figure 6.1. 
Whilst from the point of view of the CRGI, it was essential to provide clear access to 
prospective client SMEs - which in tum meant active marketing and advertising 
campalgns- funding partners felt that it was competing with them, instead of 
complementing their portfolio of activities. Such an experience has led funding partners 
to develop a shared tacit norm whereby further collaboration must not overshadow their 
own organisational activities. Therefore, when Presence Rhone-Alpes was created it 
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was not given any marketing budget and the guideline provided to the manager of the 
partnership was that it should be ' transparent . 
Figure 6-1 The emergence of 'transparency' as a shared norm 
~ceptual Leami'0 
New Value: future 
partnership organisations 
must be 'transparenf. 
Value: Enhance SME's 
access to services by 
directly marketing CRGI 
services to businesses 
Shared Mental 
Models ~ratiOnal Leami0 
Operational crisis: 
CRGI perceived as 
competing with parent 
companies. 
This meant that clients were accessmg Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie 
supported services through partnering organisations' counsellors and whilst not being 
aware of the partnership's ' behind the scene' involvement. Figure 6.1 illustrates how 
the tacit norm ' transparency' has emerged as a key driver of collaboration in the Nord 
Pas de Calais region. 
Competition between collaborating parties has been documented in an economic 
development context, as well as a purely private sector context. In the private sector 
however, the apparent contlict between the two modes of operation i not seen a 
problematic and instead is presented as desirable . Indeed collaboration (often through 
focused strategic alliances) gives the opportunity to collaborating bu ine fi r 
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instance to trade complementary resources, but it also enables them to acquire ne\\ 
competencies, which may be critical to the development on new products and services 
or to entry into new markets. This process is referred to as global learning and is seen 
as one of the primary benefits of collaborative ventures operating in a private sector 
context. It does not however, hinder collaborating parties from competing against each 
other in other markets (whilst collaborating in another). In fact, some researchers argue 
that the iteration of collaborative and competitive dynamics overall enhances the 
development of entire industries characterised by high degrees of innovation. 
In the field of economic development, by contrast, there is the assumption that 
competition must end once organisations set up a collaborative venture in areas of 
activity where they may have been operating independently in the past. Indeed. one of 
the key rationales for promoting collaborative delivery of economic development 
services is to reduce duplication and enhance the use and impact of limited government 
resources. Past research, however, indicates that in practice this is difficult to achieve. 
as some players are unwilling to relinquish their control and involvement in specific 
areas of activities. 
Therefore, the question is whether the presence of competition within a collaborative set 
up is detrimental in itself. Research in the private sector indicates that such competition 
is in fact desirable and enhances overall levels of performance across entire industries. 
Evidence in the economic development field indicates that competition persists even 
when it is meant to be superseded by collaboration. Evidence from this case study 
suggests that not only competition exists; collaboration is seen as an instrumental means 
of delivering partnering organisations' individual agenda. In such a context, there is 
consensus that the partnership should not become a prom inent institution, but instead 
provide partnering organisations a lightweight support structure. 
6.5.1.2 Operational Crisis as Market Penetration Levels Stagnate 
One of the key stated purposes of the RDT initiative is to enhance the level of 
technological innovation within SMEs. With this remit in mind Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie manager has repeatedly placed emphasis on market penetration 
objectives and called for increased levels of canvassing from technology transfer 
counsellors. 
In principle, partnering organisations adhere to these market penetration objectives and 
therefore commit their counsellors, who are their employees (as opposed to being the 
employees of the partnership), to spend 20% of their time on partnership activities. 
However, the experience from repeated and constantly reviewed market penetration 
plans is that the level of activity per counsellor remains constant, even though they may 
have committed to increased objectives. 
The partnership manager made clear his sense of frustration by referring to himself as a 
'commercial director without bonuses to give away'. He also was somewhat critical of 
the partnership's reliance on the principle of voluntary action. He indeed argued that 
for the partnership to fulfil its mission of increasing market penetration rates, it would 
need to use a system akin to that which was developed in Presence Rhone-Alpes 
whereby each visit is rewarded financially. For him partnering organisations ought to 
be contractually tied to particular levels of performance. This would in turn push them 
to actively promote RDT business amongst their employees. ConfTonted with partners 
rejection of such a system and their commitment to voluntary action, the partnership 
manager felt he had little option but to change his operational strategy and therefore 
298 
decided to move towards co-ordinating counsellor visits, instead of actively seeking to 
increase their numbers. Figure 6.2 illustrates these changes. 
Figure 6.2 shows how deeply embedded the principle of voluntary action is within 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie. The tensions that exjst between this tacit norm 
and the partnershjp's espoused theory of action that suggests that it aims to increase 
market penetration levels could clearly not be resolved. The partnership manager s 
operational response to the operational crisis can be seen as a means of avoiding contlict 
and reducing tension levels in a context where deeply held partnership values are not to 
be revisited. 
Figure 6-2 Operational crisis as market penetration levels/ail to increase 
~nceptual Learni0 
Maintained Value: 
Voluntary action to 
guide canvassing 
activities 
Value: Counsellors 
activities are based on 
Shared Mental 
Models 
voluntary action '----~ 
~rational Learni0 
Operational learning: 
Partnership manager 
focuses on visit ccr 
ordination instead of 
increased mar1<et 
penetration 
Operational crisis: 
Canvassing strategies 
fail to raise the 
number of company 
visits 
This learning sequence is typical of single loop learning and provides empirical 
evidence that suggests that operational crises can be overcome by operational I aming 
a pattern of learning, which was not anticipated when the partnership learning piral wa 
devised. 
2 
6.5.2 Question 2: What Are the Relationships Between Partnership 
Learning and the Negotiation and Implementation of 
Partnership Objectives? 
In order to explore this research question the two previously analysed learning cycles 
will be re-examined in conjunction with the learning cycle that resulted in the DRRT 
creating a competing structure when Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie was 
launched. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates how in the early stages of negotiation for the establishment of an 
RDT in the Nord Pas de Calais region, key regional actors found it impossible to agree 
on a fonnat and mode of operation. 
Figure 6-3 Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technology focuses on operational matters 
~ncePtual Leami0 
New Value: Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais 
T echnologie to focus on 
operational issues, 
induding the delivery of 
PTR grants and 
counsellor training. 
Value Crisis: Indusive consensus 
building fails as the principles and 
mode of operation of the RDT are 
discussed by technology transfer 
stakeholders. 
Shared Mental 
Models ~ratiOnal Leami0 
Operational decision 
making and shared ROT 
strategy formulation fails 
Operationalleaming : 
Schism, as the ORRT 
aeates its own tedlnology 
transfer structure; and 
remains involved in a low 
key fashion in Reseau Nord 
Pas de Calais Technologie. 
The key principle that underpinned these negotiations which were facilitat d by the 
director of the regional ANV AR office at the time relied on building an inclu ive 
consensus. This meant that all institutional actors involv d in m wa with 
technology transfer or SME support were involved in the process, making it extremel~ 
time consuming, but also adding to the complexity of the situation and the diversity of 
interests represented. Partnering organisations were not able to successfully bridge 
these varying interest and indeed one of the mandated key partner. the DRRT. did not 
feel that the options adopted suited the form of intervention they wished to see actively 
promoted within the region. This resulted in a ri~ and although the DRRT remained 
engaged with the RDT creation process, it also launched in parallel a structure, whose 
remit is so close to that of the RDT. It, therefore, effectively competes with Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie. This move from the DRRT has had a lasting impact of 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's ability to fulfil its legitimate remit to be the 
forum within which partnering institutions collaboratively formulate a technology 
transfer strategy. But the DRRT's distancing from the partnership is by no means the 
only factor affecting the partnership's inability to formulate a shared strategy. Indeed 
respondents' views on what such a strategy should entail varied dramatically from one 
to the other. In particular, visions of how small finns technological capabilities should 
be developed diverged and led to different views on service provision that was seen to 
be required. Such differences have meant that consensual decision making has by and 
large failed at the strategic level, as indicated by figure 6.3. This in tum has led to the 
emergence of a tacit acceptance, that Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie should 
focus on the delivery of the PTR grant and the management of other operational issues, 
such as counsellor training. 
Some of the early literature on organisational development has focused on the role of 
managers and leaders in enabling or inhibiting learning. Argyris (1971) in particular. 
considered the interaction among different groups of managers (organisational 
development managers and top management) and analysed how this could impact on the 
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implementation of an effective change strategy. Could management or leadership issues 
have any bearing on the learning sequence studied here? Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie's manager clearly feels his hands are tied and is frustrated by his inability 
to fulfil the partnership's explicit aim of increased market penetration. 
In the field of economic development contributions about leadership in partnership 
contexts are increasing (Coe, 1988; Tilson et aI., 1997; Huxham & Vange~ 2000b; 
Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). In their analysis of British Single Regeneration Budget 
partnerships, Tilson and Mawson (1997) consider a range of variables, including 
sectoral participation, partnership history and formation, operational issues and 
leadership. The authors introduce the notion of 'real partnerships' where all members 
are involved and where 'lead partners' are those leading the funding application 
process. In such a context, it seems that leadership is primarily concerned with securing 
funding. By contrast the work of Coe (1988), Huxham and Vangen (2000b) and 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) centre primarily on the type of leadership skills and 
abilities that are necessary to successfully manage a partnership setting where 
partnering organisations' interest may diverge. Coe (1998) emphasises the importance 
of creating a vision that can be embraced by all as she discusses the notion of evocative 
leadership. Huxham and Vangen (2000b) highlight that the hierarchical relationship 
(which tends to be a key aspect of private sector leadership) is redundant in most cross-
sectoral collaborative set ups. This is because of the wide range and multiplicity of 
organisations involved, and the general emphasis on the parity of partners and 
consensual decision-making (Grayson, 1993) as opposed to leader-follower type of 
relationships. By suggesting that partnership managers should potentially be reticulists, 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) highlight how boundary spanning skills can enable 
partnership managers to build bridges and facilitate communication between players 
whose norms and values diverge, despite the shared concerns or agenda that brought 
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them together within a partnership. 
Overall, all these authors focus largely on the skills and abilities of the partnership 
manager and see these as critical to the good functioning of the partnership. The 
multiple attempts Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie' manager has had at 
increasing market penetration levels may reflect some of his own weaknesses. Indeed 
he clearly acknowledges that targeting the very small businesses in his first market 
penetration strategy was misguided, because these firms are more difficult to reach than 
medium sized enterprises. But the repeated failures, and their analysis presented in 
figure 6.3, suggest that other significant factors, independent of the partnership 
manager's skills and abilities, need to be taken into account when analysing 
collaborative leadership. 
Some of the research that the French scholar Olivier Nay (2001) has conducted on EU 
funded partnerships in France sheds a different light on collaborative leadership. He 
explains how the stated goals of French central policy makers has been to 'pool all local 
actors involved in econom ic development at a time when the state neither wished to 
create bureaucratic solutions nor intended to impose the rules ofthe game'(Nay, 2001 p. 
463). According to him this lofty aim has over time created conditions that limit the 
very flexibility sought. Indeed 'partnership building was heavily informed by early 
experiences acquired in the midst of uncertainty characterising the first phase of 
structural funds (1989-1993). The pragmatic rules forged by actors in each region, the 
often tacit agreements which they have managed to reach during the first series of 
negotiations for European funding, the image they have constructed of their activities 
and their role created institutional rigidities, which subsequently affected the tangible 
practice of partnership' (Nay, 2001 p. 476). Therefore flexibility means that the 
partnership accumulates a historical baggage (e.g. practices, norms etc.), which cannot 
be ignored centrally, as regional and national policies may increasingly diverge over 
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time. Such a divergence can be observed in the case of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie where market penetration remains a stated policy but does not seem to be a 
key driver in practice. 
Nay's (2001) analysis is very close to the idea that organisations develop theories of 
action and mental models that largely shape their future decisions and operations. It 
therefore links well with issues highlighted in the organisational learning literature. 
The implication of the above is that collaborative leadership cannot solely be secn as the 
partnership manager's remit or the outcome of her or his actions. Indeed there is clear 
indication that interactions between key partnering organisations have a fundamental 
impact on the emergence of mental models which in tum shape partnership decision 
making and strategies. Therefore networking and social learning may be as important in 
to the emergence of effective collaborative leadership as is boundary-spanning skills. 
This suggests that the boundary spanner should not be seen as the leader of the 
partnership but as a facilitator of collaboration. Collaborative leadership and the sense 
of commonly agreed direction is the outcome of a range of processes, which include 
boundary spanning, but also social learning and networking. 
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7 Discussion and Conclusions 
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7. 1 Introduction 
Findings from chapters five and six showed that Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau 
Nord Pas de Calais Technologie experienced significant inter-organisationallearning. 
Early indications are that there are strong overlaps in areas where learning occurred. 
however learning outcomes diverge between the two partnerships. The purpose of this 
chapter is to unravel these similarities and divergences, by comparing learning 
sequences identified in each partnership. It relies on parts of organisational learning 
theory presented in chapter three. 
The chapter is structured into four sections. The first section discusses partnership 
learning issues that emerged from the case studies but were not anticipated or covered 
by the two research questions. This incorporates the issue of informal decision-making. 
and informal leadership. Their linkage with the formation of an elite governance 
structure emphasises the critical role social learning plays in economic development 
partnering. The challenges associated with the principle of non-hierarchical 
management are also outlined. This discussion highlights the intertwined relationship 
that exists between formal, hierarchical partnership structures and informal network 
forms of organising at strategic and operational levels. These relationships lead to the 
emergence of unique partnership management challenges encapsulated by the notion of 
non-hierarchical management. Each partnership'S interpretation of the notion is 
illustrated and their implications in terms of partnership learning capability are 
discussed. The third issue that is covered in the first section of this chapter is that of 
institutional system stability. Here the significance of a tacit rule of engagement (that 
the stability of the regional economic development infrastructure is paramount) is 
outlined for both partnerships. and once again, the implications for partnership learning 
are presented and discussed. 
The second section of the chapter presents the findings to this study's research 
306 
questions. Concepts of operational and value crises are validated and their significance 
in enhancing our understanding of partnership learning is highlighted. However. the 
cyclical nature of partnership learning is brought into question due to data that falls 
outside the pattern of learning proposed by the partnership learning spiral. Avenues and 
implications for further research are outlined as a result. The strong relationships that 
exist between partnership learnin~ and the negotiation and implementation of 
partnership objectives, are discussed next with the analysis of two partnership learning 
sequences present in both case studies. Here the value of earlier discussions of elite 
governance, non-hierarchical management and institutional stability are brought to bear. 
In particular, constant social learning and the emergence of a clear governing elite in the 
region are identified as key conditions for the emergence of learning that results in 
changed norms and values and new partnership theories of action. 
The third section highlights the limitations of this study. Particular attention is paid to 
the scope of the study and the implications this has for potential policy 
recommendations. Data gathering methods are also discussed, and in particular the 
desirability of observation (as well as interviews) is highlighted. Finally the scope for 
generalisation from this study is discussed further. 
The last section of this chapter synthesises this dissertation's key findings. 
7. 2 Common Issues Across Case Studies 
7.2.1 Introduction 
This study set out to investigate organisational learning processes, particu larl~ in 
relation to the negotiation and implementation of partnership objectives. It is evident 
from the cases studied in chapters five, six and from the cross-case analysis presented 
above that while the negotiation and implementation of objectives lead to clear inter-
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organisational learning, other organisational issues in partnerships (including leadership, 
managerial control and organisational positioning) are also critical sources of 
partnership learning. 
Much of the partnership learning that occurs in these areas is tacit and enabled primarily 
through socialisation. This is particularly evident in relation to leadership and elite 
governance (section 7.2.2). Non-hierarchical management and partnerships' positioning 
in regional institutional landscapes are discussed in section 7.2.3. Each partnership's 
interpretation of past events and current situation, the fonn of social interaction that they 
have developed over time, significantly influence the learning outcomes they achieve in 
these areas, and explain some of the divergence that is observed in their response to 
sim ilar issues. 
7.2.2 Informal Leadership or Institutionalised Elite Governance? 
Although respondents tended not to question the issue of collaborative leadership 
directly, some of the stories they told were directly related to just that. The ideas 
expressed about leadership in both partnerships seem to be fitting the distinction that 
Argyris and Schon (1978) made between espoused theory and theory in use. 
Collaborative technology transfer policy making within the formal realm of the ROT is 
the shared espoused theory, also that which is promoted centrally. It assumes 
harmonious collaboration amongst institutional players within the formally created 
framework of the ROT. On the other hand, the theory in use assumes decision-making 
that is informal and conducted outside formal partnership settings. Indeed, partners 
strive to resolve key issues infonna lIy. They extensively resort to coalition building. 
political manoeuvring outside established decision-making forums in order to achieve 
consensual outcomes and to develop jointly owned policies. This is particularly well 
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illustrated by Presence Rhone-Alpes. Private sector involvement in the partnership was 
encouraged as it was in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie. In fact in Rh6ne-
Alpes, private sector involvement in SME policy development (formalised with the 
GRITf) pre-dated the formation of the RDT. However, as illustrated in chapter 5. one 
of the most significant crises in the life of the partnership stemmed precisely from 
leadership challenges that arose from such involvement. The analysis of the learning 
sequence associated with the partnership manager's departure suggested that infonnal 
collaborative decision-making was a key tacit norm within the partnership. By making 
a range of deliberate unilateral decisions, particularly in relation to partnership 
marketing, the manager breached this tacit norm (theory in use). although one could 
argue that his actions were consistent with the espoused theory that Presence Rh6ne-
Alpes needed to develop and deliver a shared technology transfer strategy (see figure 
7.1). 
Figure 7-1: Single loop learning associated with informal decision-making 
GENERATE SHARED 
TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
STRATEGY 
MINIMIZE INDIVIDUAL 
POWER 
INFORMAL CONSENSUS 
BUILDING 
The problem with mandating a partnership with the development and implementation of 
a shared technology transfer strategy is that it may have seemed to provide the 
partnership manager the legitimacy and authority to direct the process. This. in turn. 
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would have created significant tensions for established institutional players whose 
power and authority could potentially be threatened by a newcomer. As one of the 
respondents pointed out "the most important question remained unspoken and plagued 
the partnership: who was going to control it all'" (DRRT Chief Executive., 1999). 
Figure 7.1 shows that by aiming to minimise the influence of a single individual, 
members of the partnership were able to sustain their emphasis on informal consensual 
decision-making (stage 1 &2 in figure 7.1). However, in a context where power 
struggles were not resolved, this meant that partners' ability to generate a shared 
technology transfer strategy was significantly hampered (stages 3 and 4). While 
partners' tacit recognition of the need to minimise power enabled them to avoid conflict. 
it also meant that there was a leadership vacuum, which undermined the partnership's 
ability to generate a joint technology transfer strategy. The partnership reached a 
stalemate as the partnership manager's attempt to instigate change further weakened 
institutional partners' trust and commitment. The crisis that emerged culminated with 
the partnership manager's departure. Figure 7.1 breaks down the sequence of events 
and illustrates how it can be analysed in terms of single loop learning. Indeed the 
partnership's theories in use relating to decision-making did not alter. There is a 
positive and reinforcing relationship between limited individual power and informal 
decision making, however, the negative impact this has on shared strategy development 
is not considered. 
In the case of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie (and at the time of the 
interviews), the partnership found itself in a similar unproductive single loop learning 
cycle. which led to strategic stalemate as illustrated in chapter 6. The partnership 
manager attempted to overcome this to some extend by focussing on operational 
objectives (as in the monitoring of PTR deliveries), however the diflicultics he 
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encountered in raising levels of activity (through visits and PTR grant applications) 
suggested that the effectiveness of this 'coping strategy' was rather limited. 
In Presence Rhone-Alpes, paralysis was eventually overcome. Some of the factors that 
triggered change included the late appointment of another partnership manager, but also 
the appointment of a new chair for the Comite des Industriels. However. the true 
catalyst for change in Rhone-Alpes was the open recognition of the so-called . gang of 
four' as the ultimate movers and shakers and the source of policy development in the 
region (see figure 7.2). 
The frequent use of the expression 'gang of four' in interviews denotes a progressive 
institutionalisation of their group as governing elite and source of policy making in the 
region. It can therefore be argued that progressively the partnership achieved double 
loop learning. The open and explicit recognition of this governing elite reaffinned their 
regional leadership and the significance of each member institution, whilst placing them 
on a level playing field. The shift of emphasis from the traditional model where one 
organisation dominates within its clearly defined policy field. to a model where a 
governing elite dominates regional policy making facilitated these organisations' 
refocus on the generation of a shared regional technology transfer policy. It also made 
their institutional struggle for leadership redundant, replacing it with a struggle to 
'belong' to the governing elite. As a result, partners in Presence Rhone-Alpes were able 
to nurture their tacit nonn of infonnal decision making, while accepting to share power 
and jointly generate policy as illustrated in figure 7.2. 
3 II 
Figure 7-2: Institutionalising the governing elite 
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In this redefined environment, partnership decision-making is seen as a coalition 
building exercise and a political game. As shown in section 5.4.4. partners have grown 
to accept that the majority's view should prevail as long as those with diverging views 
are given the opportunity to sway their partners. 
Chapter two has shown that much of the research on economic development 
partnerships has centred on joint collaborative strategy development. This type of 
research has been an important source of policy recommendation. The evidence from 
this study suggests the underpinning, and perhaps more significant challenge, is to 
establish a mode of governance that is acceptable to all key stakeholders. Therefore, the 
managerial investigation of collaborative decision making processes and the political 
analysis of governance systems need to be bridged in order to generate new and 
practical knowledge of collaborative capability. 
In their analysis of modes of governance in partnership settings Lowndes and Skelcher 
(1998) identified the limitations of assum ing that the principles of cooperation and 
mutuality associated with ideal type networks readily apply to partnerships. They 
further highlight the need to pay more attention to the issue of power (1998 pp .. 131 ): 
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"What remams unanswered - and to some extent unasked - are the 
conventional questions of the pluralist debate: who has power, who gains and 
loses as the policy makers' obsession with networks and partnerships grows:' 
Le Gales (2001) shows that urban political elites have deliberately encouraged the 
fonnation of networks in Rennes, using them as means of restructuring power and 
authority in policy fields such as culture, urban planning and property development (Le 
Gales P., 2001 pp. 168): 
"The redistribution of authority goes hand in hand with the multiplication of 
some policy networks, the development of regulation mechanisms through 
negotiation, cooperation based on interests but also on trust or values together 
with new fonns of domination and conflicts." 
Although the issue of contlict is a significant part of the partnership literature, it tends to 
be associated with clashes in organisational culture that need to be overcome in order to 
pave the way to effective dialogue and joint working (Coe, 1988; Diamond, 2001; Eden 
et aI., 1996). Cope and Goodship (1999) analyse conflict in terms of entrenched 
interests and as a 'carve up of the state'. Work on governance extends this view. Le 
Gales (200 I) as well as Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) suggest that contlict may need to 
viewed in the context of emerging local governance systems. This study shows that 
once membership of the elite is accepted and openly recognised, the development of 
joint policies may be seen as an operational challenge rather than a strategic issue that 
may threaten the existence of one partner or another. Further, the study and evaluation 
of co lIaborative leadership and of boundary spanning (Huxham & Vangen, 2000b~ ('oe, 
1988; Williams, 2002; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002) (often associated with the spec ific 
skills that partnership managers need to nurture) may be strongly affected by the 
governance context within which it is conducted. The sometimes prescriptive nature of 
these discussions may need to be moderated by considerations associated with the 
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formation, stability and membership of elite structures of governance. as the latter can 
be considered as a necessary, if not a sufficient, cond ition for effective partnering. 
The above also sheds new light on the 'transformation' argument popularised by 
Mackintosh (1992). Basset (1996) showed that in some instances. private sector 
involvement and the call for private sector management practices was driven by a desire 
to rejuvenate local economies for which the public sector was seen to be unable to 
provide appropriate leadership because it lacked appropriate tools and experience. The 
evidence from this study questions such assumptions. In Rhone-Alpes, the partnership 
manager was drawn from the private sector and attempted to manage the partnership as 
if it were his own business. This clearly failed, not because his skills as a business 
manager were inadequate, but because their use was inappropriate in this context. The 
challenge was not about making the public sector 'more like' the private sector, rather it 
was about devising an alternative form of leadership that allowed for the creation of a 
governance system incorporating key stakeholders. Further, the creation of an 
appropriate governance structure heavily relied on informal decision making and 
bargaining. Therefore when discussing and researching collaborative capability in a 
region, the key challenges may be about clarifying who the members of the governing 
elites are and unravelling their tacit rules of engagement. 
To summarise, the comparative analysis of Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas 
de Calais Technologie's learning in relation to leadership shows that increased levels of 
social interactions amongst key stakeholders (and between these stakeholders and 
service providers) can foster a widespread tacit recognition that they form, as a 
collective body, the governing elite in regional economic development. 
The formation and progressive acceptance of this form of governance has been a 
fundamental element in enabling regional partnering capability building in Rhbne-
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Alpes. By contrast, in Nord Pas de Calais, where partnering issues remain significant. 
such elite governance is not established and power struggles are not resolved. 
7.2.3 Non Hierarchical Management 
When asked how one can manage members when there is no source of hierarchical 
authority, the manager of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie laughed and 
responded: "I am still wondering ... " (l998b). Then he referred to a number of skills 
and tools, including persuasion, support, reciprocity and conviviality. He also 
highlighted how powerless his lack of hierarchical authority made him, particularly 
when attempting to enhance activity levels within the partnership. The idea that the 
partnership manager should primarily act as an enabler, rely on persuasion as opposed 
to hierarchical authority is also strongly emphasised by Presence Rhone-Alpes' manager 
(ROT Manager, 1999b): 
"[ ... ] the problem is that you can only achieve. You cannot dictate. You need 
to get people working together by convincing them, instead of dictating to 
them" 
Both partnership managers share similar views on the kinds of skills they need in order 
to fulfil effectively their role. They both used the term 'non-hierarchical' management 
when referring to their activities, mirroring principles associated with boundary 
spanning and 'catalytic' leadership (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Practitioners' use of 
such concepts mirror to some extent developments in management literature particularly 
in the analysis of organisational structures. Hedlund's seminal piece on heterarchies 
(1986) popularised the idea that networked forms of organisations were becoming 
prevalent in large corporations operating internationally. Subsequent authors have 
shown that whilst heterarchies presented specific managerial challenges, they were an 
effective means of operating in the era of knowledge based organisations (Reihlcn, 
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1996); suggesting that network structures are particularly suited to technology transfer 
initiatives. 
Yet Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's manager points to some of the difficulties 
associated with the idea of non-hierarchical management and network organising (see 
6.4.2). The lack of financial incentives that may influence member institutions' level 
of commitment and activity within the network is strongly felt in this ROT. Unlike 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, Presence Rhone-Alpes (among few other 
RDTs) operates with service level agreements where funding is proportionate to the 
number of company visits. Such agreements provide a degree of leverage to Presence 
Rhone-Alpes's manager that Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's manager lacks 
(see section 5.4.2.1). 
De Bru ijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) posit that the types of instruments that are needed 
for network management are different from the so-called first generations instruments 
suitable for hierarchical management and control: 
"Instruments suitable for use in a network context are the so-called second 
generation governance instruments, such as covenants, contracts, communicative 
planning, parameters and incentives." (1997 pp. 123). 
They further group these instruments into three broad categories of regulatory, financ ial 
and communicative instruments. In the two cases studied, it is evident that regulatory 
instruments are relied upon extensively, in so far as they define membership 
management rules: governmental guidelines determine who ROT members are; they 
define members' operational roles (as counsellors advising businesses). However. it is 
also evident that Presence Rhone-Alpes uses financial tools as means of providing direct 
institutional incentives. According to De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelh the "combinations of 
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regulatory instruments and fmancial instruments are prevalenf' (1997 pp. 129). Such 
combinations enhance actors' ability to "impair or conversely extend sources of power" 
(1997 pp. 127), by shaping the characteristics of the governance context and affecting 
relations between actors interacting within that context. Whilst the potential of 
combining financial and regulatory instruments is used in Rhone-Alpes, it is not fully 
exploited in Nord Pas de Calais. As a result, Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's 
manager's focus is diverted away from service delivery and service improvement. The 
need to secure institutional partners' commitment and active involvement in partnership 
activities is a constant concern. The tactics used include a repeated emphasis on the 
benefits associated with counsellors' membership of the network. Membership is 
presented as a privileged status without which counsellors would not be able to obtain 
PTR grants for the businesses they assist. This is in line with Sullivan and Skelcher's 
(2002) recommendation that individual incentives (in particular career developing 
prospects) as well as institutional incentives need to foster effective collaboration. The 
question is whether in this instance, the use of a status symbol is a sufficiently tangible 
benefit for counsellors to increase (as opposed to just maintain) their engagement with 
the partnership. When financial benefits are associated with counsellors' activity levels, 
increased activity within the partnership context can directly translate into the 
achievement of institutional objectives, and can impact on institutional career 
development. 
Both partnership managers also emphasise the benefits of socialisation within the 
partnership. They argue that these are as important as formal professional development 
opportunities because they help form a set of shared meanings and ties that facilitate 
client referral, irrespective of institutional boundaries. It could be argued that 
counsellors. as a body of individuals operating within the ROT context. can 
progressively develop a unique identity that bypasses institutional boundaries and 
317 
relies on their professional status as an identity derming principle (Child & Heavens, 
200 I ). This is consistent with the view that organisational and inter-organ isational 
settings are characterised by the presence of 'tribes', which interact in creating value 
(Bate,2000). However, Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's manager attempts to 
formalise such an identity (which would involve openly stating to client companies that 
counsellors are members of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie) is clearly and 
strongly resisted. This is particularly true of ARIST representatives who differentiate 
their way of working, their values and beliefs as well as their services from those of the 
RDT. As shown in section 6.4.2.2, for the ARIST representative, the partnership is 
about networking people, not their activities. According to the same interviewee the 
issue of identity is linked with that of service ownership. Indeed "membership of the 
RDT does not mean that counsellors' activities are those of the ROT" (ARIST Senior 
Manager, 1998). 
The issues of identity and ownership seem to suggest that the development of a shared 
inter-organisational identity at the operational level is problematic. This in tum affects 
the potential and perhaps type of inter-organisational learning that may take place. 
A premise of this study, in its early stages, was that the development of shared norms 
and values is a key outcome of the inter-organisational learning process, this was 
incorporated in the partnership learning spiral. The analysis of the two cases has shown 
that there were shared norms and values, although often tacit, which guided the actions 
of key institutional stakeholders. The question may therefore be whether shared norms 
and values can arise whilst maintaining distinct identities at operational and institutional 
levels. Nonoka's (1994) work emphasises the need for 'requisite variety' in effective 
knowledge creation processes. At the same time drivers towards homogenisation are 
often present in partnerships / networks. These may include drivers to standardise 
procedures for instance. Without the latter the very existence of the network or 
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partnership can be brought into question, yet as shown earlier. too much 
homogenisation can undermine requisite diversity as a condition for knowledge creation 
and learning. It can also threaten individual and institutional identities and therefore 
promote the emergence of defensive reasoning and practice. 
To summarise, the findings suggest that the meaning of non-hierarchical management 
needs to be socially evolved and accepted. Each partnership developed distinct 
perspectives and, as a resuh, relies on distinct network management instruments. The 
partnerships' ability to promote socialisation amongst counsellors is affected by this. 
Concerns over organisational versus partnership identity, counsellors' reward and 
reporting structures have a direct bearing on the partnership's ability to develop a sense 
of cohesion and shared identity at the operational level. In Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie, where the primary tools used in network management rely on 
communicative instruments, the level of success in guiding counsellors activities has 
been limited. The partnership manager remains mostly concerned with increasing levels 
of activity. By contrast, in Rhone-Alpes the notion of 'non-hierarchical' management 
has been interpreted differently. In particular, partners have sanctioned the use of 
financial instruments. The latter has enabled the partnership manager along with 
partners to focus clearly on the nature of the service provided. 
7.2.4 Institutional System Stability 
Both Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie have had to 
decide early on the organisational structure they would use to implement the RDT 
initiative. Both partnerships had the opportunity to rely on existing partnering 
arrangements, or to set up an entirely new structure. However the choices they made 
were not only different. they led to different learning outcomes. despite a shared 
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concern for sustaining a stable institutional framework within each region. 
In Nord Pas de Calais, the CRGI was by and large perceived as an expensive 
experiment which ultimately led to the creation of a structure in direct competition with 
its parent organisations. Although members of the newly created Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie embraced the principle of enhancing SME awareness and access to 
technology transfer services (this was one of their espoused theory, in learning terms), 
they adopted a theory in use that relied on the principle of a "low profile partnership'. 
Unlike the CRGI, Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie was to become a support 
structure that was not to be seen by client SMEs. Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie would, therefore, keep its marketing effort to the strict minimum. 
In Rhone-Alpes the GRITT was seen as a private sector led consultative organisation. 
The desire to move towards a more formal structure (with greater emphasis on the 
delivery of technology transfer solutions) has led to the recommendation (by external 
consultants) that a dedicated and new organisation should be formed: it would employ 
its own counsellors and deliver the technology transfer agenda on behalf of all the key 
players in the region. This proposal, apparently in line with government policy and in 
particular with the desire to enhance access to services, would have inherently led to a 
CRGI type of operation. Key players in Rhone-Alpes embraced the rationale of 
enhancing access (espoused theory) however some, particularly the Chamber of 
Commerce, were quick to assess the potential risk this posed to their own operation and 
saw the forthcoming formation of such a structure as an encroachment on their territory, 
and an unwelcome source of competition. As a result of negotiations, the newly formed 
Presence Rhone-Alpes was to rely on existing resources to deliver the government's 
agenda (theory in use). 
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Given the adoption of theories in use which deviated from their espoused theory that 
access to technological resources should be enhanced, both partnerships had to 
determine an operational solution that would emphasise increases in technology transfer 
levels (and therefore appear to satisfy the espoused criteria for the benefit of funding 
national and regional partners) whilst avoiding the potential risk of creating yet another 
structure which would cannibalise their activities. This led to the simultaneous presence 
of conflicting views and priorities within each partnership. Faced with such dilemma. 
each partnership devised solutions, which share the same rationale but seem to vary in 
effectiveness. 
The government's espoused theory, that SME's awareness and access to technological 
transfer services needs to be improved, can be interpreted indeed as a requirement to 
create and promote a one-stop-shop for such services. Such a one-stop-shop cou Id then 
pool all partners' resources and market its services to SME clients, promoting its brand 
while associating it with each partner's own range of services. 
Alternatively the espoused theory that access to technological resources should be 
enhanced can also be seen as a need to network existing disconnected sources of supply 
while establishing an effective signposting system that enables SMEs to access the most 
suitable source of service, irrespective of the partner they approach at the first inquiry 
stage. In such a scenario, partners could continue to promote their brand and services 
independently, while networking their resources and activities 'behind the scenes' due 
to the framework provided by the partnership. 
The latter was agreed upon in Rhone-Alpes, but in Nord Pas de Calais. consensus could 
not be achieved. One of the key institutional players favoured the creation of a separate 
entity with specialist counsellors that would market its services directly to clients. 
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The schism that followed in Nord Pas de Calais meant that although the majority of 
partners 'espoused' the networking solution, it was inherently undermined by the 
rejection and departure of a key partner. As a resu~ there appears to be a form of tacit 
collusion amongst institutional players that Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie will 
operate the PTR whilst containing its activities and potential strategic significance in the 
region to such an extent that partnering has become a small subset of each 
organisation's agenda. 
The recognition that, sometimes, potential partners' interests are competing is widely 
documented in the literature. In the field of housing for instance, Nicol (1998) 
illustrated the tensions that may emerge between building companies, Local authorities 
and housing associations. Martin and Oztel (1996) documented competition among 
partners in their analysis of business support organisations in Birmingham, UK. Similar 
findings appear in French studies of economic development partnerships (Nay, 200 I) 
including Technology transfer partnerships (Clergeau et aI., 2000). It seems, therefore, 
realistic to expect that in some instances partnering will fail, or that it will merely have 
the appearance of collaboration (particularly when it is centrally mandated), a point 
corroborated by Pichierri's discussion of concertation and local development trends 
throughout Europe (2002). 
However, what are the implications of such competition in terms of inter-organisational 
learning? In the case of Presence Rhone-Alpes the choice to rely on existing 
infrastructure for service delivery, and use signposting as a means of enhancing SM E' s 
awareness and access to technology transfer resources illustrates double loop learning 
designed to address the increased level of competition that a high protile new structure 
would generate (see figure 7.3): 
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Fi ure 7-3: Productive double 100 
AWARENESS & 
ACCESS TO SERVICES SIGNPOST 
STABLE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The above illustrates partners' collective agreement not to compete amongst 
themselves, and not to create a new independent structure, which would compete with 
them. This decision has led them to opt for signposting (stage I in figure 7.3). which 
conducted effectively, should deliver the enhanced awareness sought by the policy 
(stage 2 in figure 7.3). Figure 7.3 also shows how these partnership choices lead to 
positive and reinforcing feedback in each of the 'learning loops' and between the latter. 
leading, thus, to double loop learning. Here, enhanced SME access to support 
reinforces the perceived validity and usefulness of the sign posting solution (stage 3 in 
figure 7.3), which in tum reinforces partners' ability and willingness to maintain 
institutional stability (stage 4 of figure 7.3). 
In the case of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie, however, the paramount desire 
to maintain a stable institutional framework has led to pressures to minimise the 
marketing efforts of the partnership. Figure 7.4 shows how this learning sequence leads 
to single loop learning and why the effect in relation to enhancing awareness and access 
goes against government guidelines. 
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Figure 7-4: Single loop learning that blocks partnership effectiveness 
AWARENESS & 
ACCESS TO SERVICES MINIMIZE MARKETING 
STABLE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Here partners desire to minimise competition and therefore reduce the 'visibility' of 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie has led them to decide that marketing efforts 
should be minimised (stage 1 of figure 7.4). This in tum is enabling current players in 
the technology transfer field to maintain a level of stability for existing institutional 
frameworks (stage 2 offigure 7.4). 
The positive reinforcing connections between these two elements are illustrated with the 
plus signs that characterise this first loop. However, minimal marketing is having a 
detrimental effect on the partnership's ability to enhance awareness and access (stage 3 
of figure 7.4) as illustrated by the negative sign. This in tum is creating a negative 
feedback, which puts pressure on the partnership to abandon its policy to minimise 
marketing efforts (4). Partners' choices in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie 
exacerbate tensions between the espoused theory that access and awareness need to be 
enhanced, and the theory in use that the institutional framework should remain stable. 
The inability to resolve this tension means that learning remains single loop (stages 1-2 
of figure 7.4), and that only the symptoms of the problems the partnership should 
address (presence of competition) are tackled (by reducing marketing etTorts). This in 
tum is directly undermining one of the fundamental espoused theories of the RDT 
policy. that SME's access to services should be enhanced. 
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There seems to be two factors underpinning Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie's 
inability to resolve this tension the way Presence Rhone-Alpes has. Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie has signposting procedures in place; however. their effectiveness in 
reducing overall competition in the region is limited given the overt and independent 
operation of a structure with the same mission by one of the partners. Such direct 
undermining limits the effectiveness of the other partners' collaborative efforts. Using 
game theory and the prisoners dilemma' framework Gulati et al (1994) have shown how 
a situation where a partner is 'cheating' on a collaborative arrangement is equivalent to 
situations where all partnering organisations operate independently (in other words, 
compete). This suggests that key players would merely maintain a semblance of 
partnership should there be some external incentive for them to do so. In this instance, 
government funding directed to regional RDTs provides this incentive. The second 
stumbling block, that Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie seems to struggle with. is 
its members' past collaborative experience, the CRGI. The legacy of the experience is 
an association between strong marketing and lack of institutional stability in the region. 
Therefore to tackle potential competition, partners tend to direct efforts on marketing 
issues. In Rhone-Alpes, this association is not as strong, and there is consensus that 
signposting may help maintain institutional stability. According to Fiol and Lyles 
"learning necessitates experimentation, unlearning of past methods and encouraging 
multiple viewpoints and debates" (1985 pp. 811). This suggests that Reseau Nord Pas 
de Calais Technologie needs to 'unlearn' lessons from the past in order to progress. 
One of the underpinning themes of the economic development literature is the idea that 
experience has a positive impact on organisations ability and willingness to engage in 
effective collaboration. The above finding, however. suggests that not all experiences 
are assets. 
325 
To summarise, Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie have 
a shared tacit objective, which is to maintain institutional system stability. In Presence 
Rhone-Alpes this is achieved by a strong emphasis on signposting. In Reseau Nord Pas 
de Calais Technologie the historical legacy of previous partnering experiences has 
affected partners decisions, particularly in relation to marketing. As in the two previous 
sections socially evolved norms and values appear to significantly affect partnership 
learning. 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
The negotiation and implementation of partnership objectives are prime drivers of 
partnership learning because such endeavours bring into question each partnering 
organisation's identity, its values and its 'usual' way of doing business. However, this 
section showed that there were other significant areas ofleaming in partnerships. These 
are respectively linked to leadership issues (with the potential for e lite governance) 
management control issues (with the challenge of 'non-hierarchical' management), and 
partnership positioning issues (where the partnership may be required not to disturb the 
existing institutional landscape by partnering organisations). 
The analysis of learning sequences in each of the above fields showed that although the 
problems faced by each partnership were similar, their responses varied. This 
consequently affected the nature of learning that took place in each partnership. 
Presence Rhone-Alpes has been more successful in instigating double loop learning 
therefore altering existing norms, and lor generating new ones. Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie has found it difficult to move beyond single loop learning. 
Subsequently many of the deeply rooted issues that need to be resolved to enable 
efTective partnering subsist. 
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The variance in learning outcomes between the two partnerships is related to the tacit 
norms and values that they respectively evolved over time. Historical events. their 
emergent interpretations, the social dimension of the partnership and in particular key 
leaders' implicit rules of interaction and decision making have all dramatically shaped 
each partnership's ability to build their collaborative capability. This in tum suggests 
that socially evolved tacit knowledge is a key component of collaborative capability. 
7. 3 Answering The Research Questions 
7.3.1 Research Question 1: Are Value and Operational Crises 
Components of Partnership Learning? 
In Presence Rhone-Alpes, the partnership manager's failure to understand the small finn 
context triggered a value crisis. This was overcome partially by the creation of new 
recruitment procedures for private sector representatives (operational learning). In 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais, the partnership's early focus on the very small finn sector 
failed to deliver the kinds of market penetration outcomes sought (operational crisis), 
resulting in the principles behind targeting strategies being revisited, and instead a 
combination of sectoral and geographical criteria were adopted for targeting purposes 
(conceptual learning). These are just two of the many examples of operational and 
value crises that occurred in both partnerships studied. Overall, examples and analysis 
provided in sections 5.5.2 and 6.5.2 show that empirical data do provide evidence ofthe 
existence of both forms of crises. Further, in both cases studied there was evidence that 
operational crises were resolved by changes in existing value systems, or through th~ 
emergence of new values. Situations were also evident, where values crises were 
followed by new operational solutions. 
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However, the empirical data also showed that the almost predictive aspect of the 
partnership learning spiral (i.e. value crises followed by operational learning. or 
operational crises followed by conceptual learning) was not sufficiently robust. This 
was particularly the case when value crises were followed by new value formation. 
apparently 'skipping' the operational learning stage (see figure 5.2 for an example). 
The issue was addressed diagrammatically at the representational level by add ing 
arrows representing these types of shifts in learning (see figure 5.2). But identifying 
evidence that refutes the cyclical nature of organisational learning processes, limits the 
value of a tool based on that premise (i.e. that learning is cyclical in nature). In order to 
assess the implications of the above for the first research question the notion of 
organisational crisis, the proposal to distinguish between operational and conceptual 
crises, the idea that learning is cyclical and the potential to represent partnership 
learning as a cyclical process need to be revisited. 
A review of the literature which presents crises, errors and tensions as potential triggers 
for crises has shown how the ideas presented in early work by Cangelosi and Dill 
(1965) and Argyris and Schon (1978) have been significantly developed and been 
enhanced, particularly in the crisis management literature. 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) and Sagan (1994) document the nature of crises capable of 
endangering an organisation's survival. While Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) heavily 
focus on the physical and operational nature of crises, Sagan (1994) highlights that 
conflicting interests and norms amongst organisational sub-units can be the source of 
major disasters in high risk industries. 
It is with such ideas in mind that the partnership learning-spiral was devised. It shows 
that crises may stem from conflicting values and norms and from technical i 
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operational failures. Hence the proposal that value and operational crises may aid sense 
making of partnership crises and learning. This distinction further fits with the analysis 
researchers in the organisational learning field, who have traditionally made a 
distinction between cognitive and behavioural learning (See the review by Fiol & Lyles. 
1985 for example and refer to the literature review section 2.6). 
The underpinning assumption in the partnership learning-spiral is that the learning 
process is inherently cyclical, so that value crises are followed by operational solutions 
(operational learning), or operational crises are resolved with an adjustment or the 
development of new values within the partnership (conceptual learning). 
As indicated in chapter two, the cyclical nature of learning has been presented in a 
variety of fields within social sciences including total quality (with the work of Oem ing 
in the 1950s later incorporated in the Kaizen philosophy developed by Masaaki Imai 
(1986» management education (Kolb, 1976) and organisation studies with, for example, 
the work of Schein ( 1992) on learning cultures or the work of Kim (1993) analysing the 
transfer from individual learning to organisational learning. Although they use different 
labels, their consistent focus on four to five distinct learning stages is striking. Further, 
the stages of learning identified by these authors fit the two main categories of cognitive 
/ conceptual and behaviouraVoperationalleaming (as illustrated in table 7.1). 
Deming's cycle (research, design, production and sales (quoted in Imai, 1986» is 
mainly designed with quality improvement in mind and has an organisational focus as 
indicated by its reliance on organisational functions. Imai's work on total quality and. 
in particular. the principle of Kaizen which relies on the "POCA' cycle (plan. do, check. 
action) is much closer to the individual in a context where learning is seen as an 
inherent part of individual and organisational continuous improvement (1986). 
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Kolb's learning cycle (concrete experience, observation and reflection, formation of 
abstract concepts and generalisations, testing implications of concepts) was devised in 
order to enhance management education (1976). It clearly focuses on individual 
learning, yet its impact has been wide ranging and has influenced authors who have a 
stronger organisational interest. Kim is one of these scholars. He proposes an 'observe, 
assess, design and implement' cycle which draws heavily on Kolb's work and develops 
further his cycle, thus illustrating the formation of shared mental models to formulate 
the transition from individual to organisational learning (1993). 
Schein's (1992) analysis of learning cultures is also focused on the organisation and in 
particular the implementation and revision of organisational goals and objectives. 
According to him, such learning cultures rely on the continuous and cyclical 
reconsideration of organisational mission and strategies, followed by a focus on 
implementation, means and measurement, which may lead to corrective actions. Each 
of the learning cycles proposed above are mapped against types oflearning in table 7.1. 
Table 7-1 The cyclical nature of learning 
Stages of leanling identified by different authors 
Type of Deming Imai, Kim, 1993 Schein, 1992 Kolb,1976 
learning 1986 
Cognitive 1. Research 4. Action 2. Assess 5. Correction 3. Formation of 
abstract concepts Learning 
and 
or generalisations 
Conceptual 2. Design 1. Plan 3. Design 1.2. Mission I 4. Testing 
learning Strategy implications of 
-
~ncepts 
--~ -- ----- ~- -_.- ~~--- ----------
Behavioural 3. 2.00 4. 3. Means 1. Concrete 
Learning Production ImpJement experience 
4. Sales 3. Check I 1. Observe 4. Measurement 2. Observations 
or and reflection 
Operational 
Learning 
----.-
In the partnership learning spiral, the cyclical nature of learning is extended by using a 
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spiral representing the growing body of shared norms, values and routines among 
partnering organisations. This is similar to Nonoka's (1994) use of a spiral 
representation of knowledge formation. In Nonoka's work, however, the ever-growing 
spiral movement was used to illustrate the ontological dimension of knowledge. 
extending progressively from the individual, to the group, to the organisation, and to an 
inter-organ isational setting. 
By bringing together ideas such as crises as triggers of learning and concepts such as 
behavioural and cognitive learning (simplified by Kim (1993) as conceptual and 
operational learning) the partnership learning spiral was designed to be used as a sense-
making tool. The two case studies provided the opportunity to test its effectiveness in 
explaining crisis formation and resolution processes in inter-organisational settings. 
The identification of instances where the anticipated 'cycle' of learning was instead 
replaced by 'vertical' and apparently linear forms of learning (value crisis lead ing to 
conceptual learning) was not anticipated in the study. 
However, revisiting the literature, it becomes evident that other researchers have 
observed similar phenomena. For example in their early piece, Cangelosi and Dill 
stated that "many of the changes that we observed in behavior 'happened' without the 
kind of explicit analysis and discussions that might signal that changes were impending" 
(1965 pp. 190). This seems to suggest that operational tensions or crises may have 
been operationally solved without conceptual development taking place. This is 
consistent with some of the findings presented by Polanyi in his seminal book The Tacit 
Dimension (1983) originally published in 1966. Polanyi described how, in experimental 
situations, people received electrical shocks as they pronounced particular syllables. He 
illustrates how they learnt to avoid pronouncing these syllables although not 
consciously aware of their actions. In both Cangelosi and Dill's work. and m 
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Polanyi's analysis of previously conducted psychological experiments, there appears to 
be behavioural changes, yet there does not seem to be any conscious or cognitive 
understanding of that behavioural shift. Empirical evidence from the case studies 
suggests that similarly cognitive problems may be resolved through cognitive 
development, which may not manifest themselves in actions or behaviour. 
To conclude, the fIrst research question focuses on the validity of conceptual and 
operational learning concepts. It was shown that the distinction between value and 
operational crises is in line with work conducted in the crisis management literature and 
is inspired by the separation between cognitive and behavioural (or conceptual and 
operational) learning, which is widely accepted in the organisational learning literature. 
Evidence from the case studies readily fell into one or the other of the categories of 
crises, therefore contributing to the validation of these concepts. 
However, the partnership learning spiral, which was devised with these concepts in 
mind proved a less robust analytical tool. Whilst there were instances where value 
crises were indeed followed by 'operational learning' that overcame the crisis (much in 
the same way as there were instances where operational crises were followed by 
conceptual learning enabling the partnership to 'move on'); there were also instances 
where value crises were apparently followed by other forms of learning, for instance by 
conceptual learning. The presence of such phenomena could be traced in the literature 
and representational adjustments were made to the cycle. Nonetheless, the partnership 
learning spiral should not be treated as a predictive model, but merely as a sense-
making device, which will probably require additional testing, and refinement. Further. 
developments in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are shedding new light on 
individual learning and some of these findings are progressively being applied to 
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organisation studies27• To date, however, very few connections have been made 
between such concepts as organisational emotions, organisational unconscious and 
organisational learning, despite calls for research in these areas by scholars who have 
pioneered the analysis of organisational learning and change and still publish on the 
subject (Cohen, 1976; Cohen, 1991 pp. 139): 
"This point, especially taken together with its predecessors, begins to suggest 
that organizations may have a counterpart of what has been called for 
individuals as 'cognitive unconscious' [ ... ], a stock of memory and know how 
that is not readily accessible to ordinary recollection and analysis. It is. as has 
been noted, too early to be sure about the generalizability of examples such as 
those discussed. But it is the right time to assert that students of organizational 
learning are going to benefit from working out the detailed implications and 
validity ofa rich (re)new(ed) source of ideas." 
The above clearly suggests that there are many new avenues to follow in the 
investigation of organisational learning. New research findings are bound to affect 
representations of learning. The partnership learning spiral will need to be developed 
further in order to illustrate effectively the apparently changing direction of learning. 
Learning may indeed appear cyclical at times, whilst it can be analysed as a linear 
process at other times, or be conveyed as a dialectical process. Therefore, difficulties to 
capture the 'geometry' of organisational learning are only partially overcome. 
27 'Illis is the case with ~-scarch on the role of metaphoril'8l language in learning -( ~'C fix c:xamplc ()I1c1 
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7.3.2 Research Question 2: What are The Relationships Between 
Partnership Learning and The Negotiation and Implementation 
of Partnership Objectives? 
7.3.2.1 Introduction: 
Although ROT partnership objectives are defined centrally, chapters 5 and 6 have 
shown that there can be significant differences in interpretation and in levels of 
acceptance of a particular objective by regional institutions. In Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie, for example, the core concept behind the ROT policy, that is the 
idea of technology transfer, is strongly questioned by some partners who feel that 
innovation is the real challenge. Similar questioning (although less confrontational and 
extreme) on the practical relevance of technology transfer to firms exists in Presence 
Rhone-Alpes, where some partners voiced the idea that companies should be offered a 
holistic service. Some partnership objectives, like the need to increase market 
penetration (so that ever increasing numbers ofSMEs adopt technological solutions), or 
the intention to provide impartial advice, proved clearly difficult to implement in both 
partnerships. In each case though the difficulties associated with the adoption / 
acceptance of mandated objectives and their implementation have led to different 
solutions and learning outcomes. This section explores in depth how the partnerships 
studied went about implementing mandated objectives in order to identify relationships 
with partnership learning. 
First the challenges associated with the requirement to provide impartial advice are 
examined. Presence Rhone-Alpes addressed key tensions through a dramatic regional 
reinterpretation of the original ROT policy, which ultimately questioned the design, and 
principles of the initiative as it was set out nationally. In Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
JJ4 
Technologie, by contra~ partners seem to still struggle with apparently contradictory 
requirements that Presence Rhone-Alpes felt needed dramatic action. 
Second, the partnership's varying strategies to enhance market penetration levels are 
studied. In Rhone-Alpes there are clear contractual arrangements in place. which 
determine service levels and tie them to funding levels. By contrast, in Reseau Nord Pas 
de Calais Technologie increased levels of activities largely rely on the principle of 
voluntary action. 
7.3.2.2 Sign posting or Self-prescription? 
Counsellors operating in the RDT structure are constantly caught between the interests 
of their parent organisation (which requires them to promote their organisational 
services) and those of the partnership (which require them to signpost the client to the 
most suitable service provider, not necessarily their parent organisation). As seen in 
5.5.3.2 this is akin to a no win situation, also labelled double bind by Argyris and Schon 
(1978). In both of the cases studied, partners were well aware of these conflicting 
interests and had been for a number of years. The solutions they put in place enhanced 
the chances of good quality referral, but did not address the reason why there were not 
as many referrals as they might have originally expected. The situation is illustrated by 
figure 7.5. 
Figure 7.5 shows how both Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie emphasise counsellor training as an opportunity to socialise and create 
personal networks and bonds that stretch beyond organisational boundaries. The 
rationale is that personal networks and bonds are means of enhancing the quality and 
level of signposting within their ROTs. This is illustrated by stages 3 and 4 of the 
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figure. These illustrate the positive effect that training and socialisation events, which 
bring together counsellors from all partnering organisations, have on their ability and 
desire to signpost clients. 
Figure 7-5: Single loop learning thatfacilitates signposting 
TRAIN & SOCIALISE SIGNPOST 
8 
PROMOTE ORGANISATIONAL 
SERVICES 
However, the figure also shows that the promotion of socialisation strategies does not 
resolve the counsellors' need to satisfy their parent organisations' requirement to 
promote their own services, which has a detrimental impact on sign posting (stages I and 
2 in the figure). 
Indeed the right hand side of the figure 7.5 illustrates how such organisational 
requirement has a negative impact (represented by the negative signs) on counsellors' 
desire to signpost. The conflicting nature of these requirements (one being 
organisational, the other stemming from the partnership) creates a double bind situation 
and generates a significant degree of tension, that individual counsellors have to deal 
with in their daily activities and decisions, as illustrated in figure 7.5. Such a tension 
minimises counsellors' ability to fully commit to one objective or the other. This is 
compounded by the partnership's coping strategies, as the emphasis on training and 
socialisation does not address the problems generated by partners' tacit requirements. 
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Despite the difficulties that arise from the presence of conflicting requirements imposed 
on counsellors~ it is evident that both partnerships 'lived' with tension laden realities for 
most of their existence (in the case of Presence Rhone-Alpes) ifnot all of it (in the case 
of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie.) This raises a question on the sustainability 
of changes that are generated through single loop learning. Argyris (1976), and Argyris 
and Schon (1978) have emphasised that genuinely sustainable change and "productive 
learning~ can only be achieved through double loop learning, rather than single loop 
learning. The evidence above suggests that although single loop learning does not 
overcome fundamental issue~ and although tensions persi~ the partnership seems able 
to 'survive~. It has learnt to 'cope' with the situation. In this case 'adaptive learning', 
which is the label used by Senge (instead of Argyris and Schon's single loop learning) 
appears particularly suited to the situation. 
The above may in tum raise further questions on the desirability of "productive 
learning~ from the point of view of partnering organisations. Are they seeking to 
maximise the potential of the partnership~ or would they be satisfied with a sub-optimal 
levels of activity at the regional level? If so, what would be the implications for the 
national sponsors of the policy? The issue of 'satisficing' as opposed the "optimising' 
outcomes has been extensively debated in the strategic management literature. In his 
review of the main strategic management paradigms, Whittington (1993) presents a 
processual view of organisations where political manoeuvring, bounded rationality and 
self-interest combine in such a way that personally 'satisficing' rather than profit 
maximising outcomes are sought. This issue may need further investigation in the 
context of economic development partnering. Although this study does not provide 
sufficient data to further the discussion in the context of the partnerships studied. it 
highlights a potentially significant research area, which may have implications for 
national policy design. 
Whilst Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie put up with the tensions created by th~ 
existence of conflicting priorities imposed on counsellors, Presence Rhone-Alpes has 
taken dramatic steps to address the problem. With an unprecedented decision within the 
ROT networ~ regional partners in Rhone-Alpes have agreed to re-structure their 
technology transfer partnership and refocus activities. A key component of this 
decision involved convincing existing members (who were actively involved in service 
provision) to leave the ROT, so that the structure could focus on its diagnostic and 
signposting missions. Organisations such as the Chamber of Commerce and its 
affiliated enterprise agency (the ARISn were directly affected by this decision. Indeed 
it could have potentially left them vulnerable, given that they would no longer have 
influence or control over a significant source of business for them. Figure 7.6 illustrates 
the learning cycle Presence Rhone-Alpes went through. 
Figure 7-6: Separating service prescription from service delivery 
TRAIN & SOCIALISE SIGNPOST 
SEPARA IF SERVICE 
PRESCRIPTION & DELIVERY 
The decision to hold onto the service prescription mission and let service delivery occur 
outside the realm of the ROT is clearly making signposting the only means by which 
client needs of can be addressed. Stages 1 and 2 in the figure illustrate the positively 
reinforcing link that exists between the decision to focus on service prescription and 
signposting. The quality and frequency of signposting is further improved through the 
partnership's training and development activities. most of which are also conducive to 
the creation of social networks (stages 2 and 3). As signposting quality and 
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frequency improve, the view that the separation between service prescription and 
delivery was the most suitable strategy to pursue in the development and 
implementation of regional technology transfer strategies is likely to be strengthened 
(stage 4). 
In sharp contrast to the learning sequence, which characterised Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie on the same issue, Presence Rhone-Alpes has clearly undergone 
double loop learning, as illustrated by the reinforcing loops on both sides of figure 7.6. 
The partnership's restructuring not only underpins higher levels of signposting, but also 
represents a fundamental shift in collaborating organisations tacit and explicit nonns 
and vision for the partnership. Furthermore, this restructuring at the regional level is 
also reshaping policy at national level, and is an example of policy learning (Sanderson, 
200 I; Rashman & Hartley, 2002). 
A prominent debate in the French public sector policy-making field focuses on the 
question of institutional power distribution. These debates are largely connected to 
France's recent history of decentralisation and state 'deconcentration' (Guyomarch, 
1999; Smith, 1999). Smith (1999) shows that while some French scholars associate 
state deconcentration with national attempts to regain power relinquished through 
decentralisation, others argue that the process merely enhances regional and local actors 
ability to enhance governance at their level. The evidence presented above illustrates 
the strength of influence that regional actors were able to exert on such central issues as 
membership and policy. Indeed, here regional adaptation of the national policy is so far 
reaching that the design of the national policy is brought into question. Impetus for 
change came from regional actors, the so-called 'gang of four'. However, the fact that 
two of these (the DRIRE and the DRRT) are deconcentrated government oflices is most 
striking given the implications for policy at national level. 
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The sources of influence and power they used for governance fall into the category of 
regulatory instruments. According to De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof such instruments 
.... influence the number of actors in a network~ the power they wield and the intra-
organizational pluriformity" (1997 pp. 126). In this contex~ pluriformity refers to the 
presence of a dominant player in networks on several levels and in various ways (1997 
pp. 122). Whilst in the case above, data available were insufficient to determine 
whether and how particular actors used their influence at different levels; it is evident 
that as members of the governing elite, key regional stakeholders reshaped policy in 
quite fundamental ways by redefining the rules of engagement and membership an 
Rhone-Alpes. 
The question is why were similar outcomes not achieved in Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie. It is not clear whether there was a shared endeavour to resolve tensions 
that arose from conflicting objectives. There was, however, clear evidence that for some 
partners (including the ARIST, where such a position was presented in the most explicit 
terms) their organisational interests would always prevail over the partnership's needs. 
Are these symptoms of governance structures that have yet to establish themselves, or 
merely the manifestation of a collective will not to unite? These questions cannot be 
answered by this study at this stage. More extensive research would be required to 
surface emerging and existing policy networks. The analysis of their membership and 
connections with the technology transfer policy field would help determine the answers 
to the above questions. 
Despite differences between Presence Rhone-Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie and even though many questions were raised and remain unanswered. a 
clear common thread emerged between the two case stud ies. 
3.tO 
The ability of both partnerships to deliver and shape their objectives is strongly related 
to their structure and the presence (and strength) of a governing elite in their policy 
field. Further, it is clear from Presence Rhone-Alpes's case that a well established 
governing system was instrumental in enabling the progressive resolution of strategic 
(re-structuring) and operational (signposting) issues at partnership level. This suggests 
that the presence of a strong governing elite can be construed as a pre-requisite for 
effective partnering. 
7.3.2.3 Increasing Market Penetration or Just Doing 'Enough'? 
The pressing need to increase market penetration levels of the target SME market was 
strongly felt within each of the partnerships studied and is one of the prime reasons why 
ROTs were launched nationally in the first place. Once again though, Presence Rhone-
Alpes and Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie have set about achieving this 
objective using quite different strategies, each of which have different learning 
outcomes. 
Throughout its history Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie has been through an 
impressive range of targeting strategies (see section 6.3). The partnership seems to have 
experimented with various forms of market segmentation (by flJ111 size, by industry, by 
technological theme) and tried various ways of creating incentives for counsellors to 
increase their number of visits each year; for instance, by letting them agree a yearly 
target during RDT away days, or by nominally identifying potential target companies 
and asking counsellors to pick the companies they wish to visit, or by organising 
training on technological, or sectoral themes so that counsellors are better equipped to 
deal with companies in these sectors or relying on those technologies. 
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The partnership manager's evaluation of these efforts, however, is sombre. According 
to him, "relatively little was achieved" he therefore ceased these efforts. He now refers 
to "group co-ordination efforts and information exchange in relation to canvassing". 
His judgement was that one "can not reasonably speak of market penetration plans" 
(RDT Manager, 1998b). Figure 7.7 detennines the different elements of Reseau Nord 
Pas de Calais Technologie's learning cycle in relation to market penetration. 
The partnership manager's main tools to enhance levels of activity ultimately depend on 
counsellors' voluntary engagement. The methods he used revolved around personal 
development (through training) and personal choice (through the agreement of nominal 
targets for each counsellor). They were ultimately there to persuade rather than impose 
targets. From counsellors' point of view, there does not appear to be any tangible 
benefits from deliberately increasing RDT workload, all the more as their organisational 
guideline is that they should spend about 20% of their time on ROT business. 
Figure 7-7: Partners' 'theoretical' commitment to increased market penetration 
INCREASE MARKET 
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Changes in targeting strategies and the provision of dedicated training may indeed 
increase levels of counsellor commitment (EOA W TSO, 1998) and could potentially 
contribute to increased market penetration levels (stages 3 and 4 of figure 7.7). 
However there is a tension between the time constraints that counse 1I0rs' parent 
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organisations impose on their RDT business and the partnership's constant desire to 'do 
more' This tension could not be resolved by the repeated changes in targeting strategy, 
given that the critical element that needs to be affected is parent organisations' 
prioritisation, through such issues as time commitment to RDT business (stages I and 2 
of the learning cycle in figure 7.7). 
Accord ing to Fiol and Lyles (1985), when effective learning cannot take place. 
organisations trigger change to be 'seen to be doing something'. Such changes do not 
question prevailing norms and values or theories in use; instead they secure stability and 
status quo. 'Change for stability's sake' is clearly a strategy adopted by Reseau Nord 
Pas de Calais Technologie's manager. By instigating and implementing small-scale 
adjustments, even when aware of their lack of effectiveness, he can create a sense that 
action is being taken to address partnership issues. This approach enables Reseau Nord 
Pas de Calais Technologie to survive, and the manager to maintain his position in a 
context where key partners requirements and prioritisation appear to conflict. 
Presence Rhone-Alpes approach to the issue of increased market penetration is more 
comprehensive in that it involves the types of incentives provided by Reseau Nord Pas 
de Calais Technologie to prompt voluntary engagement. However, crucially important 
financial instruments complement the latter, as discussed in 7.1.2. Parent organisations 
have, as a result, strong incentives to ensure that agreed target market penetration levels 
are met. The partnership can in tum leverage parent organisations' hierarchical 
authority within the realm of the partnership, an element that eluded Presence Rhone-
Alpes as illustrated in figure 7.7. Presence Rhone-Alpes' learning sequence related to 
increased market penetration levels is illustrated in figure 7.8. 
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Figure 7.8 shows that the decision to 'pay for visits' positively influences parent 
organisations time commitments to the partnership (stages 4), but it also enables the 
partnership to fulfil its market penetration goals (stage 2). 
Figure 7-8: Financial instruments as means of enhancing market penetration levels 
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This in tum validates the decision to pay for the visits (stage 3), and secures parent 
organisations' commitment to support counsellors undertaking ROT business because 
of the financial pay off they obtain as a result (stage 1). 
Earlier discussion of the principle of 'non-hierarchical management' highlighted the 
challenges such a concept posed on partnership managers, who may feel their only 
leadership tool is persuasion. Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) like other authors point to 
reticulist skills28 and to mediation skills, as fundamental elements of network 
management. This is largely echoed by discussions of partnership leadership and 
boundary spanning skills discussed in section 2.4.3.2 of the literature review. However. 
these authors, like the remaining contributors to the same edited text (Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997), clearly emphasise that the battery of instruments available for 
network management is far broader than persuasion and its derivatives. The lattcr may 
rely on ideas and principles as varied as game theory (Klijn & Tcisman. 1997). or 
2tI Referring to "'the ability to correctly assess who should be involved in inlt..'f"d1.1ion pmceises and which 
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perception management (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). Nonetheless, all of these 
techniques can be grouped within the communication instruments category identified by 
De Bruijn and Heuvelhof (1997). The authors show that in addition to the most 
commonly emphasised communication instruments, network managers can and do use 
regulatory instruments (these can help manage network and partnership membership. 
and can be instrumental in shaping and shifting power within a network) as well as 
fmancial instruments (as illustrated by Presence Rhone-Alpes's use of service level 
agreements in order to meet its market penetration objectives). When combined these 
instruments can be extremely effective. 
In the case of Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie reliance on communication 
instruments alone proved insufficient. Whereas in Presence Rhone-A Ipes, the 
combination of communication and financial instruments appear to be an effective 
means of fostering counsellor as well as organisational engagement. Differences in 
choices between these two partnerships are interesting given that they operate the same 
policy. The choice to use or not financial instruments is not necessarily tied to the 
availability of additional financial resources. As pointed out by Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie's manager, they represent a restructuring of previously existing 
funding arrangements, inferring therefore that they do not increase the financial burden 
of sponsoring organisations. The issue then may be to determ ine why a partnership 
chooses not to use fmancial instruments for management purposes, and who has control 
over them. 
The above, combined with difficulties to harness counsellors' efforts and enhance their 
ROT activity levels suggest that the notion of authority needs to be analysed. l'his 
poses questions about the control and use of networkl partnership management 
instruments. 
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Whilst communication instruments are largely (although not entirely) within the control 
of the partnership manager, regulatory and financial instruments ultimately depend on 
the 'gang of four', the governing elite. Without hierarchical authority, partnership 
managers find themselves unable to rely on coercive or reward power. The main 
sources of power that they can exploit are linked to their source of expertise (expert 
power) and their ability to be admired as leaders (referent power). Some partnership 
managers do indeed command respect and derive authority by relying on their charisma. 
knowledge and experience. However, one may question whether existing institutional 
players would want to bring into the equation an individual whose skills and leadership 
may cast a shadow on theirs. Partnership managers, therefore, find themselves in a 
challenging position. They are required to achieve set goals but lack sources of 
authority that could enable them to demand rather then request counsellors' 
engagement. 
The case studies indicate that there may be a need to leverage forms of reward and 
coercive power within the partnership. They also indicate that the ability to do that 
largely depends on the governing elite of the partnership rather than the partnership 
manager. The issue of power has been extensively analysed in organisational behaviour 
and human resource management literatures. Progress is made in the analysis of skills 
that make effective partnership managers. There are nonetheless gaps in our 
understanding of ways and means of leveraging power in an inter-organisational 
contexts, particularly when the latter are characterised by formal structures with no 
genuine authority, and informal governing elites with control over regulatory and 
financial instruments. 
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7.3.2.4 Conclusion 
The comparative analysis of signposting and market penetration objectives has clearly 
illustrated the significant influence the governing elite has on each partnership's ability 
to effectively implement each of these strategies. It has also illustrated how the 
negotiation and implementation of these objectives could lead to diverging learning 
processes even hen the issues apparently affecting partners appeared to be the same. 
In Presence Rhone-Alpes, where key actors have established a modus operandi for 
collaborative leadership, the partnership has, over time, been fairly successful in 
addressing some of the root causes of the problems affecting the partnership. By 
formally agreeing to restructure the partnership, the inherent conflict of interest that 
existed when service prescription could be carried out by potential service providers has 
disappeared. By incorporating financial instruments in the panoply of network! 
partnership management tools used by the partnership manager, they have enabled the 
latter to enjoy a straightforward control mechanism, which could simultaneously be 
used as an incentive to enhance market penetration. In Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie the range of tools and approaches available to the partnership manager has 
historically been constrained. Although partners and the partnership manager are aware 
of the issues hampering the successful implementation of each of these objectives, a 
similar level of collaborative leadership and cohesion is not present. This in tum has 
limited the partnership manager's ability to achieve meaningful and sustainable change. 
These findings show that implications in terms of partnership learning can be very 
significant as Presence Rhone-Alpes was able to achieve double loop learning, while 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie was primarily confmed to single loop learning. 
Indeed, on the basis of empirical data available from these case studies. it appears that: 
If there is a strong governance structure in place the negotiation and 
implementation of partnership objectives can lead to double loop \earning and to 
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sustainable change in partnership norms and values. 
If there is not a strong governance structure in place, the negotiation and 
implementation of partnership objectives leads to single loop learning and 
unsustainable change in partnership norms and values. 
Clearly the above findings need to be investigated in other partnership contexts. but 
should the proposed relationships between governance and types of learning be 
validated, the management and development of partnerships in economic development 
could be affected quite significantly. Therefore further investigation of these 
relationships could potentially contribute significantly to the literature on economic 
development partnerships. Each of these statements could be used as working 
hypotheses for research in this area. 
7. 4 Study Limitations 
The aim of this study was to unravel inter-organisational learning processes in the 
specific context of the French Reseau de Diffusion Technologique (ROT). To ensure 
that the study was conducted as a systematic process, choices were made about inquiry 
methods, the amount of data gathered, and the focus of the study. These choices were 
necessary: they made the work rigorous, feasible and focused it on its research 
objectives. However, they also defined its limitations in terms of impact on policy 
design, methodology and generalisability. Each of these points will be discussed in 
tum. 
The study's focus on inter-organisational learning meant that organisational processes 
were at the heart of this work. Although clear areas of policy learning could be 
identified, and despite the fact that important governance issues were unveiled. it 
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would be unrealistic to expect the findings of this study to lead to prescriptive policy 
recommendations. Findings may lay some foundations for debates about the potential 
for inter-organisational learning and the significance of elite governance in econom ic 
development. Issues such as exclusiveness! inclusiveness, democracy and the influence 
they may have on partnership management and learning are significant. 
However, this study did not evaluate outcomes from the perspective ofSMEs, which are 
meant to benefit from the policy. In theory, they should enjoy the effects of partners' 
learning. They are at 'the receiving end' of emerging governance systems. Partners' 
perspectives on learning may be rather different from clients' perspectives on learning. 
Other governance decision-making, and inter-organisational learning instances need to 
be analysed from both perspectives, before researchers can draw conclusions on policy 
learning. 
Le Gales and Voelzkow (2001) pointed to the significance of the above in a recent 
review of local production systems in Europe, where French examples were analysed 
(Crouch, Le Gales, Trigilia, & Voelzkow, 2001). For them, there is a risk that research 
focused on local institutions and their emerging patterns of governance may represent a 
form of 'vulgar new regionalism'. Research in the field is likely to suffer should it "fail 
to take into account the basics of macro-economics, continuing state power, or 
globalised forms of capital" (200 I pp. 19). 
This point applies to this study, and as suggested earlier, it can also be argued that the 
study'S limitations are a function of its focus. The research questions relate to inter-
organisational learning, and findings appear to have implications for our understanding 
of regional governance systems. In order to provide a fuller understanding and 
appreciation of policy changes brought about, one may need to monitor and evaluate the 
operation of the partnership to assess the impact it is having on the target market, and 
more broadly on technology transfer and use within the SME sector. Such a follow up 
research project would clearly be useful and would certainly add insight into the 
potential outcomes of policies that are shaped by governance structures. 
The second issue that may affect the reading of this dissertation's findings is related to 
data gathering methods. The study heavily relied on interview data when reconstructing 
past events and analysing partnership action. The use of primarily retrospective data 
was necessary in order to gain access to a range of events, which were critical to the 
development of the partnerships studied, and could have been influenced by significant 
learning effects. Yin (1994) pointed out that although interviews were one of the most 
important sources of case study information, there are risks that they may lead to bias, 
poor recall and inaccurate articulation. Such issues were largely countered in this study 
by the reliance on data source triangulation and the systematic use of a software 
package, which made the analysis transparent and traceable, and therefore enhanced 
intra-coder reliability. 
However, the phenomenon studied, inter-organisational learning, is a process. The 
study showed that it was closely related to governance structures and social learning 
within the partnership. Consequently, there may be a need to focus more strongly on 
the dynamic aspects of these processes and their inter-relationships. Assuming 
appropriate levels of access, this could be addressed with the use of direct observation 
of partnership activities whether formal (for example board meetings) or informal (for 
example lunches). Such observation could provide the means to further evaluate the 
argument that most of the key decisions, which affect the partnership, are taken in 
informal arenas. Observation, for example by shadowing key actors in partnerships 
studied, could shed an interesting light on key decision makers' networks, networking 
patterns and the relationships that may exist between the latter and emerging 
governance structures in regions. 
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There is clearly scope for further in depth studies in the field and given that there are 
strong outstanding questions on issues of authority and power when formal partnerships 
and informal networks co-exist, these types of studies could potentially add a wealth of 
knowledge to the field. 
The third issue that affects the potential impact of this study is related to the issue of 
generalisation. Qualitative researchers have long argued that their work shou Id not be 
evaluated using the same standards as quantitative research (Gomm et at.. 2000). 
Statistical generalisation, for example, is highly unsuitable when evaluating the 
contribution of qualitative case studies (Donmoyer, 2000; Yin, 1994; Yin, 2003a). 
Statistical generalization is based on the assumption that the physical world and the 
social world are governed by regularities between causes and effects: therefore 
statistical generalisation will aim ''to discover and validate generalizations about these 
regularities" (Donmoyer, 2000 pp. 47). 
Yin contends by contrast that qualitative research, particularly when it takes the form of 
a case study, aims to achieve 'analytic generalisation', "in which a previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study" (Yin, 1994 pp. 31). 
Research in that sense focuses on conceptual and theoretical development. At the most 
basic level, it can be argued that qualitative research generates narratives, and analyses 
that can be used as sense-making devices (Weick, 2001). As such they can provide or 
generate insights into lived experience, that may not have been available had such 
narratives and analyses not been shared. Donmoyer (2000) uses schema theory to show 
how narratives derived from qualitative research can help create vicarious experience: 
"a virtual reality, that is a reality that exists within our imaginations", one whae 
narratives enable us ""to symbolize and hence think and communicate about certain 
aspects of experience" (2000 pp. 61). 
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As indicated in the methodology chapter (chapter 3), it is with this spirit that the study 
was conducted. It aims to be used as a sense-making device, the hope is that some of 
the concepts and ideas that have been developed are further explored and discussed. 
their relevance and contribution to the understanding of other contexts evaluated. The 
two polar cases that form the basis of this dissertation demonstrated that given similar 
conditions, similar constraints, and apparently similar aims, two partnerships can opt for 
quite different paths and develop rather different learning cycles. It would not be 
appropriate to suggest that the tools used, the ideas developed are invariably applicable 
to every economic development partnerships. Rather the aim is to share these tools and 
ideas so that their relevance is evaluated in different contexts. They may remain a 
means of interpreting a partnership'S lived experience, and therefore be used purely as 
sense making devices. The outcomes may also contribute to conceptual and theoretical 
development, as Yin (1994) suggests. 
7. 5 SynthesiS 
This study was undertaken to find out whether partnership learning did occur and it 
aimed to unravel some of the underpinning processes. To achieve this, it relied on two 
specific research questions: 1) Are value and operational crises components of 
partnership learning? 2) What are the relationships between partnership learning and 
the negotiation and implementation of partnership objectives? 
In order to answer the above, distinctions between single and double loop learning, and 
between operational and value crises were relied upon. Partnership members' theories 
of action were investigated and their reliance on theories in use, and espoused theories 
have been analysed. 
The findings suggest that the broad notion of partnership learning can be analysed in 
terms of social learning, and in terms of process learning. The strong discrepancies that 
exist between Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie and Presence Rhone-Alpes 
(originally chosen as polar cases) further indicate that the ability to engage in system 
and process learning is strongly dependant on the pre-requisite presence of shared social 
and tacit knowledge (that is social learning). In other words partnering capability is 
dependent on social nonns and tacit knowledge that are evolved amongst key players 
within and beyond the realm of the partnership. 
The concept of social learning is rooted in Albert Bandura's (1977) work on human 
behavior and psychology of learning. According to Bandura's social learning theory, 
'psychological functioning is a continuous reciprocal interaction between personal. 
behavioural, and environmental detenn inants' (1977 pp. 194). Human behaviour is the 
outcome of individual learning which can be either rooted in direct experience (learning 
by 'response consequences' according to Bandura -more widely known as experiential 
learning (Kolb, 1976», or the outcome of observation (learning through modelling, also 
analysed as vicarious learning - (Gioia & Manz, 1985». In the case of experiential 
learning, individuals appraise the differential response their actions trigger and select 
successful forms of behavior whilst discarding those that were ineffectual or triggered 
negative responses. However, Bandura argues that 'learning would be exceed ingly 
laborious, not to mention hazardous, if people had to rely solely on the effects of their 
own actions to inform them what to do' (1977 pp. 22). According to him, 'most human 
behavior is learned observationally through modelling: from observing others one forms 
an idea of how new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded 
information serves as a guide for action' (1977 pp. 22). 'Environmental determinants', 
that is the social response to an individual's actions (including social ~nntrol 
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mechanisms), are key factors shaping future behavior in organisational spheres, as well 
as private/social spheres. 
In the case studies, issues governed by social learning (i.e. elite governance, non 
hierarchical management and stable institutional framework) have shaped key 
partnership variables, respectively, partnership decision making processes, partnership 
and partner identity, partnership reward and reporting systems, and access to partnership 
services. The analysis of the crises and learning sequences that fed into these variables 
has shown that the theories of action that were used by both partnerships: 
were historically evolved, 
remained mostly tacit, 
were strongly linked with partners' perceptions of their identity and 
were regulated by implicit, yet, fundamental rules of interaction and 
decision-making. 
The above is highly consistent with Shrivastava's (1983) analysis of organisational 
learning systems. Following a study of strategic decision making processes, he 
identified six archetypical 'organizational learning systems'. Despite clear differences 
that existed between each of the learning systems, his study's overall conclusions are 
very similar to those outlined above: 
"They [Learning Systems] are rooted in organizational practices. This means 
they reflect the actual "'theories in use" and not the "espoused theories" or 
rhetoric in organizational activities. [ ... ] Organizational members know about 
these systems, even though some of the systems may not have been explicitly 
verbalised or docu mented." 
One of the archetypical learning systems described by Shrivastava is the "mythological 
J5-t 
learning system'. Such a system is heavily reliant on stories (sometimes myths) about 
organisational actors and activities. Shrivastava argues that such 'myths lay the 
groundwork for development of organizational norms of knowledge sharing. The socio-
cultural norms of knowledge sharing that evolve through organizational myths radicallv 
influence the distribution of and access to the stock of organizational knowledge' 
(Shrivastava, 1983 pp. 20). According to Simon this form of knowledge sharing is a 
means of stabilising organisational values and practices, and a process of induction for 
any newcomer (Simon, 1991 pp. 127): 
"Organisational values and practices can be stabilised by the fact that each new 
inductee finds himself or herself confronted with a social system that is already 
well established and prepared to mould newcomers to its procedures" 
In Presence Rhone-Alpes such an induction process either failed, or was ignored by the 
partnership manager. The crisis that culminated in his departure was instrumental in 
generating new decision making norms and values that subsequently became one of the 
assets of the partnership. Indeed, Presence Rhone-Alpes has demonstrated a higher 
propensity to engage in double loop learning than Reseau Nord Pas de Calais 
Technologie, suggesting a stronger ability to reshape established norms and values and 
to introduce new ones. Many of the difficulties encountered by Reseau Nord Pas de 
Calais Technologie are strongly related and historically evolved principles. In 
Shrivastava's terms, these principles are the outcome of myths that actors nurtured 
given past partnering experience. They are acting as barriers to the optimal 
implementation of the ROT initiative in the region. Experience and history can easily 
be construed as important and positive ingredients of learning. Simon (1991) suggests 
that they can be stabilising influences. But he highlighted that they can also lead to 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). Walsh and Rivera-Ungson ( 1991) explore this issue 
further and argue that experience and history can indeed contrihute to . encased 
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learning', organisational 'blindness' and 'rigidity'. Reviev, ing the literature on 
organisational memory, they conclude that the latter 'is an enemy of organizations; an 
enemy that can reinforce a single loop learning style that maintains the status quo.' 
(Walsh & Rivera Ungson, 1991 pp. 71). 
The comparative analysis of the two partnerships studied suggests that although both 
partnerships had strong values and norms, rooted in their respective histories, only 
Presence Rhone-Alpes was able to resolve the deep rooted causes of crises associated 
with partnership decision-making. The first partnership manager's departure and the 
turmoil that resulted slowly brought together key decision makers in technology 
transfer. This formed the basis for their progressive establishment (and increased 
recognition by regional economic development stakeholders) as the governing elite in 
the region. In Rhone-Alpes the presence of such an elite (with clear -albeit tacit- rules 
for decision making) facilitates significantly partnership 'process learn ing'. This in turn 
meant that negotiations over operational objectives, partnership strategy (or meta-
strategy) and even regional policy making became opportunities to exert influence and 
collective power as opposed to instances where some of the collaborating organisations 
would individually need to relinquish power and authority. 
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APPENDIX 1 The French administrative structure 
Public authority 
The State - L'Etat 
. The Region - La Region 
I (26 of which 22 on the mainland - the 4 'outre-
mer territories have 
departement and region 
status) 
Adm inistration 
The executive power: 
President of the French republic 
The government 
The legislative power: 
The parliament (National Assembly 
and Senatel 
Executive body: 
The president of the 'Conseil 
Regional' 
Deliberation and decision-making 
body: 
Conseil Regional 
The regional prefect (prefet 
regional) is in charge of the interest 
of the State 
County leve I Le I Executive body: 
I 
1 
Department 
(100 of which 96 on the 
mainland) 
The president of the 
General' 
'Conseil 
Deliberation and decision-making 
body: 
Conseil General 
The prefect (prefet) is in charge of 
the interest of the State 
Remit (Competences) 
Safeguards France's national unity founded on the country's historical 
past and diverse territory. It protects the national heritage, the democratic 
system and its institutions, social gains. It is also responsible for 
environmental protection and the promotion of French c u Itu re and 
language. 
Economic action: including the negotiation, drafting and implementations 
of State-Region contracts; public investment coordination and planning; 
cooperation with public authorities (e.g. communes and departements) 
with overlapping remits. 
Education: Building and maintemance of Lycees (from the age of 15 to 
18, equivalent to United Kingdom colleges); vocational training 
Transport: drafting of the regional transport scheme, canals and river 
harbours. 
Environment: Nature reserves and region~ parks 
Management of the 'domaine departemental': this involves the public 
and administrative buildings under the control of the departement, road 
infrastructure in the departement. 
Health and social action: Protection of mothers and children; fight 
against social perils; health screening, vaccinations etc... All forms of 
social care for children, the poorest and disable people. 
Education: Building and maintenance of secondary schools (from the age 
of 11 to 15), school bus service 
Economic action: subsidy support for economic development; support to 
businesses in crisis 
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The Town - La eommune 
(I.E. local authority) 
(36 550 on the mainland) 
Executive body: 
The mayor 
Deliberation and decision-making 
body: 
Conseil Municipal 
Adapted and translated from (Lescot & Sinou, 2000) 
Harboun: Creation and management of fishing and commercial 
harbours. 
Culture: Management and finance bbraries, museums, archives, theatres 
etc ... 
Management of local historical assets 
Urban Development: drafting urban development plans, including, 
housing provision, incorporating employment forecasts, and the provision 
of facilities -administration, industrial, commercial and leisure facilities. 
Edueation: In charge of nursery (from the age of 3 to 6) and primary 
schools (from the ages of 6 to 11). Building maintenance, including 
maintenance staff salaries. 
Culture: Management and finance local libraries and museums, own their 
archives. 
Hygiene: Local authorities provide disinfections services and have a 
hygiene bureau 
Harboun: The commune / local authority can create and manage leisure 
harbours 
Eeonomie and soeial aetion: The local authority can allocate grants to 
business in crisis to maintain emp loyment. 
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APPENDIX 2: List of exploratory visits and interviews 
I. Mr Vo Van Qui, Ministere de L'Industrie, Monday the 4th of August 1997 at 
10.30 a.m. 
2. Mile Arielle Feuillas, Tuesday the 5th of August 1997 at 10.00 a.m. 
3. Centre George Pompidou, Wednesday the 6th of August 1997. morning. 
4. Librairie de L'OCDE, Wednesday the 6th of August 1997, afternoon. 
5. National RDT Conference, Toulouse, 23rd of October 1998 
6. Mr Chazerand, ANV A~ RIDT manager, Tuesday the 6th of January 1998 at 
10.30 a.m. 
7. Mr Coulomb, Minister de L'education and de la recherche. Tuesday the 6th of 
January 1998 at 15.00 p.m. 
8. Mr Letowski, APCE, Wednesday the t h of January at 10.30 a.m. 
9. Mr Patrick Legales, CNRS, Wednesday the t h of January at 14.30 p.m. 
10. Mr Vo Van Qui, Ministere de L'industrie, Thursday the 8th of January at 9.30 
a.m. 
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APPENDIX 3: List of case study interviews: 
Reseau Nord Pas de Calais Technologie 
1. Jean Marie Pruvo~ partnership manager, 12/10/1998 at 12.00 
2. Catherine Larieu, RIDT manager, 1511 0/) 998 at 10.30 a.m. 
3. Daniel Chazerand, past RIDT manager, 22/10/1998 at 9.00 a.m. 
4. Didier Cuise~ manager Conseil General du Nord, 26/10/98 at 11.00 a.m. 
5. Jean Marie Pruvo~ partnership manager, 26/1 0/98 at 14.00 p.m. 
6. Francois Louis Billon, Past Director General of ANVAR, 26/10/98 at 17.00 p.m. 
7. Pierre Rousseau, ARIST manager and chamber of commerce representative, 
27/10/98 at 10.30 a.m. 
8. Jean Bernard Dupark, Manager Agence Regionale de Developpemen~ 28/10/98 
at 10.00 a.m. 
9. Thierry Trouve, Manager DRIRE, 22/10/98, interview manually recorded which 
took place during the national conference of ROTs, due to the inability of Mr 
Trouve to free up time during my visit to the Nord Pas de Calais region. 
10. Chantalle Pierrache, Manager Conseil General Nord Pas de Calais, 28/1 0/98 at 
14.30 p.m. 
11. Pierre Tesse, past CRGI manager. 28/10/98 at 17.00 p.m. 
Presence Rhone-Alpes 
1. Patrice Heyde, Managing Director, ARIST Rhone-Alpes. 31/03/99 at 9.00 a.m. 
2. Pierre Michel, Chamber of commerce manager, 31/03/99 at 11.00 a.m. 
3. Valerie Palumbo Romand. Chamber of Commerce counsellor. 31103/99 at 12.00 
4. Patrick Metral. Deputy chair of the DRRT. 31/03/99 at 14.00 p.m. 
5. Gerard Provost, Partnership Manager. 01/04/99 at 9.30 a.m. 
6. Jean Maric Revet. Deputy Chair ANVAR, 01/04/99 at 16.30 p.m. 
7. Henri Joudiou, SME managing director, partnership director, 02/0~l99 at t 0.00 
a.m. 
8. Marc Louichon~ SME Managing Director, partnership director, 02/04/99 at 
14.30 
9. Alain Echenay, SME Managing Director, partnership direcrtor, 06/04199 at 
14.00 
10. Gerard Provo~ partnership manager, 07/04/99 at t 5.00 p.m. 
11. Michel Vuillot, Chair DRIRE, 08/04/99 at 9.00 a.m. 
12. Laurence Tardy, Manager, Conseil Regional Rhone-Alpes, 08/04/99 at 13.30 
p.m. 
13. Mme Gab illaud , Managing Director, Design Rhone-Alpes, 08/04/99 at 18.00 
p.m. 
14. Mme Cruset, Senior researcher University de Lyon 11,09/04/99 at 16.00 p.m. 
APPENDIX4: interview Schedule 
Achlvements 
Values 
Structures 
Breackdown 
Culture 
Objectives 
Projects 
Key events 
Histoncally 
Evolutions 
Current 
(Q) ~ 
Political 
I nsitutional 
Local 
National 
Context 
Achievements 
tions 
Image? 
Finance 
People 
Other 
Contribution 
Histo 
Structure 
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Involvement Individual's 
Setting up 
Experiences Critical events 
Partnership 
Member 
Formation 
Review 
Finance 
Organisation 
Individual 
Control 
Communication 
Rationale 
Evolutions 
APPENDIX 5 French population by region, 1990-99 
Region 1999 1990 
Alsace 1,734,145 1,624,372 
Aquitaine 2,908,359 2,795,830 
Auvergne 1,308,878 1,321,214 
Basse Normandie 1,422,193 1,391,318 
Bourgogne 1,610,067 1,609,653 
Bretagne 2,906,197 2,795,638 
Centre 2,440,329 2,371,036 
Cham pagne-Ardenne 1,342,363 1,347,848 
Corse 260,196 250,371 
Franche-Comte 1,117,059 1,097,276 
Haute-Normandie 1,780,192 1,737,247 
Ile-de-France 10,952,011 10,660,554 
Languedoc-Roussillon 2,295,648 2,114,985 
Limousin 710,939 722,850 
Lorraine 2,310,376 2,305,726 
Midi-Pyrenees 2,551,687 2,430,663 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 3,996,588 3,965,058 
Pays de la Loire 3,222,061 3,059,112 
Picardie 1,857,481 1,810,687 
Poitou-Charentes 1,640,068 1,595,109 
Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 4,506,151 4,257,907 
Rhone-Alpes 5,645,407 5,350,701 
Guadeloupe 422,496 386,987 
Guyane 157,213 114,678 
Martinique 381,427 359,572 
Reunion 706,300 597,823 
Total France 60,185,831 58,074,215 
Source: (IN SEE, 2000b) 
APPENDIX 6 French Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2000 
By By job (l) Total (2) 0/0 of national Rank 
inhabitants GDP 
Alsace 23777 59352 41,670 2.97% 1 I 
Aguitaine 20893 53495 61,264 4.360/0 6 
Auvergne 19653 51 596 25,726 1.83% 18 
Bourgogne 20974 53553 33,823 2.410/0 15 
Bretagne 19345 50 144 56,692 4.04% 7 
Centre 20603 53083 50,546 3.60% 9 
Cham (!agne-Ardenne 21 796 55467 29,249 2.080/0 17 
Corse 18550 49724 4,862 0.350/0 20 
Franc he-Co mre 20261 52827 22,715 1.62% 19 
A 
I1e-de-France 35946 76025 395,228 28.13% I 
Languedoc-Roussillon 17827 52034 41,546 2.960/0 12 
Limousin 18859 47677 13,400 0.95% 
Lorraine 19 177 53830 44,307 3.15% 10 
Midi-Pyrenees 20 197 51 233 52,047 3.710/0 8 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 18982 53948 75,974 5.41% 4 
Basse-Normandie 19521 48612 27,886 1.990/0 17 
Haute-Nonnand ie 22909 59850 40,938 2.91% 13 
Pa~s de la Loire 20437 51 841 66,496 4.73% 5 
Picardie 19031 53655 35,498 2.530/0 14 
Po itou-Charentes 18454 50 190 30,459 2.170/0 16 
Provence-Alpes-cote 21 020 59 128 95,675 6.81% 3 
d'Azur 
Rhone-Al(!es 24 113 59234 137,354 9.78% 2 
France 23 170 (3) 1,404,775 100.000/0 
(I) Paid or unpaid job, in euros; (2) In millions of Euros; (3) Not available 
Source: (IN SEE, 2000c) 
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APPENDIX 7: Number of companies across sectors, by size in French regions 
Region Self em I!loIed 1 to 9 10 to 499 500 & above TotaJ re2. 
Alsace 25 153 32271 6836 71 64 331 
Aguitaine 70077 63211 9277 53 142 618 
Auvergne 28297 25368 4036 26 571'27 
Bour8°8ne 28890 29542 5376 37 63845 
Bretagne 54022 52776 8745 52 115 595 
Centre 39972 42220 8 102 65 90359 
Cham Eagne-Ardenne 20683 21 954 4430 36 47 103 
Corse 9317 7865 739 1 17922 
Franche-Comte 18596 19726 3757 16 42095 
A 
Ile-de-France 328673 252421 47473 532 629099 
Languedoc-Rous s ill on 61 542 51 584 6037 29 119 192 
Limousin 14400 13286 2 180 13 29879 
Lorraine 31 434 36214 7 141 69 74858 
Midi-Pyrenees 63 102 54301 7997 49 125449 
Nord -Pas-de-Calais 52338 54402 11 642 97 118479 
Basse-Normandie 25691 25479 4336 23 55 529 
Haute-Nonnandie 26825 27860 5785 58 60528 
Pa~s de la Loire 54371 56838 10723 78 122010 
Picardie 26650 26817 5 521 47 59035 
Poitou-Charentes 31 723 30826 4917 31 67497 
Provence-Alpes-Cote 139758 109032 14 116 79 262985 
d'Azur 
Rhone-All!es 134209 122386 22353 153 279 101 
GuadelouEe 26371 9752 I 259 2 37384 
Gu~ane 4432 2 146 329 0 6907 
Martinigue 15735 7890 1 017 2 24644 
Reunion 14381 10395 1 372 I 26 149 
Total France 1346642 1186562 205496 1 620 2740320 
Source: (IN SEE, 2000a) 
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APPENDIX 8: Level of self-prescription in all RDTs 1996-2000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alsace 0 100 89 57 100 
Aquitaine 47 64 44 19 19 
Auvergne 0 0 0 0 0 
Bourgogne 0 66 25 0 0 
Bretagne 56 31 24 0 48 
Centre 52 57 20 20 29 
Champagne-Ardenne 81 51 44 70 55 
Corse 70 25 80 60 0 
Franche-Comte 100 20 47 13 19 
I1e-de-France 0 0 0 0 0 
Languedoc-Roussillon 0 8 0 0 0 
Limousin 0 0 0 0 0 
Lorraine 67 65 52 29 47 
Mid i-Pyrenees 24 15 21 10 33 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 70 62 68 78 91 
Basse-Normandie 77 70 81 81 95 
Haute-Normandie 57 64 86 77 93 
Pays-de-Loire 10 25 40 40 25 
Picardie 70 24 58 86 57 
Poitou-Charentes 33 0 42 0 0 
PACA 23 20 36 53 II 
Rhone-Alpes 93 7 0 0 0 
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